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European Citizenship, although derived from the nationalities of the Mem-
ber States, came to play a significant independent role in reforming Europe-
an constitutionalism in unanticipated ways by undermining some of the key 
assumptions underlying the notions of citizenship, equality and democratic 
accountability. Instead of lingering merely as a super- structure atop Member 
State nationalities, it instead reshuffles the constitutional basics and not all 
Europeans emerge as winners as a result.
This collection, based on the contributions – fully updated – which first ap-
peared in two special sections of European Papers published in the Papers in 
the last issue of 2018, the first edited by Dimitry Kochenov and the second by 
Nathan Cambien and Elise Muir, zooms in on the core challenges, which EU 
citizenship is facing in the times of Brexit, Tjebbes and Dano and provides a 
very broad, yet substantively rich take on the current state of EU citizenship 
scholarship across Europe. Drawing on the expertise of distinguished authors 
writing alongside new graduates, this book is crossing many lines – from dis-
ciplinary, to generational, to deliver a rigorous assessment of the fascinating 
subject, which still rests, since Maastricht, at the cutting- edge of EU law. Sev-
eral authors in this book have not been among the participants of the special 
sections, including Stephen Coutts, Kirill Entin, Ulli Jessurun d’Oliveira, Gillian 
More and Benedikt Pirker. We are very grateful to them for joining already at 
the book stage.
This volume would not be possible without wholehearted dedication and 
often selfless help of numerous colleagues and friends. In particular, we are 
very grateful to Enzo Cannizzaro and his assistants at the European Papers, 
who published the majority of the advanced drafts of the chapters offered in 
this volume in the special sections of the Papers. We have also benefited from 
the help of editorial assistants in Leuven, including Martina Guarracino and 
Nabeelah Sabir, as well as in Groningen, including Nina M.  Havig Bredvold, 
Kyrill Ryabtsev, Flips Schøyen – Flips’ significant contribution has been par-
ticularly impressive  – and Jacquelyn Veraldi at Cambridge. Thanks are also 
due to all the reviewers for their generous and critical engagement: Ŭładzisłaŭ 
Bełavusaŭ (tmc Asser Institute), Martijn van den Brink (Oxford), Egle Da-
gylitė (Anglia Ruskin), Thomas Horsley (Liverpool), Sara Iglesias Sánchez 
(Luxembourg), Anastasia Karatzia (Essex), John Morijn (nyu Law and Gron-
ingen), Jurian Langer (The Hague and Groningen), Charlotte O’Brien (York), 
Harry Panagopulos (Brussels), Dagmar Schiek (Belfast), Peter Spiro (Temple, 
Philadelphia), Alina Tryfonidou (Reading), Peter Van Elsuwege (Ghent) and 
 
x Preface
other colleagues. Last but not least, this volume would not be possible without 
Anipa Baitakova at Brill, who contracted this work and supported the editors 
throughout the production process.
While these are not easy times for European citizenship, the constructive 
engagement the supranational status receives in the contributions to this vol-
ume offers plentiful optimistic vistas for the concept, if only for the significant 
inspiration it provides the European citizens themselves as well as other legal 
systems with, as demonstrated, inter alia, in Entin and Pirker’s chapter on the 
Eurasian Union Court in Minsk. European Citizenship under Stress thus com-
ments on the on- going developments, rather than putting a full stop. EU citi-
zenship is young and full of potential, even if constantly tested. As it evolves, 
this volume demonstrates, its future is bright.
N.C., D.K. and E.M.
Luxembourg, Princeton and Leuven, 5 February 2020
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 chapter 1
European Citizenship under Stress: Introduction
Nathan Cambien, Dimitry Kochenov and Elise Muir
European citizenship is under stress today as it has probably never been be-
fore. The European Union has matured to emerge as a powerful constitution-
al actor and the expectations grew accordingly, from justice, to the Rule of 
Law and other fundamental issues, all having EU citizenship and European 
citizens at the centre.1 Mass demonstrations in favour of the Union and the 
values it stands for marked the recent years, from the rallies in Britain to Po-
land and Hungary. As European flags fly above the hopeful crowds, however, 
the vector of the Union’s evolution is not unambiguous: significant achieve-
ments are reported alongside the deterioration of the constitutional climate 
in some parts of the Union2 and the perceived weakening of EU citizens’ pro-
tections.3 The very significance of fundamental rights protection in the EU is 
in question in the shade of the ‘constitutional bargain’ among the Member 
States.4 Fundamental rights of EU citizens are said to be ‘in decline’.5 Add 
Brexit to this picture, which signifies the loss of the EU citizenship status and 
all the rights attached to it by dozens of millions of Europeans as well as po-
tential difficulties for EU citizens remaining in the UK, and the picture is more 
 complex still.
 1 CMLRev. (2015). Editorial comments: The Critical Turn in EU Legal Studies. Common Market 
Law Review 52 (4), pp. 881– 888 (and the literature cited therein); de Witte, F. (2015). Justice 
in the EU:  The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity. Oxford:  Oxford University Press; Ko-
chenov, D., de Búrca, G., and Williams, A., eds. (2015). Europe’s Justice Deficit? Oxford: Hart 
Publishing; Williams, A. (2009). The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
 2 Pech, L., and Scheppele, K.L. (2017). Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU. 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 3– 47.
 3 O’Brien, C. (2018). Unity in Adversity. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
 4 Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship:  What Are the 
 Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged? In:  Kochenov, ed., EU 
Citizenship and Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.  176 et seq.; but see: 
 Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizenship  – Understanding Union Citizenship through Its 
Scope. In:  Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 204 et seq.













2 CAMBIEN, KOCHENOV AND MUIR
This volume brings together a handful of excellent scholars and practitioners6 
to look at a number of crucial challenges EU citizenship is facing at the mo-
ment – and Brexit is, naturally, the constant backdrop of any of the challenges 
discussed. In some sense, EU citizenship emerges as almost in danger. This 
context, which is quite new in the history of European integration, all the cri-
ses past and present notwithstanding, allows us to see the significance and 
value of EU citizenship with renewed clarity.
∵
According to settled case law, EU citizenship, which was introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States. EU citizenship works on at least two levels. It epitomises the 
sense of non- discrimination, robust rights for the individuals and also the idea 
of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. As the classical story 
goes, it builds on the pre- existing free movement of economic actors by adding 
free movement rights for non- economic actors, as well as, to some extent, the 
right to equal treatment for all citizens and political rights. While EU citizen-
ship initially had a mostly symbolic value, criticised by Hans Ulrich Jessurun 
d’Oliveira as a ‘pie in the sky’ at its inception,7 it has developed into a driving 
force of the European integration project two decades later.8
In recent times, however, a number of important challenges emerged as 
potential obstacles to the process of European integration. It comes as no sur-
prise then, that the concept EU citizenship in particular, as a cornerstone of 
that integration process, has been questioned, tested and even vilified. The 
‘migration crisis’, the increased popularity of Eurosceptic political movements 
and a number of contentious constitutional processes all contribute to the 
current legal- political climate where EU citizenship stands challenged, raising 
a number of fundamental questions that touch upon the core aspects of per-
sonhood and rights in EU law and which can be expected to have a profound 
impact on the EU citizenship concept.
Amongst the different challenges, Brexit occupies a particularly prominent 
place. Indeed, ever since the United Kingdom voted, on 29 March 2016, to leave 
the European Union, Brexit has dominated the legal and political debate. Given 
 6 The usual disclaimer naturally applies: the views expressed in the various contributions of 
this book only reflect the approach of their respective authors.
 7 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1995). Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky? In: Rosas and Antola, eds., 
A Citizen’s Europe. In Search for a New Order. London: Sage, p. 58.
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its symbolic resonance and its importance for the European integration process, 
it is only natural that EU citizenship came to play a central role in the negotia-
tions following the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. From the outset, 
the Council and the Commission stated that one of the first priorities for the 
negotiations would be to agree on guarantees to protect the rights of EU citizens, 
and their family members, who are affected by Brexit. At the same time, the UK 
made it clear that it wanted to limit the rights of EU citizens and their family 
members in the UK, in particular their right to free movement and residence.9 
It is inevitable, therefore, that, in the context of the Brexit negotiations, the con-
cept of EU citizenship emerged as deeply challenged, leading to a handful of am-
bitious reform proposals10 but ultimately resulting in a settlement the outcome 
of which is a significant downgrade in terms of rights of dozens of millions of 
those who were EU citizens still on January 31, 2020, as Gillian More explains.11
This volume takes a representative selection of the said challenges, which 
raise a multitude of highly complex issues, as an invitation critically to reflect 
on the current state of the EU legal framework surrounding EU citizenship. 
The contributions are grouped in four parts, dealing with constitutional devel-
opments posing challenges to EU citizenship and its nature; the developments 
related to free movement of persons and the limits of this paradigm in the con-
text of EU citizenship; challenges to EU citizenship beyond free movement; 
and, lastly, challenges to EU citizenship in the context of the outside world, 
focusing, besides the problems posed by Brexit, which inform the narrative 
throughout, also on EU citizenship’s relations with the eea12 and its implica-
tions for building the Eurasian free movement regime.13
First of all, EU citizenship has undergone important constitutional devel-
opments, while informing the core of EU’s constitutionalism, thus growing 
hand- in- hand with all the EU’s legal- political fundamentals and often chal-
lenging these in some crucial respects.14 Notably, it has developed from what 
 9 See, e.g. the White Paper entitled “The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union” (July 2018), available at https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 725288/ The_ future_ rela-
tionship_ between_ the_ United_ Kingdom_ and_ the_ European_ Union.pdf.
 10 Cf. Kostakopoulou, D. (2018). Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post- Brexit and the European 
Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (4), pp. 854– 869. 
But see van der Mei in this volume and van den Brink, M., and Kochenov, D. (2019). Against 
Associate EU Citizenship. Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (6), pp. 1366– 1382.
 11 See More’s chapter in this volume. See also Closa, C. ed. (2017). Secession from a Member 
State and Withdrawal from the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 12 See the chapter by Tobler in this volume.
 13 See Pirker and Entin in this volume.
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was initially perceived as a mostly symbolic concept into a protective layer, 
offering the holder a number of rights that must under all circumstances be 
guaranteed. It is, in particular in situations of hardship, for instance in a con-
text where fundamental rights are coming under threat, where its added value 
is most crucial.15 While the principle – first mentioned by the Court in its sem-
inal Ruiz Zambrano judgment16 – according to which EU citizens must not be 
deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their EU citizenship 
rights principle, has become well established in the ecj’s case law, the precise 
scope of this right remains unclear. Quite how the Court develops this princi-
ple, and what (fundamental) rights are covered by it, will determine how im-
portant the added value of EU citizenship will be in the years to come.17 With 
the lack of clarity on this issue, open questions remain regarding the implica-
tions of the functioning of EU citizenship status in the context of the values of 
the Union, and the role played by the citizenship of the Union in the context 
of the determination of the precise outlines of the material scope of EU law in 
concrete cases. As this book demonstrates, many vistas are open for the reas-
sessment of EU citizenship’s engagement with EU constitutionalism. A partic-
ularly thorny – and also brand new – issue in this context is the impact of the 
cumulation of EU nationalities on the level of the protection of rights, which 
Europeans enjoy in EU law today: should being a multiple citizen of Europe be 
a disqualifier in terms of the full enjoyment of rights in EU law? The ecj has 
been masterfully navigating all these issues in the recent years, as David de 
Groot shows in this volume – but numerous fundamental questions remain.18
Second, moving to the rights attached to EU citizenship, the right to free 
movement for EU citizens and their family members is traditionally seen as 
the most important such right, and with reason. The right to free movement 
gives an EU citizen the possibility to emancipate himself from the confines 
of his Member State of origin – which he has not chosen – and to “vote with 
his feet” by moving to the Member State of his choice. Obviously, as explicitly 
stated in Article 21 tfeu, this right is subject to certain limitations and condi-
tions, in particular those laid down in the Directive 2004/ 3819. The justification 
 15 See Jessurun d’Oliveira’s chapter in this volume.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano. See also 
Kochenov, D.  (2011). A  Real European Citizenship; A  New Jurisdiction Test; A  Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European Law 
18 (1) pp. 56– 109.
 17 Cf. the contribution by Kalaitzaki in this volume.
 18 See the chapter by de Groot in this volume.
 19 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
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for these limitations and conditions, and their precise scope – be this ‘social 
integration’,20 ‘abuse of law’,21 or social benefits and ‘self- sufficiency’, to name 
just a few – continues to give rise to contention.
On the one hand, a logical consequence of the said emancipating power 
ensuing from the exercise of the right to free movement is that those who do 
not or cannot rely on free movement rights are quite literally left behind. The 
different treatment between “moving” and “static” EU citizens leads to the 
fundamental question as regards the precise categories of EU citizens that are 
entitled to benefit from this right and what are the justifications for denying 
these benefits to other EU citizens. The issue of the (perceived) unequal treat-
ment of different categories of current or former EU citizens is also strongly 
felt in the context of Brexit. Indeed, one of the most pressing topics in this 
context are the extent to which UK nationals and their family members will 
continue to enjoy free movement rights in the EU after Brexit and, conversely, 
the extent to which citizens from the remaining EU Member States and their 
family members will have the right to move to the UK.22
On the other hand, the relation between the free movement of economic 
actors and that of non- economically EU citizens remains unclear. While EU 
citizenship was originally conceived as a “market citizenship”, axed on the 
traditional internal market logic, it has gradually been freed from that logic, 
as Jesse and Carter, among other contributors, demonstrate with abundant 
clarity. Unless covered by specific economic free movement regimes, such as 
the posted- workers framework, for instance,23 EU citizens have become fully- 
fledged actors in the European Union in their own right, regardless of their 
contribution to the internal market. This stands in remarkable contrast with 
the European Economic Area, which is characterised by the free movement 
of economically active persons, but which does not share the concept of EU 
citizenship. Still, the adoption of a special set of EU protective measures for 
workers and the negotiations in the context of Brexit have acted as a vivid re-
minder that, at least according to some, the hard core of EU law on citizenship 
is still to be found in the free movement of economic actors.
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123. See the chap-
ters by Coutts and Muir in this volume.
 20 See the chapter by Coutts in this volume.
 21 See the chapter by Kroeze in this volume.
 22 See the chapters by Cambien and by Jesse and Carter in this volume.
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Thirdly, EU citizens enjoy significant rights beyond free movement. The 
right to equal treatment in the different EU Member States, in particular as 
regard access to social benefits and education, is a classical example of such 
rights. Specifically in the context of education, the latter right translates into 
the freedom for students to study in another EU Member State and to enjoy, 
in that respect, equal access as students coming from that Member State.24 
Evidently, this right to equal treatment implies a degree of financial solidarity 
between the different EU Member States. For that reason, it invites delicate 
questions as to the scope of the social benefits covered by the principle of 
equal treatment and the conditions surrounding the right to rely on it, con-
ditions relating to legal residence and integration in the host Member State 
in particular. These issues are, again, of particular significance in the context 
of Brexit,25 which calls into question the existing solidarity mechanisms. At 
the moment of the writing of this introduction, the extent of the solidarity 
from which, for instance, British pensioners living in Spain or French students 
studying at a UK university will continue to benefit after Brexit remains an 
open question, but the legal principles underlying the debate do deserve an 
in- depth examination.
The sophisticated web of rules on the integration of an area without fron-
tiers for EU citizens remains contingent on politics and is therefore extreme-
ly fragile. Crucially therefore, EU citizens enjoy a number of political rights, 
which enable them to engage with the EU political level. Of utmost impor-
tance in this regard is the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections 
to the European Parliament, which acts as the representative of EU citizens at 
the EU level.26 Also crucial is the EU citizens’ initiative, which has the potential 
to develop into a meaningful form of participatory democracy.27 Such a mech-
anism is highly desirable in light of the current political context, which has led 
to growing calls for further political engagement with the process of European 
integration. While both rights have been bolstered in recent case law, the pre-
cise contours of these rights and, hence, their added value for the European 
integration project still remain unclear for the moment.
All the challenges outlined above notwithstanding, the European legal order 
and its citizenship remain a significant example of supranational legal- political 
possibilities put to the service of the citizens themselves, bolstering a constant 
(re- )negotiation of access. This is the case with eea nationals, benefiting from 
 24 See the chapter by Turmo in this volume.
 25 See the chapter by Garben in this volume.
 26 See the chapter by Platon in this volume.
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the majority of EU citizens’ rights in the EU28 and also gives rise to imitation, 
as is evidenced by the free movement framework and the case- law of the Court 
of the Eurasian Economic Union in Minsk, which clearly finds inspiration in 
the EU’s achievements and legal structures.29 The role of EU citizenship vis- 
à- vis the outside world equally concerns access to the status for those who 
do not have it by birth. Indeed, the bolstered status of EU citizenship and its 
importance for the EU constitutional framework naturally raises fundamental 
questions regarding the acquisition and loss EU citizenship. New challenges 
arise here related to the investment naturalizations practiced by a number of 
the Member States. While the orthodoxy has it – as the ecj restated in Tjebbes 
to the regret of one of the editors30 – that the Member States’ sovereignty in 
the field of the acquisition and loss of citizenship is not curtailed beyond the 
Rottmann limitations,31 the task of ensuring that the new challenges are met 
effectively could be solved via other fields of EU law, as this book shows, show-
casing the importance of observing the freedom of movement of capital, in 
one example.32
The most pressing challenges in the context of EU citizenship’s interactions 
with the ‘outside world’ arise, however, because of Brexit. Where a Member 
State decides to leave the European Union, it may be wondered whether the 
automatic loss of EU citizenship for nationals of the Member State is not or 
should not be subject to certain mitigating principles of EU law.33 Regrettably, 
as the Withdrawal Agreement demonstrates, the parties were probably much 
less inventive that they could have been in a better world, in trying to ensure 
that as little rights of EU citizens / former EU citizens are lost as a result of the 
UK’s crushing out of the Union following the surprise referendum result.34
It remains to be seen how the concept of EU citizenship and the rights 
attached to it emerge from the different challenges it faces. The aim of this 
volume is not to closely monitor current political developments from an aca-
demic perspective, but rather to explore the impact that these developments, 
and the debate they have triggered may have on the said core aspects of the 
 28 As analysed in the chapter by Tobler in this volume.
 29 See the chapter by Pirker and Entin in this volume.
 30 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes. Cf. Kochenov, D. (2019). 
The Tjebbes Fail. European Papers 4 (1), pp. 319– 336.
 31 See the chapter by Jessurun d’Oliveira in this volume.
 32 See the chapter by Kudryashova in this volume. For the general context of invest-
ment citizenship, see, Kälin, C.  (2019). Ius Doni in European and International Law. 
Boston: Brill- Nijhoff.
 33 See the chapter by van der Mei in this volume.
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concept of EU citizenship. The current challenges are used as an opportunity 
to assess the current state of EU law on citizenship and to shed light on emerg-
ing trends: How does the EU legal order understand the concept of EU citizen-
ship in the current context? Or, in other words: what lessons can be learnt from 
the current challenges raised against EU integration to date to steer reflections 
on EU citizenship in the years to come?
∵
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 chapter 2
EU Citizenship: Some Systemic Constitutional 
Implications
Dimitry Kochenov*
i Citizenships in Europe: Harmony and Conflict
The EU boasts layered citizenships1 – the nationalities of the Member States 
are supplemented by an “additional”,2 “independent”3 EU- level citizenship 
granted to Member State nationals and impossible without the nationalities 
of the Member States.4 According to the Court of Justice, it is “destined to be 
the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”.5 This programme 
outlined by the shapers of the law is slowly being fulfilled, unsurprisingly, as 
 * Professor of European Constitutional Law and Citizenship, University of Groningen (The 
Netherlands); Associate of the European Union Programme at Princeton University (New 
Jersey). I am grateful to Sarah Ganty, Harry Panagopoulos, Kyrill Ryabtsev and Flips Schøyen 
for the help with the earlier drafts of this chapter.
 1 Schönberger, C. (2005). Unionsbürger: Europas föderales Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
 2 Art. 20 tfeu.
 3 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro delivered on 30 September 2009, case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rott-
mann v. Freistaat Bayern, para. 23.
 4 Schönberger, C. (2007). European Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: Some Citizenship Les-
sons of Comparative Federalism. European Review of Public Law 19(1); Szpunar, M., and Blas 
López, M.E. (2017). Some Reflections on Member States Nationality:  A Prerequisite of EU 
Citizenship and an Obstacle to Its Enjoyment. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federal-
ism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also H.U. Jessurun d’Ol-
iveira’s chapter in this volume.
 5 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre 
public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies- Louvain- la- Neuve, para. 31; Court of Justice, judgment of 17 
September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, para. 82; Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zam-
brano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), para. 41; Court of Justice, judgment of 2 June 2016, 
case C- 438/ 14, Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v. Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe and 
Zentraler Juristischer Dienst der Stadt Karlsruhe, para. 29; Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 
2018, case C- 673/ 16, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări 















the status has received a significant boost over recent decades,6 some dis-
agreements in the literature about its occasional retreat notwithstanding.7 Ulli 
Jessurun d’Oliveira’s age of the “pies in the sky”, if it was ever correctly diag-
nosed at all,8 is now definitely over, even if the question is open as to what 
precisely to count as the starting point of its demise. Candidates for the start-
ing moment of EU citizenship abound. The point of citizenship’s proverbial 
“birth” could overlap with Ruiz Zambrano,9 Rottmann,10 Grzelczyk,11 Martínez 
 6 Kostakopoulou, D.  (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship:  Explaining Institu-
tional Change. Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp.  233– 267; Palombella, G.  (2005). Whose 
Europe? After the Constitution: A Goal- Based Citizenship. International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law 3 (2/ 3), pp. 357– 382, 377; Kochenov, D. (2011). A Real European Citizenship; 
A New Jurisdiction Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. 
Columbia Journal of European Law 18 (1), pp. 56– 109.
 7 Garner, O. (2018). The Existential Crisis of Citizenship of the European Union: The Argu-
ment for an Autonomous Status. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 20, pp. 116– 
146; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are 
the Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged? In: Kochenov, ed., 
EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit.; Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned Citizen-
ship – Understanding Union Citizenship through Its Scope. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citi-
zenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit.; Yong, A. (2019). The Rise and Decline of 
Fundamental Rights in EU Citizenship. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
 8 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1995). Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky? In: Rosas, Antola, eds., 
A Citizens’ Europe. In Search of a New Order. London: Sage Publications, p. 58. See his chap-
ter in this volume for the evolution of his views.
 9 Ruiz Zambrano, cit.; D. Kochenov, A Real European Citizenship cit.; Platon, S.  (2012). Le 
champ d’application des droits du citoyen européen après les arrêts Zambrano, McCarthy 
et Dereci: de la boîte de Pandore au labyrinth du Minotaure. Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen 48 (1), pp. 23– 52; van den Brink, M. (2012). EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental 
Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights Seriously? Legal Issues of Economic Integration 39 
(2), pp. 273– 289; Hailbronner, M., and Iglesias Sánchez, S. (2011). The European Court of 
Justice and Citizenship of the European Union: New Developments Towards a Truly Fun-
damental Status. Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 5 (4), pp. 498– 537.
 10 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat 
Bayern; Davies, G. The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights. 
In: Shaw, ed., Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in 
Nationality Law? eui Working Papers rscas 2011/ 62; Kochenov, D.  (2010). Case C- 135/ 
08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 
March 2010. Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp.  1831– 1846; de Groot, G.- R. (2010). 
Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann- beslissing van het Europese Hof van Justitie. Asiel- 
en Migrantenrecht (5/ 6), pp. 293– 300; Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2010). Ontkoppeling van 
nationaliteit en Unieburgerschap? Nederlands Juristenblad 16, pp.  1028– 1033; Iglesias 
Sánchez, S. (2010). ¿Hacia una nueva relación entre la nacionalidad estatal y la cuidadanía 
europea? tjue Sentencia de 2 de marzo de 2010 (gran sala), Janko Rottmann c. Freistaat 
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Sala,12 the Treaty of Maastricht,13 Micheletti,14 or could have even taken place 
earlier than that.15 Important rights effective throughout all EU territory ac-
crue to this supranational citizenship, which stems directly from EU law, thus 
fulfilling the historic prophecy of Van Gend en Loos concerning the “constitu-
tional heritage” of every European.16 However, this picture is nuanced by the 
fact that EU citizenship is sometimes, quite surprisingly, characterised as “not 
intended to enlarge the scope ratione materiae [of EU law]”17 – a dictum of the 
Court which is most likely ultra vires,18 and certainly significantly out of tune 
with the case law in other areas. Having been dissected and criticised by the 
author with Sir Richard Plender elsewhere,19 this formula is most likely bad 
law by now.
This chapter aims to appraise the core legal significance of the status of Eu-
rpean citizenship and to engage critically with the key mantras appended to 
it. I claim that EU citizenship directly questions the assumptions underlying 
the notions of statehood; citizenship; democracy; and equality. Moreover, this 
“additional” legal status could emerge as an enemy of the nationalities of the 
Member States, rather than their friend.
 12 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C- 85/ 96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat 
Bayern. See also Opinion of AG La Pergola delivered on 1 July 1997, case C- 85/ 96, María 
Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, para. 18.
 13 Closa, C.  (1995). Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States. Common 
Market Law Review 32 (2), pp.  487– 518. Cf. O’Leary, S.  (1996), The Evolving Concept of 
Community Citizenship:  From the Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship. The 
Hague- Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996.
 14 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 369/ 90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and oth-
ers v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, para. 10.
 15 Maas, W. (2007). Creating European Citizens. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield; Jacobs, 
F.G., ed.(1976). European Law and the Individual. Amsterdam: North- Holland.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 February 1963, case 26/ 62, NV Algemene Transport- en 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.  Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. 
Due, O.  (1994). The Law- Making Role of the European Court of Justice Considered 
in Particular from the Perspective of Individuals and Undertakings. Nordic Journal of 
International Law 63 (1), pp. 123– 137.
 17 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 1997, joined cases C- 64/ 96 and C- 65/ 96, Land 
Nordrhein- Westfalen v.  Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v.  Land Nordrhein- Westfalen, 
para. 23.
 18 Although Paul Craig does not use it as an example in his notable account: Craig, P. (2011). 
The ecj and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis. Common Market Law Review 48 
(2), pp. 395– 437.
 19 Kochenov, D., and Plender, R.  (2012). EU Citizenship:  From an Incipient Form to 

















a A Curious Legal Status Perched on Limitations
Crucially, EU citizenship is one of those rare legal statuses which, although en-
tirely dependent on the determination of the boundary of the material scope 
of the law which created it20 – being a derivative supranational legal status 
produced by a Union founded on the principle of conferral.21 Even though 
the Union is obviously capable to affect the substance of national citizen-
ship laws of the Member States to some extent,22 by prohibiting, for instance, 
non- recognition of lawfully acquired each- other’s nationalities23 or through 
subjecting the loss of EU citizenship to EU- level scrutiny based, inter alia, on 
the principle of proportionality,24 what escapes the EU’s non- vigilant eye is 
remarkable, including racist framing of citizenship25 and expatriation without 
any prior notice,26 leading to the treatment of law- abiding EU citizens worse 
than suspected terrorists.27
Most importantly  – and bizarrely, should the EU’s ‘constitutional’ claims 
be taken seriously – EU citizenship is not yet unquestionably endowed with 
fundamental rights.28 While numerous EU citizenship rights are obviously 
 20 See, for a very detailed account, Kochenov, D., ed.(2017). EU Citizenship and Federalism: The 
Role of Rights, cit.
 21 For a detailed dissection of the application of the principles to the field of EU citizen-
ship law, see:  Sarmiento, D.  (2019). EU Competence and the Attribution of Nationality 
in Member States. imc Research Paper (Geneva) No. 2019/ 02; Weingerl, P.  and Tratnik, 
M. (2021). Relevant Links: Investment Migration as an Expression of National Autonomy 
in Matters of Nationality. In: Kochenov and Surak, eds., The Law of Citizenship and Money. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 22 Cf. Kochenov, D.  (2012). Member State Nationalities and the Internal Market. In:  Nic 
Shuibhne and Gormley, eds., From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of 
John A. Usher. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 23 Micheletti, op cit.; Cf. Tratnik, M., and Weingerl, P. (2019). Investment Migration and State 
Autonomy: A Quest for the Relevant Link. imc Research Paper (Geneva) No. 2019/ 04.
 24 Rottmann, op cit. Cf. Kochenov, D.  (2010). Case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat 
Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, cit.; de Groot, G.- R. 
(2010). Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann- beslissing van het Europese Hof van 
Justitie, cit.; Iglesias Sánchez, S. (2010). ¿Hacia una nueva relación entre la nacionalidad 
estatal y la cuidadanía europea?, cit..
 25 Kaur, op cit. Cf. for the context: Lord Lester of Herne Hill, A. (2002). Thirty Years On: The 
East African Case Revisited. Public Law 47, pp. 52– 72; Tyler, I. (2010). Designed to Fail: A 
Biopolitics of British Citizenship. Citizenship Studies 14(1), pp. 61– 74.
 26 Tjebbes, op cit. Kochenov, D. (2019). The Tjebbes Fail. European Papers 4 (1), pp. 319– 336; 
de Groot, G.- R. (2019). Beschouwingen over Tjebbes. Asiel en Migrantenrecht, pp. 196– 203.
 27 Cf. Kochenov, D. (2019), The Tjebbes Fail, cit.
 28 Yong, A. (2019). The Rise and Decline of Fundamental Rights of EU Citizenship. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing.; Sharpston, E. (2012). Citizenship and Fundamental Rights – Pandora’s Box or 
a Natural Step Towards Maturity? In: Cardonnel, Rosas and Wahl, eds., Constitutionalising 
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there – and this volume scrutinises an array of those in detail too, from free 
movement and family reunification29 to social assistance,30 citizens’ initiative31 
and fundamental rights in times of economic crisis,32 to freedom to move in-
vestments around the Union33 and voting rights34 – the dependence of any EU 
citizenship rights claims on the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States unquestionably demonstrates the far- reaching limits of EU 
citizenship.35 This is because the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States generally follows what one can term as a cross- border or 
internal market logic.36 Consequently, the actual usefulness of supranational 
citizenship in taming the negative externalities of the internal market, as well 
as in establishing a firm ethical and moral grounding and justification for EU 
citizenship outside the frame of the internal market has been, although the-
oretically possible,37 truly feeble if not non- existent in practice.38 The result 
has been the weakening of the EU’s justice claims,39 and the punishment and 
undermining of the life- chances of those citizens who fail to qualify as “good 
enough” when scrutinised through the internal market lens.40 One of the core 
Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2014). Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a 
Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison? European Law Journal 20 (4), 
pp. 464– 481; Kochenov, D., and Plender, R. (2014). EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form 
to an Incipient Substance? cit.; Caro de Sousa, P. (2014). Quest for the Holy Grail – Is a 
Unified Approach to the Market Freedoms and European Citizenship Justified? European 
Law Journal 20 (4), pp. 499– 519.
 29 See the chapters by H. Kroeze and N. Cambien in this volume.
 30 See the chapters by E. Muir and by M. Jesse and D. Carter in this volume.
 31 See the chapter by N. Athanasiadou in this volume.
 32 See the chapter by K. Kalaitzaki in this volume.
 33 See the chapter by S. Kudryashova in this volume.
 34 See the chapter by S. Platon in this volume.
 35 van den Brink, M. (2019). EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights: Empirical, Normative, 
and Conceptual Problems. European Law Journal 25 (1), pp. 21– 36.
 36 See, most importantly, Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law. Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
 37 E.g. Kochenov, D.  (2013), The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of 
Clarification. European Law Journal 19 (4), pp. 502– 516.
 38 O’Brien, C.  (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free 
Movement Rights. Common Market Law Review 53 (4), pp.  937– 978; Caro de Sousa, 
P. (2014). Quest for the Holy Grail, cit.; Peebles, G. (1997). “A Very Eden of the Innate Rights 
of Man”? A Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law. Law and Social 
Inquiry 22 (3), pp. 581– 618.
 39 de Búrca, G.  (2015). Conclusion. In:  Kochenov, de Búrca, and Williams, eds., Europe’s 
Justice Deficit? Oxford- Portland: Hart Publishing.
 40 That a citizenship would punish those who do not qualify as “good citizens” in the eyes of 
the authority in charge is one of the core functions of the legal status. On this count the 






















features of the EU as it stands consists, accordingly, in ignoring the pain of 
such unworthy citizens and failing to help those in need, explaining away their 
plight, as Charlotte O’Brien among others has splendidly demonstrated.41 As 
far as EU law is concerned, those who are not “good enough” for its scope do 
not exist, falling between the cracks in the dogmas of the internal market ra-
tionality, brought down by EU law.
It is while burnishing the label on this citizenship which fosters its inter-
nal market logic, ignoring the vulnerable instead of defending citizenship 
bearers from market externalities, that the oxymoronic “market citizenship” 
was born.42 With respect to those proclaiming it – and they are no doubt 
correct in their meticulous engagement with the case law43 – “market citi-
zenship” is without doubt a misnomer: it simply cannot be taken seriously 
unless deployed, as the majority of the literature has done, purely descrip-
tively. The reason for this is that to do more requires an inevitable reversal 
of all the key principles informing the understanding of citizenship and 
the reasons for the articulation of the term in the first place, which occurs 
when the full enjoyment of this citizenship’s rights and status is made the 
prize for one’s employability and history of travel around the Union, in-
stead emerging from any idea of equality before the law and protecting the 
vulnerable.44
selects “citizens” among the available bodies, whatever criteria are employed: Kochenov, 
D. (2019). Citizenship. Cambridge MA: mit Press.
 41 O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK. Oxford- Portland:  Hart Publishing; Ganty, S.  (2021). L’intégration des citoyens 
européens et des ressortissants de pays tiers en droit de l’Union européenne. Critique d’une 
intégration choisie. Brussels. Larcier.
 42 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship. Common Market Law 
Review 47 (4), pp.  1597– 1628; O’Brien, C.  (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New 
Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, cit.; Kochenov, D. (2019). The Oxymoron 
of “Market Citizenship” and the Future of the Union. In:  Amtenbrink et  al., eds., The 
Internal Market and the Future of European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 217.
 43 Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:  The Changing Legal Shape 
of Union Citizenship. Common Market Law Review 52 (4), pp.  889– 937; Nic Shuibhne, 
N.  (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship:  What Are the Implications 
for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged? In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship 
and Federalism:  The Role of Rights, cit.; van den Brink, M.  (2019). EU Citizenship and 
(Fundamental) Rights, cit.
 44 See, for a very detailed treatment, Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship 
as the Federal Denominator. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of 
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All the talk of democracy and rights45 within the unchangeable market cit-
izenship paradigm46 could thus be nothing but a renewed entrenchment and 
glorification of the “wholly internal situation” and “reverse discrimination” 
thinking. It comes accompanied by the presumption that those who opt to 
remain outwith the scope of EU law47 – by staying at home for instance48 – 
deserve zero protection and respect within the legal context of the Union. This 
is an old and deeply troubling story ably characterised by Joseph Weiler as the 
loss by the Union of a mantle of ideals – and not much has changed in all the 
years since this characterisation appeared in print.49 By connecting human 
worth and dignity, any claim to rights, to employability and the mantras of a 
citizen’s usefulness in the context of the Internal Market, “market citizenship” 
is the epitome of the ideological space where a human being is openly – not 
tacitly – commodified, and those evading commodification or perceived as not 
useful enough are not deemed worthy of the quasi- citizenship at stake.50 They 
are not “market citizens” and any other citizenship is apparently not on offer.
The result of this is troubling. When made dependent on the division of 
competences in the scope of the rights it protects, EU citizenship is turned into 
a neo- mediæval “citizenship of personal circumstances”:51 a judge first needs 
to see your full CV with all your jobs, travel history,52 the nationality of your 
 45 Lenaerts, K., and Gutiérrez- Fons J.A. (2017). Epilogue on EU Citizenship:  Hopes and 
Fears. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit.; chapter by 
S. Platon in this volume.
 46 Davies, G. (2015). Social Legitimacy and Purposive Power: The End, the Means and the 
Consent of the People. In: Kochenov, de Búrca, and Williams, eds., Europe’s Justice Deficit?, 
cit.; Somek, A. (2014). Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan. European Law Journal 20 (2), 
pp. 142– 163.
 47 E.g. H. Kroeze in this volume.
 48 Iglesias Sánchez, S. (2017). A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a Union 
Based on Free Movement. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of 
Rights, cit.; Davies, G. (2017). A Right to Stay at Home: A Basis for Expanding European 
Family Rights. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit., 
p. 468.
 49 Weiler, J.H.H. (1998). Bread and Circus:  The State of the European Union. Columbia 
Journal of European Law 4 (11), pp. 223– 248, p. 231.
 50 Peebles, G. (1997). “A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”? cit.; Caro de Sousa, P. (2014). 
Quest for the Holy Grail, cit.; O’Brien, C.  (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum:  Class as the New 
Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, cit.; Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and 
Pillars: EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator, cit., pp. 3– 82.
 51 Kochenov, D. (2018). The Citizenship of Personal Circumstances in Europe. In: Thym, ed., 
Questioning EU Citizenship. Oxford- Portland: Hart Publishing, pp. 37– 56.
 52 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy v.  Secretary 
of State for the Home Department; Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2012). (Some of) the Kids Are All 

















current and former spouses,53 partners and children,54 and bank accounts,55 
to see whether you  – a citizen  – “deserve” any EU citizenship rights.56 This 
story would not be complete without mentioning that, unlike in the earlier 
case law, dual nationality could be interpreted against you, as David de Groot’s 
ground- breaking research has shown.57 Neither disability nor pregnancy will 
help characterise you as a “good” EU citizen either.58 A truly minor crime will 
disqualify you from supranational rights, dignity and respect.59 Not even be-
ing deemed a worker is enough anymore:60 EU law will eagerly side with the 
Member States oppressing their ethnic and linguistic, and presumably other 
minorities, as long as frowning upon these groups is part of their “constitu-
tional identity”, thus capable of creating a de facto wholly internal situation, 
 53 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2005, case C- 403/ 03, Egon Schempp v.  Finanzamt 
München V.; Spaventa, E.  (2008). Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of 
Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects. Common Market Law Review 45 (1), 
pp.13– 45, p. 21, note 34.
 54 Coman, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C- 165/ 16, Toufik Lounes 
v. Secretary of the Home Department. Very much depends on whether one of the spouses 
is an EU citizen and whether this citizenship counts: also Titshaw, S.  (2016). Same- Sex 
Spouses Lost in Translation? How to Interpret ‘Spouse’ in the EU Family Migration 
Directives. Boston University International Law Journal 34, pp. 47– 115, p. 58.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 October 2013, case C- 86/ 12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa and 
Others v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration; Court of Justice, judgment 
of 19 October 2004, case C- 200/ 02, Kunquian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. Cf. Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned Citizenship – 
Understanding Union Citizenship through Its Scope. In:  Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship 
and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit.; O’Brien, C. (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the 
New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, cit.
 56 S. Ganty. L’intégration des citoyens européens et des ressortissants de pays tiers en droit de 
l’Union européenne. cit.
 57 See the chapter by D.A.J.G. de Groot in this voume.
 58 O’Brien, C.  (2017). Union Citizenship and Disability:  Restricted Access to Equality 
Rights and the Attitudinal Model of Disability. In:  Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and 
Federalism:  The Role of Rights, cit.; O’Brien, C.  (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum:  Class as the 
New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights, cit.
 59 Belavusau, U., and Kochenov, D. (2016). Kirchberg Dispensing the Punishment: Inflicting 
‘Civil Death’ on Prisoners in Onuekwere (C- 378/ 12) and M.G. (C- 400/ 12). European 
Law Review 40, pp.  557– 577; O’Brien, C.  (2008). Real Links, Abstract Rights and False 
Alarms: The Relationship between the ecj’s “Real Link” Case Law and National Solidarity. 
European Law Review 5, pp. 643– 665.
 60 This development was predicted by Síofra O’Leary long ago: O’Leary, S. (2008). Developing 
an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe?: A Reappraisal of the Case- Law of 
the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship. Edinburgh 
Mitchell Working Papers 6, pp.14– 24. See, for a majestic treatment, Tryfonidou, A. (2016). 
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depriving “market citizens” otherwise not unworthy per se of rights under EU 
law.61 The result is a self- proclaimed constitutional system without a free and 
self- determining constitutional subject endowed with rights.62 It is a neo- 
mediæval construct where liberty and entitlements are strictly apportioned 
based on esoteric considerations rooted in personal histories, wealth, potential 
and actual employability, and travel and the willingness to do so: a triumph 
of contingent and morally vacant acts necessary to be performed to enter the 
Union’s field of vision and thereby become endowed with personality in its 
law, which is the law which purports to have claimed you as its citizen, on top 
of your own national legal order.63
The main outcome of such an approach to the individual is as atypical 
as it is troubling: before a person’s CV and bank accounts have been inves-
tigated, the most fundamental, essential legal principles of Western consti-
tutionalism will not apply. This especially concerns equality before the law, 
which does not kick in if you are too poor, like Miss Dano;64 too pregnant, 
like Jessy Saint Prix;65 or too Polish for the Lithuanian state, like Małgorzata 
Runiewicz. We are thus confronted by the lack of equality before the law as 
the main starting principle for dealing with EU citizens66 in a context where 
the EU produces and constantly re- enacts a neo- mediæval presumption of 
difference the goodness of which is presumed and does not per se require 
 61 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 2011, case C- 391/ 09, Malgožata Runevič- Vardyn 
and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others. The 
case is analysed in this vein in Kochenov, D.  (2018). When Equality Directives are Not 
Enough: Taking an Issue with the Missing Minority Rights Policy in the EU. In: Belavusau, 
and Henrard, eds., EU Anti- Discrimination Law beyond Gender. Oxford- London:  Hart 
Publishing. Cf. Dagylitė, E.  et  al. (2015). The Importance of Being Earnest:  Spelling of 
Names, EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights. Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy 11, pp. 1– 45.
 62 Cf. Azoulai, L., Barbou des Places, S., and Pataut, E., eds. (2016). Constructing the Person in 
EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities. Oxford- Portland: Hart Publishing.
 63 Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator, cit., 
pp. 3– 82.
 64 See the chapter by M. Jesse and D. Carter in this volume.
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2014, case C- 507/ 12, Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions; Ganty, S.  ‘Citoyenneté européenne et genre:  approche cri-
tique de la directive 2004/ 38/ CE’. In: Bernard and Harmel (eds.). Code commenté – Droits 
des femmes. Brussels:  Larcier, 2020, pp.  303– 307; Currie, S.  (2016). Pregnancy- Related 
Employment Breaks, the Gender Dynamics of Free Movement Law and Curtailed 
Citizenship: Jessy Saint Prix. Common Market Law Review 53 (2), pp. 543– 562.
 66 For a broader analysis of the legality in the context of EU law, see, Somek, A. (2017). Is 
Legality a Principle of EU Law? In: Vogenauer and Weatherill, eds., General Principles of 














justification.67 Why this is the case has been explained to the citizens a thou-
sand times: Niamh Nic Shuibhne might indeed be right that this is the Court 
willing “to accept the limitations coded into the current federal bargain”.68 
Yet it is not the protection of a perfect Constitution from human rights con-
cerns  – which the Court famously did, inter alia, in Opinion 2/ 1369  – but 
taking such concerns seriously, which ensures that legal systems are both 
respected and effective. Honouring the bargain, when viewed in this light, 
could obviously be a big problem.70
b EU Citizenship: Two Lessons
Armed with respect for the federal bargain which requires blind faith in and 
strict adherence to a context- sensitive neo- mediævalism, EU citizenship sends 
two signals. Firstly, it significantly empowers the willing Member State nation-
als, “good enough” in the eyes of the supranational authorities, to fall within 
the scope of EU law. Volumes have been written about the freedom of move-
ment of persons and the right is significant. The very horizon of opportunities 
of all Member State nationals is broadened by the intercitizenship logic of the 
supranational status, working as a package of dozens of national legal statuses 
fused into one.71 Secondly, being silent on the scope of the law, EU citizenship 
is constantly presented to us as relatively weak, all the numerous successes 
reported notwithstanding. Crucially, it is respectful even when the issues to 
hand unquestionably fall within the scope of EU law: if a Member States wants 
to ignore EU law to grant fewer rights to women – it can.72 If a Member State 
 67 Kochenov, D. (2016). Neo- Mediæval Permutations of Personhood in the European Union. 
In: Azoulai, Barbou des Places, and Pataut, eds., Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, 
Roles, Identities, cit., pp. 133– 158.
 68 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the 
Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged?, cit., p. 176.
 69 Opinion 2/ 13 (ECHR Accession II) (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 170. Eeckhout, 
P. (2015). Opinion 2/ 13 on EU Accession to the echr and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy 
or Autarky? Fordham International Law Journal 38 (4), pp. 955– 992; Kochenov, D. (2015). 
EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It? Yearbook of 
European Law 34, pp. 74– 96, 94.
 70 Balkin, J.  (1997). Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith. Fordham Law 
Review 65 (4), pp. 1703– 1738.
 71 Kochenov, D.  (2019). Interlegality  – Citizenship  – Intercitizenship. In:  Klabbers, and 
Palombella, eds., The Challenge of Interlegality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 133; Golynker, O. (2009). European Union as a Single Working- Living Space. In: Halpin, 
and Roeben, eds., Theorising the Global Legal Order. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 151.
 72 O’Brien, C.  (2017). The ecj Sacrifices EU Citizenship in Vain:  Commission v.  United 
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wishes to continue abusing its own ethnic minorities by denying them a right 
to a name – it can.73 Both the rights of individuals and the sovereignty of the 
Member States thus stand protected – to a point.74 The flexibility of this ar-
rangement seems to be key, however, which emerges as fundamental to the 
proverbial ‘federal bargain’. Moreover, if a Member State you are associated 
with leaves the EU, your supranational “new” citizenship is thereby extin-
guished: it is not that personal after all.75
ii EU Citizenship: Questioning the Established Narrative
Although the literature on EU citizenship has been booming in recent years, 
the absolute majority of analyses have been confined to reactions to the ever- 
growing and byzantine case law and trying to make sense of the Court’s hints 
in various directions.76 This is no doubt the core of legal research and some of 
the contributions developing scholarship in this direction have been spectac-
ularly illuminating.77 The majority of the contributions to this book fit equally 
well within this established tradition. But what if we tease the “true” lawyers 
a little and entertain scrutiny of the very context of EU law, using its citizen-
ship as a pretext, in the vein of Pedro Caro de Sousa, Agustín José Menéndez, 
Charlotte O’Brien and Alexander Somek?78 Questioning the established story 
 73 Runevič- Vardyn and Wardyn, cit.; Kochenov, D. (2018). When Equality Directives are Not 
Enough, cit.
 74 Lenaerts, K.  (2012). ‘Civis Europaeus Sum’:  From the Cross- Border Link to the Status 
of Citizen of the Union. In:  Cardonnel, Rosas and Wahl, eds., Constitutionalising the 
EU Judicial System, cit.; Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal 
Citizenship, cit.; M. Jesse and D. Carter in this volume.
 75 van den Brink, M., and Kochenov, D. (2019). Against “Associate EU Citizenship”. Journal 
of Common Market Studies 57(6), pp. 1366– 1382. But see Kostakopoulou, D. (2018). Scala 
Civium: Citizenship Templates Post- Brexit and the European Union’s Duty to Protect EU 
Citizens. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (4), pp. 854– 869.
 76 See, e.g. a great example of the opposing interpretations of the same case law by two 
of the most eminent scholars of EU citizenship: Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU 
Citizenship as Federal Citizenship:  What Are the Implications for the Citizen When 
the Polity Bargain Is Privileged?, cit., and Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizenship  – 
Understanding Union Citizenship through Its Scope, cit.
 77 E.g. Wollenschläger, F.  (2010). A  New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market 
Integration:  Union Citizenship and Its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm 
of European Integration. European Law Journal 17 (1), pp. 1– 34; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). 
Limits Rising, Duties Ascending, cit.
 78 E.g. O’Brien, C.  (2017). Unity in Adversity, cit.; Menéndez, A.J. (2015). Whose Justice? 
Which Europe? In: Kochenov, de Búrca, and Williams, eds., Europe’s Justice Deficit?, cit.; 















can be a useful way to see the well- known case law, as well as all the twists and 
turns of the European citizenship story, in quite a different light.
It can be argued that EU citizenship works against the established under-
standings of (a) statehood, (b) citizenship, (c) democracy and (d) equality, sit-
uating these in the context of cosmopolitan constitutionalism.79 The current 
dynamics illustrate the well- noted Joppkean global weakening of citizenship80 
and the rise of a new way of organising political communities.81 European 
citizenship exemplifies key future global trends in citizenship and the devel-
opment of constitutionalism, even if as already mentioned, with a necessary, 
surprising neo- mediæval twist.82
a Empowering the Citizen – Humiliating the State
EU citizenship rights are of great importance, enlarging citizens’ horizons of 
opportunities by a factor of twenty- seven: work, residence, family reunifica-
tion and non- discrimination on the basis of nationality where EU law is ap-
plicable – all have become claims to be turned against the government of any 
participating state, whether an EU member or not. Moreover, the direct effect 
of EU law, including its citizenship rights provisions, ensures that national 
law cannot prevail in the face of EU citizens’ supranational entitlements.83 
States stand “humiliated”,84 obviously enjoying no power – legally at least – to 
close their territories and their nations to others, however friendly these are 
proclaimed to be. This touches the core of statehood, if not nationhood: no 
Member State can decide (some exceptions notwithstanding)85 who among 
Freedoms and European Citizenship Justified?, cit.; Somek, A. (2012). On Cosmopolitan 
Self- Determination. Global Constitutionalism 1, pp. 405– 428.
 79 Somek, A. (2014). The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 80 Joppke, C. (2010). The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship. European Journal of Sociology 
51 (1), pp. 9– 32.
 81 Somek, A. (2014). Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan, cit.
 82 Kochenov, D. (2016). Neo- Mediæval Permutations of Personhood in the European Union., 
cit. pp. 133– 158.
 83 Arena, A.  (2018). The Twin Doctrines of Primacy and Pre- Emption. In:  Schütze, and 
Tridimas, eds., Oxford Principles of European Union Law: Vol. 1: The European Union Legal 
Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 84 Davies, G. (2010). The Humiliation of the State as a Constitutional Tactic. In: Amtenbrink, 
and Van den Berg, eds., The Constitutional Integrity of the European Union. Hague: t.m.c. 
Asser Press, p. 147.
 85 Kostakopoulou, D. (2014). When EU Citizens Become Foreigners. European Law Journal 
20 (4), pp.  447– 463; Meduna, M.  (2017). “Scelestus Europeus Sum”:  What Protection 
Against Expulsion Does EU Citizenship Offer to European Offenders? In Kochenov, ed., 
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the EU’s citizens may enter its territory, reside and work there. Going further, 
a similar regime applies to a huge number of foreigners too, be they eea na-
tionals, third country national family members of EU citizens or other priv-
ileged categories.86 Furthermore, States have lost the ability to favour “their 
own” – the first key feature of any citizenship, distinguishing between “us” and 
“them” – in a growing array of situations: the core outcome of the prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of nationality in within the scope of application 
of EU law.87 EU citizens are now virtually always “us”, striking at the heart of 
national citizenships. Being unable to empower “their own” affects the nature 
of European States. Rather than picking citizens through the framing of migra-
tion and naturalisation legislation, in the EU the States are picked by citizens 
directly empowered by EU law. The essential legal characteristics of European 
States and their nationalities are thereby seriously altered. The new reality has 
not yet been fully internalised by the legal- political systems of the Member 
States.
b Promoting Democracy – Undermining Democratic Outcomes
The implications for the nature of democracy are equally significant. In terms 
of procedure, EU citizens participate in EU- level and municipal- level elections 
in their state of residence,88 as well as being able to register citizens’ initiatives, 
provided what these propose is within the scope of EU law.89 Even without 
covering national elections, the EU and its citizenship is a vehicle of demo-
cratic inclusion. Simultaneously, however, EU citizenship can shield its bear-
ers from the application of legitimate democratic outcomes to them, once a 
connection with EU law is found. Having its final say, the Court of Justice then 
tests the reasonableness and proportionality of any national measure. This 
 86 Kochenov, D., and van den Brink, M. (2015). Pretending There Is No Union: Non- Derivative 
Quasi- Citizenship Rights of Third- Country Nationals in the EU. In: Thym, and Zoetewij- 
Turhan, eds., Rights of Third- Country Nationals under EU Association Agreements: Degrees 
of Free Movement and Citizenship. Leiden- Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, p. 66.
 87 Davies, G.  (2003). Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International; Lenaerts, K. (2006). Union Citizenship and the Principle 
of Non- Discrimination on the Grounds of Nationality. In: Fenger, Vesterdorf, and Hagel- 
Sørensen, eds., Festskrift til Claus Gulmann: Liber Amicorum. Copenhagen:  Forlaget 
Thomson.
 88 Cf. Fabbrini, F. (2017). The Political Side of EU Citizenship in the Context of EU Federalism. 
In Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit.; S. Platon’s chapter 
in this volume.
 89 Iannì, A.  (2019). The European Citizens’ Initiative in the Light of the European Debt 
Crisis: A Gateway Between International Law and the EU Legal System. European Papers 











potentially covers any national rule objected to by an EU citizen, including 
rules on nationality itself.90 Democracy’s function is thus changed significant-
ly, placing absolute emphasis on contestation.91 This produces new users of de-
mocracy: cosmopolitans fighting “unreasonable” regulation.92 While the trend 
is not new,93 the EU context reinforces it. Having used EU law to choose a State, 
EU citizens both participate in democratic decision- making and enjoy protec-
tion from its legitimate outcomes. This is valid at all levels of the law, including 
legislation, constitutional- level rules and the duties of State- level citizenship. 
That said, citizens cannot do much supranationally, given that the design of 
the Union prevents the essential principles of the internal market from being 
subjected to democratic contestation, or any other form for that matter.94 In 
a curious ideological twist, the internal market as it stands is presented to the 
Europeans as rational, technocratic and apolitical, foreclosing any democratic 
dialogue about Europe’s future development.95
c Promoting Non- Discrimination – Undermining Equality
Akin to sorting “us” from “them”, equality among the holders of the status is 
said to be a core feature of citizenship. Its practical realisation depends on how 
clearly the scopes of EU and national law are delineated: both promise equality. 
Since, as we have seen, EU citizenship cannot bring citizens automatically with-
in the material scope of EU law, additional factors are determinant. The law is 
malleable: the nationality of your former wife,96 being born across a border97 
 90 Rottmann, cit.; Kochenov, D. (2010). Case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, cit.
 91 Kumm, M. (2010). The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The 
Point of Rights- Based Proportionality Review. Law & Ethics of Human Rights 4 (2), 
pp. 142– 175.
 92 Somek, A.  (2014). Europe:  Political, Not Cosmopolitan, cit.; Somek, A.  (2013). The 
Individualisation of Liberty:  Europe’s Move from Emancipation to Empowerment. 
Transnational Legal Theory 4 (2), pp.  258– 282; Somek, A.  (2012). On Cosmopolitan 
Self- Determination, cit.; Davies, G.  (2010). Humiliation of the State as a Constitutional 
Tactic, cit.
 93 Badiou, A. (2003). L’éthique: Essai sur la conscience du mal. France: Nous.
 94 E.g. Davies, G. (2015). Social Legitimacy and Purposive Power: The End, the Means and 
the Consent of the People. In:  Kochenov, de Búrca, and Williams, eds., Europe’s Justice 
Deficit?, cit.
 95 Wilkinson, M.A. (2015). Politicising Europe’s Justice Deficit:  Some Preliminaries. 
In:  Kochenov, de Búrca, and Williams, eds., Europe’s Justice Deficit?, cit.; Menéndez, 
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or the vague likelihood of changing States in the future98 can suffice to bring 
EU- level equality into play, covering a flexible group of EU citizens; though not 
all. While EU and national citizenships extend equally to the same people, the 
application of EU equality – not dependent only on status – is an either/ or ques-
tion which disables national equality claims, as the question is not answered by 
analysing the objective situation of the person concerned. The Court’s attempts 
to frame EU law’s scope through the severity of the actual or potential violation 
of the essence of EU- level rights99 met strong resistance, ruining clarity. When 
France promises equality to all Frenchmen it cannot possibly deliver, since two 
French neighbours living largely similar lives can be subject to two different 
legal systems for reasons bearing no relation to their lives or legal status. The 
promises of national and EU- level equality are fictitious:  indeed, it is the dif-
ferentiation in the face of the law, rather than equality before the law, which 
emerges as the main supranational – and thus national- level – legal principle, 
as far as EU citizenship is concerned.
d Implications for the Rule of Law: the Sole Possibility of One Type of 
Constitutionalism
As a result of the blurred and contested essence of EU citizenship, the nature 
of the state, democracy and national citizenship in the EU are profoundly 
transformed. By its very existence, the EU and its citizenship promote one par-
ticular type of constitutionalism100 to which the Member States are bound to 
adhere, which implies an emphasis on proportionality and justification,101 and 
a toning down of representative democracy and equality claims. Due to the 
penetrating nature of EU law, the relationship between the levels of the law in 
this model is far more complex than in the majority of “straightforward” feder-
ations:102 the EU is much more malleable and haphazard.103 Two key features 
of national citizenship do not hold true here: in a Union where EU law enjoys 
supremacy and direct effect and the scope of this law is necessarily blurred, 
citizenship firstly does not bring about equal treatment. Secondly, national 
 98 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 October 2003, case C- 148/ 02, Carlos Garcia Avello 
v. Belgian State.
 99 Ruiz Zambrano, cit.
 100 Perju, V.  (2012). Proportionality and Freedom  – An Essay on Method in Constitutional 
Law. Global Constitutionalism 1 (2), pp. 334– 367.
 101 Neyer, J.  (2012). Justification of Europe:  A Political Theory of Supranational Integration. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 102 Beaud, O. (2007). Théorie de la fédération. Paris: puf.
 103 Schütze, R.  (2009). From Dual to Cooperative Federalism:  The Changing Structure of 














citizenship does not provide better treatment than other EU citizens within 
the scope of application of EU law. EU law thus brings about a very signifi-
cant alteration to the very legal essence of the Member States’ nationalities. 
Crucially, the humiliation of the state and undermining of the key features of 
citizenship is not accompanied by a solid doctrinal or practical alternative: we 
are not shown a new way. Instead, we are constantly treated to the dogmatic 
mantra of the perceived benefits of the “apolitical” internal market. As a result, 
morally and ethically vacant reasons rooted in the internal market – such as 
the programmed- in belief that those who chose to move about in space are 
entitled to more constitutional protections and are more “valuable” as EU citi-
zens – can set aside fundamental human rights concerns and key principles of 
the national constitutional law of the Member States. Setting aside the norms 
of a particular legal order is not a problem per se, of course. It becomes a prob-
lem, however, when the reasons underpinning this are not sufficiently clear – if 
not arcane – and are entirely removed from the realm of democratic testing.
iii We Have Time: the New Picture Is Here to Stay
The legal context of the EU, amplifying and reinforcing the global trends in 
citizenship, equality and democracy, also brings with it grave challenges, and 
as a path- dependent process faces virtually no serious challenge. Critical anal-
yses of it are equally limited and surprisingly new.104 Hungary and Poland, 
with their crises of the Rule of Law,105 or the waving goodbye UK, with its anti- 
immigration populism,106 oppose the EU for entirely different reasons. Howev-
er, the ongoing process of reinvention both of citizenship and the state in the 
EU has only just begun. Exposing it with clarity and scrutinising its implications 
 104 See, e.g., Editorial comments (2015). The Critical Turn in EU Legal Studies. Common 
Market Law Review 52 (4), pp.  881– 888 (and the literature cited therein). Cf. Williams, 
A. (2009). The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; de Witte, F.  (2015). Justice in the EU:  The Emergence of Transnational 
Solidarity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 105 Pech, L., and Scheppele, K.L. (2017). Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the 
EU. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 3– 47; Sadurski, W. (2018). How 
Democracy Died (In Poland): A Case Study on Anti- Constitutional Populist Backsliding. 
Sydney Law School Research Paper 1; Szente, Z.  (2017). Challenging the Basic Values  – 
Problems with the Rule of Law in Hungary and the Failure to Tackle Them. In Jakab, 
and Kochenov, eds., The Enforcement of EU Law and Values:  Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 456.
 106 Cf. Closa, C., ed. (2017). Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European 
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for the development of the constitutional systems around the world is a start-
ing point for coping with a reality which is here to stay. The sterile and cartoon-
ish official story retold in EU textbooks simply does not hold, and States which 
fail to take note are in danger of getting a rude awakening in the near future, 
be it through absurd populist victories or by finding themselves attempting 
to implement Brexit- like claims. An alternative narrative of EU citizenship, to 
contribute to a sound dynamic understanding of the evolution of statehood 
and citizenship in Europe and beyond is sorely needed at the moment. EU 
citizenship, focused on fundamental rights, equality and a critical rethinking 
of the core grounds behind the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States, could provide such a much- needed narrative and a starting 
point, offering a sounder and less awkwardly “depoliticised” paradigm of Euro-
pean integration than the pure internal market. One can coexist with the other, 
but the realisation that the essential starting points of the internal market and 
of EU citizenship are incompatible should necessarily be the starting point of 
such a journey.107
In the light of the above, how far, then, is EU citizenship deserving of its 
name? The question is open what kind of rights Europeans could legitimately 
see as unquestionably associated with their supranational citizenship – as op-
posed to with a proxy of the internal market, that is.
 107 Cf. Kochenov, D. (2013) The Citizenship Paradigm. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 15, pp. 197– 225.
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 chapter 3
Union Citizenship and Beyond
Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira*
1 Introduction
When you ask your neighbour whether she is a Union citizen you may expect a 
negative or a question mark. The status has not really sunk in, notwithstanding 
the freedom of movement that goes with it or the right to elect members of the 
European Parliament. Recently people became aware of the status because of 
Brexit, as they were suddenly confronted with what they thought was an in-
herent right turning out to be a fragile status to be taken away through Brexit.1 
Time to reflect once more on Union citizenship. This contribution addresses 
a few core issues concerning the status: the concept itself (part 2), nationality 
of a member state as the connecting factor between a person and Union citi-
zenship (part 3), and the prospects of the ‘fundamental status’ (part 4). These 
themes will be looked at with a double- faced head: history and future of the 
concept are brought into play.
2 The Concept of Union Citizenship
Union citizenship was formally instituted by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez took the initiative but it was prepared long 
before and, as an idea, had many fathers and mothers. Immanuel Kant for in-
stance, in his Zum ewigen Frieden, stated that ‘… ursprünglich aber niemand 
an einem Orte der Erde zu sein mehr Recht hat, als der andere.’ And in his uto-
pian view he dreamt of a ius cosmopoliticum ‘so fern Menschen und Staaten, in 
äussern auf einander einfliessenden Verhältnis stehend, als Bürger einer allge-
meinen Menschenstaats anzusehen sind.’ It is interesting to notice that Kant 
considered the right to hospitality and the freedom of movement of people 
 * Professor Emeritus, University of Amsterdm and European University Institute.
 1 See Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2018). Brexit, Nationality and Union Citizenship: Bottom Up 
and Top Down. In: Hess, Jayme, and Mansel, eds., Europa als Rechts- und Lebensraum: Liber 
Amicorum für Christian Kohler. Bielefeld: Gieseking Verlag, pp. 201– 214. See also the chapters 
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as the central implication of the proposition that nobody has a stronger right 
to be somewhere than anyone else. On a smaller scale, it was the right to free-
dom of movement that was the core of the rights entailed by being a European 
citizen. This despite the fact that many definitions of citizenship both by po-
litical scientists and lawyers start out with political rights as the nucleus of the 
 concept.
Mention may be made here as well of Altiero Spinelli (1907– 1986), who is 
considered to be nothing less than one of the founding fathers of the two post- 
war Europe organisations: the Council of Europe and the European Commu-
nities. During his imprisonment as a communist opponent of the fascist Mus-
solini regime, he served long prison sentences and was exiled to a small island 
off the Italian coast between Rome and Naples: Ventotene.2 Here he studied 
the American Federalists and issued in 1941, with some others, the Ventotene 
Manifesto, in which he drew up a blueprint for a federalist Europe, beyond the 
nation- states, as the only way he saw to combat fascism and national social-
ism. He had learned from James Madison that the prospects for freedom were 
greater in a larger federation than in a small one.3 He pleaded for a continental 
citizenship alongside with citizenship of the national states. Much later, as an 
mep, he inspired the Spinelli plan for a federal Europe, adopted with a large 
majority by the European Parliament, which paved the way for the Single Eu-
ropean Act and the Maastricht Treaty.4
There are many other inspirations. Let us return to the 16th of June 1940. 
France is invaded by the German army and stands on the brink of collapse. 
Talks between the French and British governments are conducted with a view 
to prevent – or at least postpone – the imminent surrender of the French army 
and to allow first and foremost the French fleet to seek refuge in foreign ports. 
Protagonists: General de Gaulle and Winston Churchill with his war cabinet. 
While de Gaulle is eagerly waiting in the next room, the war cabinet is drafting 
a concept Declaration of Union to be offered as support to prime minister Ray-
naud of France. It states e.g.:
 2 Ventotene was already used as a place of exile in ancient Rome: Emperor Augustus isolated 
his daughter Julia there because of what he saw as her excessive adultery. Recently, 22 August 
2016, Prime Minister Renzi of Italy chose this lieu de mémoire for a mini- summit on the future 
of Europe after Brexit.
 3 For a recent comparative study, see Bierbach, J.B. (2017). Frontiers of Equality in the Develop-
ment of EU and US Citizenship. The Hague/ Heidelberg: tmc Asser and Springer.
 4 The federalists assembled as The Crocodile Club, named after a Strasbourg restaurant, and 









The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall be no 
longer two nations, but one Franco- British Union.
The Constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, 
foreign, financial, and economic policies.
Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great 
Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France.5
In view of later developments it is remarkable to see General de Gaulle urging 
a union between France and Great Britain and accepting a common citizen-
ship, and to witness the willingness of the British Government to bridge the 
Channel in terms of statehood and citizenship: these were the days of ‘Brin-
troitus’. See, by contrast, the historian Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the 
Brexit- cabinet, now comparing the European Union with Hitler and Napoleon.
At the outset I  took a dim view of European Citizenship. I  wrote in 
1995: ‘The populations of the Member States have not asked for citizenship; 
it has graciously been bestowed upon them as a cover- up for the still exist-
ing democratic deficit. As an alibi it may please Brussels; whether it changes 
anything in the sceptical attitude and weak position of the populations of the 
Member States is, in my view, rather improbable.’6 The term amounted to not 
much more than a gaudy ribbon around a motley ensemble of already exist-
ing rights, first and foremost the freedom of movement for a small number of 
economically active nationals of member states. What difference can a word 
make? Well, my initial analysis proved to be wrong. I had to admit gradually 
that a word can make a difference. The word citizenship raises expectations 
about developments connected with ideas about citizenship. It is a fertilizer 
with its own growth potential. These ideas are, as is to be expected, manifold, 
blurred, and range from a status in civil society to a concept of persons as 
political agents.
Indeed, one of the disturbing problems with the definition of citizenship is 
the recurring use of citizenship as synonymous with nationality.7 In a recent 
 5 Churchill, W.  (2005) The Second World War, Volume II,— Their Finest Hour (2nd Edition). 
London: Penguin Books, p. 182 ff. Nothing came of the declaration: Prime Minister Raynaud 
could not collect the assent of his cabinet and had to resign; Pétain then took over and even-
tually bred the Vichy regime. De Gaulle escaped by the skin of his teeth: he jumped on board 
a small airplane that brought the British ambassador back from Bordeaux to London, pre-
tending to see the diplomat off.
 6 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1995), Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky? In: Rosas and Antola, eds., 
A Citizen’s Europe. In Search for a New Order. London: Sage Publications, p. 84.
 7 In the Commentary to the European Convention on Nationality at art. 2 one reads: ‘with re-
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study, Olivier Vonk, who works at the eudo Citizenship Observatory, based at 
the eui, states:
Since the Observatory uses the term citizenship in describing the domes-
tic nationality law rules in forty- seven European Countries, this practice 
provides further justification for giving citizenship a more prominent 
place than I did in previous publications.8
If this is the prevalent view at the eudo Citizenship Observatory, then it is 
difficult to distinguish between Union citizenship and its connecting factor, 
the possession of the nationality of a Member State. In order to be a Union 
citizen, one has to be a ‘citizen’ of a member state. Are there two citizenships 
involved, two nationalities, or one citizenship and one nationality? This is not 
only wordplay. Denmark, already extremely aloof about the Maastricht Treaty, 
which it had rejected by referendum in June 1992, issued a unilateral declara-
tion half a year later, stating emphatically that
1. Citizenship of the Union is a political and legal concept which is en-
tirely different from the concept of citizenship within the meaning of the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark and of the Danish legal system. 
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or foresees an under-
taking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of 
a nation- state. (…)
2. Citizenship of the Union in no way in itself gives a national of another 
Member State the right to obtain Danish citizenship or any of the rights, 
duties, privileges or advantages that are inherent in Danish citizenship 
by virtue of Denmark’s constitutional, legal and administrative rules.(…)9
Although in the English version the terms nationality and citizenship are be-
ing used, the Danish word ‘borgerskap’ refers to both concepts and may have 
caused the Danes to declare that the Unionsborger is not at all identical to the 
statsborger. There is more.
We should not forget that at the stage of the negotiations towards the Euro-
pean Constitution in 2002, Giscard d’Estaing issued a paper in which he sug-
gested that ‘member states nationals would have “double” nationality in the 
 8 Vonk, O. (2016). Reflections on Comparative Law and Legal Translation in Studying Different 
Citizenship Regimes. Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking 73, p.56.







future.’ And the Preliminary Draft stated:  ‘This article establishes and defines 
Union citizenship: every citizen of a Member State is a citizen of the Union; enjoys 
dual citizenship, national and European citizenship; and is free to use either as he 
or she chooses, with the rights and duties attached to each (…).’10 Small wonder 
that the concept of Union citizenship is surrounded by complexities and per-
plexities.
The Treaty, however, differentiates, rightly so, between nationality and cit-
izenship. It indicates that holding the nationality of a member state entails 
being a citizen of the Union, and that this citizenship ‘shall be additional to 
and not replace national citizenship.’ Nationality then is seen as a formal 
legal bond between a person and a state, whereas citizenship refers to sub-
stantive rights and duties attached to nationality, according to a municipal 
legal system, and to Union citizenship, according to the Treaty and secondary 
legislation.
It is remarkable that one can be called a citizen of an international or-
ganisation. We do not normally see ourselves as citizens of the United Na-
tions, or of the Bureau international des poids et mesures, or of the Coun-
cil of Europe. There are no citizens of nafta. The term reveals something 
about the various aspirations of the EU; how it strives to become an entity 
akin to a state, a federal thrust. It bestows on all persons holding the na-
tionality of a member State the status of citizen in this special Europe- wide 
organisation with its institutions. The term promises to these persons po-
litical influence, legitimising the European Parliament and in bridging at 
least partially the so- called democratic deficit. It suggests forms of protec-
tion as well.
The attributes of Union citizenship are only partially defined. It is telling 
that the catalogue of the rights attached to Union citizenship in the tfeu is no 
more than a rough indication: Art. 20 tfeu light- heartedly appends ‘inter alia’ 
to its list, a clear indication that it is open- ended. It may grow and new rights 
and duties may be added. We have to look, according to Art. 20, ‘in the Trea-
ties’. Hence the discussion about the extent of the rights and duties that can be 
brought under the heading of Union citizenship has animated the debate, not 
only among scholars, but also in the courts. Are fundamental rights, as men-
tioned in the Charter and the echr, part and parcel of Union citizenship? No, 
some would say, these rights can be invoked by everyone, they are not specific. 
Yes, others assert, the exclusivity of the right is not the criterion, as demon-
strated by the right to petition the EP (Art. 227 tfeu) which is assigned to ‘any 
 10 Preliminary Draft, Title ii, Art.5, cit. 
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natural or legal person residing in a Member State’, and the same goes for the 
right to apply to the European Ombudsman (Art. 228 tfeu).11 The central right 
to move and work freely in the Member States is granted to all nationals of 
non- EU efta member states as well.
In other words, the edges are blurred, and I have come to see this as an asset 
of the concept. It has grown to be a not- fully- exclusive status of nationals of 
member states. It changed from a symbolic ribbon around a set of rights as 
I saw it at the time, into a meaningful dynamic concept of the relationship be-
tween the EU and the bulk of the population. The impact of the political rights 
attached to it, especially the right to vote and stand for elections in the EP, 
has increased through the increased powers of the EP. Secondary legislation 
and case- law show a definite shift from market citizenship of the economi-
cally active to a rounder, fully- fledged form of citizenship. Up till now, as we 
all are aware of the waning enthusiasm for the European project. Many Union 
citizens are not aware of the fact that they are just that, and the meagre turn-
overs at the election of mep s not only reproduce the aversion of the voters to 
politics in general, but also show their distrust of what is perceived as the black 
box of ‘Brussels’. So my current position has, possibly against the tide, changed 
from scepticism into two hurrahs for Union citizenship. Brexit may kindle a 
new enthusiasm for the status.
3 The Connecting Factor: Nationality of a Member State
‘Every person holding the nationality of a member state’ (Art. 20 tfeu). Na-
tionality, then, is the unique pass to Union citizenship. I have had, from the 
outset, two bones of contention with this connecting factor. First, its exclu-
siveness, and second, the way the European Court of Justice has dealt with the 
nationality issue.
 11 There are more examples of non- exclusivity:  Gibraltarians have the right to vote for 
the European Parliament, though not as nationals of a member state but ‘qualified 
Commonwealth citizens’, cf. Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 145/ 
04, Spain v. United Kingdom. See also Declaration Nr. 55 by Spain and the UK, annexed 
to the Lisbon Treaties: ‘The Treaties apply to Gibraltar as a European territory for whose 
external relations a Member State is responsible. (…)’ And the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the member states is granted, derivatively, to third country 
and stateless relatives of Union citizens; on the other hand this right has been withheld 
from nationals of new member states for transitional periods. Declatations Annexed to 
the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon. 





a) Defining the “peoples”
The framers of the Treaty of Lisbon, both in its preamble and its Art. 1, talk about 
bringing about ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, and ‘desiring 
to deepen the solidarity between their peoples.’ Is the term ‘people’ identical with 
‘nationals of a specific member state’? The ecj held that this is not the case. In 
Spain v. UK it stated that ‘the term “peoples”, which is not defined, may have differ-
ent meanings in the States and languages of the Union.’12 These cases concerned 
the right to vote for the EP. Of course, this franchise may be narrowed down by 
European legislation to nationals of member states, but as long as this is not the 
case, the situation exists that there are, here again, non- nationals entitled to rights 
which belong to Union citizens as enumerated in Art. 20 tfeu as well. No exclu-
sivity in this central political right. ‘Peoples’ may have more surprises in store in 
other areas than that of voting rights.
It is interesting to notice that the Court leaves it to the member states to 
define their ‘peoples’. The member states are free to include non- nationals in 
their respective ‘peoples’, such as third country permanent residents, refugees, 
stateless persons etc. These, too, are then subject to the desire to deepen the 
solidarity and to create an ever- closer union. Why would it be unacceptable 
to grant them the status of Union citizens? Many categories among them al-
ready have a certain privileged status under EU law. Over the years various 
authors and institutions have militated for inclusion of third- country perma-
nent residents in the territories of the member states.13 For them, ‘peoples’ are 
 12 Spain v.  United Kingdom, cit., para. 71. Idem in the decision of the same day:  Court of 
Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 300/ 04, Eman and Sevinger, para. 44. 
Eman and Sevinger became later Prime Minister and Minister in the Government of 
Aruba, a ‘land’ in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
 13 Among many others, Van Dijk, P. (1992). Free Movement of Persons: Towards European 
Citizenship. Sociaal- Economische Wetgeving 40, pp.  277– 307, Oliveira, A.C. (1996) 
Third Country Nationals and European Union Law, doctoral thesis. Florence:  European 
University Institute; Bernitz, U.  and Lokrand Bernitz, H.  (1999) Human Rights and 
European Identity: the Debate about European Citizenship. In: Alston, ed., The EU and 
Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 522: ‘The conclusion is that legal abode 
in the Union is a more appropriate criterion than nationality in respect of free movement 
and other Community Rights’; O’Keeffe, D.  (1994). Union Citizenship. In:  O’Keeffe and 
Twomey, eds., Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty. London: Wiley Chancery Law, p.104 
et seq.; O’Leary, S. (1996). European Citizenship, The Option for Reform. London: Institute 
for Public Policy Research; Kochenov, D. (2013). The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging 
from the Last Ten Years of Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon? 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 62, pp. 97– 136, and the authors mentioned 
there in footnote 47; Hirsch Ballin, E. (2015). Citizens Rights and the Right to Be a Citizen. 
Leiden/ Boston: Brill Nijhoff, p.108; Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1995) Union Citizenship: Pie 
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populations of the member states that should be included in the EU as citizens. 
Union citizens are not only nationals, but persons who are legally domiciled in 
the territories of the member states as well. The non- discrimination principle 
of Art. 18 tfeu ‘on grounds of nationality’ should be extended to the prohibi-
tion on grounds of domicile. In innumerable respects, non- nationals residing 
in the EU are subject to the legal order of the EU; they should have a voice as 
Union citizens as well. One is aware of the fact that this is a constitutional is-
sue: the member states would lose part of their grip on non- nationals on their 
territory if the latter derived rights under EU law for being Union citizens. The 
self- definition of states as nation- states would be diluted and the balance be-
tween EU and the Member States would shift. Indeed, it has shifted already 
as the ecj has strengthened the grip of Union law on sedentary citizens by 
demolishing bit by bit the concept of the ‘internal case’. Furthermore, many 
third country nationals and stateless persons have rights, derived from Union 
citizens, as family members. Still, it is not acceptable to divide the populations 
of the member states into Union citizens and others, into first- class citizens 
and second- class citizens. This brings me to the second issue.
b) Defining the “nationals”
Who defines who is a national of a member state? The answer seems so simple. 
The European Convention on Nationality states at the outset (Art. 3) as a gen-
eral principle: ‘Each State shall determine under its own law who are its nation-
als.’ Full stop. This is considered to be the codification of the guiding principle 
of international law. The determination by a state is not unfettered though: hu-
man and fundamental rights delineate the boundaries of the discretion.
If the competence of the state in defining who is its national and who is not 
is beyond doubt, this does not mean that all other states have to recognize the 
outcome of this legislative competence. Under international law, as again cod-
ified in the European Convention on Nationality (Art. 3(2)) other states shall 
recognize this law ‘in so far as it is consistent with applicable international con-
ventions, customary international law and the principles generally recognized 
with regard to nationality.’ The question thus arises of whether the Union Trea-
ties allow the member states and the European Union to withhold recognition 
nationaliteit? In: Europees burgerschap. The Hague: Asser instituut Colloquium Europees 
recht, 33rd session, p.  99. See ecosoc ‘Opinion on a More Inclusive Citizenship to 
Immigrants’ Soc/ 479, 1 October 2013, para.1.11:  ‘The Committee proposes that, in future, 
when the EU undertakes a new report of the Treaty (tfeu), it amends art.20 so that 




to elements of member states’ municipal nationality laws. The Convention 
is silent about acceptance by international organizations. This is remarkable 
as the Convention dates from 1997 and was framed in the Council of Europe, 
which was well aware of the existence of the European Union. But even if one 
accepts that international organisations, with their own specific legal orders, 
are allowed to act in the same way as states, the question remains whether 
they have the right not to accept effects of the nationality (laws) of a member 
state? Are there grounds in the Treaties or elsewhere for refusing to accept the 
outcome of the laws of the member states, or, for that matter, third states?
The member states have repeatedly stated that this is not the case, and that 
the competence to define their nationals is their ‘reserved domain.’ Thus, an-
nexed to the Maastricht Treaty is a Declaration by the Conference, indicating 
that
wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference 
is made to nationals of the Member States the question whether an indi-
vidual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely 
by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned. Member 
States may declare, for information, who are to be considered their na-
tionals for Community purposes by way of a declaration lodged with the 
presidency and may amend any such declaration when necessary.
At the Edinburgh summit of December 1992, even after Micheletti,14 they re-
peated, according to the Conclusions of the Presidency, ‘The question whether 
an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely 
by reference to the national laws of the Member State concerned.’15
This is no small matter. In the end it concerns the existence of the member 
states insofar as a state is defined not only by territory and governmental or-
ganisation, but also by its nationals, citizens. If a state is not free to define who 
are its nationals, this loss of competence is at the same time not only a reduc-
tion of sovereignty, but even a loss of statehood. This fact, ‘the most sacred of 
cows’,16 has coloured my position on this issue.
 14 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 369/ 90, Micheletti and others.
 15 European Council in Edinburgh, 11– 12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, 
Part B. Annex 1, 53.
 16 Carrera Nuñez, S. (2015). How much does EU Citizenship Cost? The Maltese Citizenship- 
for- Sale Affair:  A Breakthrough for Sincere Cooperation in Citizenship of the Union? 
In: Carrera Nuñez and G.- R. de Groot, eds., European Citizenship at the Crossroads. The 
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We all are aware of the developments. In 1992, the ecj in its judgment Mi-
cheletti initiated a series of decisions in which it held that ‘[u] nder internation-
al law, it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay 
down the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality.’ Note that this is a 
misguided obiter dictum in two ways: in the first place because Micheletti was 
about the effects of Micheletti’s undisputed Italian nationality in Spain under 
Community law, and in the second place because it intimated that interna-
tional law entailed or obliged Member States to frame their nationality laws 
with due regard to Community law. That was in my mind begging the ques-
tion, and I do not see any corroboration for the Court’s assumption. According 
to international law the matter is still the ‘reserved domain’ of the state con-
cerned. The phrase was nevertheless repeated in Kaur,17 Zhu and Chen,18 and 
in Rottmann,19 without any explanation why the Court deviated from Art. 3 of 
the European Convention on Nationality or the previous Hague Convention of 
1930 Concerning Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (Art. 
1). I submit that international law is silent about the role of Union law in con-
trolling the competence of member states in matters of nationality.
The whole issue is one of recognition, of acceptance, by the Union and its 
member states, not one concerning the determination of acquisition and loss 
of nationality. In other words: the sedes materiae is Art. 3(2), not Art. 3(1) of the 
ecn. No freedom of movement allowed here. This is a difference with a term 
as ‘worker’ under Union law: there no international Conventions stand in the 
way of defining the term, for good reasons, uniformly under Union law, and to 
take away definition power from the member states.20
Importantly, ‘nationality’ under Union law may differ from nationality in 
the laws of the member states. Various member states have indicated in unilat-
eral declarations who are to be considered their nationals for Union law pur-
poses, Germany and Great Britain in particular. Although these declarations 
included and excluded many millions of persons holding the nationality of 
these states, no protests from the other member states of the Union were to 
be heard, and the ecj21 accepted them without any restraint. This means that 
 17 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 February 2001, case C- 129/ 99, Kaur.
 18 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 October 2004, case C- 200/ 02, Zhu and Chen.
 19 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Rottmann. See my case- note 
Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2011) Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship. European 
Constitutional Law Review 7 (1), pp. 138– 160, and generally the literature listed in: de Groot 
G.- R., and Vonk, O.  (2015) International Standards on Nationality Law. Oisterwijk:  Wolf 
Legal Publishers, pp. 574– 576.
 20 Cf. Court of Justice, judgment of 23 March 1982, case 53/ 81, Levin.











nationality in the Treaties is a form of functional nationality: not for all pur-
poses, but for the specific function of being a connecting factor to the Union 
legal order, especially its chapters on Union citizenship and the prohibition 
of discrimination. Therefore it is allowed, on the one hand, for member states 
to indicate which of their nationals are to be considered ‘nationals’ for Union 
purposes, and on the other hand, for the Union and its member states to con-
sider whether these indications hold water. Or, for that matter, if they have to 
be curtailed or extended.
But Union law is from my point of view not yet allowed to interfere with the 
competence of the member states to determine who are or who are not their 
nationals. There is no competence in the Treaties to deal directly with the laws 
on nationality of the member states. The idea that the obligation for sincere co-
operation (Art. 4(3) teu) can be used as an argument that the member states 
should allow inroads into their laws on nationality is not convincing. Art. 4(1) 
and (2) and Art. 5 teu are more appropriate as arguments for the proposition 
that, as long as an explicit transfer of powers by the Treaties in the area of the 
law on nationality has not taken place, then according to international law the 
competence of each state to determine under its own law who its nationals are 
is unscathed. Competences not conferred by the treaties shall remain with the 
member states (Art. 5(2) teu). Especially, it might be added, when it concerns 
such a sensitive and central issue as nationality. Laws on nationality belong to 
the identity of the member states and their fundamental constitutional struc-
tures to be respected by the EU, according to Art. 4(2) teu. Although these 
have to be interpreted restrictively, they are still in place.22
This has been my position since Micheletti, and I  remain there. But this 
does not mean that I disagree with the outcome of Rottmann. Rottmann and 
its predecessors are wrongly decided in obliging the member states (under in-
ternational law) to have due regard to Union law in matters pertaining to the 
loss and acquisition of their nationality. But I do subscribe to the idea that the 
Union and its member states have a competence to accept or refuse the out-
come of these laws for Union purposes. Union law is indeed involved when it 
comes to the recognition of the acquisition or the loss of nationality of mem-
ber states, because Union citizenship is necessarily at stake. Therefore general 
principles of Union law, including the Charter and the echr, both procedural 
 22 See, in the field of defining the concept of spouse in Directive 2004/ 38 as including same- 
sex marriages: Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, Case C- 673/ 16, Coman, Hamilton 
and Asociaţia Accept, with my comments: Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2018). Het Europese 
Hof omarmt eindelijk het huwelijk van mensen met hetzelfde geslacht. Nederlands 
Juristenblad 28, pp. 2060– 2064.
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and substantive, are to be taken as guidelines in looking at the laws of the 
member states and their application.
Let us give an example of this scrutiny. According to the Dutch law on na-
tionality, a person holding both Dutch nationality and a second nationality 
automatically loses his or her Dutch nationality after having resided for more 
than ten years abroad without receiving, on his / her request, a new passport 
or confirmation of Dutch nationality. ‘Abroad’, i.e. not having residence in the 
Netherlands or in the territories of the European Union.23 In my view, the 
Union is not allowed to interfere with this provision, but it is free not to accept 
the outcome for Union purposes, and still consider a person, though in this 
way divested of his or her Dutch nationality under Dutch law, as a Union citi-
zen under Union law. The Union may hold the provision to be contrary to Art. 
4(c) and Art. 7(1) of the European Convention on Nationality, and to Art. 47 of 
the Charter and Art. 6 of the echr.24 The provision is arbitrary, exceeds the 
limits drawn by the ecn which do not target the first generation of Dutchmen 
abroad, but subsequent ones, and is under- inclusive in its bureaucratic criteria 
for maintaining a genuine link. It is furthermore not geared to the specificities 
of the individual case. The ecj is asked to decide on this provision, which will 
probably not bear the test developed in Rottmann.25
It is the Dutch Council of State that requested a preliminary ruling in its 
decision of 19 April 2017. AG Mengozzi, however, in his conclusions considered 
that the provision was not contrary to Art. 20 tfeu and Art. 7 of the Charter. In 
one case a minor was involved, and here the AG was clear and adamant:
L’article 20 tfue et l’article 7 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de 
l’Union européenne doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent 
à une disposition législative telle que l’article 16, paragraphe 1, sous d) et 
2 de la loi sur la nationalité néerlandaise en vertu de laquelle une per-
sonne mineure, ayant également la nationalité d’un pays tiers, perd de 
plein droit, sauf cas exceptionnel, la nationalité de son Etat membre, et, 
 23 Art. 15 s. 1 sub c of the Dutch Code on Nationality.
 24 See Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2016). Automatisch verlies nationaliteit voor Nederlander 
buitenaf onhoudbaar. Nederlands Juristenblad, pp. 248– 255; and see, in the same vein, the 
Report by the Dutch National Ombudsman, Rapport verlies nationaliteit. ‘En toen was ik 
mijn Nederlanderschap kwijt …’ Report of 10 May 2016, Nr. 2016/ 145.
 25 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes and others. The Dutch 
government announced in its coalition agreement (10 October 2017)  a comprehensive 









partant, le statut de citoyen de l’Union, en conséquence de la perte de la 
nationalité par son parent.
According to the AG, a minor is not a second class Union citizen, and should 
have the same right to block the loss of his nationality as his parents. The inter-
ests of the child do not coincide with the unity of nationality in the family as 
the Dutch Government proposed to explain the automatic loss of nationality 
by the children of a parent who loses his nationality. If the Court follows, that 
would be the first time that a legislative provision would be struck:  in Rott-
mann only an individual decision by the administration was targeted.
An opposite example is the Maltese case. European institutions took cour-
age from the Rottmann judgment in attacking the Maltese Individual Inves-
tors Programme allowing rich persons to ‘buy’ Maltese nationality and by that 
token Union citizenship. Both the Commission and the European Parliament 
exerted pressure, successfully, on Malta to include as a ‘genuine link’ a condi-
tion of a residence status for the foreign investors.26 In the scheme just pro-
posed these interventions are not acceptable, but the Union, and the member 
states, are possibly in a position to refuse these new Maltese citizens their 
entailing status of citizens of the Union. This depends, of course, on argu-
ments derived from principles of Union law. I agree with Sergio Carrera that 
these institutions started on a dangerous path in insisting on the need for a 
genuine link, invoking bad old Nottebohm. In the first place one should bear 
in mind that in Micheletti, the simple fact that Italy acknowledged Micheletti 
as its citizen, although he had lived all his life in Argentina and had only the 
scantiest of links, iure sanguinis, with Italy, allowed him to claim his Europe-
an citizenship. The Court explicitly denied Spain the right to add any further 
conditions.
In the second place: Nottebohm is precisely an example where it was not the 
(Liechtenstein) nationality of a person that was denied (by Guatemala), but 
only one of the consequences, the exercise of diplomatic protection against 
another state.
In the third place, to introduce one or another type of ‘genuine link’ con-
dition as a requirement for all European nationality legislation would open 
up a Pandora’s box of brands of ethnic nationalism. It is playing with fire to 
inflate the flat criterion of nationality, which until now has sufficed, rightly 
 26 See the excellent paper by Carrera, S.  (2015), cit. Cf. Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2016). 
Nudging in Europees nationaliteitsrecht. In: Vonk et al., eds., Grootboek. Opstellen aange-
boden aan Prof. mr. Gerard- René de Groot. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer, p. 215– 228.
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so, as a ticket to Union citizenship.27 The acceptance by the Union and its 
member states of persons as Union citizens, although they lost their nation-
ality of a member state under municipal legislation, and, contrariwise, the 
refusal to accept persons as Union citizens in spite of their holding the na-
tionality of a member state, may presumably have repercussions on the na-
tionality legislation of the states involved. Member states may want to adapt 
their rules to the reactions of the Union and the other member states in 
terms of Union citizenship. That is their discretion, their reserved domain, 
according to international law, just as it is for other states and the Union to 
take a position as to the effects in their legal orders. This position must rest 
on considerations concerning the exigencies of international conventions, 
customary international law, and the principles generally recognised with 
regard to nationality, some of these conventions being part and parcel of the 
Union legal order including its Charter and the echr. Nudging is allowed, 
dictating not.
4 The Fundamental Status
‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States (…)’. Fifteen years ago, the ecj issued this futuristic clarion 
blast for the first time, in Grzelczyk.28 It repeated the formula one year later in 
Baumbast and R,29 and picked it up again in Rottmann,30 in slightly different 
wording: ‘destined’ was changed into ‘intended’. Whether this change was in-
tentional is not clear, although it seems that the Court saw no difference. (‘As 
the Court has several times stated’).It may have indicated a shift from its own 
vision (‘destined’) to deference to the vision of the lawmakers (‘intended’). Be 
that as it may, one is allowed, and even invited to try and figure out what this 
‘fundamental status’ is about.
 27 Is the fact that, five centuries ago, your (my) Sephardic ancestors have been banished from 
the Iberian peninsula a link genuine enough to warrant the acquisition of the Portuguese 
or Spanish nationality by descent? See H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira. (2016). Iberian nationality 
Legislation and Sephardic Jews. ‘With Due regard to Union Law’? In: Carrera and G.- R. de 
Groot, eds., European Citizenship at the Crossroads, cit., p. 251– 265.
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 september 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk, para. 31. In 
Dutch: ‘De hoedanigheid van burgers van de Unie dient immers de primaire hoedanigh-
eid van de onderdanen van de Lidstaten te zijn (…)’.
 29 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R, para. 82.











In the first place, there is its relationship to the nationality, citizenship, of 
the member states. As I see it, the status is emancipating itself from ius tractus, 
as Kochenov calls it, from being fully dependent of the laws on nationality of 
the member states, to an autonomous status which in turn defines the bound-
aries of these nationality laws.31 The tables are being turned and the laws on 
nationality have to conform with the exigencies of Union law and principles. 
Inroads are being trodden into the reserved domain. Union citizenship has in-
deed in this respect become fundamental, the laws of the member states are 
becoming derivative and dependent.
In the second place: although the bulk of the case- law of the ecj concerns 
the extent of freedom of movement, it is clear that there is a shift in attention 
from mobile citizens to those who stay at home. Many rights attached to Union 
citizenship can be exercised at home:  franchise for the EP, right of petition, 
right to approach the European Ombudsman. This fact undermines any doc-
trine on ‘the internal case’ and ‘reverse discrimination’.32 The Union citizen 
cannot be defined in terms of his whereabouts; wherever he is, he can claim 
a number of rights under the Treaties as a Union citizen. Most Union citizens 
stay at home, do hang their hat there, and enjoy their status as Union citizens, 
although they encounter negative aspects of the freedom of movement of mo-
bile citizens there as well. The proof of solidarity is in accepting displacement 
and possibly what is framed as social dumping. By cutting the citizen loose 
from his economic activities, the Treaties have expanded Union citizenship (in 
a practical sense) from a mere 2% of the populations to 100 percent and more, 
given the fact that there are quite a number of nationals of member states re-
siding in third countries as well, counting as Union citizens, though not living 
in the territories of the member states. In the third place, there is the swing 
from market citizen to citizens as political actors. The Union citizen is politi-
cised in that he exerts political power not only in electing his representatives 
in the European Parliament, but in the respective national parliaments as well. 
Both bodies are institutions of the Union as controllers and law- makers; they 
have grown in power. Union citizens have franchise in local government as 
well. They have a collective right to initiative. They vote in national referenda 
on Union issues. The so- called democratic deficit is not so much being caused 
 31 Kochenov, D. (2009). Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult 
Relationship between Status and Rights. Columbia Journal of European Law 15(2), 
pp. 169– 237.
 32 See already Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1990). The Community Case. Is reverse discrimina-
tion still permissible under the Single European Act?, In: De Beur, ed., Forty Years On: The 
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by the institutional arrangements, but by the lack of enthusiasm of the people 
as political actors. The non- voters have little ground to decry the lack of de-
mocracy in the Union; the low turnouts at national elections in many member 
states are mirrored by the elections for the European Parliament. Democratic 
deficit may also be defined as the waning trust of the European populations in 
the workings of their existing democracies and politicians and the problem of 
which of the manifold regulating and policy making institutions and agencies 
to address.33 We need more active citizens!
There remain a lot of desiderata. New pies in the sky. To name a few: Union 
citizenship should be extended to long- term residents on the territories of the 
Union Member states. The content of Union citizenship should be expanded 
in several ways in various areas, not only to make the concept more coherent, 
but also to offer the beneficiaries more rights in the Union and all of its mem-
ber states. This means doing away with the doctrine of the internal case, a long 
overdue exercise. One cannot uphold the idea of Union citizenship with con-
comitant rights that can be exercised in part in the home member state, one 
cannot create an area without internal frontiers, and at the same time main-
tain internal borders. Petit à petit l’oiseau fait son nid!
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 chapter 4
EU Citizenship as a Means of Broadening 




The EU is no longer an organisation which merely pursues economic ob-
jectives but is also evolving towards a more political and constitutionalised 
Union. The article supports the idea that the political integration in the do-
main of EU fundamental rights is primarily evolving through a ‘triangular’, 
inter- connected system of protection, including the constructivist transfor-
mation of EU citizenship, the institutionalised developments of EU law,1 and 
the protection of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. Yet major 
components of a comprehensive and all- embracing fundamental rights pol-
icy are still absent, which is even more perceptible during periods of crisis, 
such as the recent financial crisis, where the gaps in citizens’ rights protection 
became evident due to the difficulties encountered in challenging the con-
sequences of the conditionality imposed.2 This deficient protection largely 
derived from the restricted scope of application of fundamental rights under 
the Charter, its unstable judicial interpretation, and in turn from the unwill-
ingness of the Court to rule on complex financial cases. The financial crisis 
and its mechanisms constitute a useful case study from which to assess the 
modern ‘triangular’ protection of rights and encourage interest in assessing 
new legal paths to reinforce it.
Although EU citizenship has not played a substantial role in the financial 
crisis, this article suggests that it is not constrained to its current, ‘confined’ 
 * Early Career Fellow in European Union Law, Edinburgh Law School.
 1 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional 
Change. The Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp. 233– 267, 250 et seq.
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form, since it is designed to encounter constant evolution and progress.3 Its 
constructive character culminated in the judicially developed ‘substance of 
the rights’ doctrine, which has substantially altered the architecture of EU fun-
damental rights protection towards including purely internal violations within 
the Union’s scope, if they amount to emptying Union citizenship rights of their 
substantive meaning. When placed within a new jurisdictional test, the doc-
trine can arguably fill the gaps of the current protection system in an effort to 
link EU fundamental and citizenship rights and propose an alternative, more 
effective use of rights.
ii Setting the Scene: Legal Characteristics of the ‘Triangular’ 
Fundamental Rights Protection System
The first corner of the ‘triangle’ is the legal concept of Union citizenship,4 which 
constituted a decisive step towards a constitutionalised Union;5 although a rel-
evant personal status had clearly matured long before its formal incorporation 
in the Maastricht Treaty.6 The list of rights provided under Article 20 tfeu, 
although non- exhaustive, fell short of establishing the full range of modern 
citizenship rights,7 since no legal connection was declared with fundamental 
rights. The Commission however, defined EU citizenship as a dynamic con-
cept which should always reflect ‘the aims of the Union, […] stemming from 
the gradual and coherent development of the Union’s political, economic and 
 3 Union citizenship, Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference 
sec (91) 500 Bull EC Supp. 2/ 91, p. 87; Closa, C.  (1992). The Concept of Citizenship in the 
Treaty on European Union. Common Market Law Review 29 (6), pp. 1137– 1169, 1167.
 4 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 250.
 5 Wiener, A. (1999). The Constructive Potential of Citizenship: building European Union. Policy 
& Politics 27 (3), pp. 271– 293.
 6 Kochenov, D., and Plender, R. (2012). EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient 
Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text. European Law Review 37, pp. 369– 396; Welge, 
R. (2015). Union Citizenship as Demoi- cratic Institution: Increasing the EU’s Subjective Legit-
imacy Through Supranational Citizenship. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (1), pp. 56– 74; 
Kostakopoulou, T.  (2010). Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union:  be-
tween Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press; O’Leary, S. The relationship 
between Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community 
law. Common Market Law Review 32 (2), pp. 519– 554, 519.
 7 European Parliament (1991). Bindi Report on Union Citizenship. Doc. A 3- 0139/ 91, 23 May 
1991; Closa, C. (1995). Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States. Common 













social dimension’.8 It has indeed proved to be of ‘constructivist’ nature, espe-
cially through the Court of Justice’s case law, by deepening European integra-
tion, based on a federal logic, while broadening the potential impact on EU 
fundamental rights. Namely, after Martínez Sala,9 EU citizenship demonstrat-
ed a shift away from ‘economic and market citizens’, to a social and political 
dimension,10 while establishing protection against discrimination based on 
nationality and a free- standing right to move and reside freely.11 The construc-
tivist nature of EU citizenship culminated with the inclusion of new, unwritten 
rights into the concept, through the ‘substance of the rights doctrine’.
Regardless of the influence exerted by EU citizenship in forming current 
policies, a significant role was also played by the ‘effects of institutional in-
teraction’,12 such as the Charter, whose list of rights is far more extensive, as 
it reunites a wide range of rights and freedoms  – including socioeconomic 
rights  – which have been violated the most during the financial crisis.13 On 
the contrary, considering the nature of the two concepts, the list under EU 
citizenship might currently be limited, but its constructivist nature arguably 
allows for expansion of the ‘inter alia list’ under Article 20 tfeu. Therefore, 
 8 Union citizenship, Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence, cit., p. 87.
 9 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C- 85/ 96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat 
Bayern.
 10 O’Leary, S. (1999). Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship. European 
Law Review 24 (1), pp. 68– 79; Kochenov, D. (2009). Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European 
Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between status and Rights. Columbia Journal of 
European Law 15 (1), pp.169– 237, 173 et seq.
 11 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 September 2004, case C- 456/ 02, Trojani; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk; Barnard, C.  (2013). The 
Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R, para. 83; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 26 October 2006, case C- 192/ 05, Tas- Hagen and Tas; Opinion of AG 
Kokott delivered on 30 March 2006, case C- 192/ 05, Tas- Hagen Tas, para. 33.
 12 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 264; Liisberg, 
J.B. (2001). Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter:  a fountain of law of just an inkblot. Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, no. 4/ 01, p. 7; Lenaerts, K. (2012). Exploring the Limits of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. European Constitutional Law Review 8 (3), pp. 375– 403; 
Arestis, G. (2013). Fundamental Rights in the EU: Three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg 
Perspective. College of Europe Cooperative Research Papers No. 2/ 2013, p. 2; Schneider, C.B. 
(2014). The evolution of the first Bill of Rights of the European Union and its position 
within the constellation of national and regional fundamental rights protection systems. 
Bridging Europe Working Paper, p. 2 et seq.
 13 Peers, S., Hervey, T., Kenner, J., and Ward, A., eds. (2014). The EU Charter of Fundamental 
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while the list of rights under the Charter adequately incorporates the rights vi-
olated during the financial crisis, the precise extent of Union citizenship rights 
cannot be clearly defined from a strictly textual perspective. However, it is gen-
erally believed that the essence of EU citizenship is much broader than the list 
provided by Article 20(2) tfeu, in the broader sense of what supranational 
citizenships entail.14
The third piece of the EU triangular system is the protection of fundamental 
rights as general principles of EU law, many of which are unwritten and judge- 
made, but the majority of which have been codified in the Treaties over time.15 
They inter alia assist with judicial interpretations and legal reviews,16 but more 
importantly, they are largely used to fill legal gaps where relevant EU laws are 
lacking or do not provide a concrete answer.17 It can thus be argued that gen-
eral principles are both institutional and constructive in nature, since they are 
enshrined in the Treaty, but the Court regularly recognises new rights as falling 
within the ‘general principles umbrella’, under Article 2 teu.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness and potential use of the instruments in a 
crisis, largely depends on their material and/ or personal scope of application 
and the existence of any legal restrictions. The scope of EU citizenship was 
largely based on the logic of economic growth,18 which has arguably dimin-
ished its essence and the attempts made in the Maastricht Treaty to connect 
it with the citizen.19 However, the cjeu has identified an increasing number 
 14 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 26 et seq.
 15 Cuyvers, A. (2017). General Principles of EU law. In: Ugirashebuja, Ruhangisa, Ottervanger, 
and Cuyvers, eds., East African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and Comparative 
EU Aspects. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, p. 220.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 1991, joined cases C- 6/ 90 and C- 9/ 90 
Francovich, para. 30; Court of Justice, judgment of 5 March 1996, joined cases C- 46/ 93 and 
C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, paras. 27– 36; Court of Justice, judgment of 8 April 2004, 
joined cases C- 293/ 12 and 594/ 12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, para. 10.
 17 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 January 2010, case C- 555/ 07, Kücükdeveci, para. 21; Court 
of Justice, judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/ 83, Les Verts v. Parliament, para. 12.
 18 Kochenov, D.  (2011). A  Real European Citizenship:  A new Jurisdiction Test:  A Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European Law 
18 (1), pp. 56– 109, 61; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship. 
Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1597– 1628, 1621 et seq.; Eeckhout, P. (2002). The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question. Common Market Law Review 39 
(5), pp. 945– 994, 971; Douglas- Scott, S. (1998). In Search of Union Citizenship. Yearbook of 
European Law 18 (1), pp. 29– 65, 30 et seq.
 19 Shaw, J.  (2010). Citizenship:  Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and 














of ‘citizenship cases in which the element of true movement is either barely 
discernible or non- existent’,20 while the ratione materiae of EU law has been 
further stretched to cover virtually hypothetical cross- border situations.21 EU 
citizenship has further managed to overcome the strict requirement for a cross- 
border element completely, by creating an independent, EU citizenship- based 
right,22 and redefining the material and personal scope of EU citizenship23 to 
allow more cases to fall within the cjeu’s jurisdiction. Most importantly, in 
Ruiz Zambrano the Court ruled that Article 20 tfeu prevents Member States 
from taking measures which have the effect of ‘depriving EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred on them by the citi-
zenship of the Union’.24 It therefore created the possibility of EU law ‘interven-
ing’, once the enjoyment of the essence of EU citizenship rights is brought into 
question.25
The restriction on the field of application of the Charter under Article 51(1)26 
also severely limits the scope of fundamental rights policies, including the 
relevant jurisdiction for challenges to austerity measures. The Court has not 
accepted the restriction easily, although it continues to be difficult to predict 
whether a domestic measure will be found to be bound by the Charter.27 The 
Spaventa, E. (2008). Seeing the Wood despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship 
and its Constitutional Effects. Common Market Law Review 45 (1), pp. 13– 45, 40.
 20 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano; 
van Eijken, H., and de Vries, S.A. (2011). A  New Route into the Promised Land? Being 
a European Citizen after Ruiz Zambrano. European Law Review 36 (5), pp.  704– 721, 
710; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations:  An 
Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 35 (1), pp. 43– 67, 50 
et seq.; See further: Court of Justice, judgment of 14 October 2008, case C- 353/ 06, Grunkin 
and Paul.
 21 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 October 2004, case C- 200/ 02, Zhu and Chen, para. 45; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2005, case C- 403/ 03, Schempp, para. 47; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 2 October 2003, case C- 148/ 02, Garcia Avello, para. 45; Spaventa, 
E. (2008). Seeing the Wood despite the Trees, cit., p. 21.
 22 O’Brien, C. (2016).“Hand- to- mouth” citizenship: decision time for the UK Supreme Court 
on the substance of Zambrano rights, EU citizenship and equal treatment. Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law 38 (2), pp.228– 245, 229 et seq.
 23 Rottmann, cit.
 24 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 42.
 25 Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations, cit., p.  50 
et seq.
 26 Fontanelli, F.  (2014). The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States 
under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Columbia Journal of European 
Law 20 (2), pp. 194– 247, 193 et seq.
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Court has interestingly interpreted ‘implementation’ under Article 51(1) broad-
ly as meaning to ‘fall within the scope of EU law’.28 In Fransson29 a remote 
connection with EU law was enough to trigger the Charter, stressing how much 
grey area remains in the interpretation of this provision. The scope of EU fun-
damental rights is therefore interpreted variously, with the Charter being more 
likely to apply to national rules in cases with a stronger EU interest, while ap-
plying only in extreme cases regarding the co- ordination of rules.30 Therefore, 
although the Court has interpreted Article 51(1) broadly, the level of discretion 
available allows it to promote a differentiated understanding of the Charter’s 
scope of application in selected cases. The vagueness and uncertainty deriving 
therefrom,31 was also criticised by the European Parliament, stating that the 
citizens’ expectations “go beyond the Charter’s strictly legal provisions” and 
called on the Commission to do more to meet citizens’ expectations.32 With-
in the framework of strengthening the protection of EU fundamental rights, 
the Parliament had even proposed the deletion of Article 51 of the Charter,33 
recognising the structural difficulties it creates. A reinforced system, towards 
a truly constitutionalised Union, could be achieved by adopting a broader and 
more stable use of the Charter, to make rights more visible to citizens, espe-
cially in situations which are firmly within the scope of EU law or have a clear 
connection with it, such as those of the European Stability Mechanism (esm).
General principles of EU law are also invoked when ‘implementing Union 
law’, in view of the fact that almost all Charter rights have been previously rec-
ognised as general principles.34 Unlike the Charter, however, due to their hy-
brid nature, the scope of application of general principles is not as restricted.35 
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 June 1991, case C- 260/ 89, ERT v. DEP, para. 42; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 13 June 1996, case C- 144/ 95, Maurin.
 29 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C- 617/ 10, Åkerberg Fransson; 
Spaventa, E.  (2016). The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights:  The Dilemma of Stricter or Broader Application of the Charter to National 
Measures. European Parliament’s PETI Committee PE 556.930.
 30 Spaventa, E.  (2016). The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, cit., p. 10.
 31 Fontanelli, F. (2014). The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States, cit., 
p. 200.
 32 European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2016 on the activities of the Committee of 
Petitions, 2014, (2014/ 2218(INI)), para. 24.
 33 European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental 
rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/ 2078(INI)), para. 15.
 34 van den Brink, M.J. (2012). EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights:  Taking EU 
Citizenship Rights Seriously. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 39 (2), pp. 273– 289, 287.
 35 Tridimas, T.  (2013). Horizontal Effect of General Principles:  Bold Rulings and Fine 

















According to AG Bot in his Opinion in Scattolon, the restrictive scope of appli-
cation defined for the Charter was not intended to restrict the scope of appli-
cation of the fundamental rights recognised as general principles of EU law,36 
which can still be invoked where the Charter cannot. Therefore, in terms of 
the scope of application of the respective instruments, it is argued that a con-
structivist understanding of EU citizenship can more effectively overcome its 
restrictions compared to the Charter, demonstrating its greater potential for 
safeguarding citizens’ rights.37
iii The Modern Protection of Fundamental Rights
To cope with the financial crisis and safeguard financial stability in the euro 
area,38 new mechanisms were adopted,39 including the permanent esm, 
which was established as an international, intergovernmental Treaty (esmt)40 
concluded and ratified by the Member States outside the EU legal order. Ac-
cordingly, Article 136(3) tfeu states that the mechanism is activated if indis-
pensable to safeguarding the stability of the euro area as a whole, subject to 
strict conditionality,41 which is agreed under the relevant memoranda of un-
derstanding (MoUs). As a way to alleviate budgetary concerns, conditionality 
is based on austerity and includes reductions in public spending, cuts in wages 
European Private Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer; Lenaerts K., and Gutiérrez- 
Fons, J.A. (2010). The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law. 
Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1629– 1669, 1640; Court of Justice, judgment of 13 
July 1989, case 5/ 88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft.
 36 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 5 April 2011, case C- 108/ 10, Scattolon, para. 120.
 37 Kochenov, D. (2011). A Real European Citizenship, cit., p. 61.
 38 Tuori, K. (2014). The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis by Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus 
Tuori, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; European Commission (2015). Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area. Economic and Financial Affairs 14 (2), p. 28, http:// ec.europa.
eu/ economy_ finance/ publications/ eeip/ pdf/ ip001_ en.pdf; Regulation (EU) 407/ 2010 of 
the Council of 11 May 2010 on establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism; 
Council Document 9614/ 10 of 10 May 2010, OJ L/ 118, 12.05.2010, p. 1– 4.
 39 Rodriguez, P.M. (2016). A missing piece of European emergency law: legal certainty and 
individuals’ expectations in the EU response to the crisis. European Constitutional Law 
Review 12 (2), pp. 265– 293, 270.
 40 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (esm) (2012) D/ 12/ 3, Recitals 
1 and 5.
 41 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, case C- 370/ 12, Pringle, paras. 142– 143; 
Craig, P. (2014). Pringle and the Nature of Legal Reasoning. Maastricht Journal of European 
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and increases in tax revenues.42 Although necessary for the mechanism to 
work,43 the conditionality imposed was repeatedly challenged for fundamen-
tal rights infringements.44 Due to the diversified legal establishment and the 
use of the financial assistance mechanisms, the judicial challenges have prov-
en arduous,45 while the current protection system has been largely ineffective 
in protecting EU citizens’ rights.
The Court has repeatedly referred to the Charter in its rulings, only to con-
clude in most cases that it cannot be invoked due to a lack of connection with 
EU law. Therefore, leaving aside the level of protection which could actually 
have been offered by the Charter, the Court’s persistent preference for inter-
preting Article 51(1) in the narrowest way possible when in fact a connection 
with EU law could be identified, has led EU citizens to a state of deadlock in 
such actions. This is primarily the case in claims against the Member States, 
which are under a duty to implement the agreed conditionality into national 
laws, in order to restore stability and return to sustainable growth.46 The Court 
in Pringle47 and later in Sindicatos dos Bancarios,48 ruled that the provisions of 
the Charter do not apply to the implementation of the MoUs for the provision 
of stability support under the esm, since the Member States are not imple-
menting Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.49 The 
 42 Theodoropoulou, S., and Watt, A.(2011). Withdrawal symptoms: an assessment of the aus-
terity packages in Europe. European Trade Union Institute Working papers No. 2/ 2011, p. 11 
et seq. 8.
 43 Gilliams, H.  (2011). Stress Testing the Regulator:  Review of State Aid to Financial 
Institutions after the Collapse of Lehman. European Law Review 36 (1), pp. 3– 25, 5 et seq.; 
Avalos, H.R.B. (2012). Moral Hazard in the Euro- Zone. MPRA Papers No. 61103, p. 2 et seq.; 
Pringle, cit., paras. 69 and 111.
 44 Lusiani, N., and Saiz, I.  (2014). Safeguarding human rights in times of economic cri-
sis. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, available at https:// rm.coe.int/ 
safeguarding- human- rights- in- times- of- economic- crisis- issue- paper- publ/ 1680908dfa. 
https:// rm.coe.int/ 16806daa3f.
 45 Kilpatrick, C.  (2015). On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency:  The Degradation 
of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2), 
pp. 325– 353, 331.
 46 Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between European Stability Mechanism and 
The Republic of Cyprus as the Beneficiary Member State and Central Bank of Cyprus 
as Central Bank, https:// www.esm.europa.eu/ sites/ default/ files/ esm_ ffa_ cyprus_ publica-
tion_ version_ final.pdf.
 47 Pringle, cit., para. 178.
 48 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 March 2013, case C- 128/ 12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte 
and Others.
 49 Adam, S., and Mena Parras, F.J. (2013). The European Stability Mechanism through the 
legal meanderings of the Union’s constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle. European Law 

















Pringle ruling had raised intense debate, since the esmt, indicates that the EU 
framework should be observed by the esm members, especially ‘the economic 
governance rules’ set out in the tfeu,50 while previous rulings and principles, 
allowed more room for a connecting link with EU law.51
Further reluctance was manifested, in Sindicato Nacional,52 where the 
Court, narrowly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to determine the request 
for preliminary ruling, since no link with EU law was found.53 In contrast, 
although, the Portuguese Government seemed to ‘have gone further than its 
commitments in the MoU’,54 the national legislation also makes express ref-
erence to the Council Decision on granting financial assistance, thus at least a 
remote link between the national measure with EU law was evident. The Court 
of Justice was straightforwardly asked about the validity and interpretation of 
specific provisions implemented in national law in Florescu,55 where it had for 
the first time indicated that since the MoU is an act of the EU institutions, it 
must be regarded as implementing that law according to Article 51(1), despite 
the amount of discretion they have in deciding the implementing measures.56 
As a whole, the Charter failed to protect EU citizens’ rights completely during 
the financial crisis, primarily because the unstable status of the restriction un-
der Article 51(1) allowed the Courts to treat claims against Member States as 
purely internal,57 even when a remote connection with EU law existed. This 
approach largely deprived citizens of the ability to proceed in such litigation to 
the factual assessment of the disputed measures and possible remedies.
 50 Beck, G. (2014). The Court of Justice, legal reasoning, and the Pringle case – law as the 
continuation of politics by other means. European Law Review 39 (2), pp. 234– 250, 240; 
Hinarejos, A.  (2013). The Court of Justice of the EU and the legality of the European 
Stability Mechanism. Cambridge Law Journal 72 (2), pp. 237– 240, 237.
 51 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2009, case C- 45/ 07, Commission v. Greece; Court 
of Justice, judgment of 20 April 2010, case C- 246/ 07 Commission v.  Sweden, para. 91; 
Barnard, C. (2013). The Charter, the Court – and the Crisis. University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Papers No. 18/ 2013, p. 9.
 52 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 June 2014, case C- 264/ 12, Sindicato Nacional dos 
Profissionais de Seguros e Afins.
 53 See also, Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2012, case C- 134/ 12, Corpul Naţional al 
Poliţiştilor.
 54 Barnard, C. (2013). The Charter in time of crisis: a case study of dismissal. In: Countouris, 
and Freedland, eds., Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis. Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, p. 262.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 June 2017, case C- 258/ 14, Florescu and Others.
 56 Ibid., para. 34.
 57 Kilpatrick, C. (2015). Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are 
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The Charter has been more successfully invoked against the acts of the EU 
institutions tasked with negotiating the MoUs and overseeing the austerity 
plan.58 In her view in Pringle, AG Kokott emphasised that the Commission re-
mains a Union institution and is bound by the full extent of EU law, even when 
acting within the framework of the esm.59 Accordingly, the Court in Ledra Ad-
vertising Ltd stated that the Commission retains within the framework of the 
esmt, its role as guardian of the Treaties and should refrain from signing an 
MoU whose consistency with EU law and the Charter is doubtful.60
In contrast, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law have rarely 
been used, and only recently with any positive effect. Specifically, Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses61 questioned the compatibility of austerity mea-
sures imposed on the judiciary with the principle of judicial independence. 
The Court clearly sought to overcome the legal barrier of the Charter by invok-
ing the principle of effective judicial protection under Article 19(1) teu, since 
according to the Court, its material scope goes beyond that of Article 47 of the 
Charter. Although this is a beneficial development for fundamental rights, it is 
another demonstration of the Charter’s weaknesses, forcing the Court to resort 
to concepts from the pre- constitutionalisation years, where the protection of 
rights solely depended on general principles. In contrast to the minimal appli-
cation of the Charter and the general principles, EU citizenship has not played 
any substantive role in the austerity measures case law. This is primarily due 
to the limited list of rights attached to it, rendering it irrelevant in such cases, 
which are grounded in alleged fundamental rights’ infringements, thus demot-
ing citizenship from being ‘the fundamental status of Union citizens’.62
The limited applicability of these legal instruments left many wondering 
how fundamental rights can be among the foundational values of a constitu-
tionalised Union, if their use can be limited more easily than it can be invoked. 
It has also resulted in a gap in effective judicial protection, because of the lim-
ited routes available to access justice, the reluctance of the Courts to support 
those seeking to minimise the impact of the austerity measures, and finally 
because the Court’s rulings were largely based on reasons unconnected with 
 58 Article 13(3) of the esm Treaty.
 59 Opinion of AG Kokott, Pringle, cit., para. 176; Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 
Opinion, 11 February 2014, 2013/ 2277(INI), para. 11.
 60 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2016, joined cases C- 8/ 15 P to C- 10/ 15 P, Ledra 
Advertising v. Commission and ECB, para. 59.
 61 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 February 2018, case C- 64/ 16, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses; See further, Court of Justice, judgment of 7 February 2019, case C- 49/ 
18, Escribano Vindel.












law, but rather with politics.63 The reluctance of the Court is arguably based 
on the nature of the claims under dispute, which include complex econom-
ic situations and can have substantial impact on national democracy.64 The 
Court has therefore demonstrated a preference for ‘evading’ performing legal 
assessment, rather than embarking on judicial activism, so as to avoid the hos-
tile reaction which would ensue. A disparity in the pursuit of Union objectives 
is also demonstrated, namely that the Court seems more willing now to act 
to address the current rule of law crisis and protect the democratic judicial 
processes at the national and European level,65 than it did during the financial 
crisis. Interest in assessing new routes to equally safeguard citizens’ rights and 
Union’s objectives has been prompted, such as the use of EU citizenship in 
novel areas using the recent ‘substance of the rights doctrine’.
iv The Court’s ‘substance of the rights’ Doctrine
To tackle the limitations of EU law described above effectively, a broader scope 
of application of fundamental rights is needed, using a ‘living instrument’ 
with transformative qualities, such as the concept of EU citizenship, and the 
substance of the rights doctrine. Rottmann66 in particular has been correctly 
described as the foundation which paved the way towards the emancipation 
of EU citizenship from the limits inherent in its free movement origins.67 The 
Court indicated the importance of having due regard to EU law when exercis-
ing national powers within the sphere of nationality,68 and specifically ruling 
 63 Tomkin, J. (2013). Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact 
of the Adoption of the esm Treaty on the State of European Democracy. German Law 
Journal 14 (1), pp. 169– 189, 180 et seq.; Repasi, R. (2017). Judicial protection against austerity 
measures in the euro area: Ledra and Mallis. Common Market Law Review 54 (4), pp. 1123– 
1155, 1123 et seq.; Ghailani, D. (2017). Violations of fundamental rights: collateral damage of 
the Eurozone crisis. In: Vanhercke, Natali, and Bouget, eds., Social policy in the European 
Union: state of play 2016. Brussels: etui, p. 158 et seq.
 64 Kriesi, H.  (2012). The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
Europe:  Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest. Swiss Political Science Review 18 
(4), pp.  518– 522, 519 et seq.; Funke, M., Schularick, M., and Trebesch, C.  (2016). Going 
to extremes:  Politics after financial crises 1870– 2014. European Economic Review 88, 
pp. 227– 260, 230.
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 July 2018, case C- 216/ 18 PPU, Minister for Justice and 
Equality.
 66 Rottmann, cit.
 67 Lenaerts, K. (2015). EU citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s ‘stone- by- stone’ 
approach. International Comparative Jurisprudence 1 (1), pp. 1– 10, 2.
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that where an EU citizen is addressed by a decision withdrawing naturalisa-
tion, which causes him to lose the status and the rights conferred by Article 20 
tfeu, this falls by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit 
of EU law.69 The citizenship- specific rights which a person would lose are thus 
emphasised, rather than the general human rights imperative, which indicates 
a substantial increase in the effect of EU citizenship on national citizenship.70
The Ruiz Zambrano case offered further insights into this development and 
extended the idea that Member States and the EU should leave the substan-
tive core of rights under EU citizenship intact.71 In answering the question of 
whether Article 20 tfeu has an autonomous character and serves as a suffi-
cient connection with EU law, the Court of Justice developed a jurisdictional 
test, whereby national measures are precluded if depriving EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship rights.72 Consequent-
ly, third- country nationals obtain a derived right to reside in their children’s 
Member State of nationality under Article 20 tfeu when the factual condi-
tions of Ruiz Zambrano are met.73 This ruling constitutes one of the most in-
spiring of the last decade, primarily due to it marking a departure from the 
traditional cross- border concept, as the Court interpreted Article 20 tfeu as 
a sufficient link in itself,74 consequently extending the scope of application of 
EU law. Secondly, because the prohibition against a violation of the substance 
of rights has been applied as a self- standing EU test,75 while it had hitherto 
been applied within the context of the proportionality test. Despite the po-
tentially enormous implications of the doctrine, it has been characterised as 
frustratingly opaque,76 since little clarity was provided with regards to the cir-
cumstances under which it can be invoked.
Subsequent case law provided further clarity, on the conditions for trigger-
ing the recently developed doctrine. It is evident that not every limitation of a 
 69 Ibid., para. 42.
 70 Shaw, J.  (2011). Setting the scene:  the Rottmann case introduced. In:  Shaw, ed., Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? EUI 
Working Papers RSCAS 2011/ 62, p. 4.
 71 Ruiz Zambrano, cit.
 72 Ibid., para. 44.
 73 Ibid., para. 45.
 74 van Eijken, H., and de Vries, S.A. (2011). A New Route into the Promised Land, cit., p. 711.
 75 van den Brink, M.  (2017). The origins and the Potential Federalising Effects of the 
Substance of Rights Test. In:  Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism:  The Role of 
Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 90 et seq.
 76 Lansbergen, A., and Miller, N. (2011). European Citizenship Rights in Internal Situations: An 


















right will trigger the doctrine, but only its deprivation. In particular, the Court 
clarified in McCarthy77 that Article 21 tfeu is ‘applicable to situations that 
have the effect of depriving [a Union citizen] of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights’ under EU citizenship or of ‘impeding the exercise of 
his right of free movement and residence’ within the Member States.78 The 
use of the doctrine, does not thus depend on an EU citizens’ age, but rather 
upon the seriousness of the restraint to the substance of the rights normally 
conferred. Therefore, a distinction is made whereby the ‘impeding effect’ re-
fers to the traditional line of case law requiring a cross- border link, without 
requiring the national measures to cause the loss of the status of Union citi-
zens in practice.79 If no cross- border situation occurs, only a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights will trigger EU law,80 requiring the national measure to 
create more than a ‘serious inconvenience’. Moreover, in Dereci,81 the Court in-
dicated that the ‘deprivation’ of the substance of the rights refers to situations 
in which the Union citizen not only has to leave the territory of the Member 
State, but the Union territory as a whole.82 The strict approach was confirmed 
in Yoshikazu lida,83 where the Court recalled that ‘purely hypothetical pros-
pects of exercising the right of freedom of movement’ and of that right being 
obstructed84 do not establish a sufficient link with EU law. This stricter ap-
proach85 emphasised the need to determine whether there is a relationship of 
dependency with the child’s primary carer,86 while a major part underlying the 
Court’s reasoning was clearly based on the respect for the division and balance 
of competences as enshrined in Article 5 teu. The Court of Justice affirmed 
in Rendón Marín that the prohibition under Article 20 tfeu, only applies in 
‘very specific’ situations, while this derived right cannot be refused when the 
 77 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, McCarthy.
 78 McCarthy, cit., para. 56.
 79 Lenaerts, K. (2011). ‘Civis Europeus Sum’: from the cross- border link to the status of citizen 
of the Union. Online Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union 3, 
pp. 6– 18, 8 et seq.
 80 McCarthy, cit., para. 56.
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 November 2011, case C- 256/ 11, Dereci and Others.
 82 Ibid., para. 66.
 83 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 November 2012, case C- 40/ 11, Iida.
 84 Ibid., para. 77.
 85 See further: Court of Justice, judgment of 8 May 2013, case C- 87/ 12, Ymeraga and Ymeraga- 
Tafarshiku; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 133/ 15, Chávez- Vílchez and 
Others.
 86 Royston, T., and O’Brien, C. (2017). Breathing and not- incarcerated, estranged fathers do 
not automatically cancel out mothers’ Zambrano rights. Journal of Social Security Law 24 
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effectiveness of EU citizenship is to be disregarded.87 Therefore, in the Court’s 
view, any possible limitations on the substance of citizenship rights under-
mine its effectiveness.88 A de facto loss of a Union citizenship right is thus re-
quired, which rightly reduces the consequences of the test without being too 
intrusive.89 Although it is believed that fundamental rights should not be ruled 
out based on a narrow reading of the Treaties,90 the doctrine should be applied 
only when EU citizenship rights are deprived and cannot be remedied at the 
national level, to keep the test within the limits of an acceptable federal and 
legal balance within the EU.
The reasoning of Rottmann was more recently applied in Tjebbes,91 confirm-
ing the applicability of EU law and competence of the Court to answer the 
Raad van State’s (Council of State) question on the compatibility of Dutch na-
tionality law with the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, even though the loss 
of nationality occurred by operation of a law rather than an express individual 
decision.92 The Tjebbes judgment has in fact been even more progressive in 
intervening into Member State nationality law, both procedurally and substan-
tively, by requiring an individual examination of any decision withdrawing na-
tionality having regard to a set of consequences linked to the status of Union 
citizenship. While this judicial progression, constitutionalising one of the few 
areas of executive discretion and dominance,93 could constitute the means to 
effectively protect the legal heritage of EU citizens, the Court followed a rather 
unexpected logic. Despite the jurisdictional examination, the ruling in Tjebbes 
tacitly overturns previous caselaw of the Court by holding that EU law does 
not preclude the withdrawal of EU citizenship based on an ex lege annulment, 
which comes without warning and based on no wrong- doing.94 In other words, 
 87 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 165/ 14, Rendón Marín, para. 74.
 88 Neuvonen, P.J. (2017). EU citizenship and its “very specific” essence: Rendón Marín and CS. 
Common Market Law Review 54 (4), pp. 1201– 1220, 1205 et seq.
 89 See further: Ritter, C. (2006). Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, 
Dzodzi and Article 234. European Law Review 31 (5), pp. 690– 710; Wiesbrock, A.  (2012). 
Disentangling the ‘Union Citizenship Puzzle’? The McCarthy Case. European Law Review 
36 (6), pp. 861– 873; Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2014). Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of 
the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison? European Law 
Journal 20 (4), pp. 464– 481.
 90 D. Kochenov, On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator, in 
D. Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 10.
 91 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes and others.
 92 Ibid., para. 20.
 93 S. Coutts, Bold and Thoughtful:  The Court of Justice Intervenes in Nationality Case 
Law: Case C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes, in European Law Blog, 25 March 2019, europeanlawblog.eu.


















while confirming and even extending the applicability of EU law when exam-
ining the loss/ acquisition of EU citizenship, the Court regressively made EU 
citizenship dependent upon the renewal of a passport before its expiration 
according to the facts of the case.
The judicial establishment of the doctrine, is of great significance, not only 
concerning its numerous implications, but also in relation to its prospects for 
further progress and development, towards a more constitutionalised Union. In 
particular, the judicial activism of the Court of Justice has marked a process of 
re- delimiting the scope of EU law, through the development of the constructiv-
ist nature of EU citizenship, while more meaning and value has been granted to 
the concept of EU citizenship and the rights attached thereto. More important-
ly, the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, has expanded the non- exhaustive list, 
towards including new rights. The ‘inter alia clause’ under Article 20(2) tfeu 
suggests that citizens can enjoy further rights, beyond those expressly stated 
therein, not only through the procedure enshrined under Article 25 tfeu but 
also through the judicial incorporation of unwritten rights.95 Following the re-
cent judicial developments, the list has indeed been expanded to include new 
rights, contrary to the allegation of McCarthy that the approach put forward in 
Ruiz Zambrano was only applicable to the ‘rights listed in Article 20(2) tfeu’.96 
This consideration is arguably rather unexpected and inaccurate since the re-
cent series of case law has protected EU citizens’ rights not expressly listed in 
Article 20(2) tfeu, such as the right against forced removal from the EU’s ter-
ritory or even the ability to benefit from equality in a wholly internal situation 
outside the scope of EU law.97 It is therefore argued that the extent of Union 
citizenship rights is much broader than what is defined in a textual sense.98
v The Way Forward: the ‘Internal Applicability of EU Law’ Test
The recently developed ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, seems to have the 
potential to change the architecture of the fundamental rights protection, to-
wards enhancing the modern protection of EU citizens’ rights and overcoming 
 95 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit., p. 25 et seq.
 96 Lenaerts, K. (2011). ‘Civis Europeus Sum’, cit., p. 9.
 97 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 300/ 04, Eman and Sevinger, para. 
61; Besselink, L.M. (2008). Annotation of Spain v UK, Eman en Sevinger, and ECtHR Case 
Seviger and Eman v The Netherlands. Common Market Law Review 45 (3), pp. 787– 813.
 98 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
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the deficiencies identified. This can be done by establishing a connection of 
the substance of the rights doctrine with the Charter rights and/ or the funda-
mental rights as general principles of EU law, aiming to grant EU citizens a core 
of rights other than those already listed in Article 20(2).
The proposed way forward, namely the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test 
will be built on two main starting points. It will be firstly based on the idea that 
the non- exhaustive list under Article 20(2) tfeu, should always be interpreted 
in compliance with Article 2 teu which the Member States are also obliged 
to comply with. The second starting point is that beyond the scope of Article 
51(1) of the Charter, fundamental rights issues are left to national legislation 
and judiciary, provided that they safeguard the values enshrined under Article 
2 teu. The recent developments have, however, allowed some room for EU in-
tervention, in cases that are normally considered as wholly internal and/ or as 
falling outside the scope of EU law.99 The proposal brings the classic doctrine 
a step further, by proposing a three- step jurisdictional test which will allow EU 
fundamental rights, besides the ones under the list of Article 20 tfeu, to be 
specifically used in purely internal situations. The test particularly involves a 
judicial incorporation combing a dynamic reading of Article 2 teu, Article 20 
tfeu and the general principles of EU law.
1 First Step: Delimiting the Test in Accordance with Article 2 teu
The first step of the test consists in the delimitation of the scope of application 
of the proposal using Article 2 teu, in a different way from von Bogdandy’s 
‘reverse Solange’.100 This article supports that the ‘inter alia clause’ under the 
non- exhaustive list of Article 20(2) tfeu should be interpreted as including 
the Union’s foundational values, which also work as general legal standards of 
protection for EU citizens. However, broadening the scope of application of 
fundamental rights cannot be achieved merely by extending the list of EU cit-
izenship rights already falling within the sphere of the substance of the rights 
doctrine. It is necessary to focus on cases which require EU intervention by de-
limiting the scope of application of the proposal to the essential core of rights, 
which represents the minimum circle of fundamental rights common to the 
Member States, which cannot be diminished without the right in question los-
ing its value either for the right holder or for society as a whole.101 The first step 
 99 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange – Protecting the essence of fundamental 
rights against EU Member States. Common Market Law Review 49 (2), pp. 489– 519, 490.
 100 Ibid., p. 489.
 101 Brkan, M.  (2018). The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal 









will essentially elaborate this idea through Article 2 teu102 and embody an 
assessment of the exact content of its values.
Although Article 2 teu works as a legal standard of assessment, it cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that the Member States are fully bound by the entire fun-
damental rights acquis, since this is expressly prevented by the Charter and the 
Treaty itself.103 On the contrary, it aims at safeguarding the essentials which are 
‘common to the Member States’,104 covering long- standing national traditions105 
used by several constitutional courts, and infringements of certain rights which 
cannot be justified in accordance with the cjeu’s case law.106 For instance, in Tele2 
Sverige,107 the cjeu ruled that the right to freedom of expression (Article 11 of the 
Charter), constitutes one of the EU’s foundational values under Article 2 teu and 
it is an essential foundation of a pluralist democratic society.108
The right to effective judicial protection, largely unprotected and exposed 
during the financial crisis, also falls under Article 2 teu, not only because it 
constitutes a component of the ‘rule of law’, but also because it is undoubtedly 
connected to the ‘respect for human rights’. Relatively early in the case law, 
the Court insisted that the Union is based on the rule of law and has built up 
in its case law a catalogue of elements inherent to the rule of law, within the 
meaning of Article 2 teu,109 including the principle of separation of powers,110 
the principle of effective judicial protection111 and effective application of EU 
law.112 Consequently, a violation of the rule of law principle under Article 2 
pp. 332– 368, 340 et seq.; Rivers, J. (2006). Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review. 
The Cambridge Law Journal 65 (1), pp. 174– 207, 176 et seq.
 102 Conclusions of the Presidency of 21– 22 June 1993 (SN 180/ 1/ 93).
 103 Article 51(1) of the Charter and Article 6 teu.
 104 Von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 500.
 105 The need to protect the essence of fundamental rights and not to impose any unjust limita-
tions is expressly enshrined in most of the national Constitutions or EU Charters: Article 
19(2) German Basic Law, Article 4(2) Czech Fundamental Rights Charter, Article 8(2) 
Hungarian Constitution, Article 30(3) Polish Constitution, Article 18(3) Portuguese 
Constitution, Article 49(2) Rumanian Constitution, Article 13(4) Slovakian Constitution, 
Article 53(1) Spanish Constitution.
 106 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 491.
 107 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2016, joined cases C- 203/ 15 and C- 698/ 15, Tele2 
Sverige AB.
 108 Nakanishi, Y.  (2018). The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights. 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 46, pp. 1– 12, 5.
 109 The term ‘rule of law’ was enshrined in Article 6 teu by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997.
 110 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2016, case C- 477/ 16 ppu, Kovalkovas.
 111 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2017, case C- 72/ 15, Rosneft; Schrems, cit.
 112 Nakanishi, Y.  (2018). The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights, cit., 
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teu would likely aggravate a fundamental rights infringement, undermine 
the basic foundations of the EU legal order and the substantive meaning of 
Union citizenship.113 Such infringements, amounting in their extent and se-
riousness to the total inexistence of the fundamental right’s essence, cannot 
be adequately remedied within a Member State, but rather at the Union level, 
through the use of a federalising tool.114 However, the use of Article 2 teu in 
the proposed test, does not aim to establish its infringement, but is rather used 
as a safety valve towards including only the ‘essentials’ within Article 20(2).
2 Second and Third Step: Another Use of Rights
After defining the essence of Article 2 teu – delimiting the content eligible 
to be judicially incorporated into the ‘inter alia’ list – the next step is to assess 
the scope of application of the respective Charter right or general principle, 
to determine its compatibility with the doctrine. The infringement under dis-
pute must finally constitute a deprivation in accordance with the Zambrano 
doctrine and not a mere inconvenience or impediment, so as to satisfy the 
proposed test and challenge rights- violating measures outside a strict interpre-
tation of the scope of EU law.
As a result of this divergence in interpretations of Article 51(1), the test’s 
wording is not entirely unambiguous.115 The question is thus to what extent 
the Court of Justice could interpret the scope of the Charter so as to fall with-
in the substance of the rights doctrine. On the one hand, if the ‘implementa-
tion’ concept is adopted according to Åkerberg Fransson,116 the Charter can be 
considered applicable in situations ‘falling within the scope of EU law’ and be 
invoked in relation to the substance of the rights doctrine.117 On the contrary, 
if the Court cleaves to its narrow interpretation, this does not necessarily pre-
vent the application of EU fundamental rights in purely internal situations,118 
depending on the extent to which the narrow scope of the Charter can restrain 
Order, cit., p 340 et seq.; Court of Justice, judgment of 20 November 2017, case C- 441/ 17, 
Commission v. Poland; Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 31.
 113 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro delivered on 12 September 2007, case C- 380/ 05, Centro 
Europa 7, para. 22; Guidance can be drawn from the interpretation given to the criterion 
of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ under Article 7(2) teu.
 114 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 501.
 115 The explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007) OJ C 303/ 02, state 
that the Charter ‘is only binding of the Member States when they act in the scope of 
Union law’.
 116 Åkerberg Fransson, cit.
 117 van den Brink, M.J. (2012). EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 282.















the scope of those general principles as well.119 The prevailing view in this ar-
ticle is that the scope of application of the Charter is narrower than that of 
general principles of EU law and the narrow scope of the former cannot affect 
that of the latter.
After the pragmatic Opinion of AG Bot in Scattolon,120 the Court in Asso-
ciação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses clarified that Article 19(1) teu can be ap-
plied in full, even if the Charter does not apply, in a far- reaching demonstration 
of the Court’s judicial activism in favour of European integration.121 It is there-
fore safe to say that at least in the case of effective judicial protection, gener-
al principles of EU law have a broader scope of application than the Charter 
rights, with the latter not affecting the former’s application. Accordingly, the 
argument put forward by AG Mengozzi that the Charter prevents the inclu-
sion of EU fundamental rights in the substance of the rights doctrine is not 
entirely correct,122 or at least is not the only possible explanation. That being 
the case and due to the complexity of the Charter’s scope, fundamental rights 
as general principles are more likely to be found eligible to be included in the 
substance of the rights doctrine as part of the new jurisdictional test.
3 The Paradigm of Effective Judicial Protection
A link between fundamental rights as general principles of EU law and the 
substance of the rights doctrine is accordingly attainable, provided that the 
relevant principle of EU law is an ‘essential’ under Article 2 teu and its scope 
of application is broader than that of Article 20 tfeu. Although this possibility 
is arguably achievable for several principles, that of effective judicial protec-
tion is the most suitable for examination, since it has been a vulnerable and 
constantly- violated right during the recent financial crisis, and recent judicial 
developments have substantially added to its significance.123
The concept of ‘effective judicial protection’ is dual- faced, occasionally referred 
to by the Courts as a self- standing ‘principle’124 of EU law or as a ‘fundamental 
 119 Editorial Comments (2010). The Scope of Application of the General Principles of Union 
law: An Ever Expanding Union. Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1589– 1596, 1590.
 120 Opinion of AG Bot, Scattolon, cit., para. 120.
 121 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 29.
 122 Opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 29 September 2001, case C- 256/ 11, Dereci and 
Others, paras. 37– 39.
 123 Alston P., and Weiler, J.H.H. (1999). An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights 
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights. In: Alston, ed., The EU and Human Rights. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 200.
 124 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2002, case C- 50/ 00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores 
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right’ under the Charter.125 It inter alia entrusts the responsibility to ensure judi-
cial review in the EU legal order both to the Court of Justice and to the national 
courts and tribunals.126 As discussed above, the Court made clear in Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses that the scope of application of Article 19 teu is 
broader than that of Article 47 of the Charter.127 Through a particularly interest-
ing legal reasoning, the Court built on ‘operationalising’ Article 2 teu, by stating 
that Article 19 teu, ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law’.128 
Without offering any explanation on the applicability of the Charter, the Court 
overcame the barrier in Article 51(1) and exclusively relied on Article 19(1) teu, 
merely by requiring the existence of a virtual link between the relevant national 
measures and EU law and thus enabled natural and legal persons to challenge a 
broader set of national measures using this route.129 This ruling has created a na-
tional legal obligation to safeguard judicial independence based on a combined 
reading of Articles 2, 4(3) and 19(1) teu, regardless of whether the situation falls 
within the scope of EU law. The judgment has far- reaching consequences for ef-
fective judicial protection, since the Court went beyond the minimum effective 
necessity of the national remedies needed to ensure the application of EU law 
and gave the green light to proceed with the proposed jurisdictional test.130
The new approach towards Article 19 teu, is believed to have a great resem-
blance with the substance of the rights doctrine, since both were developed 
by the Court of Justice as the main actor, through the exercise of judicial activ-
ism. Moreover, they aimed to overcome the barrier created by the restricting 
provision of the Charter’s scope, while at the same time, both resulted in the 
enhancement of citizens’ rights protection. There are however significant dis-
similarities between them, namely the substance of the rights doctrine con-
stitutes a tool for claiming EU legal jurisdiction, which is only triggered when 
v. Jégo- Quéré, para. 29; Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 2009, case C- 12/ 08, Mono Car 
Styling, para. 46.
 125 Court of Justice, judgment of 29 January 2009, case C- 275/ 06, Promusicae, para. 
62; Leczykiewicz, D.  (2010). ‘Effective Judicial Protection’ of Human Rights After 
Lisbon: Should National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law. European 
Law Review 35 (3), pp. 326– 348, 330.
 126 Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2013). The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law:  Constitutional 
Responsibility and the Court of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 127 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 32.
 128 Ibid., paras. 29– 38.
 129 Ibid., paras. 27– 29; Pech, L., and Platon, S. (2018). Rule of Law backsliding in the EU: The 
Court of Justice to the rescue? Some thoughts on the ecj ruling in Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses. EU Law Analysis, available at http:// eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.
cy/ 2018/ 03/ rule- of- law- backsliding- in- eu- court- of.html.














a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights under 
Article 20 tfeu occurs.131 It can thus be characterised as a moderately invasive 
approach, which must be used as a last resort to preserve the effectiveness of 
EU law. In contrast, the development of Article 19(1) teu132 constitutes a new 
general obligation, regardless of whether the matter falls within the scope of 
EU law. It is therefore more invasive, since it essentially created a federal stan-
dard of review for the principle of judicial independence that can now be di-
rectly invoked before national courts, demonstrating that the Court of Justice 
does not hesitate to issue courageous decisions to secure EU law.133
This article proposes a practical tool for claiming jurisdiction under EU law, 
rather than a general obligation, to enable the review of national breaches of 
the rule of law occurring outside the areas covered by the EU’s acquis. Beyond 
the scope of the Charter, applicants challenging austerity measures have not 
been able successfully to invoke EU fundamental rights, although numerous 
assistance packages were clearly granted through EU- established mechanisms, 
unless the substance of the rights doctrine were triggered and the matter were 
brought within the scope of EU law. According to the current proposal, if an 
infringed right whose substance had been deprived by a national measure was 
not expressed within the list of Article 20(2), the ‘inter alia’ clause applies, sug-
gesting that citizens can also enjoy the protection of other rights.134 The delim-
itation of the ‘eligible’ rights is best achieved using Article 2 teu, without aim-
ing to establish its infringement, but it is rather used as a boundaries- indicator. 
Subsequently, the scope of application of the respective Charter right or gener-
al principle, is assessed to determine its compatibility with the doctrine.
vi Concluding Remarks
Recent judicial developments, including the substance of the rights doctrine, 
have built on the constitutional perspective of EU citizenship,135 by inter alia 
 131 Ruiz Zambrano, cit., para. 44.
 132 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit.
 133 Taborowski, M. (2018). cjeu Opens the Door for the Commission to Reconsider Charges 
against Poland. Verfassungsblog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ cjeu- opens- the- 
door- for- the- commission- to- reconsider- charges- against- poland/ .
 134 See, Eeckhout, P. (2002). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 980 et seq.; Da Cruz 
Vilaça, J.L., and Silveira, A. (2017). The European Federalisation Process and the Dynamics 
of Fundamental Rights. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 133 et seq.
 135 Hailbronner K., and Thym, D.  (2011). Case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v.  Office 
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proving that the list of rights the Treaties express is not exhaustive, but can 
rather incorporate ‘unwritten’ rights.136 More importantly, they have granted 
further opportunities for reinforcing EU fundamental rights protection, such 
as the proposed expansion of the substance of the rights doctrine towards in-
cluding the principle of effective judicial protection, when a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights under the principle of effective judicial protection oc-
curs. Nevertheless, strong objections against such a proposal can be raised. The 
proposed expansion of the doctrine can easily be perceived as a threat to the 
system of allocation of competences. However, no such contradiction occurs, 
because Article 2 teu is employed as a safety valve, confining the expansion 
of the proposal with the requirement for a deprivation of the substance of the 
rights, which safeguards national identities, provided that the foundations and 
the effectiveness of EU law are not eroded.
Moreover, conflicts with other Treaty provisions can emerge, including with 
Article 25(2), which allegedly prevents the desired judicial incorporation of 
fundamental rights into citizenship status. However, this does not constitute 
an absolute obstacle to judicial incorporation, since the procedural limitations 
are read as applying to the legislature only,137 thus ensuring the constitutional 
legitimacy of a judicial incorporation. The use of Article 2 teu could also raise 
arguments that the ‘values on which the Union is built’ are illusory in a num-
ber of respects.138 Although an acquis on values would give it more weight, the 
increasing use of the provision in the Court’s case law proves the opposite.139 
Moreover, no conflict with Article 7 teu can arise, since the proposal is not 
intending to turn Article 2 teu into black- letter law or establish its violation, 
but rather to ‘operationalise’ it, by shaping the essence of the values expressed 
therein, which also constitute basic rights to be enjoyed by EU citizens.140
 136 Kochenov, D.  (2013). The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years 
of Academic Debate:  Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon? International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 62, pp. 97– 136, 100.
 137 Düsterhaus, D. (2017). EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights: Contradictory, Converging 
or Complementary. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 643 et seq.
 138 Kochenov, D.  (2013). On Policing Article 2 teu Compliance  – Reverse Solange And 
Systemic Infringements Analyzed. Polish Yearbook of International Law 33, pp.  145– 170, 
150 et seq.
 139 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit.; General Court, judgment of 3 February 
2017, case T- 646/ 13, Minority SafePack  – one million signatures for diversity in Europe 
v.  Commission; Court of Justice, order of 17 July 2014, case C- 505/ 13, Yumer; Court of 
Justice, order of 12 June 2014, case C- 28/ 14, Pańczyk; General Court, judgment of 10 May 
2016, case T- 529/ 13, Izsák and Dabis v. Commission.












All in all, the proposal is fully in line with the doctrinal and jurispruden-
tial approaches towards Union citizenship and will arguably allow citizens 
facing effective judicial protection violations, including those faced during 
the financial crisis, to bring their cases within the scope of EU law, provided 
that the requirements described above are satisfied. Further rights can also 
be protected through this proposal if the test is satisfied, with equality and 
non- discrimination rights constituting the most likely candidates, considering 
that during the crisis, the disputed measures were commonly challenged be-
fore the Court as being discriminatory and that the general principle of non- 
discrimination has long been established within the EU legal order. Although 
the proposal’s reach is limited, it would definitely overcome the barrier im-
posed by Article 51(1) of the Charter and safeguard the ‘substance’ of the ‘es-
sential’ rights which must be included in the list of EU citizenship rights. It is 
also believed that such an incorporation in practice would prompt the Court to 
be more willing to claim jurisdiction, while the current imbalance between the 
EU’s purposes would be largely restored, by acknowledging that the enjoyment 
of rights continued to lie at the heart of the EU, even during the financial crisis.
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 chapter 5
Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens
David A.J.G. de Groot*
i Introduction
Nationality is a curious good. You either have it, or you don’t; you can acquire it 
and you can lose it; you can have one or multiple. The problem for those with 
multiple nationalities is that only one at a time can be applied to each specific 
situation. The question then is, which nationality is applied to which specific 
situation?
In the book that was launched at the conference where this Chapter was 
first introduced,1 AG Szpunar and Blas López wrote that situations where the 
nationality of a person does not reflect the Member State of origin where this 
person was born and always resided, and situations of dual EU citizens “should 
be taken into account, firstly, by the EU legislator and, secondly, by the Court 
of Justice in its interpretation of EU law, to prevent Union citizenship becom-
ing in part a victim of its own success”.2 In many cases where nationality is a 
connecting factor for the establishment of rights, the Court only considers the 
implications of the judgment on dual EU citizens when they are a party to the 
case, but fails to do so when they are not a party.3 However, it is not only the EU 
 * Independent Consultant and PhD candidate, National Center of Competence in Research – 
the Migration- Mobility Nexus (NCCR on the move) and University of Bern. This research was 
funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
 1 Kochenov, D., ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. At the conference EU Citizenship, Federalism and Rights, Luxem-
bourg, 18– 19 November 2017.
 2 Szpunar, M., and Blas López, M.E. (2017). Member State Nationality. In: Kochenov (ed.), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism, cit., pp. 122– 123.
 3 The Court of Justice did consider it in Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff and in Freitag, where the 
applicants were dual EU citizens. However, for example in Runevič- Vardyn the fact that there 
was a dual EU citizen child of the applicants was mentioned and that he was born after the 
case was submitted and therefore couldn’t be an applicant, but for the effects of the judg-
ment it seemed to be not considered. Nor did the Court even consider what would happen 
if Sayn- Wittgenstein had also had the German nationality next to the Austrian one. Such a 
situation would have led to a clash of constitutions. Court of Justice: judgment of 2 June 2016, 












legislator and the Court, but also academia that should take more account of 
the free movement rights of dual EU citizens. There is extensive literature that 
touches upon the subject of dual nationality in general. This mostly relates 
to topics of whether it should be allowed or not;4 private international law;5 
loyalty issues;6 political participation;7 whether or not one should renounce 
the other Member State’s nationality upon naturalisation in another Member 
judgment of 12 May 2011, case C- 391/ 09, Runevič- Vardyn; judgment of 22 December 2010, case 
C- 208/ 09, Sayn- Wittgenstein.
 4 See, i.a., de Groot, G.-R., and Vink, M. (2008). Meervoudige nationaliteit in Europees perspec-
tief:  een landenvergelijkend overzicht, Voorstudie voor de Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelin-
genzaken. Den Haag: acvz; Faist, T., ed. (2007). Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood 
to Societal Integration, Aldershot: Ashgate; de Groot, G.-R. (2006). Een pleidooi voor meer-
voudige nationaliteit. In: Faure and Peeters, eds, Grensoverschrijdend recht. Antwerpen/ Ox-
ford: Intersentia; de Groot, G.-R., and Schneider, H.E.G.S. (2006). Die zunehmende Akzep-
tanz von Fällen mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit in West- Europa. In:  Menkhaus and Sato, 
eds., Japanischer Brückenbauer zum deutschen Rechtskreis. Berlin:  Duncker&Humblot; de 
Groot, G.-R. (2003). The Background of the Changed Attitude of European States in Respect 
to Multiple Nationality. In: Kondo and Westin, eds., New Concepts of Citizenship: Residential/ 
Regional Citizenship and Dual Nationality/ Identity. Stockholm: ceifo.
 5 See, i.a., Pfeiff, S. (2017). La portabilité du statut personnel dans l’espace européen. De l’émer-
gence d’un droit fondamental à l’élaboration d’une méthode de la reconnaissance. Brux-
elles:  Bruylant; Franzina, P.  (2013). The Evolving Role of Nationality in Private Interna-
tional Law. In: Annoni and Forlati, eds., The Changing Role of Nationality in International 
Law. London: Routledge; Vonk, O. (2012). Dual Nationality in the European Union. A Study 
on Changing Norms in Public and Private International Law and in the Municipal Laws of 
the Member States. Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Vonk O. (2011). De rol van 
dubbele nationaliteit voor toegang to the Unieburgerschap en voor rechts  – en Forum-
keuzebevoegdheid in het Europese international privaatrecht. Nederlands Juristenblad 27, 
pp. 1760– 1766; de la Pradelle, G. (2002). Dual Nationality and the French Citizenship Tra-
dition. In: Hansen and Weil, eds., Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in 
the US and Europe. New York: Berghahn Books; Verwilghen, M. (1999). Conflits de nation-
alités, plurinationalité et apatridie. Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 
de la Haye, pp. 9– 484.; Dethloff, N. (1995). Doppelstaatsangehörigkeit und Internationales 
Privatrecht. Juristenzeitung 50 (2), pp. 64– 73; Boele- Woelki, K. (1981). Die Effektivitätsprü-
fung der Staatsangehörigkeit im niederländischen internationalen Familienrecht. Deventer: 
Kluwer.
 6 See, i.a., Spiro, P.J. (2017). Multiple Citizenship. In: Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad, and Vink, 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford:  Oxford University Press; Jones- Correa, 
M. (2001). Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin American and Its Consequences for 
Naturalisation in the United States. International Migration Review 35 (4), pp. 997– 1029.
 7 See, i.a., Bauböck, R. (2007). Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participa-
tion. A Normative Evaluation of External Voting. Fordham Law Review 75 (5), pp. 2393– 2447; 
Spiro, P.J. (2003). Political Rights and Dual Nationality. In:  Martin, and Hailbronner, eds., 
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State;8 and more general questions of loss9 and acquisition of nationality,10 
and an independent EU citizenship.11 There is furthermore quite abundant lit-
erature concerning purely internal situations,12 which focuses either on per-
sons who only possess the nationality of the Member State of residence, or on 
dual EU citizens who have never moved or have a Third Country background.13
However, free movement law as applied to dual EU citizens who have al-
ready moved is an almost forgotten issue in recent years.14 It used to be an 
issue of interest before 2011,15 when a dual EU citizen was considered a “Super 
Citizen” based on the Garcia Avello case.16 At the time, Alina Tryfonidou stated 
 8 See, i.a., Kochenov, D. (2011). Double Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance. 
European Law Journal 17 (3), pp. 323– 343.
 9 Concerning loss of nationality there have in recent years been many publications concerning 
dual nationals, where it concerns deprivation of nationality on grounds of terrorist activi-
ties: i.a. de Groot, G.-R., and Vonk, O. (2015). De ontneming van het Nederlanderschap wegens 
jihadistische activiteiten. Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 6 (1) pp. 34– 53; Wautelet, P.R. 
(2017). Deprivation of Citizenship for “Jihadists”. Analysis of Belgian and French Practice and 
Policy in Light of the Principle of Equal Treatment. Recht van de Islam 30, p. 49 et seq.
 10 See, i.a., Witte, N.  (2014). Legal and Symbolic Membership. Symbolic Boundaries and 
Naturalisation Intentions of Turkish Residents in Germany. EUI Working Paper RSCAS 
2014/ 100.
 11 See, i.a., Margiotta, C., and Vonk, O. (2010). Nationality Law and European Citizenship: The 
Role of Dual Nationality, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/ 66.
 12 See, i.a., Tryfonidou, A. (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An 
Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 35 (1), pp. 43– 67; 
Lenaerts, K.  (2011). ‘Civis Europeaus Sum’: From the Cross- border Link to the Status of 
Citizen of the Union. Online Journal on Free Movement of Workers within the European 
Union 3 (6), pp. .
 13 Groenendijk, K. (2014). Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens 
of Immigrant Origin. In: Guild, ed., The Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship. 
Leiden: Brill, pp. 173– 176.
 14 It is considered in some Opinions of AGs. See e.g.: Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 
30 September 2010, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano; Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 25 
November 2010, case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy; Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 
12 December 2013, case C- 456/ 12, O, B, S and G; Opinion of AG Szpunar delivered on 20 
May 2014, case C- 202/ 13, Sean Ambrose McCarthy; Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 30 May 
2017, case C- 165/ 16, Lounes.
 15 On 5 May 2011 the Court of Justice rendered the ruling in case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 October 2003, case C- 148/ 02, Garcia Avello. After Garcia 
Avello, Thomas Ackermann had argued that a dual EU citizen could never fall within a 
purely internal situation as long as (s)he had residence in an EU Member State. Dimitry 
Kochenov wrote that “[a] ll of them [read: dual EU citizens] are now within the scope rati-
one materiae of EU law whatever happens”. After Shirley McCarthy, Janek Nowak stated 
that this was obviously not the case. See:  Ackermann, T.  (2007). Case C- 148/ 02, Carlos 
Garcia Avello v. Etat Belge. Common Market Law Review 44 (1), pp. 141– 154, 146; Kochenov, 


















quite clearly what seemed to be on the minds of many scholars dealing with 
dual citizens and reverse discrimination: “In my view, reverse discrimination is 
discrimination based on the ground of ‘non- contribution to the internal mar-
ket’. This is due to the fact that, in cases of reverse discrimination, the only per-
son/ traders that are disadvantaged and discriminated against are those that 
rely on EC law against their own Member State and cannot show the existence 
of the requisite link with the fundamental freedoms”.17 Since dual EU citizens 
can establish an intracommunity connection from their other Member State’s 
nationality, they are able to rely on Community law; hence free movement law 
applies to them in all cases. Indeed, at the time this could have been validly ar-
gued based on the existing case- law. However, with the Shirley McCarthy case, 
things changed, and have, nearly unnoticed, become worse and worse for dual 
EU citizens.18
One can now find statements like “[w] ith dual citizenship, migrants can freely 
pursue economic opportunity in states of original and adopted citizenship, a ben-
efit to growing numbers of circular migrants”.19 This is correct, but solely for the 
dual citizen, not for his Third Country National (tcn) family members, because all 
applicable laws concerning family reunification would be national legislation, and 
not derived rights from EU law. That is, until Lounes was decided by the Court.20
In this Chapter, a couple of constellations of movement of dual EU citizens 
will be discussed, introduced by explaining beforehand the system of ranking, 
movement, and the mobility quality. Special attention will first be given to the 
“right to return” case- law, where the Court created a double condition, which 
has detrimental effects on dual EU citizens moving between the Member 
States of nationality.21 Thereafter, the Lounes constellation will be explained, 
Working Paper 8/ 2010, p. 47; Nowak, J.T. (2010). Case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v. Office National de L’Emploi (Onem) & Case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department. Columbia Journal of European Law 17 (3), pp. 673– 704, 703.
 17 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, p. 19.
 18 Tryfonidou, A.  (2012). Redefining the Outer Boundaries of EU Law:  The Zambrano, 
McCarthy and Dereci Trilogy. European Public Law 18 (3), pp. 493– 526, 511.
 19 Spiro, P.J. (2017), Multiple Citizenship, cit., p. 635.
 20 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C- 165/ 16, Lounes. See also on the 
case with a different analysis:  Gualco, E.  (2018). Is Toufik Lounes Another Brick in the 
Wall? The cjeu and the On- going Shaping of the EU Citizenship. European Papers  – 
European Forum, Insight 3 (2), pp. 911– 922, available at europeanpapers.eu.
 21 “Right to return” or “returners” refers to its meaning according to the case- law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union on persons who resided in a Member State (of which 
they did not have the nationality) and then returned to the Member State of nationality. 
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where the Court ruled on the situation of a naturalised dual EU citizen and the 
continued application of Art. 21 tfeu. This case has to be dissected in detail, 
as it creates more issues than it solves. These questions relate, first of all, to 
whether Lounes applies only in a Member State of naturalisation and only for 
as long as that naturalised dual EU citizen stays there, or whether it applies 
anywhere in the EU. Secondly, it has to be considered to whom the case ap-
plies. This second part relates to the mode of acquisition of the additional na-
tionality and whether a certain genuine link has to exist in order for the case to 
apply. The argument continues with the question whether Lounes only applies 
to dual EU citizens, or whether it also applies to any other “single” EU citizens 
who lost the original Member State nationality upon naturalisation in another 
Member State. If the case were to only apply to the dual EU citizens, it is then 
argued that Member States would have to be restricted concerning nationality 
laws which establish automatic loss of nationality upon acquisition of another 
nationality and rules on acquisition which require a renouncement of the pre-
viously held nationality. When looking at the potential consequences of this 
case applying to any “single” EU citizen who had the nationality of another 
Member State before acquiring the one of the Member State of residence, we 
see a legal and practical distinction between own nationals, which is prohib-
ited. The Court would then have no choice but to change the “right to return” 
case- law and to revisit cases where the nationality of another Member State 
was lost, leading to a loss of rights. It is concluded that the Court has to make a 
choice: either apply Lounes only to dual EU citizens and consequently restrict 
severely the competences of Member State in nationality law; or apply it to any 
EU citizen who has made use of the free movement rights, which means that 
extensive case- law has to be changed.
ii Setting the Scene
ii.1 Applicable Nationality – Ranking and Mobility Quality
Applicable nationality is a matter of recognition of nationality, but principally 
a matter of giving effect to a nationality. A State has to recognise that a person 
has the nationality of another state based on International Law; whether it 
the general provision of “right to return” in international law, as established in i.a. Art. 12, 
para. 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr). Concerning 
this general right see Edwards, A. (2014). The Meaning of Nationality in International Law 
in an Era of Human Rights. In: Edwards and van Waas, eds., Nationality and Statelessness 




applies this nationality, which is connected to a certain set of rights, or an-
other, which is connected to a different set of rights, is another issue.22 While 
in International Law, based on Nottebohm,23 a genuine- link principle or most- 
effective- nationality principle is applied, in EU law there is a sort of ranking of 
nationalities, based especially on Micheletti.24 Depending on the legal situa-
tion, be it applicable law to the name, or applicability of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, 
the ranking is different.25
One can distinguish four different ranks of nationality in EU law. These 
ranks are the Third Country nationality (TC), the Privileged Third Country na-
tionality (TC+),26 the nationality of a Member State other than the Member 
State of residence or destination (MS) and the nationality of the Member State 
of residence or destination (Home MS).27
With these four ranks one can have nine different combinations of dual na-
tionalities (see Table 5.1)28:
 22 Permanent Court of International Justice, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 
advisory opinion of 7 February 1923.
 23 International Court of Justice, Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v.  Guatemala), judgment of 6 
April 1955.
 24 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 369/ 90, Micheletti.
 25 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 26 A State with whom the Union has a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement which grants 
certain rights to its nationals. After Brexit also the UK will be part of this category, if a 
trade agreement is concluded. See for an overview of different TC+ Countries and rights 
(until 2010): Wiesbrock, A. (2010). Legal Migration to the European Union, Ten Years after 
Tampere. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, p. 97 et seq. For specifically the status of cit-
izens of the European Free Trade Association (efta) states, which I consider only the 
most privileged of the TC+, see:  García Andrade, P.  (2014). Privileged Third- Country 
Nationals and Their Right of Free Movement and Residence to and in the EU: Questions 
of Status and Competence. In: Guild, Gortázar Rotaeche, and Kostakopoulou, eds., The 
Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, p. 111 et seq.
 27 The point of view for MS and Home MS rank nationality is always the Member State 
where certain rights are to be applied. A dual French- German person from the point of 
view of the Netherlands, thus a Member State of which the person does not have the 
nationality, has a “MS/ MS” combination of nationalities. From the point of view of France 
or Germany the person would have a “Home MS/ MS” combination.
 28 Diagonal pattern means that the person is an EU citizen. A “Home MS/ Home MS” constel-
lation for the nationality purpose is impossible, as it would mean that a person has two 
nationalities which are, however, of the same Member State. It is therefore shaded with 
a grid pattern. As will be seen for the movement factor this is different as one can move 
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Based on the case- law of the European Court of Justice it can be established 
that of these types of nationality, in case of application of Directive 2004/ 38/ 
EC, the Home MS’s nationality is ranked highest.29 This leads to many (possi-
ble) conflicts where it concerns dual EU citizens, as the Directive might simply 
not be applied to the case on the ground that the dual EU citizen has the na-
tionality of that Member State.
In EU free movement law and migration law, what is worth most is the MS 
rank. The MS rank takes precedence over the TC and TC+, based on the Mi-
cheletti case- law, which ruled that having the nationality of another Member 
State is enough to fall within the ambit of EU law. Regardless of whether the 
genuine- link with a TC rank nationality is greater, the MS rank always prevails.
The MS rank gives full access to the rights under the Treaties, especially Arts 
20 and 21 tfeu, and access to Directive 2004/ 38/ EC with the privileged family 
reunification rules concerning tcn family members. It is, however, limited by 
the condition that the person must have made use of his free movement rights. 
This I will call having activated the “mobility quality”. It is furthermore limited 
by the requirement of having sufficient means, or by being a worker or self- 
employed. If these conditions are fulfilled it is granted all rights of a Home MS 
rank, with only a few exceptions, like the right to vote in national elections and 
table 5.1  Dual nationality combinations
Nationality 2 Other MS 
(MS)Nationality 1
Third Country TC/TC
Third Country+ TC+/TC TC+/TC+










b   Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2012, case C- 7/ 10 and C- 9/ 10, Kahveci and Inan.
c   If mover: Right to return case- law (Singh/ Eind/ O&B, cit., see sections ii.3 and ii.4). If non- 
mover: Shirley McCarthy, cit. If naturalised: Lounes, cit.
 29 Except when it concerns a TC+ rank national who has naturalised in the “Home MS” while 
retaining the TC+ nationality. This would not lead to application of the Directive, but of 








protection against expulsion (which is already very limited). These exceptions 
are even more limited when the person gains the long- term resident status. 
The MS rank is, however, ranked (for the moment) lower than the Home MS. 
Thus, for a dual EU citizen who has both the Home MS rank and an MS rank 
nationality (Home MS/ MS), the Home MS takes precedence.
The Home MS nationality is on the one hand ranked highest, as it takes 
(at the moment) precedence over the others where it concerns nationality to 
which effect is given concerning migration law and free movement (except 
against TC+ when naturalised), but worth least in EU law, as all rules applicable 
to it are decided by the Member State in question. These can be as limited or 
as generous as the Member State desires. As was stated before, the only rights 
that the Home MS has and the MS does not, are the rights to vote in national 
elections, and to absolute protection from expulsion from the Home MS. The 
Home MS nationality can be turned into an MS nationality i.a. by movement 
to an MS State, thus activating the “mobility quality”. This mobility quality also 
functions to prevent that certain rights are lost which were previously acquired 
and made use of while it was an MS rank.
This rank has to be combined for certain cases with a “movement” or a 
change of purpose factor of the Member State (“residence” to be used in cases 
of naturalisation or renouncement).
There are in total twelve different types of movement, as is shown in 
 Table 5.2.30
To give some examples:
– a dual EU citizen moving from a Member State of which he has the nation-
ality, to a Member State of which he does not have the nationality is “MS/ MS 
movement Home MS/ MS”;31
– a dual EU citizen moving between the Member States of nationality is 
“Home MS/ MS movement Home MS/ Home MS”;32
 30 Diagonal pattern means EU law applies, or at least to a certain extent. Horizontal pattern 
means EU law might indirectly apply depending on the relation between the TC+ and the 
EU. Vertical pattern means EU law probably does not apply. If the mobility quality was 
activated once in a lifetime though, it would be favourable if it continued to be effective 
even if an individual between residence in an MS and returning to a Home MS resides in 
a TC. No pattern concerns any move to a TC where EU free movement law obviously is not 
applicable.
 31 The nationality ranks are both MS rank, as the point of view has to be the Member State 
of destination.
 32 As the point of view of only the Member State of destination has to be taken, only one of 
the nationalities of the person is a Home MS rank, the other nationality is MS rank, irre-
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– an EU citizen that is born and continues to reside in a Member State of 
which (s)he is not a national is “MS residence MS”;33
– an EU citizen that naturalises in the host Member State while retain-
ing the other Member State’s nationality is “Home MS/ MS residence MS/ 
Home MS”.34
On the contrary, when one considers the case- law of the Court on names’ rec-
ognition, the Member States’ nationalities are equal, and the dual EU citizen 
may choose between the two. A Member State can only refuse to recognise a 
name established by the law of the other Member State of nationality if there 
is an absolute constitutional prohibition.35
table 5.2 Movement and residence changes
Other MS
Third Country TC/TC TC+/TC MS/TC Home MS/TC
Third Country+ TC/TC+ TC+/TC+ MS/TC+ Home MS/TC+









a   It is argued in this Chapter that Lounes, cit., implies that also in a Home MS/ Home MS move 
Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu applies.
the movement it is different. There both the point of view of the Member State of origin 
and the Member State of destination have to be considered. As the EU citizen moving 
between Member States of nationality is considered by either as its national, it is “move-
ment Home MS/ Home MS”.
 33 It is “residence MS” as there is no actual movement between Member States. This is the 
Catherine Zhu constellation. Court of Justice, judgment of 19 October 2002, case C- 200/ 
02, Zhu and Chen.
 34 It is “residence MS/ Home MS” as before naturalisation the Member State of residence was 
not a Member State of nationality. With the naturalisation the function of this Member 
State changes, as it becomes a Home MS. “Residence” makes clear that there is no factual 
movement between states, but that it is a function change of the Member State of residence.
 35 One has to distinguish in the case- law of the Court “absolute constitutional prohibitions” 
from “conditional and inconsistently applied constitutional prohibitions”. Whereas the 
first can justify a refusal to recognise the name, the latter also has to fulfil the condition of 











There are many different constellations and lines of case- law in free move-
ment law. If one considers the free movement of persons and workers, and EU 
citizenship cases,36 the entire setting where it concerns family reunification 
under Directive 2004/ 38/ EC looks like this Picture.37
I will especially address the Lounes and the “returner” constellations.
inconsistently applied constitutional prohibition, can never justify a restriction, since it 
cannot be proportional. To give some examples of different types: in Sayn- Wittgenstein it 
concerned an absolute constitutional prohibition; in Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff it con-
cerned a “conditional constitutional prohibitions” and in Runevič- Vardyn it concerned an 
inconsistently applied constitutional prohibition.
 36 I exclude here case- law like Carpenter which is in free movement of services and tech-
nically could apply to a dual national living in the Member State of nationality, if one 
compares them to persons having only the nationality of the Member State of residence 
(Court of Justice, judgment of 11 July 2002, case C- 60/ 00 Carpenter). Carpenter would add 
thus an additional category to “Non- Mover” – “Dual National- National of the host MS at 
Birth” => “Grant Services abroad”, if the answer is yes Carpenter applies, if the answer is 
no, Shirley McCarthy would apply. However, if services are provided abroad that means 
that there must be sufficient means or that the person is a worker or self- employed. In 
the argumentation used in this Chapter, this should be already enough to make a Shirley 
McCarthy case a Catherine Zhu constellation by ranking the other MS nationality higher 
than the Home MS nationality.
 37 To explain the shapes and colours of the boxes: Shapes: a) Square means a characteris-
tic of the person, like nationality; b) Oval/ Round means applicable law or case- law; c) 
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ii.3 Right to Return – Conditions (Home MS(/ MS) Movement MS/ 
Home MS)
In O and B38 the Court in essence set out three conditions39 for the right to 
return,40 which have to be fulfilled next to the exhaustive list of documents 
required based on Art. 8, para. 2, and Art. 10, para. 2, of the Directive, which is 
applicable by analogy:41
 a) the Union citizen made use of his free movement rights under the Directive 
by application of Art. 7, para. 1, or even Art. 16, para. 1, of the Directive;42
 b) the family life must have been established, or the tcn must have joined 
the Union citizen while the Union citizen was exercising his rights under 
Art. 7, para. 1, or Art. 16, para. 1;43
 c) the family member must have had residence in the host Member State 
based on Union law, specifically Art. 7, para. 2, or Art. 16, para. 2, of the 
Directive.44
The O and B case is considered to facilitate circular migration. This is, however, 
only true to the extent that it concerns a person who comes from a Member 
State of which he is not a national. When it concerns a dual EU citizen coming 
from a Home MS, who is moving to another Home MS, O and B is anything but 
a facilitator; it is indeed an impediment.
Hexagon means (non- )action by the person; Patterns:  a) Diagonal (Catherine Zhu and 
Free movement of Persons/ Workers) means EU Free movement lawfully applicable (incl. 
Directive 2004/ 38/ EC); b) Vertical (Shirley McCarthy) means purely internal situation; c) 
Horizontal means applicability of EU Free movement law is (yet) unclear (?) and EU free 
movement law is only in so far applicable that it has been used before (thus Directive 
2004/ 38/ EC applicable by analogy: Singh/ Eind/ O and B). In the case of Lounes the hori-
zontal pattern is looser because the rule that the rights must have been used before does 
not apply. In the schematics the person always has the nationality of another Member 
State, thus MS rank nationality. If Catherine Zhu had theoretically at birth somehow been 
granted several other Member State nationalities, but not the one of residence (thus MS/ 
MS rank), the situation would have been the same.
 38 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2004, case C- 456/ 12, O and B.
 39 Ibid., para. 57.
 40 Previous case- law on the right to return:  Court of justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, 
case C- 370/ 90, Singh; Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 291/ 05, 
Eind. See also:  Berneri, Ch. (2017). Family Reunification in the EU:  The Movement and 
Residence Rights of Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens. Oxford/ 
Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing, especially pp. 43– 63; Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights 
for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers: O and B, and S and G. Common Market Law 
Review 52 (3), pp. 753– 777.
 41 O and B, cit., para. 50.
 42 Ibid., paras. 51 and 56.
 43 Ibid., paras. 54– 55.
















ii.4 “Circular” Right to Return – (Home MS/ MS Movement Home MS/ 
Home MS)
In O and B, the Court seems to have forgotten to take into account dual nation-
als and how its case- law applies to them. The reason is that the Court wanted 
to emphasise an issue concerning the Shirley McCarthy case. This concerned 
the application of the Directive to nationals of the Member State of residence.
The Court stated that “[i] t follows from a literal, systematic and teleological 
interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 that it does not establish a derived right 
of residence for third- country nationals who are family members of a Union 
citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national”.45 From a te-
leological interpretation, the Court argues that the aim of the Directive is to 
“facilitate and strengthen the exercise of the primary and individual right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States” as is stated 
in Art. 1, let. a), of the Directive.
Here, the Court emphasises the point that one is actually exercising that 
right.46 By “move”, the Court seems to mean a movement within the territory 
 figure 5.2  Constellation right to return from MS
 45 Ibid., para. 37.
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of the Union, and “reside” refers to the territory of all the Member States minus 
one, the Home Member State.
The Court also mentioned that, because international law does not allow 
a State to refuse to its own nationals the right to enter and remain there, the 
Directive only applies to cases where the Union citizen wants to enter a Mem-
ber State of which he is not a national.47 Thus, the Court states that “Directive 
2004/ 38 is therefore also not intended to confer a derived right of residence on 
third- country nationals who are family members of a Union citizen residing 
in the Member State of which the latter is a national”.48 Derived rights of res-
idence for a tcn family member of a Union citizen who resides in a Member 
State of nationality would only be possible in some circumstances based on 
Art. 21 tfeu.49 As stated before, the Directive would apply by analogy in these 
cases, but not directly.
There is a serious problem here when one considers dual nationals. The 
Court has made the right to return conditional upon the Directive having al-
ready been applicable before, while it has made the Directive conditional upon 
not having the nationality of the “host” Member State. This double condition 
can only affect dual EU citizens in a negative way.
 figure 5.3  Constellation right to return from home MS
 47 Ibid., para. 42.
 48 Ibid., para. 43.









Let’s consider a dual German- Romanian national who was born and grew 
up in Germany. At a certain moment, this person moves to Romania and works 
there for a couple of years. In this period, he marries a tcn. Because he has Ro-
manian nationality, the authorities do not allow family reunification based on 
the Directive, but they are kind enough to give a national residence permit to 
the spouse. After some time in Romania, the couple decide to go to Germany. 
The German authorities, however, refuse the right to return on the following 
grounds, based on the previous three criteria set out:
 a) the EU citizen did not have a residence right in Romania based on Art. 7, 
para. 1, of the Directive, but an autonomous right because he is a Roma-
nian national;
 b) because the EU citizen did not have an Art. 7, para. 1, based residence 
right, the tcn spouse is considered not to have joined him while he was 
exercising this right;
 c) consequently, the tcn spouse did not have an EU residence permit under 
Art. 7, para. 2, or Art. 16, para. 2, but merely a national residence permit.
As the Directive has never been applicable to the case, it can also not be ap-
plied by analogy.
This constellation highlights the challenge for circular migrating dual EU 
citizens.
First of all, the fact that the dual citizen is not considered to be exercising 
his rights under Art. 7, para. 1, of the Directive while he is moving to another 
Member State. If he had not had Romanian nationality, this would clearly have 
been an Art. 7, para. 1, residence. Only the fact that he is a dual national puts 
him in a disadvantaged position.
The second point is the specific condition that the Court imposed, that the 
tcn family member must have had a derived residence right under Art. 7, para. 
2, and Art. 16, para. 2, of the Directive. What if the tcn has a residence right on 
his own, like a blue card or national residence card? In Eind the Court stated 
that:
Community law does not require the authorities of that State [the home 
Member State] to grant a right of entry and residence to a third- country 
national who is a member of that worker’s family because of the mere 
fact that, in the host Member State where that worker was gainfully em-
ployed, that third- country national held a valid residence permit issued 
on the basis of Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/ 68.50
 50 Eind, cit., para. 26. 
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The national authorities could, therefore, just ignore this fact.
As the Court of Justice seems to believe that the Directive does not apply in 
such cases of dual nationals moving between the Member States of which they 
are nationals, it would also be highly doubtful whether it would consider Art. 
7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) to be 
applicable in such a case. This happens despite the fact that there is an obvious 
cross- border element, and in all other cases the Directive, meaning an imple-
menting act in the sense of Art. 51, para. 1, of the Charter, would be applicable.
It is very unfortunate that this case of the dual German- Romanian nation-
al is not just a theoretical scenario meant to describe the disadvantages for 
dual nationals, but it is an actual case from 2016 where the Bayerischer Ver-
waltungsgerichtshof had to decide on a family reunification case with a dual 
German- Romanian citizen who had lived his entire life in either Germany or 
Romania.51 The Court considered it unclear, though it refrained from referring 
a preliminary question to the Court of Justice, whether a person who has the 
nationality of two Member States and moves from one to the other in order to 
work, has made use of his free movement rights and whether – upon returning 
to the first Member State after four years – the right to return also applies.52 
The uncertainty about this was based upon the reason that the dual EU citizen 
had always lived in a Member State of which he has the nationality.53
Let’s consider now that this German- Romanian dual EU citizen moved first 
to Greece and benefited from family reunification there based on the Direc-
tive, which is applicable because he is not a national of Greece. He then moves 
to Romania, and the Directive applies by analogy, and therefore family reunifi-
cation is granted. But if he would move then from Romania to Germany, would 
the Directive, which was applicable by analogy in Romania, again be applica-
ble by analogy?
The entire situation looks even more curious if one considers another 
German- Romanian, Mircea Florian Freitag, who moved between both Home 
Member States in order to have his name changed to the original Romanian 
version, which he wanted to be recognised in Germany, his other state of na-
tionality. His case was decided only recently, in June 2017.
 51 Administrative Court of Munich, judgment of 20 January 2016, 10 C 15.723.
 52 Ibid., para. 46.
 53 Germany has altered its administrative guidelines in the meantime concerning this 
aspect to allow the applicability of the free movement rights. Administrative Guidelines 
on the Implementation of the Freedom of Movement Act of 3 February 2016 (Germany), 








In Freitag, the Court stated that “[a] ccording to settled case- law, a link with 
EU law exists in regard to nationals of one Member State lawfully resident in 
the territory of another Member State […].That is the case as regards the ap-
plicant in the main proceedings, who is a Romanian national and is resident in 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, of which he is also a nation-
al”.54 Furthermore, the Court considered that making recognition of the name 
established by another Member State conditional upon having the habitual 
residence there – which means in essence that Art. 7, para. 1, of the Directive is 
applicable to the person – is a restriction of the free movement rights.55
The Court therefore states the opposite in Freitag, where it concerned 
names, from what it ruled in O and B, where it concerned family reunification. 
This issue has now been addressed in Lounes.
ii.5 Naturalisation – Lounes (Home MS/ MS Residence MS/ Home MS)
On 14 November 2017, the Court of Justice gave its judgment in the Lounes case, 
which concerns a person who has the nationality of one Member State, moved 
to another Member State, and naturalised there while retaining the first Mem-
ber State’s nationality. The question addressed to the Court was whether Direc-
tive 2004/ 38/ EC would still apply to that person after naturalisation. The Court 
of Justice had to make a choice between two lines of case- law:
 a) the “right to return” case- law, which would mean that the Directive ceased 
to be applicable to the person upon naturalisation, and only rights previ-
ously made use of (e.g. family reunification was applied for before natu-
ralisation) would be retained by analogy. This is a logical option, since the 
only difference between the right to return and naturalisation is that the 
“movement” change is replaced by a “residence factor” change; or
 b) the TC+ naturalisation cases, where it was decided that preferential rights 
on migration acquired under the legal framework applicable to nationals 
of a TC+ continue to be applicable after naturalisation.56
This second option concerns the Kahveci and Inan case- law.57
As was explained concerning the ranking, privileged Third Countries are 
called here TC+. This does not mean that each of these countries has the same 
rights. Some have more than others. Swiss citizens have, due to the Bilateral 
Treaties, nearly equal rights with EU citizens, and the same applies to nationals 
 54 Freitag, cit., para 34.
 55 Ibid., para. 39.
 56 Meaning, cases concerning persons who had at naturalisation the nationality of a TC+ 
and who were able to retain this other nationality.
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of the eea States.58 Others have fewer rights but are still quite privileged, such 
as Turkish nationals who benefit from the eec- Turkey Association Agree-
ment59 and Decision 1/ 80.60
 figure 5.4  Constellations lounes
 58 I.a. Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons – Final Act – 
Joint Declarations – Information relating to the entry into force of the seven Agreements 
with the Swiss Confederation in the sectors free movement of persons, air and land trans-
port, public procurement, scientific and technological cooperation, mutual recognition 
in relation to conformity assessment, and trade in agricultural products.
 59 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
(eec) and Turkey, signed at Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the Republic of Turkey and 
by the Member States of the eec and the Community and concluded, approved and con-
firmed on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 64/ 732/ EEC of 23 December 1963.









In Kahveci and Inan, the question was whether a Turkish national could still 
invoke Decision 1/ 80 after he had acquired the nationality of the host State, in 
casu the Netherlands, while retaining Turkish nationality.61 The Court stated 
that “[a] rule […] providing that the rights conferred by the first paragraph of 
Article 7 of Decision No 1/ 80 can no longer be relied upon where the Turkish 
worker who is already legally integrated in the host Member State has obtained 
Netherlands nationality, would have precisely the effect of undermining the 
legal status expressly conferred on Turkish nationals by the law resulting the 
eec- Turkey Association Agreement”.62 Here, the Court made a similar argu-
mentation as in Micheletti, though in this case, ironically, the third- country na-
tionality gained preference, as more rights were attached to it than to having 
the nationality of the host State. The Court concluded that “Article 7 of Deci-
sion No 1/ 80 must be interpreted as meaning that the members of the family of 
a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member 
State can still invoke that provision once that worker has acquired the nation-
ality of the host Member State while retaining his Turkish nationality”.63 This, 
however, only applies to cases where the TC+ rights concern family reunifica-
tion, and not to other rights, such as social security.64
The reasoning behind this decision of the Court was that, if integration re-
sults in the loss of rights, this would lead to discouraging TC+s from pursuing 
the ultimate form of integration, “naturalisation”.65
In his Opinion on Lounes, AG Bot comes, to a certain extent, to the same 
conclusion as the Court in Kahveci and Inan.66 However, he makes things rath-
er confusing, by not referring to this case- law.67 Instead, he first applies option 
 61 It thus involved a “Home MS/ TC+ residence MS/ Home MS” constellation. It is not entirely 
clear whether the applicants had actually retained Turkish nationality or reacquired it 
while retaining the Dutch nationality. There is in the Netherlands a renouncement 
requirement of the previous nationality upon naturalisation, which can be waived in case 
it is (nearly) impossible to lose the other nationality. This is what might have happened. 
What is also possible is that they reacquired Turkish nationality while retaining the Dutch 
nationality which is also possible, through a derogation of the rule on automatic loss of 
nationality upon acquisition of another nationality if one is born there or it is the nation-
ality of the spouse.
 62 Kahveci and Inan, cit., para. 38.
 63 Ibid., para. 41.
 64 This was at issue in Court of Justice, judgment of 11 November 1999, case C- 179/ 98, Mesbah. 
See for this distinction: Kahveci and Inan, cit., para. 34.
 65 Kahveci and Inan, cit., paras. 33 and 35.
 66 Opinion of AG Bot, Lounes, cit.
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1, coming to the conclusion that only rights attained before naturalisation can 
still be applied, but then changes his mind.68
If the Court had decided for option 1, this would have led to a consistent 
application of case- law unfavourable to dual EU citizens – unfavourable, but at 
least consistent. Still, this would mean that a naturalised TC+ would have more 
rights than a naturalised person who already was an EU citizen before.
Option 1 would have been especially problematic in the light of Brexit, because 
it would also mean that a person who naturalised in one Member State, who re-
tained the nationality of another Member State – that has withdrawn from the 
Union under Art. 50 teu and has negotiated a preferential trade agreement with 
the EU, including certain free movement rights – would suddenly be in a better 
position in the Home MS, than when (s)he was a dual EU citizen, since the per-
son would be a TC+. This certainly cannot have been the intended outcome.
The Court decided for option 2, and thus made the other Member State’s 
nationality effective concerning the application of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC in a 
Home Member State; this leads to a situation where it is utterly unclear when 
the Directive is applicable to a dual EU citizen. This gives rise to questions such 
as “would it only apply to naturalised dual EU citizens, to the detriment of dual 
EU citizens who have both nationalities since birth?” or “can this second group 
get into the same situation by moving to another Member State, returning, and 
having a life- long application of the Directive; or only for a certain period? And 
what if they renounce one nationality, and then reacquire it?”.
iii Lounes Judgment
iii.1 Dual Nationality and the Directive – Home MS Rank Always 
Applicable
Concerning the Directive, the Court considered that the purpose of it is to “fa-
cilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move freely within 
 68 Though, he also comes to a similar conclusion, while stating that Art. 21 tfeu should be 
applied because it would be conflicting with integration. The AG stated that “[t] o continue 
the family life which she has started, she would then be forced to leave that State [state of 
naturalisation] to move to another Member State in order to be able to claim once again 
the rights conferred by Directive 2004/ 38 and, in particular, the possibility of residing with 
her spouse”. For Mrs Garcia Ormazabal and Mr Lounes this does not change the situation 
at all. Mrs Garcia Ormazabal and Mr Lounes did not have a family life before her naturali-
sation, but only four years afterwards. According to the facts she naturalised on 12 August 
2009 and Mr Lounes only arrived in the UK in January 2010. Only in 2013 did they begin a 






the territory of the Member States”, a right that is granted to EU citizens. Fam-
ily members of these citizens have a derived right. However, the Court con-
firmed here that tcn family members cannot derive any autonomous rights 
from the Directive.69 The Court furthermore reiterated what it had stated in O 
and B, that through a “literal, contextual and teleological interpretation”, the 
Directive does not confer a derived right of residence to tcn family members 
of an EU citizen in his Home MS. The Court once again considered that the 
wording used in the Directive – “Member State other than that of which they 
are a national”, “another Member State” and “host Member State” – clearly in-
dicates that it is not supposed to be applicable in a Member State of which the 
person is a national.70 The Court also stated that the Directive only governed 
the exercise of the free movement rights (and consequently not the retention 
of these rights).71
Moreover, the Court considered that the Directive is not intended to grant 
the right of entry and residence in the Home MS since, based on a principle 
of international law, a Member State cannot refuse such a right to its own na-
tionals. Since the EU citizen already has an unconditional right of residence 
in the Member State of nationality, the Directive is consequently not intend-
ed to grant a derived right of residence to the tcn family members of such a 
 person.72
Applying these considerations to the case, the Court concluded that there 
is no doubt that Mrs García Ormazábal had indeed exercised her right of free 
movement when she moved to the UK, as a Spanish national. She therefore 
had held the status of beneficiary under Art. 3, para. 1, of the Directive and had 
resided there based on Art. 7, para. 1, and even Art. 16, para. 1, of the Directive. 
However, this had changed when she naturalised. According to the Court the 
“acquisition of British citizenship gave rise to a change in the legal rules appli-
cable to her, under both national law and the directive”.73 From the moment of 
naturalisation she ceased to be a beneficiary for the purpose of the Directive, 
 69 This is actually not entirely correct. Art. 13, para. 2, of the Directive concerns the retention 
of the right of residence by a tcn family member in case of divorce, annulment of mar-
riage or termination of the registered partnership. Under the conditions set in that article, 
the residence is retained. The article furthermore states that “[s] uch family members shall 
retain their right of residence exclusively on personal basis”. One cannot but understand 
this “exclusively on personal basis” as meaning that it concerns an autonomous right.
 70 Lounes, cit., paras. 34– 35.
 71 Ibid., para. 36.
 72 Ibid., para. 37.
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as her residence was no longer a conferred right, but an inherently uncondi-
tional right under national law.74
The fact that she still had Spanish nationality, or that she had exercised her 
free movement rights did not change this. The Court considered that, despite 
these conditions, Mrs García Ormazábal had, since her naturalisation, no lon-
ger “been residing in a ‘Member State other than that of which [she is] a na-
tional’ ”.75 Consequently, the Directive is not applicable to the Home MS/ MS 
combination as the Home MS rank gains preference.
Thus far, the judgment is not very surprising; the statements made by the 
Court concerning Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu are, however, far- reaching.
iii.2 Dual Nationality and Art. 21, Para. 1, tfeu
Concerning Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu the Court considered, first, that just like the 
Directive, Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu does not grant an autonomous right of resi-
dence to the tcn family member of an EU citizen, but only a derived right 
of residence. The “purpose and justification” for this derived right are based 
on the fact that the refusal would interfere with the free movement rights, its 
exercise, and its effectiveness accorded to the EU citizen.76
The government of the UK argued that it concerned a purely internal situ-
ation. The Court disagreed with this, considering that a situation where an EU 
citizen has made use of the free movement rights by residing legally in another 
Member State cannot be treated as a purely internal situation solely on the 
ground that the person has acquired the nationality of the Member State of 
residence. The Court emphasised, referring to Freitag, that it “has already held 
that there is a link with EU law with regard to nationals of one Member State 
who are lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State of which 
they are also nationals”.77
The Court went on, stating that a dual EU citizen who has exercised the free 
movement rights by moving to a Member State other than “the Member State 
of origin”, may rely on the rights pertaining to EU citizenship “also against one 
of those two Member States”, meaning the Member States of nationality. This 
specifically includes, according to the Court with reference to Metock, the right 
“to lead a normal family life, together with their family members, in the host 
 74 Read the purpose of the Member State of residence has changed concerning the move-
ment and residence indications as explained in section ii.1.
 75 This means that the Home MS rank nationality gains priority over the MS rank nationality 
for the purpose of the Directive, irrespective whether the mobility quality was activated.
 76 Lounes, cit., paras. 45– 48.












Member State”. Denying this right to a dual EU citizen who has naturalised in 
the Member State of residence would undermine the effectiveness of Art. 21, 
para. 1, tfeu.78
The Court then provides several grounds for this.
First of all, denying this right would place Mrs García Ormazábal in the 
same situation as Shirley McCarthy, who had not made use of the free move-
ment rights.
Secondly, the rights conferred by Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu are intended for in-
tegration into the host Member State. Naturalisation is the show of intent “to 
become permanently integrated in that State”. It would be illogical, according 
to the Court, that an EU citizen who has acquired rights by making use of the 
free movement rights, would have to “forego those rights” because (s)he wants 
to naturalise in order to be more deeply integrated into the society of that 
State.79
The Court further stated that an EU citizen who had acquired the nation-
ality of the Member State of residence next to the original Member State na-
tionality would be treated less favourably for the purpose of family life than 
the EU citizen who holds only the nationality of origin. The Court considered 
that these rights “would thus be reduced in line with their increasing degree of 
integration in the society of that Member State and according to the number of 
nationalities that they hold”.80 The last part of the sentence is rather cryptically 
formulated – one should consider for this the situation described above con-
cerning the consequences of Option 1 (applying O and B strictly to the case), 
which would result in a situation where a person having the nationalities of 
every Member State would never be able to derive rights from the Directive 
and consequently from EU law.
The Court concluded that a person who naturalised in the Member State of 
residence, while retaining the original nationality of another Member State, 
should be able to continue to enjoy the rights derived from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, 
especially the right to “build a family life” with the tcn spouse, by means of 
a derived right of residence for the spouse. The conditions for granting this 
derived right of residence should not be stricter than those provided for in the 
Directive, as was already stated in O and B.81
 78 Ibid., paras. 51– 53.
 79 Ibid., paras. 56– 58. It is very remarkable, that the Court did not make any reference on 
this point to Kahveci and Inan, cit., while the argumentation is identical and the wording 
extremely similar.
 80 Lounes, cit., para. 59 (emphasis added).
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iii.3 Discussion
This case is interesting from many points of view.
Essentially, the Court ruled that a dual EU citizen who has made use of free 
movement rights can always rely on Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, even in a Home MS, and 
that this includes Metock- type situations. Therefore, the tcn family member does 
not need to have had prior legal residence in the EU to have a derived right of res-
idence in the Home MS. The Court further confirmed the theory presented in this 
Chapter, of giving effect to nationality and the mobility quality.
It is curious, though, that for certain issues, and especially concerning the 
integration argument, the Court seems to draw considerable inspiration from 
Kahveci and Inan, but does not refer to it at all. This is even more surprising 
considering that the referring Court had explicitly relied on this case.
It also left both Shirley McCarthy and O and B standing in full, which will 
cause some new legal questions, as will be explained below.
 a) For the Directive: Home MS rank nationality highest. As regards giving ef-
fect to nationality according to the Directive, the Court made it absolute-
ly clear with its detailed analysis that the Home MS rank nationality gains 
absolute priority over any other nationality. With this, the Court limited 
Shirley McCarthy even further, by excluding the MS rank nationality of 
a dual EU citizen from being applicable to the Directive in a Home MS, 
even if they have made use of their free movement rights.82 As explained 
above in section ii.4, the Court had already done this in O and B, but 
without direct reference to it also being applicable to dual EU citizens.
 Thus, the Court has now confirmed that the Directive is not applicable 
in a situation such as above, concerning circular dual EU citizens moving 
between the two Home MS. This is the case even if the first move is to the 
other Home MS, and where no other link exists with that Member State 
except for the nationality.
 b) Confirmation of giving effect to a nationality and the mobility quality. 
As the Directive is not directly applicable, one has to check whether the 
mobility quality is activated, which puts the MS rank nationality above 
the Home MS rank nationality, for the purpose of Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu. 
 82 In Shirley McCarthy, cit., para. 39, the Court still concluded that “in so far as the Union 
citizen concerned has never exercised his right of free movement and has always resided 
in a Member State of which he is a national, that citizen is not covered by the concept 
of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of Art. 3(1) of Directive 2004/ 38, so that that directive 
is not applicable to him” (emphasis added). This “in so far as” could be considered as a 
limitation that excluded her from the scope. With Lounes it is now confirmed that even 
if she had made use of the free movement rights Shirley McCarthy would not have been 






The Court stated in Lounes that “[a] Member State cannot restrict the 
effects that follow from holding the nationality of another Member State, 
in particular the rights which are attendant thereon under EU law and 
which are triggered by a citizen exercising his freedom of movement”.83
This as such is nothing new, considering that in Micheletti and in Zhu and Chen 
the Court had already stated that a Member State cannot restrict the rights de-
rived from an MS rank nationality. The rights are thus attached to the MS rank 
nationality and are “triggered” by the exercise of free movement rights, which 
means the mobility quality becomes activated.
iv “New” Issues
There are some problems in this judgment, with possibly large implications, 
because on some points, the Court was not very clear, while on others, it was 
too detailed.
This especially concerns the type of nationality acquisition and retention of 
the other MS nationality.
In its conclusion, the Court set out certain conditions. These were based on 
the manner in which the questions had been phrased by the referring Court. 
The Court should maybe have deviated a bit from this, since it makes certain 
issues unclear, meaning that these conditions will have to be reinterpreted at 
a later stage.
The Court stated that a tcn family member of an EU citizen who:
 a) has made use of the free movement rights, specifically Art. 7, para. 1, or 
Art. 16, para. 1, of the Directive; and
 b) has acquired the nationality of the Member State of residence; and
 c) has retained the nationality of the other Member State; and
 d) marries several years later with the tcn; and
 e) continues to reside in “that Member State”, meaning the Member State of 
naturalisation, has no right of residence under the Directive, but has that 
right under Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu for which the conditions on entry and 
residence may not be stricter than under the Directive.
Here, the Court was too specific and there will surely be national courts who 
will interpret this as follows:  “It is now clear that a dual EU citizen who has 
moved to another Member State and who acquires that Member States na-
tionality, while keeping his first nationality, still has the rights accorded to him 
by the Directive by analogy afterwards in the Member State of naturalisation”.
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In all other situations, this right of residence might be refused, even though 
this would be a very narrow and incorrect interpretation of Lounes.
Instead, the Court should have stated something like:
– The Directive is never applicable to an EU citizen holding the nation-
ality of the Member State of residence, irrespective of whether such an 
individual also holds the nationality of another Member State.
– The tcn family member of an EU citizen who holds, irrespective of the 
timing and mode of acquisition of these, the nationality of more than 
one Member State, and who has exercised his/ her freedom of move-
ment by residing either in a Member State other than that of which (s)
he is a national, under Article 7(1) or Article 16(1) of the Directive, irre-
spective whether the EU citizen later acquired the nationality of this 
Member State, or, in a Member State of which he is a national other 
than the Member State in which he was born, while fulfilling the con-
ditions as provided for in Article 7(1) of the Directive applied by anal-
ogy, shall have a derived right of residence under Article 21(1) tfeu, 
on conditions which must not be stricter than those provided for by 
Directive 2004/ 38 for the grant of such a right to a tcn who is a family 
member of a Union citizen who has exercised his right of freedom of 
movement by settling in a Member State other than the Member State 
of which he is a national.
This is a bit more technical, but would have solved multiple issues, which are 
unclear because of the specific wording of the Court.
In the following analysis, the multiple questions left open by Lounes will be 
considered.
iv.1 Does Lounes Apply Only in the Member State of Naturalisation? – 
Geographical Scope
If read strictly, one might consider that Mrs García Ormazábal retained her 
rights due to the fact that she never left the UK again after her naturalisation.
Such consideration must be denied. As stated above, the Court held that 
there does exist a link with EU law for dual EU citizens who reside in a Home 
MS, based on Freitag. The Court consequently ruled that a dual EU citizen, 
who has exercised the free movement rights in a Member State other than the 
Member State of origin – which one should read as Member State of birth – 
continues to rely on the rights derived from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, “also against 
one of those two Member States”.84
 84 Ibid., para. 51. In French, the language of drafting at the Court it also contains the specific 





One could take this literally, as meaning that the dual EU citizen can rely on 
it against one of the two, but not against both. Against the other Member State 
of nationality, rules like the ones set out in O and B would apply. This cannot, 
and may not, be argued.
Freitag concerned a dual EU citizen moving between the two Home MS, 
who wanted a civil status, the name, which had been changed in one Home MS 
during a period similar to Art. 6, para. 1, of the Directive, to be recognised in the 
other Home MS, where he resided. Consequently, it applies in both Home MS.
If it were to mean that it applied only in the Home MS of naturalisation, and 
only for as long as the naturalised dual EU citizen does not move away again, 
this would have as a consequence that once again moving to another Mem-
ber State would become very unattractive, since afterwards, the less favourable 
case- law would apply. It would also mean that the naturalised dual EU citizen 
might have to prove when applying for a residence permit for the tcn spouse, 
that (s)he has not yet made use of the free movement rights by moving to an-
other Member State since the naturalisation. It can be quite cumbersome, if 
not even impossible, to prove a negative.
Lounes consequently must apply both in the Home MS of origin and the 
Home MS of naturalisation. Thus, the case Lounes applies only to applications 
of family reunification in any Home MS. A dual EU citizen in an MS country 
has an MS/ MS combination and consequently either the Zhu and Chen or the 
Micheletti constellation applies.
This, however, could also mean that the Home MS of origin would have to 
treat a dual EU citizen who naturalised in another Member State differently 
from someone who did not naturalise in the host Member State and then re-
turns, since O and B would still be applicable to the latter.
This leads to an essential question: to whom exactly does Lounes apply?
iv.2 To Whom Does Lounes Apply? – Individual Scope
More specifically, the question is: does Lounes only apply to dual EU citizens, 
or also to any naturalised EU citizens who previously had the nationality of an-
other Member State and subsequently lost this nationality? To get to the latter 
part, one must first consider what the consequences would be if Lounes were 
to apply only to dual EU citizens.
a) Does Lounes apply only to naturalised dual EU citizens? This question is 
going to be crucial.
According to Art. 5, para. 2, of the European Convention on Nationality 
(ecn), to which many Member States are party, “[e] ach State Party shall be 
guided by the principle of non- discrimination between its nationals, wheth-
er they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently”. 
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According to the Explanatory Report to the Convention, “shall be guided by” 
indicates a declaration of intent and not a mandatory rule. The explanatory 
report further clarifies that it is aimed at “eliminating the discriminatory appli-
cation of rules in matters of nationality between nationals at birth and other 
nationals, including naturalised persons”. It then explicitly states that Art. 7, 
para. 1, let. b), is an exemption from this rule, which concerns loss of nation-
ality because of acquisition by fraudulent means.85 One should thus consider 
that only profound reasons could allow for a deviation from this general prin-
ciple of non- discrimination based on the mode of acquisition.
If Lounes were to apply only to dual EU citizens who acquired the nation-
ality of another Member State at a later point in life through naturalisation, it 
would put naturalised dual EU citizens in a better position than “birth” dual EU 
citizens, which is prohibited by Art. 5, para. 2, ecn.
This would be unfair also because a “birth” dual EU citizen cannot “upgrade” 
his nationality status.
Limiting the scope of Lounes to naturalised dual EU citizens does not seem 
to have been the intention of the Court, as it states in para. 54 that “denying 
[the dual EU citizen] that right would amount to treating him in the same way 
as a citizen of the host Member State who has never left that State [read Shirley 
McCarthy], disregarding the fact that the national concerned has exercised his 
freedom of movement by settling in the host Member State”. Even though it 
might not be the Court’s intention to limit the effects of Lounes to naturalised 
dual EU citizens, we should still have a look at all the consequences that dif-
ferent forms of limited interpretation of the judgment might have concerning 
naturalisation.
b) Does Lounes apply to a specific mode of nationality acquisition or does 
it require a certain genuine link with the nationalities? Mrs García Ormazábal 
was naturalised, which requires a certain period of residence and proof of inte-
gration. The Court emphasised in its judgment that she had sought to become 
more “deeply integrated” or “permanently integrated”. The Court also stated 
that there is an “underlying logic of gradual integration that informs Article 
21(1) tfeu”. She therefore retained her rights as EU citizen, because she had 
integrated.
However, only the ordinary naturalisation requires integration, whereas 
other modes of acquisition do not necessarily, especially where nationality is 
acquired abroad iure sanguinis, but also for facilitated naturalisations or acqui-
sition by option.
 85 Explanatory report to the ecn of 6 November 1997, paras. 45– 46. 
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The nationality codes of the Member States are very diverse, and in each 
and every single one of them there are modes of facilitated acquisition of na-
tionality, which require a shorter period of residence, or even no residence. 
With this, I do not refer only to Investment Citizenship, but also to any form of 
facilitated naturalisation e.g. spouses of nationals, children born out of wed-
lock if they do not acquire the nationality automatically upon recognition, or 
persons where a family member in ascending line was a national. This is even 
required by Art. 6, para. 4, ecn.
Could a Member State now refuse to give effect to the MS rank nationality 
of a dual EU citizen in the Home MS, because it was acquired via a facilitated 
mode of acquisition instead of through the ordinary naturalisation?86
It definitely could not. This would be an additional condition for recognition of 
the nationality of another Member State, as prohibited by the Court in Micheletti.
Furthermore, when applying for naturalisation, a person does not really 
have a choice for one mode of acquisition or another. If (s)he fulfils the condi-
tions of a facilitated naturalisation that mode is applied, even though the high-
er set of conditions for another mode of acquisition would also be fulfilled.
On top of this, it would be legally impossible for a person to “upgrade” the 
nationality acquired by one mode, to the same nationality acquired by another 
mode. This is because nationals have to be treated equally, irrespective of how 
they acquired the nationality from the Home MS. The Member State of nation-
ality is therefore even prohibited from providing for such an “upgrade”, as that 
would explicitly acknowledge a different rank in status based on the mode of 
acquisition of nationality.
One should also consider that the Court accepted only on one occasion that 
a nationality of a Member State would not be applied, because of the way in 
which it had been acquired. However, there it concerned the Home MS rank 
nationality acquired ex lege by marriage to a national, which would otherwise 
have resulted in a loss of rights derived from the MS rank nationality.87
Furthermore, there are modes of facilitated naturalisation that do not re-
quire any residence. Would Lounes not be applicable in such a case?
Imagine the following situations:
– what if, a person of Hungarian origin would naturalise in Hungary in accor-
dance with Section 4, para. 3, of the Act on Hungarian Citizenship, which 
 86 A similar question was asked by Steve Peers in his comment on the judgment. See: Peers, 
S. (2017). Dual Citizens and EU Citizenship: Clarification from the ecj. EU Law Analysis, 
available at eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.
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does not require residence, but only knowledge of the language, while still 
residing in the other Member State of nationality?88
– what if, a child is born in a Member State of which it automatically acquires 
the nationality, and only at a later moment acquires the nationality of an-
other Member State iure sanguinis, by registration, as that Member State 
has no automatic iure sanguinis abroad if only one parent is a national e.g. 
the situation of Slovenian nationality?
All these questions have the same answer.
Based on the principle of recognition of nationality and national jurisdic-
tion concerning nationality, a Member State has to recognise the grant of na-
tionality by another Member State and consequently that the person involved 
has become a dual EU citizen.
As was established in Lounes, what is important is that the person has had 
the mobility quality. If (s)he has never made use of the free movement rights, 
Shirley McCarthy applies.
Therefore, if at any moment before in life, a person has made use of free 
movement rights, he or she can derive rights from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu on ac-
quiring the nationality of the other Member State and becoming a “Home MS/ 
MS residence Home MS/ Home MS”. In the latter situation though, the person 
must be a returner; thus, it would be rather curious that the mobility quality 
would first be dormant upon return, and only the rights previously used would 
be retained, because of attachment to the Home MS rank.89 Conversely, with-
out movement, but by acquiring the nationality of another Member State, the 
mobility quality would become reactivated for eternity, because of automatic 
attachment to the MS rank.
As will be explained, the Court must change its approach in O and B, where 
it concerns the application of rights after return.
Lounes must, at the minimum, be applied to any dual EU citizen, irrespec-
tive of the mode of acquisition of the nationalities. It therefore not only ap-
plies to ordinary naturalisations, but also to any form of naturalisation, as well 
as to “birth” dual EU citizens who have the mobility quality.
 88 Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship of 15 June 1993 as amended by Act xliv of 26 
May 2010 (Hungary), 2010, Évi xliv. törvény a magyar állampolgárságról szóló 1993. évi 
LV. törvény módosításáról.
 89 Has made use of the free movement rights means once upon a time “MS movement …/ 
MS”; as the person resides at the time of acquisition of the other nationality in the Home 
MS, the person must have come back “Home MS movement MS/ Home MS” and then con-







c) Must the individual have retained the other Member State nationality? 
The condition of retention of the previous Member State nationality is where 
the main crux in this story is. The Court emphasises on multiple occasions in 
the judgment concerning Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu that Mrs García Ormazábal had 
retained her nationality of origin.90 Considering how restrictively certain na-
tional courts and governments interpret cjeu judgments, this can lead to the 
conclusion that, if the EU citizen does not retain the other MS rank nationality 
when naturalising in the Member State of residence, the case is not applicable.
Many Member States have introduced rules with exceptions for retention of 
the original nationality upon naturalisation if the original nationality is of one 
Member State, and/ or have created an exception to the automatic loss of their 
nationality upon acquisition of another nationality, if this is the nationality of 
another Member State.
A logical reaction of the Member States to Lounes would be that these rules 
would once again be abolished. For, if Mrs García Ormazábal had not retained 
her Spanish nationality, the mobility quality would not have been attached to 
her MS rank nationality, but to the Home MS rank nationality. Consequently, 
as was seen in O and B, only the rights used before would have been retained, 
and the mobility quality for future use would have been lost, correct?
According to the Court’s judgments in Micheletti and in Rottmann, Member 
States must, “when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have 
due regard to European Union law”.91 The judgment of Rottmann has been 
discussed a lot in the literature and was considered by some to be surprising, 
despite the fact that this exact line of reasoning had already been put forward 
as far back as the 1980s and 90s.92 One could thus wonder whether a duty to 
renounce the other Member State nationality upon naturalisation, or the au-
tomatic loss of the original Member State nationality, would be in accordance 
with EU law.
 90 Lounes, cit., paras. 49, 54, 60, and 62.
 91 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Rottmann, para. 45.
 92 Greenwood, C.  (1987). Nationality and the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons 
in Community Law. Yearbook of European Law 7 (1), pp.  185– 210; Evans, A.C. (1982). 
Nationality Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the eec. Yearbook of European Law 
2 (1), pp. 173– 189; Hartley, T.C. (1978). EEC Immigration Law. Amsterdam: North Holland 
Publishing Co., p.  78. According to Síofra O’Leary these authors argued that “[s] ince 
nationality is a means to define the personal scope of free movement and since it is also 
a means chosen by the Community, they argue that it is also a question for Community 
law, or at least on which Member States cannot unilaterally dispose of without reference 
to Community law”. This is exactly what has happened in later case- law. O’Leary, S. (1992). 
Nationality Law and Community Citizenship: A Tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows. Yearbook 
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d) Presuming that Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens: automatic loss 
upon acquisition of the nationality of another Member State. Automatic loss 
or withdrawal of one nationality upon acquisition of another used to be quite 
common practice back when dual nationality was still considered a bad thing. 
However, many Member States abandoned that practice,93 although in some 
exceptional cases they then (re)introduced it.94
Art. 7, para. 1, let. a), ecn provides that such a mode of loss is permitted. 
However, if Lounes applies only to dual EU citizens, automatic loss of the orig-
inal Member State nationality upon acquisition of another Member State’s na-
tionality would mean that EU citizens who “have acquired rights under [Art. 21, 
para. 1, tfeu] as a result of having exercised their freedom of movement, must 
forgo those rights […] because they have sought, by becoming naturalised in 
[the other] Member State, to become more deeply integrated in the society of 
that [other] State”.95
Therefore, one should consider the first case that truly concerned loss of EU 
citizenship based on loss of the nationality of a Member State: Rottmann.96
In that case, the Court decided that:
[t] he provis[ion] that due regard must be had to European Union law 
does not compromise the principle of international law previously 
 93 Globalcit Database ground of loss L5. It was abandoned by Denmark in 2015 (law no. 1496 
of 23 December 2014 (Denmark), Lov om ændring af lov om dansk indfødsret (Accept af 
dobbelt statsborgerskab og betaling af gebyr i sager om dansk indfødsret), in force since 1 
September 2015). It still exists in Austria (Art. 27); Estonia (Art. 29); Ireland, but only for 
naturalised nationals who subsequently acquire another nationality (Art. 19, para. 1, let. 
e)); Germany, but is not applicable when acquiring the nationality of another Member 
State (Art. 17, para. 1, sub- para. 2, and Art. 25. The exception is mentioned in Art. 25, para. 
1); Latvia, but provides that when one acquires the nationality of i.a. an EU Member State 
one retains Latvian nationality (Art. 23, para. 2, and Art. 24, para. 1, sub- para. 1. The excep-
tion for the nationality of another EU Member State is provided in Art. 9, para. 1, sub- para. 
1); Lithuania (Art. 24, para. 2, and Art. 26); the Netherlands (Art. 15, para. 1, let. a), and 
Art. 16, para. 1, let. c) and e)); Slovakia (Art. 9, para. 1, let. b)); Spain, loss happens after 
three years of acquisition, but one can make a declaration within this period to retain the 
Spanish nationality (Art. 24, para. 1).
 94 E.g. Slovakia in 2010 in response to the Hungarian changes on the grant of its national-
ity. Act no. 40/ 1993 on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic of 19 January 1993 as amended 
by Act no.  250/ 2010 of 26 May 2010 (Slovakia), Zákon, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon 
Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/ 1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky 
v znení neskorších predpisov. Zbierka zákonov Slovenskej republiky č. 250/ 2010.
 95 With slight alterations, Lounes, cit., para. 58.
 96 It is generally accepted that Kaur (Court of Justice, judgment of 20 February 2001, case C- 
192/ 99, Kaur) did not concern a loss of EU citizenship because she never had it. Therefore, 










recognised by the Court, […] that the Member States have the power to 
lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality, but 
rather enshrines the principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, 
the exercise of that power, in so far as it affects the rights conferred and 
protected by the legal order of the Union, as is in particular the case of 
a decision withdrawing naturalisation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of Eu-
ropean Union law.97
The Court further stated in Rottmann “that the principles stemming from this 
judgment with regard to the powers of the Member States in the sphere of 
nationality, and also their duty to exercise those powers having due regard to 
European Union law, apply both to the Member State of naturalisation and to 
the Member State of the original nationality”.98
This means that judicial review by the Member State of origin would also 
have to be applied if it wants to take away rights derived from EU law. A simi-
lar issue was under consideration in Tjebbes.99 That case concerns the ground 
for automatic loss of the Dutch nationality for dual nationals while residing 
outside of the EU and without applying for a new Dutch identity document 
within ten years. Next to Dutch nationality, several of the applicants also have 
Swiss citizenship and reside in Switzerland. If the Swiss courts were to apply 
Lounes, which conflicts with their own recent case- law, a situation as in Tjeb-
bes would mean that they had EU citizen rights, in Switzerland – irrespective 
of the fact that these were denied by the Swiss authorities – and would have 
lost them, due to the automatic loss resulting from living outside the territo-
ries of the EU.100 The Court, however, in its judgment did not take this into 
consideration and even stated that all applicants had never made use of the 
 97 Rottmann, cit., para. 48.
 98 Ibid., para. 62.
 99 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes.
 100 Up until 2016 dual EU- Swiss (EU- CH) citizens were considered to fall within the 
ambit of the bilateral treaties even when they had not made use of the free move-
ment rights. Swiss Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 28 January 2016, C2_ 296/ 2015. 
See also Epiney, A., and Nüesch, D.  (2016). Zur schweizerischen Rechtsprechung zum 
Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen. In: Achermann, Amarelle, Caroni, Epiney, Künzli, and 
Uebersax, eds., Jahrbuch für Migrationsrecht 2015/ 2016. Bern: Stämpfli Verlag, p. 310. This 
changed when the courts decided to apply O and B, S and G and Shirley McCarthy to simi-
lar situations in Switzerland, while applying it to a dual EU- CH citizen who had made use 
of the free movement rights before. Swiss Federal Administrative Court, judgment of 10 
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free movement rights and, therefore, excluded Art. 21 tfeu from the scope of 
the case.101
In Rottmann, the Court stated that “[h] aving regard to the importance which 
primary law attaches to the status of citizen of the Union, when examining 
a decision withdrawing naturalisation [read ‘the nationality’] it is necessary, 
therefore, to take into account the consequences that the decision entails for 
the person concerned and, if relevant, for the members of his family with re-
gard to the loss of the rights enjoyed by every citizen of the Union”.102
Considering the fact that in Lounes, the Court accepted that the naturalised 
dual EU citizen continues to have family reunification rights derived from Art. 
21, para. 1, tfeu, this has to include future family members. It is unfortunate, 
that the Court did not take the issue of Art. 21 tfeu into consideration in Tjeb-
bes. While the Court decided that the nationality of a Member State may be 
lost while residing in a Third Country as long as certain conditions are fulfilled, 
it should have strongly distinguished this from the same person residing in a 
Member State or a TC+. By the exclusion of Art. 21 tfeu from the scope of the 
judgment, one might derive that different rules would have been applicable if 
such a loss by residence abroad could occur while residing in another Mem-
ber State. The Court, however, should have replaced the application of Art. 21 
tfeu, with the application of the Bilateral Treaties with Switzerland which do 
grant free movement rights.
If an automatic loss in a Member State would be permitted, it would also 
mean that persons from Member States which provide for automatic loss upon 
acquisition of another nationality would be less inclined to become “fully in-
tegrated” in another Member State, because they would lose their original 
Member State nationality and consequently any rights they derive from hav-
ing an MS rank nationality. These EU citizens would be thus at a disadvantage 
compared to nationals from Member States that allow the retention of their 
nationality.
Although an instance of reverse discrimination, here the reason for the loss 
would be because the persons had made use of the free movement rights.
e) Presuming that Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens: duty to renounc-
es the other Member State nationality. This question is maybe more straight-
forward than the previous one.
If Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens, then such a duty to renounce the 
other Member State nationality would mean that the EU citizens would have 
to forgo his acquired rights in order to naturalise in another Member State. 
 101 Tjebbes, cit., para. 28.






Consequently, such a duty to renounce the other Member State’s nationality 
upon naturalisation may not be required.
f) Presuming that Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens:  conclusion. If 
Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens, it must have consequences for nation-
al rules concerning loss and acquisition of nationality. Specifically, it must have 
consequences for the rules on automatic loss of nationality upon acquisition 
of another nationality, and for the rules on duty to renounce the previous na-
tionality upon acquisition.
One should take into account that these rules should not only apply where 
the previous nationality is the nationality of a Member State, but also where 
the previous nationality is of a TC+. It should furthermore apply to candidate 
states – which are already mostly TC+ – and also to any possible future candi-
date states. If not to the latter, these candidate states should, upon becoming 
Member States, create an option possibility for any former nationals who ac-
quired the nationality of a Member State and consequently lost the former 
candidate state’s nationality. The reacquisition of the nationality would not 
result in a loss of the Member State’s nationality, since it would have been an 
acquisition of the nationality of another Member State.
g) Presuming that Lounes applies to any EU citizen who had the national-
ity of one Member State when acquiring the nationality of another Member 
State. Let us now look at the other side, and presume that Lounes applies to 
any EU citizen who had the nationality of one Member State when acquiring 
the nationality of another Member State, thus including individuals who had 
lost their original Member State nationality due to naturalisation. This yields 
an entirely different set of results and issues.
If Lounes were to apply only to naturalised EU citizens, it would mean that 
Lounes would clearly give an advantage to naturalised EU citizens, compared 
to those who did not acquire the nationality by naturalisation, but by another 
mode of acquisition. This is incompatible with Art. 5, para. 2, ecn.
Next to the legal problem, there are also practical implications. Either a 
Member State would have to check for every returner in turn whether the in-
dividual had acquired the nationality by naturalisation and what the previous 
nationality was, or the individual would have to prove this. The first option 
means that the Member State would actively have to make a distinction in its 
law and practice on registration between certain groups of its own nationals.
As this is not allowed, the Court would have to change its approach con-
cerning O and B and also give the same rights as dual EU citizens in the Home 
MS to persons who only had one nationality at birth and subsequently never 
acquired another one. The Court recently decided on three cases concerning 
the right to return. The Coman case concerns the right to return as regards 
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same- sex marriages and the Banger case concerns the right to return as regards 
non- marital relationships.103 In these cases, the Court could have considered 
the issue. It has not been addressed specifically in either case though, and the 
Court did not deal with it.104
However, in Altiner and Ravn, it concerns exactly the question of whether 
the mobility quality stays active after return.105 The case concerned a Danish 
national married to a tcn, who resided together in Sweden. They returned to 
Denmark and were covered by the right to return. After a while, they requested 
family reunification with the son of the tcn spouse from a previous marriage, 
who was also covered as a privileged family member under Art. 2, para. 2, let. 
c), of the Directive. The son did, however, not reside with them in Sweden and 
consequently would be excluded from the scope set by O and B. This would 
have been the perfect opportunity for the Court to overrule or enlighten its 
judgment in O and B.106
That Lounes would apply to any naturalised EU citizen who previously held 
another Member State’s nationality has, however, also other consequences. It 
means that the Court will have to rethink its case- law in other fields as well, 
like the Baldinger case.107 This case concerned war victim benefits that were 
granted to Austrian nationals. Mr Baldinger was an Austrian national in the 
 103 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman and others; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 12 July2018, case C- 89/ 17, Banger.
 104 In Coman the Court did refer multiple times to Lounes concerning the right to return in 
general. From this one can deduct that Lounes also applies in the Member State of birth 
and not only in the Member State of naturalisation. However, when it concerned the par-
ticular situation, the Court only referred to O and B. This distinction is probably due to 
fact that it concerned an accompanying family member and not a joining family member. 
Coman and others, cit., para. 24 compared to paras. 18, 20, 22, 23, 25.
 105 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 June 2018, case C- 230/ 17, Altiner and Ravn. It concerns 
a Danish national who had resided in Sweden with her Turkish spouse. They return to 
Denmark and later request family reunification with the son from a previous marriage of 
the Turkish spouse, which was denied by the Danish authorities based on O and B.
 106 Altiner and Ravn was decided without an Opinion of AG Wahl. This means that AG Wahl 
probably considered that the “return” case- law, meaning O and B, is clear and should be 
applied directly to this case. This would mean that no “new” family reunification would 
be granted after return to Denmark. The Court followed this approach. Consequently, 
this means that there is a different line of case- law applicable to dual EU citizens and 
“single” EU citizens. This must have as a consequence that Member States are no longer 
permitted to provide for automatic loss of their nationality upon acquisition of another 
Member State’s or TC+’s nationality, nor may the condition for acquisition be made that 
the previous nationality is renounced, where this nationality is of a Member State or TC+, 
as was explained supra.
 107 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 September 2004, case C- 386/ 02, Baldinger. I would like to 












Second World War and was taken prisoner of war. Later, he moved to Sweden 
and naturalised. As Austria has a strict single nationality policy, Mr Baldinger 
subsequently automatically lost Austrian nationality. Because of this loss of 
nationality, Mr Baldinger was considered not to fall within the scope of Aus-
trian war victim benefits. The Court accepted this. In a subsequent case, Tas- 
Hagen, it also concerned the refusal of war victim benefits, but in this case it 
was based on residence abroad while the applicant had retained the nation-
ality of the country granting the benefit – the Netherlands – while residing in 
Spain.108 In that case, the Court considered that the condition of residence in 
the Member State granting the benefit was incompatible with the right to free 
movement.109
Therefore, using the free movement rights may not impede continuous 
access to certain benefits from the Home Member State while retaining the 
nationality; however, losing the nationality by acquiring the nationality of an-
other Member State was considered an acceptable reason to discontinue the 
grant of these benefits. With Lounes, this might become a dubious stance of 
the Court.
h) Conclusion: Lounes should apply not only to dual EU citizens, but to all 
EU citizens. If one compares the two consequence analyses of whether Lounes 
applies to only dual EU citizens or to any EU citizen who naturalised and pre-
viously already had the nationality of a Member State, it becomes clear that 
both are quite burdensome.
If it applies only to dual EU citizens it must have consequences on the free-
dom of Member States to decide on grounds of loss of their nationality and on 
conditions of renunciation of the previous nationality. On the other hand, if it 
applies to any EU citizen who has moved, because it cannot apply only to nat-
uralised EU citizens as was already explained above, this means that not only 
the “return” case- law has to be revisited, but any case- law where it concerned 
a person who had lost the nationality of a Member State upon naturalisation 
in another Member State.
iv.3 Emphasis on Having the Mobility Quality
The Court in Lounes, just like in Shirley McCarthy, emphasised the importance 
for dual EU citizens of having made use of the free movement rights, conse-
quently of having the mobility quality. In certain constellations, this might give 
rise to some issues.
 108 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 October 2006, case C- 192/ 05, Tas- Hagen.







Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens 103
a) Catherine Zhu naturalises and Shirley McCarthy renounces. What if 
Catherine Zhu would naturalise in the UK while retaining her Irish nationali-
ty? The child at first would be using the free movement rights. However, after-
wards she would be in the same situation as Shirley McCarthy, since she would 
live in the Home MS in which she was born and has always resided.
As the mobility quality had been active before acquisition of the Home MS 
rank nationality, the mobility quality would be attached to the MS rank nation-
ality and consequently, a lifetime of rights derived from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu 
would be granted.
This also means that it would theoretically be possible to maximize the ap-
plicability of EU law by influencing the order of acquisition of nationality, each 
resulting in another legal basis for residence.110 It also means that a child who 
is born and resides in a Member State of which it does not have the nationality, 
but acquires the nationality of two other Member States at birth iure sanguinis, 
automatically is covered by Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu for its entire life.111
The only way to prevent this automatic coverage by Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu for 
a child who only has the nationality of another Member State at birth, but not 
the one of residence, would – rather ironically – be that the Member State of 
residence grants its nationality to such a child at birth iure soli. Only after the 
child would make use of the free movement rights by moving somewhere else 
would it gain lifetime coverage of Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu.
It would of course be peculiar to grant nationality in order to prevent a 
child from deriving rights from EU law. For, what the Member State in essence 
wants is to prevent family reunification with tcn spouses based on EU law. 
One might consider it a bit premature and excessive to grant nationality to a 
child at birth in order to prevent it from having “family reunification with the 
spouse”. Especially since the child who has reached the age of majority when 
it is allowed to marry might easily circumvent the rules by moving to another 
Member State and by later returning to the Member State of birth. Member 
States would do better, to simply accept the fact that, if a child like Catherine 
Zhu naturalises in the Member State of birth, it has a lifetime coverage of Art. 
21, para. 1, tfeu.
Purely theoretically, a Member State could also in such a case, retroactive-
ly to the time of birth, grant its nationality to the child, when it requests for 
family reunification. The subsequent time of residence in between the time 
of birth and the time of the retroactive grant of nationality would have to be 
 110 This influencing can only be done where the nationality of a Member State is only 
acquired upon registration with the authorities of that Member State.






considered as if it had been spent as a national and not based on the Directive. 
However, this would be an absolute abuse of the grant of nationality by the 
Member State in order to prevent a person from exercising his rights derived 
from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu.
Another issue is the question what if Shirley McCarthy had renounced her 
British Citizenship based on Section 12 of the 1981 British Nationality Act?112
In that case, she would have been in a similar position as Catherine Zhu, 
and the Directive would have applied, had she been a worker.113 This renounce-
ment would technically speaking be an abus de droit. The rules on abus de droit 
state that an action by an EU citizen, which is entirely artificial and only done 
to come within the ambit of EU law is prohibited. But one can hardly argue 
that renouncing a Member State’s nationality should be required to fall within 
the ambit of EU law. This would be paradoxical.
What makes this similar to Lounes is that it should also be considered 
whether Mrs McCarthy could afterwards have re- acquired or resumed her Brit-
ish citizenship based on Section 13, para. 3, of the British Nationality Act, or if 
she could have re- naturalised.114 This Section requires approval from the Sec-
retary of State, who might refuse to grant resumption because the renounce-
ment was only made in order to fall within the ambit of EU law, which might 
be considered abusive.
However, refusing to grant nationality on the grounds that the person want-
ed to fall within the ambit of EU law and make use of the free movement rights 
would again be a restriction of Art. 21 tfeu.
b) Other methods that the Court could have used in Lounes. The Court could 
have also handled Lounes in other ways, and might still use these to overcome 
the O and B restrictions.
Over the years, the Court seems to have only concentrated on Arts 18 and 21 
tfeu, and has put its own case- law related to the other free movement rights 
on a back shelf. To refer again to the words of Szpunar and Blas López – Union 
citizenship has become a victim of its own success.
When a case concerning dual EU citizens is pending, the Court should re-
member that the Directive has five legal bases:
 112 Maas, W.  (2014), The Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship. 
German Law Journal 15 (5), pp. 797– 820, 816.
 113 The formula would be “MS residence Home MS/ MS”. As renouncement would lead to the 
fact that she would no longer be a dual EU citizen, only a single MS is entered.
 114 Resumption based on Section 13, para. 1, is not possible as this requires that the renounce-
ment was made in order to acquire or retain another nationality based on Section 13, 
para. 1, let. b). Section 13, para. 3, allows for the resumption of British citizenship on the 
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 a) Art. 12 EC (now Art. 18 tfeu) – principle of non- discrimination based on 
nationality;
 b) Art. 18 EC (now Art. 21 tfeu) – EU citizenship;
 c) Art. 40 EC (now Art. 46 tfeu) – Free movement of workers;
 d) Art. 44 EC (now Art. 50 tfeu) – Free movement of establishment;
 e) Art. 52 EC (now Art. 59 tfeu) – Free movement of services.
It is curious that where a Carpenter115 and S and G116 constellation exists for a 
person who only has the nationality of the Home MS, Art. 45 tfeu is applica-
ble, and therefore the Directive is also applicable by analogy. If the person is 
a dual EU citizen, the Court only considers Art. 21 tfeu, and consequently is 
mostly more restrictive on any application of the Directive.
Another option of what the Court could have done is applying Micheletti 
more strictly. Before the Shirley McCarthy case, this was also considered an 
acte clair by the national courts, with the exception apparently of the British 
courts. The requirement of not- having- the- nationality- of- the- Member- State- 
of- residence was considered an additional requirement to the “recognition” of 
the nationality of another Member State. Some courts even applied this prin-
ciple to persons who naturalised at a moment when their State of nationality 
had not yet acceded to the EU.117 They considered that from the moment that 
State had joined, the person, although already a national of the resident Mem-
ber State, was exercising the free movement rights.118
One could argue that the wording of Art. 3, para. 1, of the Directive is 
substantially different from the wording of Art. 1 of its predecessor Regu-
lation 1612/ 68,119 and that therefore its scope is also different. However, in 
 115 Carpenter, cit.
 116 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 457/ 12, S and G.
 117 Dutch Council of State, judgment of 25 March 2013, BZ7520.
 118 Ibid., para. 5.2: “Het standpunt van de minister dat de referente is genaturaliseerd voordat 
Bulgarije tot de Europese Unie toetrad en zij om die reden geen rechten kan ontlenen aan 
haar Bulgaarse nationaliteit, veronderstelt dat het bezitten van de Nederlandse nation-
aliteit kan afdoen aan de rechten die referente aan haar hoedanigheid van burger van een 
andere lidstaat aan het Unierecht ontleent. Voor die veronderstelling bestaat, gelet op 
jurisprudentie van het Hof, geen grond”. Similar also Dutch Council of State, judgment of 
28 January 2013, BZ0412, para. 2.2. See for the case- law up to 2013: van Rosmalen, A. (2013). 
Conditional Citizenship of the Union? Family Migration for EU citizens and the Outdated 
Notion of “Internal Affairs”. Hanneke Steenbergen Scriptieprijs, available at steenbergen-
scriptieprijs.nl.
 119 Art. 1 of Regulation (eec) 1612/ 68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of move-
ment for workers within the Community: “1. Any national of a Member State, shall, irre-
spective of his place of residence, have the right to take up an activity as an employed 
person, and to pursue such activity, within the territory of another Member State in 











Scholz,120 which concerned a dual German- Italian citizen in Italy, the Court 
stated that:
It should be borne in mind, first of all that Article 7 of the Treaty [now 
Art. 18 tfeu], which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality, does not apply independently where the Treaty lays down, as it does 
in Article 48(2) [now Art. 45 tfeu] in relation to the free movement of 
workers, a specific prohibition of discrimination. […] In addition, Arti-
cles 1 and 3 of Regulation No 1612/ 68 merely clarify and give effect to the 
rights already conferred by Article 48 of the Treaty. Accordingly, that pro-
vision alone is relevant to this case.121
This means that under Art. 45 tfeu, a dual EU citizen can invoke the Directive 
by analogy against the Home MS, while under Art. 21 tfeu this might not be 
possible, even though this article incorporates the rights under Art. 45 tfeu.
In that case, the Court also held that “[a] ny Community national who, irre-
spective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right 
to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in another 
Member State, falls within the scope of the aforesaid provision”.122
The application of Art. 45 tfeu would be a system of creating a “mobility 
quality”. If a dual EU citizen is a worker, self- employed or has sufficient means, 
(s)he gains access to the quality. If (s)he becomes unemployed, loses the busi-
ness or resources, this mobility quality continues to have effect for as long as 
the Directive provides under Art. 9, but is lost afterwards, except if more fa-
vourable conditions are applicable.
However, the option taken by the Court is the most favourable by a simple 
reference to the name case- law, which it did by referring to this sentence from 
Freitag which is similar to Scholz, but based on Art. 21 tfeu: “[a] ccording to 
settled case- law, a link with EU law exists in regard to nationals of one Member 
State lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State […]. That is 
the case as regards the applicant in the main proceedings, who is a Romanian 
national and is resident in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
of which he is also a national”.123 It should be remembered, though, that for 
governing the employment of nationals of that State. 2. He shall, in particular, have the 
right to take up available employment in the territory of another Member State with the 
same priority as nationals of that State”.
 120 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 February 1994, case C- 419/ 92, Scholz.
 121 Ibid., para. 6.
 122 Ibid., para. 9.
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the name case- law, actual movement, and therefore the mobility quality, is not 
required.
v Conclusion – a Choice: Nationality Competence or Abandonment 
of Reverse Discrimination
In Lounes, the Court decided in favour of European integration, by making it 
clear that integration – and therefore naturalisation – does not affect the fu-
ture applicability by analogy of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC.
It must be reiterated that, had the Court decided against European integra-
tion instead, it would have been remarkable that a UK- EU dual citizen would 
have had more rights in the other Member State of nationality after Brexit, as 
a TC+, than before.
With Lounes it is now clear that the mobility quality always gets attached to 
a present MS rank nationality even when a Home MS rank nationality is pres-
ent. In the absence of an MS rank nationality though, it gets attached to the 
Home MS rank nationality which only allows rights to be retained which were 
previously used while it was an MS rank. This differentiation between the MS 
and Home MS ranks cannot stand in the long run. Only when they are treated 
equally can EU citizenship become a reality.
Even though the ruling in Lounes is favourable, it has its flaws, which will 
manifest themselves sooner or later. These flaws are created by the fact that 
the Court did not make clear how O and B and Lounes are interlinked, except 
where it concerned the documentation required. This will create an imbalance 
between the rights of dual EU citizens and of “single” EU citizen returners. 
Furthermore, is it detrimental for EU citizens with certain nationalities who 
would lose the original Member State nationality compared to those who can 
retain it.
The Court has now an uncomfortable choice. If the Court considers that 
Lounes only applies to dual EU citizens, this means that it has to limit the com-
petence of the Member State in the field of nationality law. If it does not want 
to do so, it has no choice but to revoke the previous family life requirement for 
returners established in O and B. This would mean though that any EU citizen 
who has ever made use of the free movement rights would be covered by the 
Directive by analogy for a lifetime, for example after doing an Erasmus.
The earliest option for the Court to make this choice was Coman, Banger or 
Altiner and Ravn. Especially in Altiner and Ravn the Court seems to have made 
the choice that Lounes is not applicable to “single” EU citizens. The Court did 
relax the residence requirement to some extent by replacing the Art. 7, para. 2, 
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residence requirement with a previously in the host Member State established 
and uninterrupted family life requirement.124 In Tjebbes the Court should have 
made a distinction between those applicants living in a third country and 
those living in a privileged third country. Since it has not done so, this will have 
consequences for future relations with the UK after Brexit.
The Court has to keep in mind that, based on the ecn, naturalised persons 
and persons who had the nationality at birth have to be treated equally and 
that the same principle applies to dual EU citizens.
To the question of how the Court should take dual EU citizens into account, 
I would like to state the following: the Court (and the EU legislator) should re-
frain from making not- having the nationality of the Member State of Residence 
a condition for the applicability of secondary legislation. If it does, under no 
circumstances may it make – like it did in O and B – previous applicability of 
that secondary legislation conditional on future application in a Member State 
of nationality. Such a double condition is only detrimental for dual EU citizens.
The Court should also, in cases of recognition of names, be very careful 
where it allows for a restriction based on constitutional values, because this 
might lead to a conflict of national Constitutions.125 It should especially be 
 124 The Court held in Altiner and Ravn that the tcn family member can also join the EU 
citizen at a later in the Home Member State (Altiner and Ravn, cit., paras. 29 and 31). 
The tcn family member would no longer have a derived right based on the Directive in 
the host Member State when the EU citizen leaves (Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 
2015, C- 218/ 14, Singh, para. 58; Court of Justice, judgment of 30 June 2016, case C- 115/ 15, 
NA, paras 34 and 35). This means that a previous Art. 7, para. 2, residence right cannot be 
required when the tcn family member joins the EU citizen in the Home Member State. 
Consequently, if the tcn family member stayed in the host Member State after the EU cit-
izen left, this also means that (s)he must have had an independent residence right there. 
In certain circumstances this independent residence right can be indirectly derived from 
the previous worker status of the EU citizen family member in the host Member State, 
e.g. the continued residence status to continue education. Court of Justice, judgment of 17 
September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast; Court of Justice, judgment of 23 February 2010, 
case C- 310/ 08, Ibrahim; NA, cit., paras. 58 and 59. See Hoogenboom, A. (2017). Balancing 
Student Mobility Rights and National Higher Education: Autonomy in the European Union. 
Leiden, Boston: Nijhoff, pp. 127– 128.
 125 For example: what if Ilonka Sayn- Wittgenstein had next to the Austrian nationality also 
the nationality of Germany? The prohibition and the “grant” of the title of nobility would 
have been based on each Constitution. Unfortunately, both the Regional Administrative 
Courts of Salzburg and of Oberösterreich did not request a preliminary ruling when 
they were confronted with exactly this issue and decided that the Austrian Constitution 
applies. Regional Administrative Court of Salzburg, judgment of 25 January 2017, 405– 
10/ 200/ 1/ 4- 2017; Regional Administrative Court of Salzburg, judgment of 28 June 2017, 
405– 10/ 265/ 1/ 7- 2017; Regional Administrative Court of Oberösterreich, judgment of 4 
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careful where it is aware that there is a third party who is a dual EU citizen and 
would be directly affected by the case. For, did the Court ever consider in, for 
example, Runevič- Vardyn,126 what would happen to the son?127
It is regrettable that this son was not also an applicant in this case, for, would 
the Lithuanian authorities have issued a document for the child with his fa-
ther’s surname in its original form? No, they would not have. In fact, they re-
fused to do so! In April 2016, the District Court of Vilnius ruled in a case where 
the authorities refused to register the name of a dual Lithuanian- Polish nation-
al who was born in Belgium, whose father is Polish and mother is Lithuanian, 
with the name Wardyn.128 The District Court decided that the name had to be 
entered with the “W” and thus the Polish spelling was to be used. Additional 
five years of litigation could have been saved if the Court had taken the effects 
of its judgment on this child into consideration.129
Dual EU citizenship is a symptom of European integration. European inte-
gration has led to EU citizens moving to other Member States and meeting and 
falling in love with nationals from these Member States. This, in combination 
with gender equality in nationality transmission, and acceptance of retention 
of other Member State’s nationalities, leads to the logical consequence of an 
increasing number of dual and multi EU citizens. More and more cases on the 
free movement and dual citizenship will arise, because of a simple reason: we 
are nearing the final stages of full European integration.130
 126 Runevič- Vardyn, cit.
 127 In the Opinion of AG Szpunar in Sean Ambrose McCarthy he makes a similar example, but 
states that the person only has Lithuanian nationality and consequently not the Polish 
nationality (Opinion of AG Szpunar Sean Ambrose McCarthy, cit., para. 67). This is not 
entirely correct. It is true that Art. 3, para. 4, of the Lithuanian nationality code prohibits 
in general dual nationality. Exceptions to this are listed in Art. 7, one of them being that 
the other nationality was also acquired at birth and the person has not yet reached the 
age of 21. Upon reaching the age of 21 Lithuanian citizenship is lost by such persons if they 
have not renounced the other citizenship until that moment in accordance with Art. 24, 
para. 8. Another way to have dual citizenship in accordance with Art. 7, para. 5, is when 
the other nationality was acquired ex lege upon marriage.
 128 Vilnius District Court, judgment of 12 April 2016, 2- 01- 3- 11866- 2010- 1. Original decision 
available at: www.e- tar.lt; English translation of this decision (without name redaction) is 
available at: en.efhr.eu.
 129 It is especially strange that the Court did not take this child into consideration as its exis-
tence and dual citizenship is mentioned in the judgment, Runevič- Vardyn, cit., para. 54.
 130 E.g. Tjebbes and others, cit., concerning loss of a Member State’s nationality of a dual 
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 chapter 6
The Court, the Legislature and the Co- Construction 
of a Status of Social Integration
Stephen Coutts*
 Introduction
25  years after its introduction, Union citizenship has demonstrated a re-
markable capacity for dynamism. As a legal institution its history has been 
marked by an almost constant development prompted first by the Court and 
later developed by the legislature. Originally considered a mere cipher,1 Union 
citizenship constituted the vehicle by which rights previously the preserve 
of the economically active were extended to the non- economically active. 
In this way a novel transnational membership status has been progressively 
developed. As noted by the Kostakopoulou, its development is best under-
stood as a constructive process, with Union citizenship evolving through the 
contributions of different actors at different stages of its development.2 The 
purpose of this contribution is to assess the respective roles of the Court and 
the legislature in the development of Union citizenship. It will be argued that 
both institutions have contributed in a largely complementary fashion to the 
development of this institution and to its current shape. Particular emphasis 
is placed on the development of Union citizenship as a transnational status of 
social  integration.
An important consideration here is the debate that was triggered by the 
Dano line of caselaw regarding the appropriate interpretative role of the Court 
of Justice in this field, which is characterised by an unsettled hierarchy of norms 
 * School of Law, University College Cork.
 1 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institution-
al Change. Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp. 233– 267, 234– 235. For a prescient account of an 
‘incipient’ European citizenship, developed from free movement of persons provisions in 
the early years of the internal market see Plender, R. (1976). An Incipient Form of Europe-
an Citizenship. In: Jacobs, ed., European Law and the Individual. Amsterdam: North- Holland 
Publishing Company.
 2 Ibid and Kostakopoulou, D. (2013). Co- Creating European Union Citizenship:  Institutional 










between primary and secondary law. This contribution is related to that debate 
and the analyses of van den Brink,3 Mortiz and Carter4 and Muir5 are relied 
upon here.6 However, the focus of this chapter is not so much on the interpre-
tive techniques of the Court of Justice, its activism or otherwise, and whether 
or not this is appropriate in the context of Union citizenship but instead on 
the development of Union citizenship as an institution of transnational and 
supranational membership, the respective contributions of the legislator and 
the Court to this construction and the interaction between their respective 
contributions. The conclusion is that both have contributed to giving constitu-
tional shape to this institution in a broadly collaborative and symbiotic man-
ner. However, before engaging in a discussion of the respective contributions 
of the Court and the legislator it is necessary to clarify the constitutional con-
text. The next section will therefore assess the roles attributed to these actors 
by the relevant Treaty provisions, noting in particular the unusual position of 
secondary law and hence the legislature in this scheme. Section ii will assess 
the role of the legislator and the contribution made in the form of Directive 
2004/ 38/ EC to the development of Union citizenship as a transnational sta-
tus of integration. Section iii will address the manner in which the Court of 
Justice has engaged with and utilised this directive in its jurisprudence and 
ongoing development of the institution of Union citizenship. A final section 
will draw some conclusions.
 3 See Van den Brink, M. (2019). Justice, Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the 
European Union. Modern Law Review 82 (2), pp. 293– 318.
 4 Moritz Jesse and Daniel Carter in this volume. See also an analysis of this question in Níc 
Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union 
Citizenship. Common Market Law Review 52 (4), pp.  889– 937, and Spaventa, E.  (2017). 
Earned Citizenship:  Understanding Union Citizenship through its Scope. In:  Kochenov, 
ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
 5 Elise Muir in this volume.
 6 The pieces relied upon here relate to the question of interpretation and the relationship be-
tween the legislature and the Court in the field of Union citizenship. This debate was trig-
gered by the Court’s jurisprudence in the field of access to social benefits, especially Court 
of Justice, judgment of 11 November 2014, case C- 333/ 13, Dano and related judgments. This 
restrictive turn in the case law was not uncriticised, including in the new, more deferential 
role adopted by the Court of Justice. See for example Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizen-
ship: Understanding Union Citizenship through its Scope, cit., and O’Brien, C. (2017). The ecj 
Sacrifices EU Citizenship in Vain: Commission v United Kingdom. Common Market Law Review 
54 (1), pp. 209– 243. See also the contributions in Thym, D., ed. (2017). Questioning EU Citizen-
ship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. Oxford/ Portland: Hart 
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i The Constitutional Context and the Roles of the Court and the 
Legislature
Before evaluating any contribution of the Court and legislature to the construc-
tion of Union citizenship it is necessary to first assess the constitutional context 
and legal framework for the establishment and elaboration of this institution. 
Union citizenship is an institution provided for and established by primary law, 
a point that has been reemphasised in the line of Article 20 tfeu judgments, 
starting with Rottmann7 and most recently reaffirmed in Tjebbes.8 Article 20 
tfeu provides quite simply that ‘Union citizenship is hereby established’, per-
forming an important constitutional speech act9 and one that has had import-
ant implications for the nationals of Member States, who now enjoy a com-
plementary set of membership rights in other Member States. Some of these 
rights are then articulated in Article 21 tfeu, most importantly the rights to 
free movement and residence. A number of aspects of Articles 20 and 21 tfeu 
have implications for the roles of the Court and the legislature respectively.
It is worth noting the relatively open- textured nature of Article 20 tfeu and 
to a lesser extent Article 21 tfeu. This is a feature of constitutional law and of 
Union law especially. Union citizenship is established and a set of rights are 
associated with it, especially free movement and residence. And yet the pre-
cise nature of Union citizenship is not entirely clear, especially how it relates 
to the broader composite constitution of the Union.10 For some it was simply 
a repackaging of internal market rights of free movement and establishment.11 
 7 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat 
 Bayern.
 8 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes and others. See paras. 
30– 31 and 44 ff in which the Court lays down criteria against which any decision with-
drawing Member State nationality must be assessed, thus underlining the fact that loss of 
nationality falls within the framework of Union law. It should be noted however that the 
judgment is deferential regarding the operation of nationality law and in particular the 
reasons for withdrawal, leading some to criticise the judgment. See Kochenov, D. (2019). 
The Tjebbes Fail. European Papers Forum, available at http:// www.europeanpapers.eu/ en/ 
europeanforum/ the- tjebbes- fail.
 9 As noted by Kostakopoulou ‘EU citizenship is not the product of mimesis; it is an actor 
original creation’. See Kostakopoulou, D.  (2013). Co- Creating European Union Citizen-
ship, cit., 258.
 10 Besselink, L.  (2007). A Composite European Constitution. Groningen:  Europa Law 
Publishing.
 11 See Kostakopoulou, D. (2007). European Citizenship: Writing the Future. European Law 
Jounal 13 (5), pp. 623– 646, 624 speaking of the ‘minimalist assessments’ of Union citizen-












Alternatively, it may have contained the seeds for a supranational fully- fledged 
federal citizenship, for all intents and purposes replacing national citizenship 
as the operative status of individuals. Or was it intended to be a transnational 
citizenship that somehow went beyond the market freedoms? There are some 
hints in the treaty provisions; Union citizenship’s relationship with nationality 
was underlined as complementary, as noted by the shift in language to ‘addi-
tional to’. The rights that were listed for Union citizenship were free movement 
and residence; the heritage of the internal market is hard to deny12 and indeed 
influenced profoundly the Court’s early post- Maastricht jurisprudence, includ-
ing adopting various internal market related assumptions into the operation 
of Union citizenship.13 However, as Kochenov and Plender point out, these as-
sumptions and the general trajectory of Union citizenship as an outgrowth of 
the internal market, were never dictated by the text of the Treaty itself, which 
left the precise contours of Union citizenship undefined and opened a space 
for its future construction.14
The fact that the status of Union citizenship and certain of its rights are 
found in primary law and hence enjoy a constitutional nature is relevant for 
the role of the Court of Justice. As put by Níc Shuibhne ‘a constitutional court 
has a responsibility to protect and to further the objectives and values en-
shrined in “its” constitution – essentially to ensure that the rights and respon-
sibilities that a constitution promises are realized … and to discharge these 
tasks on behalf of and for the benefit of the constitutional subjects’.15 There 
is therefore a very legitimate role bestowed by the Treaties, understood as the 
Union’s constitutional text, for the Court in giving expression to and shaping 
an institution established to integrate the individual as a key component in the 
Union’s constitutional order. In light of its role as a constitutional court, the 
 12 Indeed, for many years academic debates centred precisely on its relationship with and 
difference from internal market freedoms. See for example Jacobs, F. (2007) Citizenship 
of the European Union – A Legal Analysis. European Law Jounal 13 (5), pp. 591– 610 not-
ing the movement towards replicating classic free movement rights (ie prohibitions on 
discrimination and on restrictions on movement) in a non- market context. The tem-
plate of the internal market is impossible to deny here in the imagination of contrib-
utors. See also Wollenschläger, F.  (2011). A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market 
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of 
European Integration. European Law Jounal 17 (1), pp. 1– 34.
 13 Kochenov, D., and Plender, R.  (2012). EU Citizenship:  From an Incipient Form to an 
Incipient Substance? European Law Review 37, pp. 369– 396, 375 ff.
 14 See ibid, also noting that it was not until the judgment in Rottmann that the Court fully 
acknowledged the implications of introducing citizenship status into the Treaties.
 15 Níc Shuibhne, N.  (2013). The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law:  Constitutional 
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Court has not only a role but a duty to contribute to the construction of Union 
citizenship and to give meaning to this institution in light of the broader con-
stitutional context.
A further implication of the primary law nature of these rights is that the 
interventions of the Court, depending on their manner – enjoy a constrain-
ing capacity and anterior role vis- à- vis the legislature. This is perfectly logical 
and a necessary consequence of entrenching a status and set of rights in a 
constitution.16 The very purpose of entrenchment and having a constitutional 
status is to insulate that status from political pressures and ordinary legislative 
discretion. Having said that, we should be mindful of the other aspects of Níc 
Shuibhne’s conception of the responsibilities of the Court as a constitutional 
court. In the passage cited above she also notes that a constitutional court has 
the right and duty to give expression to the values inherent in its constitution 
but also ‘to respect the checks and limits built into it.’17 Likewise, the constitu-
tional subject, while certainly including individual Union citizens also include 
the Member States,18 who it must be recalled, represent citizens of the Union 
in their capacity of nationals and the collective interests of those national 
communities.
 16 Although we should be mindful of the particular problems of entrenchment in context 
of the European Union. On the one hand the Treaties contain provisions which would 
ordinarily not find themselves into a constitutional text. On the other the Treaties are par-
ticularly difficult to amend. This problem is compounded when the Court, employing a 
teleological interpretative technique, develops Treaty provisions in particular, politically 
important ways (see for example Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2007, case C- 
341/ 05, Laval). The Court’s interpretation of treaty provisions can constrain not only the 
Union legislature but Member State governments, a very present problem in the area of 
Union citizenship, as discussed in Schmidt, S.K. (2017). Extending Citizenship Rights and 
Losing it all: Brexit and the Perils of Over- Constitutionalisation. In Thym, ed., Questioning 
EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU, cit. This 
danger of over- constitutionalisation or inappropriately entrenching particular political 
choices and ideologies leads to their removal from the realms of political contestation, 
generating difficulties of legitimacy for the Union. See for example in the context of the 
Eurocrisis Wilkinson, M.A. (2013). The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on 
the Constitutional Crisis of the European Union. German Law Journal 14 (5). pp. 527– 560 
and Wilkinson, M.A. (2013). Political Constitutionalism and the European Union. Modern 
Law Review 76 (2), pp.  191– 222. See also Přibáň, J.  (2015). The Evolving Idea of Political 
Justice in the EU: From Substantive Deficits to the Systemic Contingency of European 
Society. In De Búrca, Kochenov and Williams, eds., Europe’s Justice Deficit? Oxford/ 
Portland: Hart.
 17 Ibid, 8.
 18 For a discussion of the multi- faceted nature of the ‘constitutional subject’ see Rosenfeld, 








This leads to the unusual position of the legislature in the field of Union cit-
izenship law. On the one hand this is an entrenched status and rights, which 
should and has enjoyed protection from the intervention by the legislator 
through the interpretation and application of primary law by the Court of Jus-
tice. On the other hand, the precise manner of this entrenchment in the Treaties 
is ambiguous, with Article 20 tfeu also providing that the rights associated with 
the status of Union citizenship ‘shall be exercised in accordance with the condi-
tions and the limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereun-
der’ while Article 21 tfeu provides a legislative basis for secondary legislation to 
facilitate the rights contained in that provision.19 Secondary legislation is given 
the unusual capacity of limiting and conditioning rights established by primary 
law. The legislature has a legitimate and constitutionally allocated role not only 
in in articulating detailed rules for its operation but in giving overall shape to 
Union citizenship. This unusual position of the legislature in Article 21 also in-
troduces an ambiguity in the relationship between primary and secondary law, 
unsettling the classic hierarchy of laws. The caselaw has shifted from relying on 
the primary law nature of the rights created by Articles 20 and 21 tfeu – con-
straining the operation of secondary legislation and its application by Member 
States20 – to more recently respecting the special task allocated to the legislator 
in light Articles 20 and 21 tfeu by restricting itself to an analysis of secondary 
law and a more literal application of the conditions and limits it contains.21
The Treaties have therefore given a somewhat more prominent role to the 
legislature in shaping the institution of Union citizenship than might be ex-
pected and that might arise from a simple ‘primary- secondary’ law dichoto-
my. It also lays the normative foundation for a greater role for the legislator 
in designing and fashioning what is a constitutional status. On one view this 
gives the Member States the possibility of protecting or balancing their inter-
ests against those of mobile Union citizens.22 Although such a view establishes 
what might be a false opposition between the rights of mobile Union citizens 
and the interests of Member States.23 More importantly, the legislature has 
 19 Art 20 tfeu.
 20 For an excellent analysis of this see Dougan, M. (2006). The Constitutional Dimension to 
the case law on Union Citizenship. European Law Review 31 (5), pp. 613– 641.
 21 See Jesse and Carter in this volume and especially Muir in this volume.
 22 See paragraph 107 of Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 20 May 2014, case C- 333/ 13, 
Dano, describing it as part of the legislature’s intention to allow Member States to refuse 
to extend social assistance to non- national Union citizens.
 23 More than anything they respond to the political imperatives faced by governments in 
Member States, in an environment hostile to EU migration. See for example the discus-
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a key role in ‘putting flesh on the bones’ of Union citizenship,24 pouring real 
normative content into the shell provided by the Treaties, in designing what 
might be called the underlying philosophy of Union citizenship and ultimately 
shaping its contours. In this sense the legislature is a genuine ‘co- interpreter’ of 
the Treaties25 and enjoys a role alongside the Court as a co- constructor of this 
constitutional status. This importance attributed to the legislature has been 
affirmed by its approach, which has been to adopt an overarching framework 
law, providing not simply a set of rules guiding the operation of Union cit-
izenship but containing within it a relatively coherent conception of Union 
citizenship as one based on transnational social integration.26 Directive 2004/ 
38/ EC does more than merely elaborate technical rules and procedures in the 
fulfilment of some ‘detail- filling’ role subject to the parameters of a constitu-
tionally determined status but gives shape to the underlying choices left open 
by the ambiguity inherent in Articles 20 and 21 tfeu on the nature of Union 
citizenship.
ii The Legislature and Directive 2004/ 38/ EC
Directive 2004/ 38/ EC was an important moment in the constitutional devel-
opment of Union citizenship not only in codifying previous disparate pieces 
of legislation and detailing the rules surrounding the enjoyment of the various 
rights contained in the Directive but in contributing to the articulation of the 
constitutional form of Union citizenship as a status of transnational social in-
tegration. In adopting Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, the Union legislature therefore 
played the role both of elaborating and reforming the law and of contributing in 
remain in the European Union and the dangers of what this implies regarding the status 
of Union citizenship in Reynolds, S. (2017). (De)Constructing the Road to Brexit: Paving 
the Way to Further Limitations on Free Movement and Equal Treatment. In: Thym, ed., 
Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the 
EU, cit.
 24 To borrow a phrase from Síofra O’Leary when discussing the intervention of the Court in 
Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C- 85/ 96, Maria Martínez Sala (see O’Leary, 
S. (1999). Putting flesh on the bones of European Union Citizenship. European Law Review 
24 (1), pp. 68– 79).
 25 See Davies, G. (2018). Does the Court of Justice own the Treaties? Interpretative pluralism 
as a solution to over- constitutionalisation. European Law Journal 24 (6), pp. 358– 375 refer-
ring primarily to the relationship between national courts and the Treaties.
 26 For an account of Union citizenship as a status of social integration see Azoulai, L. (2010). 
La Citoyenneté Européenne, un Statut d’Intégration Sociale. In: Cohen- Jonathan and oth-









a meaningful and constructive way to the constitutional construction of Union 
citizenship. Moreover Directive 2004/ 38/ EC displays a clear engagement with 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In adopting Directive 2004/ 38/ EC 
the legislature endorsed the nascent conceptualisation of Union citizenship 
developed by the Court in its foundational citizenship judgments, especially 
Martinez Sala27 and Grzelcyk28 by codifying the principles developed in those 
cases. Its contribution went beyond mere codification however but amounted 
to a genuine contribution to the shape of Union citizenship through crystallis-
ing the concept of a progressively enhanced citizenship status operating along 
the vector of social integration, as evidenced most strongly by the major inno-
vation of the Directive, namely the status of permanent residence.
Firstly, Directive 2004/ 38/ EC codified the law on Union citizenship. As iden-
tified by de Bruycker at the time,29 it did so in two ways. Firstly, the Directive 
incorporated and replaced most but not all of the diverse instruments that had 
heretofore regulated the position of the free movement of persons under the 
internal market and replaced it with a single instrument regulating the posi-
tion of mobile Union citizens. Important gaps remained in its coverage, both 
regarding some aspects of the position of free movement of workers, which 
remained regulated by Regulation 1612/ 68/ EEC30 (since replaced by Regula-
tion 492/ 2011/ EU)31 and more crucially the position of the non- mobile or stat-
ic Union citizen.32 It also reproduced within the status of Union citizenship 
some of the categories it was purporting to abolish through the imposition of 
variable conditions to different individuals depending on the basis of their stay 
in other Member States. Nonetheless, despite these deficiencies, the Directive 
2004/ 38/ EC remains a significant piece of codification providing an overarch-
ing framework for the free movement of persons and does so importantly un-
der the rubric of the status of Union citizenship, performing an important sym-
bolic shift from the language of workers, establishment and service provides 
 27 Martínez Sala, cit.
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk.
 29 De Bruycker, P. (2006). La Libre Circulation des Citoyens Europeens Entre Codification et 
Reforme. In: Carlier and Guild, eds., L’Avenir de la libre circulation des personnes dans l’UE/ 
The Future of Free Movemenet of Persons in the EU. Brussels: Bruylant.
 30 Regulation 1612/ 68/ EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, OJ 
L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2– 12.
 31 Regulation 492/ 2011/ EU on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (codifica-
tion), OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 1– 12.
 32 See Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
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to that of citizenship itself, indicating that these rights were to be enjoyed, at 
least potentially, by all citizens of the Union rather than simply market actors. 
The importance of this codification was acknowledged by the Court in Metock 
which found that the Directive aims to ‘strengthen’ and improve on the rights 
of free movement compared to the earlier directives it replaced.33 In Metock 
‘[t] he Court has … given a distinctly positive and forward looking role to Di-
rective 2004/ 38. The Directive is understood as a development on pre- existing 
legislation, giving expression to the primary citizenship rights.’34
Secondly, in elaborating the Directive the legislator codified various el-
ements of the early jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, which had (as is 
explored further below) begun to explore and define the contours of Union 
citizenship, building on35 but exceeding the limits of the internal market free-
doms. Provisions on the exercise of the public policy exception were heavi-
ly revised from the by then out of date Directive 64/ 221/ EC36 and, alongside 
updating considerably the procedural safeguards afforded individuals subject 
to expulsion and exclusion measures, incorporate large elements of the Court 
of Justice’s jurisprudence.37 The engagement with the Court’s jurisprudence is 
even more remarkable in relation to equal treatment in the field of social wel-
fare where the legislature incorporated wholesale the somewhat ambiguous 
approach towards the relationship between equal treatment rights and resi-
dence adopted in Grzelczyk.38 As put by de Bruycker this incorporation was 
‘autant plus remarquable que cette decision absolument fondamentale s’in-
scrit dans une série d’arrêts audacieux, voire téméraires’.39
 33 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08, Metock v. Minister for Justince 
Equality and Law Reform, para. 59.
 34 Muir in this volume at 173.
 35 For a critique of this approach linking post Maastricht Union citizenship with assump-
tions derived from the internal market see Kochenov, D., and Plender, R.  (2012). EU 
Citizenship: Citizenship From an incipient form to an incipient substance? The discovery 
of the Treaty Text, cit.
 36 Directive 64/ 221/ EEC on the co- ordination of special measures concerning the movement 
and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health, OJ 56, 4.4.1964, p. 850– 857.
 37 See for example the proportionality test as elaborated in Court of Justice, judgment of 29 
April 2004, joined cases C- 482/ 01 and C- 493/ 01 Georgios Ofanopoulos et al and Raffaele 
Oliveri v. Land Baden- Würtemberg and the definition of a threat to public policy as a ‘gen-
uine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’ 
articulated in in Court of Justice, judgment of 27 October 1977, case 30/ 77 Regina v. Pierre 
Bouchereau.
 38 Grzelczyk, cit.

















This went beyond a mere codification of jurisprudential developments but 
involved an incorporation of the underlying philosophy articulated in the ear-
ly jurisprudence of the Court regarding the position of mobile Union citizens 
and their relationship with the host Member State, a relationship that should 
be characterised by integration and solidarity. Despite its perhaps vague and 
somewhat contradictory nature, the Directive codified the rule of Grzelczyk, 
permitting Member States to withdraw a right of residence but not as an au-
tomatic consequence of recourse to social assistance.40 This reflected an ac-
ceptance of the embryonic philosophy of Union citizenship being articulated 
in the first wave of judgments of the Court of Justice. These set of cases were 
developing Union citizenship as a status which offered something to the non- 
economically active Union citizens and imbued it with an underlying vocation 
to extend rights to the non- economically active Union citizen. This rested on a 
particular vision of the relationship between the mobile Union citizen and the 
host Member State which went beyond a market focused instrumentalism and 
instead focused on solidarity and inclusion. The beginnings of a transnational 
status of integration could be discerned. The important point here is that in its 
codification of these rules in Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, the legislator responded to 
and endorsed this developing vision of Union citizenship.
Not only did it endorse the vision of Union citizenship advanced by the 
Court up to that point, in its contribution in Directive 2004/ 38/ EC the legisla-
ture went further and brought its own contribution to that construction. Aside 
from simplified administrative burdens,41 the major innovation of the Direc-
tive was the introduction of the status of permanent residence. Acquired after 
5 years of residence, those enjoying permanent residence are no longer subject 
to conditions on their residence nor to limitations on the right to equal treat-
ment. On a doctrinal level is important for the security of residence it brings42 
(although certainly not absolute, as was argued for by the Commission in the 
legislative process)43 and for equal treatment.44 On a broader level regarding 
 40 Grzelczyk, cit., para. 43.
 41 De Bruycker, P. (2006). La Libre Circulation des Citoyens Europeens Entre Codification et 
Reforme, p. 32.
 42 See Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, 
p. 77– 123, art 28(2).
 43 See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, OJ C 270E, 25.9.2001, p. 150– 160, art 26(2). Under the Commission’s initial 
proposal absolute protection from expulsion would attach to permanent residence.
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the nature of Union citizenship it is explicitly linked to the vocation for Union 
citizenship to be a ‘genuine vehicle of integration’ for the individual Union 
citizen into the society of the host Member State. As such it is a distinct con-
tribution to the shaping of Union citizenship as a transnational status intend-
ed to facilitate the full inclusion of the individual into the society of the host 
Member State.
The Directive established a progressive status whereby rights were gradually 
acquired after periods of residence in the host Member State (under certain 
conditions) with three broad categories of citizens enjoying different levels of 
rights depending on their period of residence. The scheme established by the 
Directive is well known. What is worth stressing for present purposes is the 
general philosophy underpinning the Directive as one of gradual inclusion of 
the individual through the attribution of rights, acquired over time and one 
premised on integration, albeit an integration that is only manifested by time 
and place.45 The relationship between rights and integration has certainly 
been unsettled, with social integration shifting from a goal of rights attribu-
tion (rights in order to secure integration) to a precondition for rights.46 While 
this is an important development, what is emphasised here is the legislator’s 
contribution to the shaping of Union citizenship not as a status of migration 
based on a particular activity – as existed before in the fragmented legislative 
landscape of the internal market – but as a fundamental status with the voca-
tion of securing the inclusion and integration of the mobile Union citizen in 
the society of the host Member State, with this inclusion and integration to be 
secured and rewarded via a gradual acquisition of rights.
iii The Role of the Court
If the legislature has played a singularly important role Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, 
which can rightly be termed an organic law, endorsing a particular conceptu-
alisation of Union citizenship, namely as a transnational status of integration, 
 45 Somek, A.  (2007). Solidarity Decomposed:  Being and Time in European Citizenship. 
European Law Review 32 (6), pp. 787– 818.
 46 Secure residence rights, family reunification and broad equal treatment might be con-
ceived of as facilitating integration. Since the ‘reactionary turn’ in Union citizenship law 
however, the security of residence rights and equal treatment in the field of social assis-
tance have now become contingent on a particular form and level of social integration. 
See broadly Coutts, S. (2018). The Absence of Integration and the Responsibilisation of 







what has been the role of the Court in the development of this institution? 
The Court’s role has been threefold in its interaction with the Directive and by 
implication the legislature. Firstly, the Court has, taking seriously the primary 
law nature of the rights and status of Union citizenship, acted as the catalyst 
for the development of Union citizenship rights and shaping its basic princi-
ples. Secondly, it has played a key role in the interpretation of Directive 2004/ 
38/ EC, not simply in giving expression to the will of the legislature as reflected 
in the text of the Directive but rather in interpreting the Directive in light of 
the broader nature of Union citizenship as a status of social integration. Fi-
nally, reflecting the key role of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC in shaping the concept 
Union citizenship, the Court has also borrowed from the Directive, applying it 
‘by analogy’ in areas not covered by the Directive itself.
a) Catalyst for Constitutional Construction
The original role of the Court was to act as a catalyst for the development of 
Union citizenship as a meaningful status and in providing initial guiding prin-
ciples regarding its operation. This was originally performed in relation to the 
transnational dimension of Union citizenship as expressed in the rights con-
tained in Article 21 tfeu. It has recently reprised this role in relation to the 
developing further the legal implications of the status of Union citizenship 
contained in Article 20 tfeu.
The initial introduction of Union citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht 
carried with it few additional rights to those found in the free movement of 
persons under internal market law. The foundational judgments of Martínez 
Sala,47 Grzelczyk48 and Bidar49 significantly altered that situation and devel-
oped the status of Union citizenship into one of transnational social integra-
tion, a conception which, as described in the previous section, was endorsed 
and further developed by the legislature. The rights of free movement and res-
idence were linked with a broader guarantee of non- discrimination, introduc-
ing the notion of equality – so central to the operation of citizenship as a con-
cept – to the transnational context, providing the opportunity to force open 
national communities and in the words of Kostakopoulou render the bound-
aries between national communities more open and flexible.50 Baumbast and 
 47 Martínez Sala, cit.
 48 Grzelczyk, cit.
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C- 209/ 03, The Queen (on the application 
of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough v. Ealing, Sec. of State for Education and Skills.
 50 Kostakopoulou, D.  (2007). European Citizenship:  Writing the Future. European Law 
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R insisted on the primary law nature of the rights of free movement and resi-
dence and their direct effect, a move which allowed the Court to constrain the 
operation of the earlier secondary legislation and open it up to proportionality 
assessments.51 Grzelczyk found that Members States have accepted a certain 
degree of solidarity with mobile Union citizenship. In Bidar,52 this was com-
bined with an emphasis on proportionality which itself was linked with the 
notion of integration; equal treatment should be guaranteed for individuals 
in accordance with their level of social integration in the society of the host 
Member State. Emerging from these cases is firstly the constitutional nature 
of Union citizenship and its rights and secondly the beginnings of a vision of 
Union citizenship based on transnational social integration, a vision which 
was taken and further developed by the legislature in Directive 2004/ 38/ EC as 
described in the previous section.
More recently, the Court has also performed the role of catalyst in a fur-
ther development of Union citizenship under Article 20 tfeu. In Rottmann,53 
Ruiz Zambrano,54 Chavez- Vilchez55 and Tjebbes,56 the Court has, relying on the 
status of Union citizenship, developed the so- called ‘genuine enjoyment test’. 
While clearly linked to the rights of free movement and residence contained 
 51 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.
 52 Bidar, cit.
 53 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat 
Bayern. For a comment see Kochenov, D. (2010). Case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat 
Bayern, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010. Common Market Law 
Review 47 (6), pp. 1831– 1846.
 54 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEm). For a comment see Níc Shuibhne, N. (2011). Seven Questions 
for Seven Paragraphs. European Law Review 36 (2), pp. 161– 162. See also Azoulai, L. (2011). 
“Euro- Bonds” The Ruiz Zambrano judgment or the Real Invention of EU Citizenship. 
Perspectives on Federalism 3, pp. 33– 39.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 133/ 15, Chavez- Vilchez and Others v 
Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others. For a comment see Staiano, 
F. (2018). Derivative Residence Rights for Parents of Union Citizen Children under Article 
20 tfeu: Chavez- Vilchez. Common Market Law Review 55 (1), pp. 225– 241.
 56 Tjebbes, cit. For comments see Coutts, S. (2019). Bold and Thoughtful: the Court of Justice 
intervenes in Nationality Law, Case C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes. European Law Blog, available at 
https:// europeanlawblog.eu/ 2019/ 03/ 25/ bold- and- thoughtful- the- court- of- justice- 
intervenes- in- nationality- law- case- c- 221- 17- tjebbes; Van den Brink, M. (2019). Bold, but 
Without Justification? Tjebbes. European Papers 4 (1), pp. 409– 415; Kochenov, D. (2019). 
The Tjebbes Fail, cit. and Platon, S. (2019). L’insoutenable légèreté de la citoyenneté de 
l’Union européenne: l’arrêt Tjebbes et la perte de nationalité pour les personnes résidant 













in Article 21 tfeu, it does provide a certain baseline of protection for Union 
citizens, especially non- mobile Union citizen minors. It also reflects a right to 
place associated with Union citizenship, where that place is the Union terri-
tory.57 Perhaps more significantly it carries within it significant potential for 
future development of Union citizenship.58
The Court has therefore played its legitimate constitutional role, affirming 
the constitutional nature of the status, elaborating and protecting basic prin-
ciples and rights contained in the constitutional text and developing from 
them an underlying philosophy – of transnational social integration in the 
area of Article 21 tfeu rights and of the right to a place in the field of Article 
20 tfeu. At least in the case of Article 21 tfeu rights, this underlying con-
ception of Union citizenship has ultimately found expression in Directive 
2004/ 38/ EU which clearly reflects a gradualist approach towards the acqui-
sition of rights of the mobile Union citizen in the host Member State, lead-
ing  ultimately to the quasi- full membership under the status of permanent 
resident.
b) Interpreting Directive 2004/ 38/ EC
In asserting and operationalising the rights found in primary legislation, the 
Court has performed a classic duty of a constitutional court, as outlined by Níc 
Shuibhne above. It has also informed the further development of Union citi-
zenship. However, as is noted above, the legislature is given a key role to play in 
articulating and developing the status of Union citizenship. In its engagement 
with the Directive, the Court has respected the role of the legislature, both in 
the normative choices it made with respect to specific provisions but also in 
the broader contribution it has made and the vision of Union citizenship the 
Directive reflects.
The debate on the interpretation of the Directive, particularly after the 
Dano line of caselaw, is often focused on an activist interpretation of second-
ary legislation or a more deferential, literalist approach.59 From this perspec-
tive, we witness inconsistencies in the approach of the Court either across 
 57 Coutts, S.  (2020). The Shifting Geometry of Union Citizenship: A Supranational Status 
from Transnational Rights. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 21 pp 318- 341.
 58 For a particularly progressive and expansive vision of the potential of Union citizenship 
see Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
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time, or even across the Directive itself. As noted by van den Brink, a literal 
approach towards interpretation is taken in social assistance judgments, such 
as Dano and Alimanovic, at the same time as a purposive or more active ap-
proach is taken in the area of public security, such as in PI and Onukwere.60 
However, while seen from the point of view of interpretative approach there 
is a degree of inconsistency in the Court’s approach, what is consistent in the 
interpretation of the Court is its adherence to the concept of social integration 
as the guiding principle of the Directive and of Union citizenship more broad-
ly. What we have witnessed is an engagement with the text of the Directive and 
the choices made in that legislation and an appreciation of the constitutional-
ly allocated role of the legislature in this area.
In the field of social assistance, we have certainly witnessed a shift or at 
least a marked development in the jurisprudence of the Court.61 This has 
been characterised by a more deferential approach to the legislature, with 
the Court now relying primarily on secondary rather than primary law provi-
sions,62 a fact that is also reflected in a more textualist approach to the inter-
pretation of that Directive.63 However, it is submitted that there remains an 
purposive dimension to the Court’s approach. The underlying philosophy of 
social integration still aminates the Court’s approach towards transnational 
citizenship matters, the difference is that it is more deferential to the legis-
lature’s choices regarding how that integration is to be measured; behind a 
literal approach lies a teleological backdrop. As noted by Jesse and Carter, 
Förster (which can be instructively contrasted with Bidar) is an early indica-
tion of this approach.64 In Förster the Court, applying its traditional approach 
towards equal treatment based on a degree of social integration, found that 
five years residence period was appropriate to ensure that an individual had a 
certain connection with the society of the host member state, in this case the 
 60 Ibid at 305. These judgments are not uncontested and have been criticising not simply 
for introducing an exclusionary and discriminatory dynamic into the operation of Union 
citizenship but also for contradicting the spirit of the Directive itself. See for example 
Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizenship:  Understanding Union Citizenship through its 
Scope, cit., and Kostakopoulou, D. (2014). When EU Citizens become Foreigners. European 
Law Jounal 20 (4), pp. 447– 463.
 61 For a contrary view see Davies, G. ‘Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deserv-
ingness of litigants as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication’ (2018) 
Journal of European Public Policy 25 (10), pp.1442– 1460.
 62 See Muir in this volume.
 63 See Jesse and Carter in this volume and Van den Brink, M. (2019). Justice, Legitimacy and 
the Authority of Legislation within the European Union, cit.












Netherlands. It was explicitly inspired in this approach by the five- year period 
contained in the Directive in order to acquire permanent residence, a status 
which in turn guarantees unconditional equal treatment.65 This is not a sim-
ple application of a black letter rule found in the legislation but reflects for 
the Court an aspect of the underlying logic of integration that animates the 
Directive as a whole. The five- year rule contained in the Directive is used as a 
proxy for the degree of integration an individual has achieved in the society 
of the host Member State.
The line of cases starting with Dano can certainly be understood as a re-
strictive turn in the Court’s jurisprudence,66 protecting the interests of states 
vis- à- vis mobile Union citizens in a period of hostility to migration. In the 
abandonment of the individualised proportionality test they also provide 
more certainty to individuals and especially to administrations.67 Finally, they 
are also a case of a more faithful and deferential approach to the text of the 
Directive itself, abandoning references to primary law and the need to assess 
the proportionality not only of the secondary law but of its application in in-
dividual cases that began in Baumbast.68 These cases represent all of these 
things. However, in them the Court does not abandon the social integration 
approach but instead defers to the legislative choices regarding the criteria for 
assessing whether or not that integration is achieved. An early indication of 
this approach can be found in Dias where the conditions contained in Article 
7 of the Directive were said to represent ‘qualitative elements relating to the 
level of integration in the host Member State’.69 Understood against this char-
acterisation of the Article 7 conditions it is evident that Dano, in making equal 
treatment contingent on residence in compliance with the conditions found 
in Article 7 of the Directive, was in effect making access to social assistance 
contingent on the level of integration in the host Member State. Only now, the 
criteria for the integration of the individual were those found in the Directive 
itself. Echoing this, in Alimanovic, the Court found that an individual assess-
ment was unnecessary as ‘Directive 2004/ 38, establishing a gradual system … 
itself takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual of 
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 November 2008, case C- 158/ 07, Jacqueline Förster v IB 
Groep, para. 55.
 66 See generally the contributions in Thym, D., ed. (2017). Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges 
and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing.
 67 See Jesse and Carter in this volume.
 68 Baumbast and R, cit.
 69 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 July 2011, case C- 325/ 09, Secretary of State for the Home 
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each applicant for social assistance and in particular, the duration of the exer-
cise of any economic activity’.70
That the Court is concerned with the underlying philosophy of the Direc-
tive rather than a close and literal approach towards its interpretation is ev-
idenced by its approach in public security matters, which as van den Brink 
notes were characterised by an interpretative approach which appeared to 
contradict the literal meaning of the Directives provisions. In Tsakouridis71 
and PI,72 the Court gave an interpretation to the term ‘public security’ which 
was broader than the term is normally understood and appeared to contradict 
the distinction the legislature wished to establish between public policy and 
public security.73 It is arguable that what lay behind this determination was 
not a security- orientated Court, although this is certainly a possibility, but also 
an understanding of the relationship between rights acquisition, appropriate 
behaviour and integration. As is articulated in the Opinion of AG Bot in PI, 
under a scheme which is characterised by a gradual acquisition of rights on 
the basis of social integration, it is difficult to rationalize a heightened level of 
protection from expulsion for those individuals who through their behaviour 
have demonstrated a distinct absence of integration with the society of the 
host Member State.74 While the Court did not follow the Advocate General in 
denying PI the protection offered by Article 28(3) of the Directive, in its inter-
pretation of the concept of public security it achieved a similar result, radically 
diminishing the importance of this heightened protection for those who have 
committed particularly serious crimes.
Similarly, in cases relating to imprisonment and the acquisition of this 
heightened protection under Article 28(3) Directive 2004/ 38, the Court has 
insisted on the link with the social integration of the individual. Heightened 
protection is acquired after ten years residence in the host Member State. 
 70 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2015, case C- 67/ 14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln 
v. Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, para. 60.
 71 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 November 2010, case C- 145/ 09, Land Baden- Wurttemberg 
v Panagiotis Tsakouridis.
 72 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 May 2012, case C- 348/ 09, PI v. Oberburgermeisterin der 
Stadt Remscheid.
 73 See Kostakopoulou D., and Ferreira, N.  (2014) Testing Liberal Norms: The Public Policy 
and Public Security Derogations and the Cracks in European Union Citizenship. 
Columbia Journal of European Law 20 (3), pp. 167– 192 and Azoulai, L., and Coutts, S. (2013). 
Restricting Union Citizens’ Residence Rights on Grounds of Public Security. Common 
Market Law Review 50 (2), pp. 553– 570.
 74 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 6 March 2012, case C- 348/ 09, PI v. Oberburgermeisterin der 












However, first in Onukwere75 and later confirmed (and nuanced) in B and Vom-
ero76 these ten years can be broken by the conviction and imprisonment of the 
individual. In order to determine if an individual benefits from the heightened 
protection an assessment of the interrogative links he or she enjoys with the 
society of the host Member State should be carried out, an assessment that 
should take into account various factors, including the nature of the offence 
and conduct while in prison.77 The contrast with the social assistance cases is 
marked, not only in reading additional conditions into a Directive which con-
tains a simple ten- year rule, but also in introducing a standard based test and 
the associated administrative uncertainty, which the new approach in Dano is 
intended to remove. What links both sets of cases however is an overall faith-
fulness to the underlying conception of Union citizenship as a status of social 
integration, a conception reflected in the Directive.
c) Applying the Directive by Analogy
A further aspect of the Court’s engagement with Directive 2004/ 38/ EC has 
been the use of the Directive in areas not covered by the Directive itself, ex-
tending in effect the choices inherent in Directive 2004/ 38/ EC to novel situ-
ations. This both underlines the central importance of the Directive and the 
vision of Union citizenship it reflects and ensures a greater coherence across 
Union citizenship law.
Firstly, the conditions under Article 7 of the Directive have been used by 
the Court of Justice in situations of family reunification and circular migra-
tion. Here an individual travels to another Member State, enjoys a family life 
there, and seeks to maintain that family life upon return to his or her home 
Member State. Such situations, dealing with the situation of Union citizens in 
their home Member State, are not governed by Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, and yet 
the Court of Justice has relied on the conditions in Article 7 as criteria to en-
sure than an individual has enjoyed ‘genuine residence’ in the second Member 
State and that family life is ‘created or strengthened in that Member State’ as 
a result.78 Only under these conditions can an individual then return to his or 
 75 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 January 2014, case C- 378/ 12, Nnamdi Onuekwere 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.
 76 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 April 2018, joined cases C- 316/ 16 and C- 424/ 16, B v. Land 
Baden- Württemberg and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Vomero.
 77 Ibid, paras. 70– 75.
 78 See Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 456/ 12, O v. Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v. B, para. 51 and Court 
of justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman and ors v. Inspectoratul General 
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her Member State. Furthermore, the provisions of the Directive are to apply 
by analogy to govern the family reunification right upon return to the home 
Member State.79 This logic and a similar use of the Directive was also extended 
to dual nationals Union citizens in Lounes,80 at least where nationality of the 
Member State of residence was acquired on foot of previous free movement.81
The use of the rules contained in the Directive has also occurred in the field 
of expulsion matters where an individual who enjoys a right to reside under 
Article 20 tfeu. In Rendon- Marin82 and in CS,83 the Court of Justice found that 
removal of the parent of a Union citizen would lead to the deprivation of the 
genuine enjoyment of the Union citizenship rights of the minor child.84 A right 
of residence for those parents would therefore need to be provided. However, 
it also found that that right could be restricted for reasons of public policy and 
public security. Without explicitly mentioning Directive 2004/ 38, in outlining 
the conditions under which such as assessment should take place, the Court 
drew heavily on its jurisprudence developed in the context of mobile Union cit-
izens and especially in its interpretation of analogous provisions under Direc-
tive 2004/ 38/ EC.85 While the possibility of expulsion in Article 20 tfeu cases is 
not unproblematic, in light of the removal of the Union citizen child from the 
territory of the Union as a whole, the approach adopted by the Court at least 
has the merit of ensuring a degree of coherence across Union citizenship law, 
principally based on rules developed on the basis of the Directive.
iv Conclusion
The early years of Union citizenship were marked by a certain tension between 
the Court and the legislature. Grzelczyk, Trojani, Baumbast & R and Bidar all 
appeared to at least limit or modify conditions contained in the secondary law 
 79 O&B, cit., para. 50 and Coman, cit., para. 24.
 80 For a discussion see De Groot, D. (2018). Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens. European 
Papers 3 (3), pp. 1075– 1113, who points out the complications created by this judgment for 
dual nationals of various types and the need for it to be reconciled with O & B and the 
situation of returnees in particular.
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C- 165/ 16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department.
 82 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 165/ 14, Alfredo Rendón Marín 
v. Administración del Estado.
 83 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 304/ 14, Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. CS.
 84 Ibid, para. 32 and Rendón Marín, cit., para. 78.
















in force at the time, namely the residence Directives. Kay Hailbronner was par-
ticularly critical at the time, seeing a clear contradiction between the text of 
the Directives and the position of the Court of Justice in extending welfare 
assistance to individuals who failed to fulfil the relevant conditions.86 What 
is apparent is that in these judgments, the Court of Justice was performing its 
allocated constitutional role, identifying and making meaningful the primary 
law nature of the status of Union citizenship and the rights that accompany it. 
Dougan at the time also noted the constitutional significance of the judgments 
and their treatment of secondary legislation, insisting on a proportionality as-
sessment on the actions of Member States even when they were acting within 
the strict text of the Directives; thereby imposing indirectly subjecting the sec-
ondary legislation of the Union to constraints.87
The adoption of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC represented a clear turning point 
in the approach of the Court. As put by Níc Shuibhne ‘[t] he negotiation and 
adoption of this measure restored a sense of institutional mutuality, reviving 
the legislative- judicial interplay that characterised the regulation of personal 
free movement in earlier times.’88 The Directive respected the Court’s earlier 
interventions by codifying its jurisprudence and developing its underlying un-
derstanding of Union citizenship as a status of social integration. The underly-
ing concept of Union citizenship as a status of social integration, establishing 
various rights and responsibilities between the mobile Union citizen and the 
host Member State is its basic operating principle. This is reflected not only in 
the gradualist scheme underpinning the Directive and the creation of various 
categories of citizens but also in the main innovation of the Directive, namely 
the status of permanent residence. The Directive therefore occupies an im-
portant place in Union citizenship law. This is a function of its codifying and 
comprehensive character, offering not only a coherent set of detailed rules but 
also an underlying philosophy of the status. It marks a distinct legislative in-
tervention in the field, seeking to contribute to the constitutional construction 
of Union citizenship and give direction to its development. It is also a function 
of the unusual position of secondary legislation and hence the legislature in 
the constitutional framework established by Articles 20 and 21 tfeu, which 
acknowledges an ability to establish limits and conditions to constitutional 
 86 See Hailbronner, K.  (2005). Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits. Common 
Market Law Review 42 (5), pp. 1245– 1267.
 87 Dougan, M. (2006). The Constitutional Dimension to the case law on Union Citizenship, cit.
 88 Níc Shuibhne, N.  (2012). The Third Age of EU Citizenship. In: Syrpis, ed., The Juriciary, 
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rights. The legislature therefore enjoys a therefore a constitutional mandate to 
shape the institution.
Perhaps mindful of this position, the Court in its engagement with the Di-
rective has been largely respectful of its limits but more importantly has en-
gaged with the underlying philosophy of the Directive. The relationship be-
tween the mobile Union citizen and host Member States based on rights and 
increasingly responsibilities and operating before a backdrop of social integra-
tion is one taken seriously by the Court. This helps explain the different ap-
proaches to the interpretation of the Directive we have witnessed in the latest, 
so- called restrictive, phase of Union citizenship. Social assistance and public 
security judgments display different interpretative techniques. Under normal 
circumstances this would indicate a variable attitude towards the position of 
the legislature. However, considered against the backdrop of the particular vi-
sion of Union citizenship embodied in the Directive, the divergent approaches 
of the Court are more understandable. In social assistance matters the Court 
has not so much abandoned its prior commitment to protecting a status of so-
cial integration but instead has deferred to the legislature regarding the criteria 
according to which such integration should be measured. This does entail a 
modified position for individuals, imposing requirements of economic activ-
ity and removing individual assessments. However, it is not inconsistent with 
the broader vision of Union citizenship pioneered by the Court of Justice in 
its earlier caselaw and developed further by the legislature. Similarly, its more 
creative approach to its interpretation of public security and heightened pro-
tection does go beyond the literal meaning of the relevant provisions of the 
Directive. However, its reading is informed by the centrality of social integra-
tion, only now complemented with a certain obligations of good behaviour 
imposed on the individual. Finally, the central position of the Directive in the 
operation of Union citizenship law is underlined by its use by the Court in 
situations not covered by the Directive, principally family reunification in sit-
uations of circular migration.
To date, Union citizenship has operated almost exclusively on a transna-
tional plane, allowing individuals to assert rights vis- à- vis other Member 
States. In achieving this it has developed a status of transnational social in-
tegration. Both the Court, in its initial judgments and its deployment of pow-
erful concepts of equal treatment and proportionality, and the legislature in 
providing a legislative framework which progressively awards rights to indi-
vidual Union citizens based on a variety of criteria of time, residence and eco-
nomic criteria, have contributed to this construction. More recently, the Court 
has begun to develop Union citizenship in another direction under Article 20 
tfeu. In doing so it is playing its role as a constitutional court, emphasising the 
134 Coutts
constitutional nature of this status, developing its key principles and ensuring 
that protections offered by that status are enjoyed by individuals. We are per-
haps at the beginning of a new age of Union citizenship, where its impact will 
be felt across a wider field of Union law.89 What role the legislature will play 
is as yet uncertain. But its intervention will be crucial, not simply in providing 
legal certainty but in giving shape and direction to this status. The roles played 
by the Court and the legislature in Union citizenship have to date been largely 
complementary and symbiotic, characterised by mutual engagement and co- 
constructing a meaningful status for mobile Union citizens. It is to be hoped 
that a similar constructive approach will characterise the future development 
of this key institution for the Union.
 89 See Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator, 
cit., and Sarmiento, D., and Sharpston, E.  (2017). European Citizenship and its New 
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Life after the ‘Dano- Trilogy’: Legal Certainty, 
Choices and Limitations in EU Citizenship 
Case Law
Moritz Jesse and Daniel William Carter*
 Introduction
Welfare entitlements of EU Citizens, especially those who are not economical-
ly active, were always controversial. This chapter will show that the European 
Court of Justice, in a line of cases starting with the Förster decision,1 started 
to develop quite coherent case- law based on Directive 2004/ 38, which linked 
equal treatment as regards social benefits to legal residence under Directive 
2004/ 38.2 Despite one or two exceptions, this approach was gradually consoli-
dated in follow- up cases, such as Ziółkowski and later Dano. The decisions tak-
en by the Court are of course always embedded in a complex mixture of legal 
and non- legal factors, which all have likely contributed to the Court’s attitude 
and approach.3 However, it will be shown that the Dano judgment can be seen 
as a product of rather conventional evolution of case law after the adoption 
of Directive 2004/ 38, rather than a full- on departure from the pre- existing 
 * Dr. Moritz Jesse is Associate Professor of EU Law at Leiden Law School. Daniel William Carter 
is a PhD Fellow at Leiden Law School. This chapter is an updated and elaborate version of 
Carter D., Jesse M. (2018), The “Dano Evolution”: Assessing Legal Integration and Access to 
Social Benefits for EU Citizens, European Papers 3(3): 1179- 1208.
 1 For example, see the difference between Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have 
the cases? The deservingness of litigants as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudi-
cation. Journal of European Public Policy 25 (10), pp. 1442– 1460, and Hoogenboom, A. (2018). 
cjeu case law on EU Citizenship:  normatively consistent? Unlikely! A  response to Davies 
“Has the Court changed, or have the cases?”. EU Law Analysis, available at http:// eulawanaly-
sis.blogspot.com/ 2018/ 11/ cjeu- case- law- on- eu- citizenship.html.
 2 Thym, D. (2015). When Union citizens turn into illegal migrants:  the Dano case. European 
Law Review 40(2), pp. 249– 262.
 3 Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants 
as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication, cit., p. 1443; Šadl, U., and Sankari, 
S. (2017). Why did the Citizenship Jurisprudence Change? In: Thym, ed., Questioning EU Citi-












acquis.4 This development evolved into the much- discussed Dano- Trilogy of 
cases,5 which has caused quite a stir amongst academic commentators, de-
spite limited effects in daily legal administration and practice.6 The Dano cases 
and its follow- ups were widely criticised for abandoning the Court’s traditional 
stance of protecting EU citizens and furthering the value of Union citizenship 
by interpreting the law away from its market- based confines.7 That, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly,8 the Court has engaged in a “swift dismantling project” 
of the Union Citizenship acquis,9 and that through its decisions the Court is 
reacting to the current Zeitgeist by attempting to help quell the nationalist 
tide sweeping across Europe.10 Another explanation included the changing 
 4 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship. Common Market Law Review 52 (4), pp. 889– 937, 907; Schiek, D. (2017). 
Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to Status Socialis Acti-
vus via Two Forms of Transnational Solidarity. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Fed-
eralism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 360– 361.
 5 This is defined as the series of cases concerning ‘special non- contributory cash benefits’, 
which runs through Court of Justice, judgment of 19 September 2013, case C- 140/ 12, Brey; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 11 November 2014, case C- 333/ 13, Dano; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 15 September 2015, case C- 67/ 14, Alimanovic; Court of Justice, judgment of 25 
February 2016, case C- 299/ 14, García Nieto.
 6 See Mantu S., and Minderhout, P. (2019) Exploring the Links between Residence and So-
cial Rights for Economically Inactive EU Citizens. European Journal of Migration and Law 
21, pp. 313– 337, 316ff., 335.
 7 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship. Common Market Law Review 52 (4), pp. 889– 937; O’Brien, C.  (2017). 
The ecj Sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v United Kingdom. Common Market 
Law Review, 54 (1), pp. 209– 243; Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizenship – Understand-
ing Union Citizenship through Its Scope. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federal-
ism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
 8 See, amongst others, Van den Brink, M. (2019). The Court and the Legislators: Who Should 
Define the Scope of Free Movement in the EU? In: Bauböck, ed., Debating European Citi-
zenship. Cham: Springer; Lenaerts, K. (2011). European Union Citizenship, National Wel-
fare Systems and Social Solidarity. Jurisprudencia 18 (2), pp. 397– 422; Thym, D. (2017). The 
Evolution of Citizens’ Rights in Light of the European Union’s Constitutional Develop-
ment. In: Thym, ed., Questioning EU Citizenship – Judges and the Limits of Free Movement 
and Solidarity in the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, 
Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship, cit.; Davies, G. (2018). 
Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants as an element in 
Court of Justice citizenship adjudication, cit.
 9 O’Brien, C. (2017). The ecj Sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v United King-
dom, cit., p. 210.
 10 Šadl, U., and Sankari, S. (2017). Why did the Citizenship Jurisprudence Change? In: Thym, 
ed., Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the 
EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 109; O’Brien, C. (2017). The ecj Sacrifices EU citizenship in 
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nature of cases reacting the Court and the increasingly un- deserving nature 
of the applicants which have led to controversial decisions such as Dano and 
Alimanovic.11
This chapter will argue amongst a more orthodox, less political line to 
explain the Dano- Evolution: The three cases of the Dano- Trilogy are not the 
revolutionary cases that they are asserted to be. Instead, the developments 
both before and after Dano can be attributed to a natural evolution of the 
case- law following the introduction of Directive 2004/ 38. In this respect, it 
will be argued that the alleged “patchwork” of citizenship case- law is in fact 
rather coherent,12 the reasoning and outcomes of the judgments are on the 
whole convincing.13 In order words, setting aside the fractious normative 
and political arguments surrounding the cases, it will be claimed that legal 
developments can be explained as mostly logical and predictable evolution 
of the law. This ‘evolution’ can be best explained as ‘interpretation cessat in 
claris’, and conforms to the standard method of legal reasoning used by the 
Court. This dictates that so long as the wording of a legal text is clear, there 
is no reason to search for a more purposive or teleological meaning beyond 
its ordinary understanding. This is what has happened after the adoption of 
Directive 2004/ 38.14
Thereafter, the chapter will introduce some of the inevitable consequences 
of the new formalistic interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 will have for eco-
nomically active and not economically active EU Citizens. Also, the anatomy 
of a decrease of individualized proportionality tests and automatic tests of 
legal residence under the Directive, as well as the ever- broadening scope of 
social assistance and the range of social benefits that can be subjected to resi-
dence tests will be looked at.
It will be concluded that despite the problems associated with a strict inter-
pretation of the Directive, particular for certain groups of EU Citizens, it has to 
be acknowledged that the Court is increasing legal certainty and predictability 
of judgments. The Court is accepting the political choices made by the EU leg-
islature, and by applying such rules as laid down in secondary legislation, the 
 11 Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants 
as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication. Journal of European Public 
Policy 25 (10), pp. 1442– 1460, 1443.
 12 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 35.
 13 Neergaard, U.  (2016). Europe and the Welfare State  – Friends, Foes, or …? Yearbook of 
European Law 35 (1), pp. 341– 381, 377.
 14 Lenaerts, K., and Gutiérrez- Fons, J.A. (2013). To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of 










Court is sticking to its standard method of legal reasoning. As such, any criti-
cism of the legal situation of EU Citizens under Directive 2004/ 38, which may 
be valid and justified, may be better placed against the EU legislature rather 
than the judiciary.
1 The Evolution that Led to the Dano- Triloygy
1.1 The Early Cases: Martínez Sala, Baumbast, and Trojani
Accessing a Member State’s “circle of solidarity” has never been open- ended or 
unconditional for economically inactive EU Citizens.15 Traditionally, workers, 
the self- employed, and their family members, were awarded equal treatment 
not only with regard to accessing employment and working conditions in the 
strict sense, but also with regard to all other social advantages enjoyed by do-
mestic workers and Member State nationals,16 including accessing all manner 
of social benefits. Other categories of individuals moving throughout the EU 
were not granted such far- reaching equal treatment rights.17 Following the in-
troduction of EU Citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, academic discussion 
was divided about its precise nature in this regard, and it took a while before 
the Court stepped into this discussion in the 1990s with a series of judgments 
which defined the value of EU Citizenship.18
In Martínez Sala, the Court held that a Spanish national residing lawfully 
in Germany for over 20 years could not be denied equal treatment with regard 
 15 Verschueren, H. (2015). Preventing “benefit tourism” in the EU: A narrow or broad inter-
pretation of the possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano? Common Market Law Review 52 
(2), pp. 363– 390, 364.
 16 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/ 68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2– 12; See Plender, R.  (2005). 
Citizenship and Immigration. European Business Law Review 16 (3), pp. 559– 590, 566– 567.
 17 This was the case even after the adoption of the ‘Residency Directives’: Directive 90/ 364/ 
EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 26– 27; Directive 68/ 360/ 
EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community 
for workers of Member States and their families, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 13– 16; Directive 93/ 
96/ EEC of the Council of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, OJ L 317, 
18.12.1993, p. 59– 60; See Kostakopoulou, D. (1999). Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in 
the European Union. Columbia Journal of European Law 5 (3), pp. 389– 414, 404– 405.
 18 For example, see Shaw, J.  (1997). The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in 
the EU. European Law Review 22 (6), pp.  554– 572; Weiler, J.  (1996). European Neo- 
Constitutionalism:  In search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order. 
Political studies 44 (3), pp.  517– 533; Kostakopoulou, D.  (1996). Towards a Theory of 
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to social (security) benefits in the form of a child benefit,19 solely because her 
residence permit granted on the basis of national law had expired and she was 
yet to receive a new one. In this seminal case, the Court first linked the free-
dom of EU Citizens to move and reside throughout the Union with the princi-
ple of equal treatment.20 The decision excited many commentators about the 
prospect of equal treatment being extended beyond the realms of economic 
activity and to arise solely on the basis of residence.21 At first, this seemed at-
tainable, as the scope of Union Citizenship and the link between any kind of 
legal residence and equal treatment was extended further in the cases of Ba-
umbast and Trojani.
In Baumbast, even though no social benefit was at stake, the Court found 
a national measure rejecting a right of residence for Mr Baumbast’s Colom-
bian wife disproportionate, even though he arguably failed to meet the con-
ditions laid down in the Residency Directive 90/ 364. His health insurance did 
not cover all risks, as was technically required by this predecessor to Directive 
2004/ 38.22 The Court held that he could nevertheless rely directly on Article 
18 tec (Article 21 tfeu) to obtain a right to reside and consequently equal 
treatment.23 Baumbast showed that Directive 90/ 364, a Directive adopted be-
fore EU Citizenship was introduced into the EC Treaty, did not limit the wider 
application of Article 18 tec to persons who arguably had no right of residence 
under secondary legislation.
The Court developed this line of argument further in Trojani, where a 
Frenchman residing in Belgium and working for the Salvation Army in return 
 19 Defined as a family benefit under Article 1(u)(i) Regulation 1408/ 71 on the application 
of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community, OJ L 149, 5.7.1971, p. 2– 50; see also Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, 
Case C- 85/ 96, María Martínez Sala, para. 24.
 20 Articles 8(2) EC (now Articles 20  & 21 tfeu) and Article 6 EC (now Article 18 tfeu) 
respectively.
 21 Shaw, J. (2010). A View of the Citizenship Classics: Martinez Sala and Subsequent Cases on 
Citizenship of the Union. In: Maduro and Azoulai, eds., The Past and Future of EU Law – 
The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty. Oxford: Hart; 
see also Closa, C. (1992). The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty of the European Union. 
Common Market Law Review 29 (6), pp. 1137– 1169; Vincenzi, C. (1995). European citizen-
ship and free movement rights in the United Kingdom. Public Law, pp. 259– 275; Meehan, 
E.  (1993). Citizenship and the new European Community. Political Quarterly 64 (2), 
pp. 172– 186.
 22 Art. 1 Council Directive 90/ 364/ EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence.
 23 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, C- 413/ 99, Baumbast; See Timmermans, 
C. (2010). Martinez Sala and Baumbast revisited. In: Maduro and Azoulai, eds., The Past 
and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 












for ‘pocket money’, food, and shelter was denied access to the Belgian ‘mini-
mex’ social assistance benefit. In its decision, the Court outlined three situa-
tions in which an application for social assistance must be granted. The first is 
if they can be classified as a worker and are engaged in ‘genuine’ economic ac-
tivity. The second is if the individual has resided in the host- Member State for 
a “period of time” (à la Martínez Sala). Trojani added a third situation, where 
the individual was in possession of a residence permit granted on the basis of 
national law. This was held to be enough to demonstrate lawful residence also 
from the perspective of EU law, with all the benefits that that status entails. 
This again demonstrated that a right of residence could be established out-
side the conditions under applicable secondary legislation. As shall be seen, 
this far- reaching approach that blurs the distinction between national and EU- 
based residence, is now obsolete in the wake of Directive 2004/ 38.
Even during this period in which cases were mostly decided in favour of the 
applicants, the Court nonetheless reiterated the ability of Member States to 
protect their welfare system from unreasonable burdens posed by EU Citizens. 
In Baumbast, the Court emphasized that the whilst the preamble to Directive 
90/ 364 stated that individuals must not become an unreasonable burden on 
the host Member State, this was not the case with either Mr Baumbast or the 
members of his family.24 In Trojani, the Court again emphasised that the right 
to move and reside is not unconditional, and can be limited to ensure the EU 
Citizen has “sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social as-
sistance system”,25 even if Mr Trojani’s specific situation was not considered.26 
These formative cases emphasised the independent legal value of Union Citi-
zenship by linking what is now Article 21 tfeu directly with the right to equal 
treatment under Article 18 tfeu. National residence status was also linked 
with equal treatment, with primary law seemingly trumping both EU second-
ary legislation, which at the time proceeded the introduction of Union Citizen-
ship, as well as national legislation, with any restriction having to be judged in 
the light of proportionality.27
1.2 The Reign of Vague Legal Formulas: Grzelczyk, Bidar, and Brey
The next wave of cases that reached the Court before the adoption of Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 concerned a variety of categories of social benefits ranging from 
 24 Baumbast, cit., paras. 90 –  92.
 25 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 September 2004, Case C- 456/ 02, Trojani¸ para. 33.
 26 Trojani, cit., paras. 32 –  33.
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student loans to unemployment benefits. Whilst the legal environments which 
governed the access to these benefits were quite different, the Court dealt with 
this variety of social benefits in a surprisingly similar fashion. In Grzelczyk and 
Bidar, two cases which concerned the rights of students in accessing minimum 
subsistence benefits and student financing,28 the Court developed complicat-
ed formulae to test when individuals can access equal rights regarding access 
to social benefits and when such access can be denied. On paper, these formu-
las recognized the legitimate interest of Member States to protect the financial 
sustainability of their welfare systems. However, in practice they strengthened 
the position of individual applicants vis- à- vis the State, again arguably circum-
venting conditions contained in applicable secondary legislation. It should be 
noted that in the case of students, Directive 93/ 96 was adopted shortly before 
the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force in November 1993, and is slightly 
different from the situation in stage 1 where the relevant secondary law was 
adopted clearly before Maastricht.
Grzelczyk concerned a French student in Belgium claiming minimum sub-
sistence assistance in the final year of his studies. Article 1 Directive 93/ 96 stat-
ed that students must assure national authorities that they were in possession 
of sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the host- state’s social 
assistance system, whilst Article 4 further stated that students would have a 
right of residence so long as these conditions were met. Despite this, the Court 
held that denying a right of residence could never be the ‘automatic conse-
quence’ of a mere request of social assistance,29 and that the Member State in 
question must demonstrate ‘a degree of financial solidarity’ with the migrant, 
assuming the difficulties are temporary and the individual does not become 
an ‘unreasonable’ burden on the public finances of the host state.30 In doing 
so, the Court introduced a subtle distinction between burdens that could be 
considered ‘reasonable’ and those so ‘unreasonable’ as to break this bond of 
financial solidarity between the host- state and the migrant student,31 even if 
Belgium could in theory still revoke or refuse to renew Mr Grzelcyk’s residence 
permit.32 However, the decision gave no real indication as to how to define the 
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C- 209/ 03, Bidar.
 29 Grzelczyk, cit., para. 43.
 30 Grzelczyk, cit., para. 44.
 31 Kostakopoulou, D.  (2007). European Union Citizenship:  Writing the Future. European 
Law Journal 13 (5), pp.  623– 646; O’Brien, C.  (2017). United in Adversity:  EU Citizenship, 
Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, cit.












terms ‘unreasonable burden’, ‘automatic consequences’, and ‘temporary prob-
lems’. This was not helpful to national administrators, and created a constant 
threat as denying such an application for social assistance benefits who claim 
to be hit by temporary financial difficulties could be subsequently found to 
breach the bonds financial solidarity as it would not constitute an unreason-
able burden in the particular case.
In Bidar, the Court reiterated that a ‘genuine link’ between the applicant 
and the host society which could expressed through a ‘sufficient level’ of inte-
gration, which would allow economically inactive students to access student 
financing in the host state. The UK rule, which required three years’ residence 
to establish such a link was held in principle to be legal.33 However, it was too 
restrictive as it made it impossible for nationals of other Member States to 
demonstrate ‘integration’ in any way other than three years’ residence.34 As-
sessing Mr Bidar’s situation, the Court found that as he had undergone a sig-
nificant portion of his secondary education in the UK, a ‘genuine link’ with 
British society could be established.35 Like in Grzelczyk, the Court did not de-
fine the terminology used. Authorities only knew that (1) three years’ residence 
was not suitable as an exclusive category for determining a ‘sufficient degree 
of integration’; and that (2) such a sufficient degree of integration existed af-
ter undergoing a significant portion of secondary education in the host state. 
Member States could theoretically protect their social assistance systems from 
unreasonable burdens by denying claims from individuals with an insufficient 
links to the host societies. However, the vague formulae provided by the Court 
always meant that they faced an elevated risk of violating EU law.36 A similar 
formula was constructed in the context of jobseekers’ allowances under the 
free movement of workers, without any of the terminology being concrete-
ly defined. In Collins, the Court held that a period of working in the UK for 
15 years before a claim for a jobseeker’s allowance was lodged was too distant 
to establish a ‘sufficiently close connection’ with the UK’s labour market. How-
ever, a ‘genuine link’ between the jobseeker and the employment market could 
be established through a ‘reasonable period’ of residence within which the 
candidate ‘genuinely’ sought work.37 This would oblige the Member State to 
 33 Bidar, cit., para. 52.
 34 Bidar, cit., para. 61.
 35 Bidar, cit., paras. 60 –  62.
 36 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2016). What I tell you three times is true: Lawful Residence and Equal 
Treatment after Dano. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23 (6), 
pp. 908– 936, 920.
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grant social benefits “intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour 
market”.38
The Court has intermittently used such an approach after the adoption of 
Directive 2004/ 38, with the most recent example being Brey, decided in 2013.39 
It is argued here that this case is more of an outliner inspired by the older pur-
posive approach of the Court. The case concerned yet another form of social 
benefit, this time a pension supplement, however, the Court used the same 
vague formulae to determine its accessibility. Austria rejected the claim of re-
tired German couple, stating that that they did not have legal residence under 
Directive 2004/ 38 due to their insufficient income. In its judgment, the third 
chamber of the Court emphasised the link between Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38 
and the requirement not to rely on welfare benefits in the country of residence. 
However, it also stated the common dictum that an ‘automatic’ denial of social 
assistance based on the presumption of insufficient resources is not permit-
ted. Instead, the Member State in question must assess on a case- by- case basis 
whether an individual places an unreasonable burden on the welfare system 
of the state as a whole, by reference to the personal circumstances of the in-
dividual, and must comply with the principle of proportionality.40 This there-
fore required national authorities to assess every single claim, even during the 
first three months of residence where Directive 2004/ 38 rules out social assis-
tance,41 against the impact such granting would have on the financial stability 
of the national welfare system overall. The formula put a heavy burden on the 
Member States and authorities while handing a significant advantage to in-
dividual applicants, and presupposed assessments that many (decentralized) 
administrations in charge of granting social benefits will find impossible to 
perform in practice.42 Brey was rendered by the Third Chamber of the Court in 
the year 2013 and seems out of place compared to subsequent developments. 
By 2014 the Grand Chamber of the Court had already moved on and adjusted 
 38 Collins, cit., para. 63.
 39 Minderhoud P., and Mantu, S. (2017). Back to the Roots? No Access to Social Assistance for 
Union Citizens who are Economically Inactive. In: Thym, ed., Questioning EU Citizenship – 
Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
p. 197– 198.
 40 Brey, cit., para. 63– 64.
 41 Art. 6 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
 42 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit.; O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice 
and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, cit., p. 49; see also O’Brien, C. (2017). The ecj Sacrifices 












its approach not only in Dano but also in Förster and Ziolkowski. This suggests 
that Brey is the ‘swansong’ of the Court’s old qualitative approach, sang sole-
ly by the Third Chamber, rather than a signal of continuity of the orthodox 
 approach.43
1.3 The Turning Point toward Legal Certainty: Förster
Directive 2004/ 38/ EC had the purpose of unifying the fragmented legal land-
scape consisting of several Directives and Regulations for various groups of 
EU citizens into one coherent piece of legislation.44 Furthermore, it sought 
to codify case- law interpreting the rights of EU Citizens, which was mostly 
interpreting treaty provisions directly. At the same time it must also be seen 
as the expression of the EU legislator fulfilling its role under Articles 20 and 
21 tfeu to adopt secondary legislation providing for the enjoyment, but also 
for the limitation and conditions of free movement rights, as opposed to pre- 
existing Directives. It was adopted specifically on the Union Citizenship and 
Equal Treatment bases, giving further effect to these primary law rights. We 
argue here that the Court of Justice effectively took the adoption of Directive 
2004/ 38 as opportunity to review and adjust its case- law. This is akin to what 
happened in the first step described above, albeit the mirror image of the early 
cases of the Court, when the Court took the introduction of Union Citizenship 
as an occasion to re- define its approach to free movement in the light of newly 
established Treaty provisions. The first opportunity the Court had to do this 
reversal was the Förster case rendered in 2008, although the facts of the case 
took place prior to the adoption and transposition of Directive 2004/ 38.45
Jacqueline Förster was a German national who had studied in Amsterdam. 
Because she was working, she was able to claim Dutch study benefits as she 
was an EU worker and therefore entitled to all ‘social advantages’ under Article 
7(2) Regulation 1612/ 68. However, during a regular check at a later stage of her 
studies the Dutch authorities discovered that Ms Förster was not employed for 
a short period of time and asked her to re- pay the benefits she received during 
 43 Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:  The Changing Legal Shape 
of Union Citizenship, cit., p.  892, 905– 907; Schiek, D.  (2017). Perspectives on Social 
Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to Status Socialis Activus via Two Forms of 
Transnational Solidarity, cit., p. 360– 361.
 44 As stated in the Directive, it amends Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 on freedom of move-
ment for workers within the Community and repeals Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 
72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC.
 45 See for more information on the case Golynker, O.  (2009). Case C- 158/ 07, Jacqueline 
Förster v.  Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
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these months. Relying on the Bidar case, Ms Förster argued that she had a suf-
ficient degree of integration and genuine links with the Netherlands and could 
not be obliged to repay the benefits received. The case seemed an appropriate 
opportunity to merge the elements of allowing for access to social benefits be-
cause of a ‘certain degree of integration’ known from Bidar with the elements 
of temporal financial solidarity known from Grzelczyk.46 However, this did not 
happen. Instead, the Court dramatically changed the substance of the ‘certain 
degree of integration’ test to access the welfare system of the host- Member 
State as an economically inactive student, while the very wording of the test 
used by the Court stayed exactly the same. In Bidar, three years’ residence was 
just one indicator allowed to consider if a genuine link existed. In Förster, the 
Court accepted the Dutch rule defining five years’ legal residence as the only 
way of proving a sufficient degree of integration. This condition was by itself 
held proportionate to the legitimate aim of guaranteeing a genuine link.47
In its reasoning, the Court signalled the importance of permanent residence 
under Article 16(1) Directive 2004/ 38, which also requires five years of legal 
and continuous residence, even though the Directive was not applicable to the 
facts of the case.48 It is remarkable that the Court was able to shift from a qual-
itative to a quantitative test that assumes a sufficient level of integration only 
after five year’s residence without changing one word in how the reasoning is 
formulated.49
Rather, by linking it to the Directive, it was the entire meaning of the con-
cepts that changed. The decision meant in practice that students needed to 
either be economically active or have permanent residence status under Arti-
cle 16(1) of the Directive before they were entitled to student grants and loans. 
This decision by the Court immediately created more legal certainty and made 
things much easier for national administrators. It also signalled to Member 
States that a strict word- for- word transposition of the Directive including re-
strictions to access public benefits for students would not be struck down by 
 46 On this issue, see Jesse, M.  (2011). The Legal Value of ‘Integration’ in European Law. 
European Law Journal 17 (1), pp.  172– 189; O’Leary, S.  (2009). Equal Treatment and EU 
Citizens:  A new chapter on cross- border educational mobility and access to student 
financial assistance. European Law Review 34 (4), pp.  612– 627; see also Hoogenboom, 
A. (2018). cjeu case law on EU Citizenship: normatively consistent? Unlikely! A response 
to Davies “Has the Court changed, or have the cases?”, cit.
 47 Förster, cit., paras. 52– 54.
 48 Förster, cit., para. 55.
 49 Jesse, M. (2011). The Legal Value of ‘Integration’ in European Law, cit.; O’Leary, S. (2009). 
Equal Treatment and EU Citizens: A new chapter on cross- border educational mobility 










the Court on the basis of primary EU law and earlier decisions such as Bidar. 
The rules as contained in the Directive, particularly those relating to perma-
nent residence and student financing were a key part of the political compro-
mise leading to the Directive’s adoption.50 As later case- law has shown, this 
promise was lived- up to by the Court.
1.4 The (New) Dominance of Directive 2004/ 38: Ziółkowski & Szeja
The next step in our evolution was Ziółkowski & Szeja, decided in 2011 and which 
concerned the nature of the newly established permanent residence status un-
der the Directive.51 In particular it threw light on the issue of which forms of 
residence gives access to permanent residence rights under Article 16(1), and 
whether the qualifying residence period of five years could have started before 
Directive 2004/ 38 had entered into force and transposed by Member States, or 
even before the EU Citizen’s Member State of origin joined the EU. The Court 
had already established previously in Lassal that residence completed “in ac-
cordance with earlier European Union law instruments” should be considered 
when determining whether there has been five years residence under Article 
16(1).52 However, Ziółkowski & Szeja concerned the relationship between Arti-
cle 16(1) permanent residence and residence on the basis of national humani-
tarian law, even though the applicants were economically inactive and did not 
have sufficient resources under Article 7. In his Opinion, the Advocate General 
cited the Court’s reasoning in Dias,53 which stated that permanent residence 
under Directive 2004/ 38 was above all a tool to assist with the integration of 
EU Citizens in the host Member State. In his opinion, this meant that length of 
residence on the basis of national law as well as EU law should be considered, 
as well as taking into account other ‘qualitative factors’.54
However, the Court continued on the path of a more textual, formalistic 
interpretation of the Directive. Instead of accepting at all types of legal resi-
dence under EU and national law, the Court held that the definition of ‘legal’ 
and ‘continuous’ residence for 5 years under Article 16(1) of the Directive must 
 50 See Jesse, M. (2012). Joined Cases C- 424/ 10, Tomasz Ziółkowski v. Land Berlin, and C- 425/ 10, 
Barbara Szeja, Maria- Magdalena Szeja, Marlon Szeja v. Land Berlin. Common Market Law 
Review 49 (6), pp. 2003– 2017.
 51 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, joined cases C- 424/ 10 and C- 425/ 10, 
Ziółkowski & Szeja.
 52 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2010, case C- 162/ 09, Lassal, para. 40.
 53 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 July 2011, case C- 325/ 09, Dias, para. 64; Opinion of 
Advocate Genera Bot delivered on 14 September 2011, joined cases C- 424/ 10 and C- 425/ 10, 
Ziółkowski & Szeja, para. 53.
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be interpreted autonomously from national law. There is, after all, no reference 
to national law in Articles 7 or 16(1) of Directive 2004/ 38. Hence only residence 
in conformity with Article 7 of the Directive can lead to permanent residences 
status under Article 16(1). This includes, however, periods of residence in com-
pliance with the conditions mentioned in Article 7 before the entry into force 
of the Directive and even before the accession of new Member States.55 In Ziół-
kowski, the applicants could not prove that they had sufficient resources in the 
5- year period before requesting permanent residence, hence their residence 
did not comply with the conditions of Article 7 of the Directive and permanent 
residence under Article 16(1) could not be established.
Neither the Advocate General nor the Court mentioned the Förster judg-
ment in Ziółkowski. Others have therefore marked Ziółkowski and not Förster as 
the turning point from a ‘rights- opening’ to a ‘rights- closing approach’ only.56 
Yet, it is our claim that both cases form a continuum. The absence of Förster in 
Ziółkowski may be because the subject matter in each case was different, or be-
cause, at least officially, the Directive did not yet apply in Förster. Whilst Förster 
dealt with student grants, it did touch upon permanent residence under Di-
rective 2004/ 38 indirectly as five years of legal residence was the only way un-
der Dutch law to show the required ‘degree of integration’. However, the seeds 
sowed in Förster in 2008 fell on fertile ground in Ziółkowski, which confirmed 
the closed system to define the conditions for legal residence and resulting 
equal treatment exclusively on Directive 2004/ 38. After these two judgments 
the Directive emerged as the only frame within which the Court establishes 
legality of residence of EU Citizens. In Förster, this link was more indirect, by 
validating Dutch law which transposed the Directive.57 In both cases, howev-
er, only the Directive and the choices made by the EU legislator therein were 
looked at to determine the status of the applicant in a distinct departure from 
 55 Ziółkowski & Szeja, cit., para. 63; see also Jesse, M. (2012). Joined Cases C- 424/ 10, Tomasz 
Ziółkowski v.  Land Berlin, and C- 425/ 10, Barbara Szeja, Maria- Magdalena Szeja, Marlon 
Szeja v. Land Berlin, cit.
 56 Šadl, U., and Sankari, S. (2017). Why did the Citizenship Jurisprudence Change?, cit., p. 91; 
Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., p. 917.
 57 In para. 55 of the Förster judgment the Court explicitly discusses permanent residence 
in the context of Article 24(2)of the Directive: ‘Directive 2004/ 38 (…) provides in Article 
24(2) that, in the case of persons other than workers, self- employed persons, persons who 
retain such status and members of their families (i.e. students) the host Member State is 
not obliged to grant maintenance assistance for studies, including vocational training, 









the above mentioned pre- Förster jurisprudence on Union Citizenship. After 
these two judgments, the Dano- Trilogy was the inevitable next step.
1.5 The Inevitable and Logical Next Step: Dano, Alimanovic, and 
Garcia Nieto
Our final step is the Dano case and subsequent decisions of the Court. In Dano, 
the Court allowed Germany to refuse social minimum assistance benefits for 
an unemployed Romanian mother, because she did not meet the conditions 
for legal residence in Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38. She was neither a worker nor 
did she have sufficient resources at her disposal. Therefore, she could not rely 
on the right to equal treatment under Article 24(1).58 Simply put, Dano con-
firmed that individuals cannot claim equal treatment under Article 24 unless 
they have a right to reside under Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, at least within 
the first 5 years of their residence in the host Member State.59 As in Ziółkow-
ski¸ the Court assessed legal residence and equal treatment rights exclusively 
within the framework created by Directive 2004/ 38. It declined to consider any 
potential quantitative or qualitative factors or ‘links’ between Ms Dano and 
Germany outside of the Directive.
After Förster and Ziółkowski, the judgment in Dano was inevitable. If Union 
Citizens, after Ziółkowski, need to comply with the conditions laid down in Ar-
ticle 7 Directive 2004/ 38 in order to obtain long- term residence status under 
Article 16(1), then it stands to reason that they must comply with the condi-
tions of Article 7 during the initial 5 year period of residence if they wish to 
claim equal treatment and social benefits under the same legal instrument. 
Separate concepts of legal residence for the purposes of Articles 6, 7, 16(1), 
and/ or 24 of Directive 2004/ 38 would be detrimental to legal certainty and 
coherence, which the Directive was meant to introduce. Put in simple terms, 
after Förster, Ziółkowski, and Dano, access to permanent residence, legal res-
idence, and equal treatment, including access to social benefits for econom-
ically inactive EU citizens, depends entirely on the same form of legal resi-
dence under Directive 2004. Primary EU law effectively plays no more role in 
this regard.
The Court followed the same logic in 2015 in Alimanovic.60 The case con-
cerned a Swedish mother and her daughters, who returned to Germany in 2010 
 58 Dano, cit., para. 82.
 59 Thym, D. (2015). When Union citizens turn into illegal migrants: the Dano case. European 
Law Review 40(2), pp. 249– 262; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: 
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after some years’ absence. They worked intermittently for 11  months before 
they lodged an application for social minimum subsistence benefits.61 The 
question was whether, as jobseekers who were formerly employed years ago 
and for 11 months just prior to their application, they should retain the status 
of worker, or be treated as jobseekers. Against the advice of Advocate Gener-
al Wathelet,62 the Court upheld the link made in Dano between residence in 
conformity with Article 7 and equal treatment under Article 24(1) of the Citi-
zens’ Directive. As in Dano and Ziółkowski, their residence and equal treatment 
rights were assessed under the Directive only, with primary EU law playing no 
role. The Court then proceeded to apply the rules on retaining worker status 
as laid down in the Directive. According to Article 7(3)(c) Directive 2004/ 38, 
Union citizens retain the status of worker for a minimum of 6 months, after 
employment of less than 12 months. Hence Ms Alimanovic and her daughter 
could not retain worker status for longer than 6 months. Whilst they still could 
reside as a jobseeker under Article 14(4)(b), the express derogation in Article 
24(2) allowed Germany to deny them social assistance. Whilst not decisive in 
the case itself, the Court also established a new test for determining what is 
an ‘unreasonable’ burden under the Directive. It moved away from a duty to 
establish that each individual claim of social security benefits would amount 
to an unreasonable burden, and instead held that “while an individual claim 
might not place the Member State concerned under an unreasonable burden, 
the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to it 
would be bound to do so”.63
The final case of the Dano- Trilogy is Garcia Nieto.64 The case concerned two 
Spanish nationals that moved to Germany in 2012. The couple were neither 
married nor in a civil partnership, but did have a child together. The mother 
moved in April 2012 with their common child in order to work, whilst the 
father moved in June of the same year with his child from a previous relation-
ship. After arriving in Germany, the father applied for a minimum subsistence 
social assistance under the German Social Law, i.e. the Hartz- 4 benefit under 
the German Social Code ii (sgb ii), the same social benefits as in Dano, from 
July until September. His claim was denied because he had not been residing 
 61 See also the excellent summary by Nic Shuibhne, N. (2016). What I tell you three times is 
true: Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano, cit., p. 911– 913.
 62 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 26 March 2015, case C- 67/ 14, 
Alimanovic, paras. 99– 109.
 63 Alimanovic, cit., para. 62.










in Germany for longer than three months.65 The Court held that father and 
son were not entitled to this social assistance benefit as Article 24 Directive 
2004/ 38 contained an explicit derogation whereby the host Member State is 
not obliged to grant social assistance during the first three months of res-
idence.66 The Court emphasized, as did the Advocate General,67 that this 
limitation according to Recital 10 of the Directive seeks to maintain the “fi-
nancial equilibrium of the social assistance systems of the Member States”.68 
The Court also makes a link with the system of retention of worker status in 
Alimanovic, asserting that Directive 2004/ 38 approach by confirming that the 
German rule excluding such persons from social assistance claims guaran-
tees a “significant level of legal certainty and transparency … while comply-
ing with the principle of proportionality”.69 The Court here also confirms the 
new approach taken in Alimanovic to determining what is an unreasonable 
burden.70
After these initial three cases, the Court has followed its line and remained 
answering questions posed about Citizenship of the Union exclusively through 
a textual interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 as when they fall within the scope 
of application of the Directive.71 This has been done, for example, in Diallo, to 
limit the rather lose interpretation of procedural deadlines in the Directive the 
Belgian State had in place,72 or Tarola, about retention of worker status after 
becoming involuntary unemployed after a short period of work only.73 Also in 
many cases of return, where the Directive is not applicable as such, the Court 
referred to it as frame of reference in analogy.74
 65 It should also be noted that mother and common child were entitled to such benefits 
due to the mother’s economic activity, however, father and son were not seen as ‘family 
members’ deriving rights under the Directive.
 66 García Nieto, cit., para. 44.
 67 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 4 June 2015, case C- 299/ 14, García 
Nieto, para. 70.
 68 García Nieto, cit., para. 45.
 69 García Nieto, cit., para. 49.
 70 García Nieto, cit., para. 50.
 71 See for an updated commentary on case- law of the cjeu in, inter alia, the fields of EU 
Citizenship and free- movement rights, Van den Bogaert, S., Jesse, M. et al. (2019). Kroniek 
van het Europees materieel recht. Nederlands Juristen Blad 10.
 72 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 june 2018, case C- 246/ 17, Diallo v. Belgium.
 73 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 april 2019, case C- 483/ 17, Tarola v. Ireland.
 74 See for example Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, Banger v. VK, 
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1.6 Constitutional Aspects and the Relationship between Primary and 
Secondary Law over Time
After describing the evolution of case law throughout the above mentioned 
five steps, it is necessary to reflect on the changing legal framework for EU 
Citizenship during this period. The Court has had to define the temporal and 
constitutional relationship between pre- existing secondary EU law,75 the pro-
visions on Union Citizenship,76 as well as Directive 2004/ 38. The introduction 
of EU Citizenship in 1993 did not immediately lead to a revision of pre- existing 
secondary law by the EU legislator. As such, it was not until 2004 that the full 
range of rights and conditions applicable to EU Citizens was codified. Before-
hand, the Court was required to “fill out” the Treaty provisions on EU Citizen-
ship and define their precise relationship with secondary pre- existing second-
ary legislation in its acquis,77 as has been shown above in Steps 1 and 2. The 
Court did not overrule existing secondary law or bluntly ignored it. Instead, it 
merely adopted its case- law to a new legal situation after the introduction of 
the primary law rights contained in the provisions on EU Citizenship through 
a teleological interpretation of the law.78 What happened in Steps 3, 4, and 5 
with and after the Förster and Ziółkowski cases is the mirror image to this de-
velopment. Directive 2004/ 38 was adopted on a host of legal bases, inter alia 
Article 18 tec (now Article 21 tfeu), and concerns the rights and obligations 
of all EU Citizens. The Directive codified parts of the Court’s case- law and also 
introduced new ideas and wishes of the EU legislator, such as those of per-
manent residence status and a specific provision on equal treatment.79 Such 
notions are absent from the pre- existing Directives as well as the primary law 
provisions on Union Citizenship.80 Directive 2004/ 38 is therefore much clearer 
in defining the precise status and rights, including equal treatment rights, of 
all European migrants, which were the result of the Union’s (albeit imperfect) 
democratic decision making process,81 at least when compared to the loose 
 75 In particular, the Residency Directives 90/ 364/ EEC; 68/ 360/ EEC; and 93/ 96/ EEC.
 76 See above steps 1 and 2.
 77 Lenaerts, K., and Gutiérrez- Fons, J.A. (2013). To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of 
Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, cit., p. 25.
 78 See for example, Nowak, T.  (2018). The rights of EU Citizens:  a legal- historical anal-
ysis. In:  Van der Harst et  al., ed., European Citizenship in Perspective. Cheltenham/ 
Northhampton MA: Edward Elgar.
 79 Art. 16(1) Directive 2004/ 38, plus Recital (17); Article 24 Directive 2004/ 38.
 80 With the exception of the Revised Student Residency Directive 93/ 96/ EEC of the Council 
of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students.
 81 Van den Brink, M. (2019). The Court and the Legislators: Who Should Define the Scope of 

















combination of primary law rights combined with pre- existing secondary leg-
islation. From this perspective it is logical that the new legal situation after 
the adoption of Directive 2004/ 38 would influence the evolution of the case 
law. Just like after the introduction of Union Citizenship, a new legal environ-
ment new was created, and the Court took note and adjusted its approach ac-
cordingly, shifting towards a more formal, strict reliance on the wording of the 
 Directive.
This is not a radical departure from the Court’s traditional approach to le-
gal reasoning, but rather its explicit, albeit largely theoretical, approach.82 This 
is based on the ‘classic’ textual, contextual, and purposive approach applied 
by other national courts.83 This suggests that, assuming the ordinary mean-
ing of the text is clear, that the Court need not develop further contextual or 
teleological interpretations of the law. That being said, the Court of Justice is 
not always consistent in the weight or ranking it gives to textual or purposive 
interpretations, and whether it has relied purely on the wording of the text in 
question, or primarily purposive criteria.84 However, the Court broadly applies 
the same reasoning as other courts, and contrary to what some commentators 
suggest, evidence from its case- law suggests that it does focus most heavily on 
textual arguments when deciding cases, a trend which has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years.85 The Court’s approach must therefore be seen as part 
of this overall trend.
A strict literal interpretation of the law is not unproblematic. It ignores the 
context and real- life consequences of individual cases, as well as the social or 
historical circumstances behind the adoption of the text, including the weight 
given to multiple purposes associated with it, and the context in which the 
applicable word or phrase is placed. As such, a level of purpose is inherent 
when interpreting any legal rule.86 In fact, even in Dano the Court felt the need 
to look at the purpose of Article 7 of the Directive, which is intended to pre-
vent persons from becoming an unreasonable burden.87 This is suggested to 
 82 Lenaerts, K., and Gutiérrez- Fons, J.A. (2013). To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of 
Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, cit.
 83 Beck, G.  (2013). The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. Oxford:  Hart 
Publishing, p. 281.
 84 Ibid, p. 280– 283.
 85 Ibid, p. 285– 287.
 86 Schlag, P. (2018). On Textualist and Purposivist Interpretation (Challenges and Problems). 
In: Perišin and Rodin, eds., The Transformation or Reconstitution of Europe: The Critical 
Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of the Courts in the European Union. Oxford:  Hart 
Publishing, p. 19, 24– 27.
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deviate from other situations in which the Court has considered the purpose 
of Directive 2004/ 38.88 However, to stray too far away from the ordinary mean-
ing of the Directive’s rules would effectively ignore its adoption entirely and 
could create a situation where no social benefits could ever be denied from EU 
migrants.89 It would also run counter to the principles of legal certainty and in-
ter- institutional balance enshrined in Article 13(2) teu.90 It sometimes seems 
that the Court is criticised simply for giving meaning to Directive 2004/ 38. 
For example, it is suggested that the Court has contributed towards the more 
widespread and sustained recent shift from a “predominantly rights- opening 
to predominantly rights- curbing assessments of citizenship rights”.91 This is ex-
panded upon by Shuibhne in more detail:  “the Court poured the content of 
the primary right to equal treatment into a statement in secondary law. That 
method turns the standard approach to conditions and limits on its head – the 
latter no longer temper equal treatment rights; they constitute the rights”.92 
Under this perspective, the Directive is brought up to ‘constitutional level’, and 
yet the Court does not apply a constitutional level review because it fails to 
review the legitimacy of legislative acts vis- à- vis the Treaty and wider general 
principles. As such, it is no longer clear that individuals residing on the basis of 
national law, but not EU law, will be able to benefit from equal treatment rights 
outside the Directive. In simple terms, the criticism is that the Court seems to 
have abandoned its case law based on primary EU law because of provisions 
found in secondary EU law, i.e. Directive 2004/ 38, an inferior source of law to 
the Treaties.93
The problem with such criticism is that the primary EU law itself explicitly 
mentions that Union Citizens can only exercise their rights “in accordance 
with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures 
adopted thereunder”.94 Free Movement rights are “subject to the limitations 
and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give 
 88 Thym, D. (2015). The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits 
for Economically Inactive Union Citizens. Common Market Law Review 52 (1), pp. 17– 50, 25.
 89 Van den Brink, M. (2019). The Court and the Legislators: Who Should Define the Scope of 
Free Movement in the EU?, cit., p. 134.
 90 Lenaerts, K., and Gutiérrez- Fons, J.A. (2013). To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of 
Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, cit., p. 7.
 91 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., p. 902.
 92 Ibid, p. 909– 910.
 93 Ibid, p. 915; O’Brien, C.  (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the 
Cautionary Tale of the UK, cit.
















them effect”.95 Both Articles 20 and 21 tfeu suggest that the Directive merely 
fulfils its constitutional role laid down in the Treaties in defining the condi-
tions and limitations under which EU Citizens can move. This is different 
to the pre- existing secondary legislation which did not “give effect” to such 
primary rights. In other words, within the clear mandate given to the EU 
legislator in the Treaties, and on the basis of all legal bases related to the 
free movement of persons, the Directive comprehensively covers residency 
and equal treatment rights, as well as the limits thereof for all groups of EU 
Citizens moving to another Member State. It is therefore the explicit objec-
tive of the Directive to codify and harmonise the precise conditions for the 
enjoyments of free- movement rights of all EU Citizens as laid down in the 
Treaties. The Directive effectively sets a floor of minimum standards that the 
Member States must abide by, e.g. providing for six months’ retained worker 
status after a period of less than 12 months employment,96 but will allow the 
Member States discretion to go beyond this once they meet these minimum 
conditions.97 Crucially, however, Member States cannot be forced to do so 
based on case law preceding the Directive. A different approach in the line 
of cases starting with Förster and ending with the above mentioned ‘Dano- 
trilogy’ based on earlier case law would have meant that the Court would 
have gone against the exact wording of Directive 2004/ 38, which has to be 
seen as the expression of the EU legislator based on a firm mandate in the 
Treaties.98 It would be strange for the Court to act as if this did not exist by 
relying on case- law from the preceding era. If this was the standard of judi-
cial review in the future, the room of manoeuvre for the EU legislator would 
be significantly limited. Bearing these legal facts in mind, it seems unfair to 
solely criticise the Court for applying the law of the land in the form of Di-
rective 2004/ 38, albeit strictly, rather than the EU legislator for adopting the 
Directive in its current form.
 95 Article 21 tfeu, ex 18 tec.
 96 See article 7(3) Directive 2004/ 38; as was at issue in Alimanovic. See also O’Brien, C., 
Spaventa, E., and De Coninck, J. (2015). The concept of worker under Article 45 TFEU and cer-
tain non- standard forms of employment. Project Report, Brussels: European Commission.
 97 See Article 37, Directive 2004/ 38 explicitly states that it shall not affect any laws, regula-
tions or administrative provisions “which would be more favourable to the persons cov-
ered by this Directive”.
 98 Thym, D.  (2017). The Evolution of Citizens’ Rights in Light of the European Union’s 
Constitutional Development. In: Thym, ed., Questioning EU Citizenship – Judges and the 
Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing; Van den Brink, 
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1.7 Interim Conclusion: Evolution, Not Revolution
The five- step evolution of the case- law leaves Union Citizens in the following 
position: First, access to equal treatment, including social benefits, and access 
to permanent residence depend on legal residence. Second, legal residence is 
exclusively determined with reference to Directive 2004/ 38. In other words, 
without legal residence under Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38, with very limit-
ed exceptions,99 neither equal treatment nor permanent residence can be 
successfully claimed. Third, the Dano ‘revolution’ was an example of a quite 
ordinary evolution of judicial interpretation. This evolution began with the 
Förster judgment, when the Court first started to assess the legal situation of 
applicants exclusively within the system created by Directive 2004/ 38 itself, 
and continued with Ziółkowski, Dano, Alimanovic, and other subsequent cas-
es. The Court clearly no longer considers that it its role is to create teleological 
concepts such as ‘genuine links’ or ‘sufficient degrees of integration’ to deter-
mine the rights of applicants directly under the Treaties. Instead, all that is 
required is a strict reliance on the normal meaning of the wording contained 
in Directive 2004/ 38. From this perspective, the decisive and exclusive refer-
ence to Directive 2004/ 38 has contributed to legal certainty and is judicially 
coherent and in fact the comparative lack of attention in the recent discus-
sion on the Ziółkowski and Förster cases, at least when compared to Dano, is 
surprising.100
Whilst interesting for academic debate and providing a lot of room for ma-
noeuvre for lawyers, the vague formulas described in Step 2 above were next 
to useless in daily administrative practice. As Shuibhne notes, “case- by- case 
assessments are far from perfect, especially from the perspectives of legal cer-
tainty and workability”.101 They give very little guidance as to precisely when a 
claim can be denied.102 This makes it difficult for authorities to know exactly 
when they can legally deny a claim to protect integrity of the national welfare 
system, something that was always permissible, at least in theory, according to 
 99 A notable exception being Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2014, case C- 507/ 12, Saint 
Prix, where the Court held that a women could retain the status of worker after leav-
ing work due to the “physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy” as long as she 
returns to work within “a reasonable period” – see hereunder.
 100 See on the development of case law and the importance of this judgment, Šadl, U., and 
Sankari, S. (2017). Why did the Citizenship Jurisprudence Change?, p. 91– 109.
 101 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., p. 913.
 102 Schmidt, S.K. (2017). Extending Citizenship Rights and Losing it All: Brexit and the Perils 
of ‘Over- Constitutionalization’. In: Thym, ed., Questioning EU Citizenship – Judges and the 











the Court.103 As the Court has explained, the shift in approach was indeed to 
create a more legally certain system. In Alimanovic and Garcia Nieto, the Court 
asserts that the German rule at hand enables those concerned to know “with-
out any ambiguity, what their rights and obligations are”, and as such guaran-
tees “a significant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context of 
the award of social assistance”.104 The idea is that creating strict identifiable 
rules, rather than vague formulas is beneficial for national administrators and 
applicants alike as everyone knows where they stand. Member State legislators 
are also reassured since the Förster case, as mentioned above, that if they com-
ply with the words of the Directive, their implementation and decisions taken 
based on it will not be second- guessed by the Court of Justice as they were in 
the past.
From this perspective, one way in which the Dano decision is ‘revolutionary’ 
is that it constitutes a reversal of the system as it was previously understood, 
whereby Member States would engage on the “thorny path” of granting social 
benefits but then subsequently expelling EU citizens that become a burden 
on the social system of the host- Member State. Instead, now Member States 
may now withhold equal treatment from “any category” of European citizens 
making use of their free movement rights.105 This is a valid critique, and indeed 
this article will discuss in the following section some of the implications of the 
Court’s reasoning in terms of determining when an individual has sufficient 
resources and/ or is an unreasonable burden. However, it should initially be 
emphasised that in Dano it was already established in the facts of the case that 
the applicant did not have a right to reside under the Directive.106 As such, 
the Court was merely called upon to ask whether these individuals should be 
entitled to rely on the principle of equal treatment under Article 24. The Direc-
tive is clear that this provision is only available to those citizens “residing on 
the basis of this Directive”. Moreover, unlike Article 6 residence which should 
not be lost “as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden”, Article 7 
residence is only valid “as long as they meet the conditions set out therein”.107 
This approach would also conform with the analysis of whether individuals 
meet the conditions for permanent residence under Article 16(1). Lastly, it has 
 103 Grzelczyck, cit. paras. 42– 43; see also Šadl, U., and Sankari, S.  (2017). Why did the 
Citizenship Jurisprudence Change?, cit., p. 98.
 104 Alimanovic, cit., para. 61; Garcia Nieto, cit., para. 49.
 105 Schiek, D. (2017). Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to 
Status Socialis Activus via Two Forms of Transnational Solidarity, cit., p. 361.
 106 Dano, cit., para. 44.
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to be questioned whether being able to make a claim for social assistance but 
having the possibility of it being rejected without losing a right to reside is re-
ally a worse situation for the individual in question, rather than automatically 
being entitled to social assistance only to subsequently find that granting this 
granting has resulted in their residence status being rescinded entirely and an 
expulsion order made against them?
2 The Consequences of the Evolution: beyond the Dano- Trilogy
2.1 The Marginalization of the Precariat and the Janus- Faced Approach 
of the Court
The five- step evolution explained above is for the most part judicially coher-
ent, and the increase in legal certainty can be seen as a positive development. 
Yet, there are certain consequences that are problematic. It cannot be empha-
sised enough that a direct consequence is the potential exclusion from legal 
residence and equal treatment of various vulnerable groups of EU citizens. 
A system that focusses almost exclusively on legal stay under Article 7 Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 will inherently have the same built- in bias for economically ac-
tive and wealthier individuals as the Directive itself. Economically active indi-
viduals, as the original actors on the common and then internal market, have 
always had a privileged position over economically inactive EU citizens.108 
This differentiation is deeply ingrained in EU free movement rights, and leads 
to situations where EU law distinguishes between the ‘good’ or ‘deserving’ citi-
zen on the one hand, and the ‘bad’ or ‘undeserving’ ones on the other hand.109 
This means that the Directive falls short of being a tool for positive citizen-
ship, or receptive solidarity, which argues that in order to achieve equality and 
fully realise social citizenship individuals, particular more vulnerable groups 
of persons, require positive rights such as welfare entitlement.110 Instead, the 
conditional nature of Directive 2004/ 38 results in the potential exclusion from 
protection of those EU Citizens who in fact would need protection the most. 
 108 See Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship. Common Market 
Law Review 47 (4), pp.  1597– 1628; O’Brien, C.  (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum:  Class as the 
New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights. Common Market Law Review 53 (4), 
pp. 937– 978.
 109 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., p. 928.
 110 Schiek, D. (2017). Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to 










This arguably goes against the very idea of ‘citizenship’ as a philosophical con-
cept and the creation of ‘equality’ between all fellow- citizens as one of its cen-
tral tenets. EU citizenship, as Kochenov writes, “virtually never protects the 
weak and the needy” based on their human needs alone. As such, it does not 
empower but merely informs the “dogmatic ideal of a good market citizen”.111 
In a cruel irony, EU Citizenship rights become available only for those “who do 
not need them and only when they do not need them”.112 This becomes even 
more problematic as, as other scholars have rightly pointed out, EU Citizens 
falling foul of such strict conditionality will most likely be minority groups; 
women and disabled persons;113 and low- pay, marginal workers.114 In other 
words, those already on the margins of society are stigmatised even more 
as ‘undeserving’ and stand to lose out most in terms of residence and equal 
 treatment rights.
In practice, this doctrinally defensible stance may not just lead to the grant-
ing or denial of a social benefit, but can result in unlawful residence and even 
social exclusion. This is particularly so because those who do not meet the re-
quirements laid down in Directive 2004/ 38 will not only be denied equality as 
regards access to social benefits, but can be held to fall outside the scope of 
EU law entirely if their social benefit claim is denied because their residence 
is deemed illegal under article 7 Directive 2004/ 38. In some cases, these indi-
viduals will become ‘tolerated’ citizens,115 who are not or cannot be expelled 
but whose legal status is nevertheless technically irregular. They may form a 
class of “illegal migrants, living unlawfully in other Member States without 
equal treatment guarantees”.116 This EU Lumpenproletariat117 has no right 
to residence and equal treatment, and even no rights under the Charter of 
 111 Kochenov, D. (2017). The Citizenship of Personal Circumstances in Europe. In: Thym, ed., 
Questioning EU Citizenship – Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the 
EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 51.
 112 Minderhoud P., and Mantu, S. (2017). Back to the Roots? No Access to Social Assistance for 
Union Citizens who are Economically Inactive, cit., p. 207.
 113 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK, cit., pp. 92– 102.
 114 O’Brien, C., Spaventa, E., and De Coninck, J.  (2015). The concept of worker under Article 
45 TFEU and certain non- standard forms of employment, cit.; O’Brien, C. (2017). United in 
Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, cit., pp. 149– 159.
 115 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., pp. 926– 927.
 116 Thym, D. (2015). When Union citizens turn into illegal migrants: the Dano case, cit.
 117 Schiek, D. (2017). Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to 
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Fundamental Rights as they fall outside the scope of application of EU Law,118 
a (non- )status so far unknown in EU Law.
On the other hand, cases like Gusa,119 Saint- Prix,120 and Dakneviciute,121 sug-
gest that the Court is not seeing the Directive as a tool to ‘cut- off ’ rights for 
EU Citizens in need. All these cases concerned dealt with entitlements of EU 
Citizens under Directive 2004/ 38 after they became unemployed of incapable 
of continuing to work as self- employed persons. The problem was, that the 
Directive wording of the Directive was unclear about retention of rights of self- 
employed persons, see Gusa, or workers or self- employed persons, who could 
not continue their economic activity due to pregnancy, see Saint- Prix and Da-
kneviciute respectively. In all cases the Court ensured that the citizen could 
retain worker status through an interpretation of the Directive or reference to 
art. 45 tfeu itself, if the Directive would not resolve the situation satisfactori-
ly, is vaguely formulated, or, as was the case in Saint- Prix and Dakneviciute,122 
simply does not deal with pregnancy as a cause for ceasing economic activity 
is significant. It is important to emphasize, however, that all three applicants 
were economically active before and wanted to retain their status; the cases did 
not concern access to legal residence and, as a consequence, equal treatment 
as regards access to social benefits under Directive 2004/ 38.
2.2 Increasing Rights for Some under Directive 2004/ 38
That being said, the denial of equal rights to access social assistance and prob-
lematic rights of residence to EU Citizens who have never worked, have no in-
tention to work, and have no independent funds at their disposal, as in Dano, is 
quite normal.123 Furthermore, criticism that the European Union is a ‘rich per-
son’s club’ that only benefits the affluent few over the many is hardly a novel 
critique and omits the fact that the freedoms enjoyed by all EU Citizens on the 
internal market go far beyond anything available in other legal regimes. Such 
developments do not signal that the Court has ‘abandoned’ EU citizens, as is 
 118 As the Court made explicit in Dano, cit., paras. 89– 91; See Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2015). 
Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:  The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship, cit., 
pp. 914– 915.
 119 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 December 2017, case C- 442/ 16, Gusa v. Ireland.
 120 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2014, case C- 507/ 12, Jessy Saint- Prix.
 121 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2019, case C- 544/ 18, UK v. Dakneviciute.
 122 See, Saint- Prix, cit., paras. 26– 39 and Dakneviciute, cit., paras. 27– 30.
 123 Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants 
as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication, cit. See also on this issue Nic 













suggested.124 In fact, the exclusive focus on Directive 2004/ 38 by the Court has 
a Janus- face. Whilst Dano and Alimanovic can be seen as, on balance, reducing 
the rights available to EU citizens, there are other cases wherein a strict appli-
cation of the Directive actually lead to an increase of rights for EU Citizens. 
For example, in Metock,125 differentiations between family reunification and 
family formation, which were allowed under the pre- Directive Akrich case,126 
were ruled out by the cjeu because such differentiations would not re- appear 
in Directive 2004/ 38.127 The EU legislator refrained from codifying the Akrich 
rule in Directive 2004/ 38 and therefore Member States were prohibited from 
applying it. Whilst Metock is mostly seen as a decision which fits with the clas-
sic paradigm of cases in which the cjeu gradually strengthens the rights of 
EU citizens,128 such analysis overlooks the decisive and exclusive dominance 
the Court awarded to rules and conditions contained in Directive 2004/ 38 in 
its judgment, particularly emphasizing the choices made by the EU legislator.
Another case which fits into this line is the recent case of Coman. This de-
cision was widely applauded for recognizing the rights of same- sex spouses, 
married in a Member State allowing for same- sex marriages, to travel and 
reside with their partner throughout the EU, including return to the home 
state.129 The Court reasons that Directive 2004/ 38, which applies in analogy 
in situations or return to the home state,130 would allow the Member States 
leeway as regards the recognition of ‘registered partnerships’ entered into in 
other Member States only. The recognition of these are ‘subject to national 
 124 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, p. 936.
 125 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08, Metock and Others.
 126 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 September 2003, case C- 109/ 01, Akrich.
 127 See about this practice of ‘gold- plating’, Valcke, A.  (2019). EU Citizens’ Rights in 
Practice: Exploring the Implementation Gap in Free Movement Law. European Journal of 
Migration and Law 21, pp. 289– 312, 297ff.
 128 Minderhoud P., and Mantu, S. (2017). Back to the Roots? No Access to Social Assistance for 
Union Citizens who are Economically Inactive, cit., p. 192; see also Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). 
Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:  The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship, cit., 
p. 989.
 129 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, Case C- 673/ 16, Coman, para. 25; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 456/ 12, O & B, paras. 50, 61.
 130 This builds upon the ‘Singh principle’, which states that EU rights “cannot be fully effective 
if such a person may be deterred from exercising them by obstacles raised in his or her 
country of origin to the entry and residence of his or her spouse … when a Community 
national who has availed himself or herself of those rights returns to his or her country 
of origin, his or her spouse must enjoy at least the same rights of entry and residence as 
would be granted to him or her under Community law”, Court of Justice, judgment of 7 
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law’. However, no such reference to national law is made in the Directive as re-
gards the term ‘spouse’. The Court in Coman focussed solely on the wording of 
Article 2 Directive 2004/ 38, finding that Member States cannot rely on nation-
al legislation as regards the recognition of a marriage entered into in another 
Member State.131 The analogous and strict application of Directive 2004/ 38 is 
also beneficial for ‘returning citizens’ who since its adoption have found that 
their conditions of entry “should not, in principle, be more strict than those 
provided for by Directive 2004/ 38”.132
The fact that the Metock, and Coman, cases are simultaneously characterised 
as ‘rights- enhancing’ judgments, while Förster, Ziółkowski, Dano and Alimanovic 
are seen as diminishing rights, but all nevertheless share Directive 2004/ 38 as 
the exclusive framework within which the Court establishes legal residence and 
integration shows the Janus- faced results of the evolution of Court’s case law. 
On the one hand, access to rights is made stricter with reference to legal resi-
dence under Directive 2003/ 38 exclusively, while on the other hand, the reach 
of rights obtained when residence is legal under the Directive is increased. The 
Court is in fact building a legally certain and coherent system of assessing legal 
residence and access to rights for EU Citizens based on the provisions of Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 alone, even if its application means some EU citizens lose out.133
2.3 Less Room for Individual (Proportionality) Assessments and 
Automatic Findings of Illegality
The Court’s approach to interpreting Directive 2004/ 38 has been criticised for 
denying applicants individual proportionality assessments in their cases. This 
is particularly so when determining whether the burden placed by that specif-
ic EU citizen is ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’.134 In this regard, the Court has 
 131 Coman, cit., para. 36. Thereafter the Court looks at potential justifications of a restriction 
to free movement of persons and holds them all to be inapplicable.
 132 See in this regard O & B, cit., paras. 50, 61, with reference to Singh, cit., para 20: “He would 
in particular be deterred from (exercise his free movement rights) if his spouse and chil-
dren were not also permitted to enter and reside in the territory of his Member State of 
origin under conditions at least equivalent to those granted them by Community law in 
the territory of another Member State”; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, 
case C- 165/ 16, Lounes, paras. 60– 61; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 
133/ 15, Chavez- Vilchez, para. 55; Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, 
Banger, para. 35.
 133 As mentioned before the Court actively interprets the Directive in favor of applicants, for 
example in case of family life and children adopted under the Algerian Kafala system, see 
Court of Justice, judgment of 26 March 2019, case C- 129/ 18, S.M. v. UK.
 134 As the Court formulated in Grzelczyk and other cases; see O’Brien, C.  (2017). United in 











completely departed from its individualistic test last used in Brey,135 which was 
held to be “unworkable” and redundant.136 Instead, it has opted for a more ‘sys-
temic’ test in Alimanovic,137 which asserts that that a single applicant for wel-
fare benefits could “scarcely be described as an ‘unreasonable burden’, howev-
er, the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to 
it would be bound to do so”.138 In doing so, it has been claimed that the status 
of individual assessments is “radically downgraded”,139 and that proportion-
ality / individual assessments have not been “set to work” as was the case in 
earlier cases.140 O’Brien is strongest in her criticism claiming that the Court 
uses “a sledgehammer to crack an already cracked nut”,141 by deciding the cases 
without any regard given to sufficient resources or applying proportionality “at 
any stage” in either Dano or Alimanovic.142
It is true that in both Dano and Alimanovic there was a distinct lack of in-
dividual assessment as to the position of the applicants at hand. However, in 
Dano the Court was merely determining whether those already deemed to be 
without sufficient resources, as the referring court had already established, 
could under the Directive rely on the principle of equal treatment to claim 
social assistance.143 In this situation, the Court did emphasise that her the fi-
nancial situation should be specifically examined without taking into account 
the benefit claimed.144 The Court did not, however, feel the need to consider 
the reasonableness of Ms Dano’s burden. This omission is strange especially 
as Ms Dano is a stark example of an individual that is not entitled to social 
assistance or residence rights under EU law,145 as she only entered Germany to 
 135 see Section ii.2 above.
 136 O’Brien, C.  (2017). United in Adversity:  EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary 
Tale of the UK, cit., p. 49; see also O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices EU citizenship in 
vain: Commission v United Kingdom, cit., p. 216.
 137 To use the terminology as applied by Thym, D.  (2015). The Elusive Limits of 
Solidarity:  Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Union 
Citizens, cit.
 138 Alimanovic, cit., para. 62.
 139 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 
Union Citizenship, cit., p. 913.
 140 Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants 
as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication, cit., p. 1445.
 141 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK, cit., p. 49.
 142 Ibid, p. 51, 55.
 143 Dano, cit., para. 44.
 144 Dano, cit., para. 80.
 145 Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants 
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obtain social assistance despite the fact she did not have sufficient resources to 
claim a right of residence.146
In Alimanovic again the Court did not assess the individual situation of the 
applicants, and nor did it test the German rule against the principle of propor-
tionality after finding that it was in conformity with the wording of the Direc-
tive 2004/ 38. This approach differs indeed from earlier cases, such as Baum-
bast, which was decided under article 18 EC (now Article 21 tfeu) and outside 
the scope of Directive 90/ 364. Back then, the Court held that any limitations to 
that Treaty right must be in accordance with the general principle of propor-
tionality.147 In Alimanovic, however, the legal situation under Article 45 tfeu 
received little attention.148 The Court held that the Directive itself established 
a system which considers various factors, guarantees a significant level of legal 
certainty, and complies with the principle of proportionality.149 Whilst it is not 
clear just how many ‘various factors’ Directive 2004/ 38 actually considers,150 
the comparison between Alimanovic and Baumbast is not entirely appropri-
ate. As explained above and unlike Directive 90/ 364, Directive 2004/ 38 has 
as its legal bases both Articles 45 and 18 tfeu, and sets minimum standards 
on EU Citizens’ rights including retaining worker status, which the Member 
States cannot go below. A literal interpretation and application of this Direc-
tive should not be seen as disproportionate in the context outlined above.151 
As such, the Court’s decision to apply the standards and conditions codified by 
the EU legislator based on several legal bases in Directive 2004/ 38 is a coherent 
interpretation of the rules in force. The message for the Member State remains 
the same since the Förster decision:  a word- by- word implementation of the 
Directive will not be second guessed by the Court.
That is not to say that the lack of individual proportionality assessments is 
unproblematic. It carries the danger of endorsing, albeit tacitly, national sys-
tems which employ circular arguments permitting authorities to either block 
economically inactive EU citizens from obtaining certain social benefits, or at 
least allowing said authorities to systematically check individuals’ residence 
status upon their application for social assistance. Every application for social 
benefits might in such a situation automatically lead to an assessment of legal 
 146 Dano, cit., para. 78.
 147 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK, cit., p. 42– 43.
 148 Ibid, p. 51.
 149 Alimanovic, cit., para. 61.
 150 Article 7(3), the Article that decided Alimanovic, is being based almost exclusively on 
time spent in genuine employment.














residence of the applicant under Directive 2004/ 38, which in turn might lead 
to a finding of ‘illegal residence’ under the Directive.152 As Thym notes, the 
Dano decision can be understood as meaning that “any recourse to social as-
sistance pre- empts legal residence status”, as is the case in Germany.153 Indeed, 
without any kind of assessment of individual circumstances, the mere appli-
cation for social assistance is potentially enough to exclude their eligibility for 
such benefits as this by itself demonstrates their lack of resources.154 More-
over, whilst Ms Dano was denied a sgb ii (Jobseeker) benefit as she was not 
actively looking for work and only entered Germany in order to claim social as-
sistance benefits, Alimanovic also concerned sgb ii (Jobseeker) benefits, and 
yet the applicants who were actively seeking employment were again denied 
such benefits due to the exception contained in Article 24(2). This reasoning 
means that sgb ii (Jobseekers) benefits are seemingly inaccessible to all eco-
nomically inactive EU citizens.155
Another clear example of this circular reasoning can be seen in Commis-
sion v UK,156 which concerned the legality of the UK’s ‘habitual residence test’, 
that effectively imposes an Article 7 right- to- reside test upon claimants before 
granting Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit social benefits. The Commission 
claimed this legal test was not permitted under Article 11(3)(c) of Regulation 
883/ 2004, which imposed solely a factual test of residence. However, the Court 
found that Regulation 883/ 2004 does not harmonise the conditions for grant-
ing social security benefits, and that the UK right- to- reside test was an “inte-
gral part” of the eligibility criteria for these social benefits, which is outside 
the scope of the Regulation.157 Part of the Commission’s complaint was that 
by checking individuals’ residence status upon application for the benefits in 
question, this constituted “systematic checking” of individuals residence sta-
tus, prohibited under Article 14(2) Directive 2004/ 38. However, the Court dis-
agreed with this.158 The decision has been criticised strongly by O’Brien, who 
 152 Thym, D. (2015). The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits 
for Economically Inactive Union Citizens, cit.
 153 Ibid, p. 42.
 154 Although, it should be emphasized that whilst Ms Dano was excluded from social assis-
tance benefits, she continued (before and after the decision) to receive Child Benefit 
(social security) for her son, which was unaffected by her social assistance claim.
 155 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK, cit., pp. 53– 56.
 156 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2016, case C- 308/ 14, Commission v. United Kingdom.
 157 Commission v. United Kingdom, cit., para. 69. See also O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices 
EU citizenship in vain: Commission v United Kingdom, cit., p. 221.
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claims that the UK procedures essentially mean that no economically inactive 
eea migrant, who is applying for social benefits, can ever have a right to re-
side, because “any benefit application is deemed to dissolve any claim to self- 
sufficiency”.159 In other words, the mere application for social benefits results 
in a finding that the EU citizen in question does not have a right- to- reside un-
der Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38. Furthermore, “there is no starting presumption 
of lawful residence, or starting position of citizenship- based eligibility that is 
then limited and in some cases checked”.160 In fact, the individual’s status is 
checked purely because they apply for such a benefit, meaning in effect there is 
actually a presumption of illegality. Given that a rejection of the social benefit 
results in the individual being outside the scope of application of the EU free 
movement rules,161 the UK system is likely to have a chilling effect on social 
benefit claims by economically inactive EU citizens, disproportionality affect-
ing some of the most vulnerable persons in society.
2.4 The Ever Increasing Scope of ‘Social Assistance’ under Directive  
2004/ 38
The formalised approach of the Court and the new status of the Directive 
has also impacted upon the range of social benefits that can be subjected to a 
right- to- reside test on the basis of Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38. Directive 2004/ 
38 itself only refers to ‘social assistance’, with ‘social security’ benefits being 
coordinated by Regulation 883/ 2004 and its predecessors. Given that the 2004 
Regulation as opposed to earlier versions, which only applied to workers, also 
applies to “the new category of non- active persons”,162 it was considered that 
Regulation 883/ 2004 would apply to anyone subject to the legislation of one 
or more Member states, regardless of economic activity.163 The Regulation was 
 159 O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v United Kingdom, 
cit., p. 212.
 160 Ibid.
 161 See Thym, D.  (2015). The Elusive Limits of Solidarity:  Residence Rights of and Social 
Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens, cit., p. 21.
 162 Recital (42) Regulation 883/ 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ 
L 166, 30.4.2004, p.  1– 98; See O’Brien, C.  (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices EU citizenship in 
vain: Commission v United Kingdom, cit., p. 222.
 163 Article 2, Regulation 883/ 2004; see also Article 11 of Implementing Regulation No 987/ 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/ 2004 on the coor-
dination of social security systems, OJ L 284, 30.10.2009, p. 1– 42; see also Internal Labour 
Organisation (2010). Coordination of Social Security Systems in the European Union:  An 
explanatory report on EC Regulation No 883/ 2004 and its Implementing Regulation No 987/ 













considered to be triggered by a factual test of residence, rather than a legal test 
of lawful residence.164
The cases of Brey, Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia- Nieto all concerned ‘spe-
cial non- contributory cash benefits’. Whilst not classified as ‘social security’ in 
the strict sense, these benefits are included under Article 70 Regulation 883/ 
2004, and are suggested to have the nature of both social security and social 
assistance.165 In these cases the Court rejected the European Commission’s 
initial argument that social assistance, and consequently right- to- reside tests 
on the basis of Directive 2004/ 38, could only be applied to social benefits not 
mentioned in Regulation 883/ 2004 and therefore outside its scope of appli-
cation.166 Rather, it held that social assistance should have its own definition 
under EU law and that special non- contributory cash benefits met this defini-
tion.167 In the aforementioned Commission v United Kingdom case, the Court 
was confronted with the application of a right- to- reside test to Child Benefit 
and Child Tax Credits. These were clearly not special non- contributory cash 
benefits,168 but rather fell under Chapter 8 of Regulation 883/ 2004 on Fami-
ly Benefits and “must be regarded as social security benefits”.169 However, the 
Court still held that there is “nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social 
benefits to Union citizens who are not economically active being made subject 
to (a right to reside test)”.170 According to the Court, the applicants failed to 
fulfil the conditions of entitlement of the benefit. The Court’s reasoning sug-
gests that potentially any social benefit, so long as it has some characteristics of 
social assistance, such as being taxpayer funded or non- contributory in nature, 
can be subjected to a right- to- reside on the basis of Article 7 Directive 2004/ 38, 
regardless of the benefit’s classification under Regulation 883/ 2004.171
The application of Article 7 criteria to social security benefits has been crit-
icised for undermining the political compromise at the heart of both pieces of 
 164 Verschueren, H. (2013). Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: The Unreasonable Burden of 
Brey. European Journal of Migration 16 (2), pp. 147– 79.
 165 See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 29 May 2013, case C- 140/ 12, Brey, 
para. 48.
 166 See Brey, cit., para. 48.
 167 Brey, cit., paras. 58– 59.
 168 Indeed, the original complaint included special non- contributory cash benefits, but these 
were removed following the Brey and Dano decisions. See Commission v. United Kingdom, 
cit., para. 27.
 169 Commission v. United Kingdom, cit., para. 60.
 170 Commission v. United Kingdom, cit., para. 68.
 171 Commission v. United Kingdom, cit., para. 51. See also O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices 
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legislation adopted in 2004 as well as the differentiation between the two types 
of social benefits that flow from it.172 Furthermore, in Commission v United 
Kingdom the Court relies upon paragraphs 83 of Dano and 44 of Brey to come 
to this conclusion. However, both cases concern special non- contributory cash 
benefits, which are a special category within Regulation 883/ 2004. The Court 
ignores the differentiation of benefits within the Regulation and applied them 
as if there was one general rule applicable to all social benefits. As a result, 
the conflation of the two legal instruments makes the equal treatment provi-
sion in Article 4 Regulation 883/ 2004 almost redundant.173 At the same time, 
the Court has made relying on the equality clause in Article 24 of Directive 
2004/ 38 difficult in cases involving applications for social security benefits for 
inactive EU Citizens regardless of the status of the benefit in question under 
Regulation 883/ 2004. Potentially all applications for social benefits can be sub-
jected to a right- to- reside test, with all problems attached to the circular appli-
cation of such tests outlined in the previous section.
3 Conclusion
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, this article has made the argument 
that the Court is not working to “advantage the few, excluding the many”.174 
Recognising that the Court is caught between a “rock and a (very) hard place”,175 
and unable to please everybody, it has been shown that at least for the most 
part the Court’s reasoning is logical and judicially coherent. The development 
of legal residence and accessing social benefits has developed from the initial 
introduction of secondary legislation, to the establishment of Union Citizen-
ship, and the adoption and interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 through five 
major steps. Where this chapter departs from much other scholarly opinion is 
by asserting that in fact the major factor in the Court’s evolving approach is the 
adoption and subsequent implementation, application, and interpretation of 
Directive 2004/ 38. In this respect, the Court is merely following its traditional 
 172 Verschueren, H.  (2013). Free Movement or Benefit Tourism:  The Unreasonable Burden 
of Brey, cit., pp. 159– 165; see also O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices EU citizenship in 
vain: Commission v United Kingdom, cit.
 173 O’Brien, C. (2017). United in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK, cit., p. 51.
 174 Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship through Its 
Scope, cit., p. 223.
 175 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of 











method of interpreting EU rules by sticking to a formal, textual interpretation 
of the law following the adoption of secondary legislation. Criticism that the 
Court is re- establishing the dichotomy between economically active and inac-
tive individuals often misses the point that these differences are clearly man-
ifest in Directive 2004/ 38, which also adds categories of citizens who benefit 
from equal treatment without economic activity, such as persons with suffi-
cient means and permanent residents. The Directive has been interpreted to 
create a closed system for the definition of legal residence whereby, with very 
limited exceptions, only residence that is considered lawful under the Direc-
tive itself will be accepted by the Court. Only legal residence as defined by the 
Directive can lead to permanent residence, as stated in Ziółkowski, and only 
such legal residence gives access to equal treatment with Member State na-
tionals, as can be seen in Dano and Alimanovic. Yet, this exclusive reference 
to the Directive can also be beneficial for other groups of EU Citizens, as for 
example the Metock and Coman cases have shown.
The reliance on Directive 2004/ 38 has changed the dynamics of law gov-
erning EU Citizenship. First, as has been shown, the Court is building a co-
herent and simplified approach to rights enjoyed by EU Citizens based on a 
strict interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38. This will increase legal certainty for 
applicants and national authorities involved in decision making. Second, by 
following the wording of the Directive and accepting literal implementations 
of the Directive by the Member States since the Förster case, the Court has 
achieved two things. It has assured Member States that their implementation 
of the Directive, if true to its wording, is safe from being second guessed by 
the Court on grounds of primary law. Member States can always provide more 
rights than prescribed by the Directive, however, they will not be forced to do 
so. In addition, the Court has taken itself out of the line of fire in the sensitive 
political discussions about access to social benefits for (economically inactive) 
EU Citizens. It may be that the Court is suffering from “a certain degree of 
‘citizenship exhaustion” and has “put the brakes on a liberal interpretation of 
free movement rights”.176 After decades of acting as the motor for European 
integration in the field of EU citizenship, the Court might reasonably now be-
lieve that its job is done and that further developments have to be driven by 
all political actors in the new governance structures created by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.177 Moreover, it could be argued that the Court does not see the core 
of Union citizenship in residence and access to social welfare of economically 
 176 Sarmiento D., and Sharpston, E. (2017). European Citizenship and Its New Union: Time to 
Move on? In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism – The Role of Rights, cit., p. 229.
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inactive Citizens, but in ‘constitutional principles’ such as “the protection of 
fundamental rights, the development of democracy, and the Rule of Law”.178 
Notwithstanding a poor attempt at playing politics by intervening in the Brex-
it debate by releasing the Commission v United Kingdom judgment one week 
before the referendum,179 the Court seems much less willing to ‘legislate’ in 
this area in addition to the European legislator. Instead, it persistently defers 
back to the words approved by Council and Parliament in Directive 2004/ 38. 
When compared to other issues connected to Citizenship, such as the need 
to preserve the legal position and ensure the continuity of rights for the four 
million UK nationals and EU Citizens potentially affected by Brexit,180 cas-
es concerning social assistance claims by economically inactive citizens can 
seem marginal. Furthermore, the fully justified criticism of the law as it stands 
may be more wisely directed at the EU legislator, and future improvements to 
the precarious situation of Union Citizens should be expected foremost from 
amendments and/ or revisions to Directive 2004/ 38, as opposed to expecting 
developments to arise solely from the Court.
 178 Ibid, p. 227.
 179 O’Brien, C. (2017). The ECJ Sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v United Kingdom, 
cit., p. 209.
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 chapter 8
EU Citizenship, Access to “Social Benefits” 
and Third- Country National Family Members: 
Reflecting on the Relationship between Primary 
and Secondary Rights in Times of Brexit
Elise Muir*
i Introduction
It is often observed that EU law is highly “constitutionalised”. The embedding 
of many EU rights in its “constitutional charter”,1 in other words the EU trea-
ties, has two related effects. It allows for the granting of a high degree of pro-
tection to selected rights. Simultaneously, it limits the ability of the EU legal 
order to process disagreement on the content and scope of such rights through 
ordinary political channels. Academic writings regularly and critically exam-
ine the high level of legal protection afforded to economic rights in the EU, in 
particular the four freedoms.2
To date, little attention has been devoted to non- economic rights en-
shrined in EU constitutional norms. As illustrated by the reservations of the 
UK, Poland and the Czech Republic on the justiciability of the “Solidarity” 
Title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), 
owing to its Protocol 30,3 the legal status of non- economic rights in the EU 
legal order is often lower than that of economic rights. Furthermore, and 
 * Prof. dr. Elise Muir, Head of the Institute for European Law and Visiting Professor at the Col-
lege of Europe. Publication contributing to the RESHUFFLE project, supported by the Euro-
pean Research Council. I am most grateful to Gillian More as well as Jonathan Tomkin for 
valuable comments on at earlier draft.
 1 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/ 83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European 
Parliament, para. 23.
 2 E.g. Scharpf, F.W. (2009). The Double Asymmetry of European Integration; or: Why the EU 
Cannot Be a Social Market Economy. MPIfG Working Papers, no. 12, p. 5.
 3 Art. 2 of Protocol no. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean union to Poland and to the United Kingdom and Protocol on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic, in Annex 1 of 
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precisely for that reason, the argument usually is that the legal rank of non- 
economic rights should be upgraded to act as a counter- weight to EU eco-
nomic rights.4
Yet, the EU ‘constitutional charter’ does include provisions protecting 
a number of non- economic rights, in particular those of EU citizens. These 
have been actively used over the past few years. How do these constitutional 
norms protecting non- economic rights5 interact with related EU legislation in 
this field?
This chapter investigates the relationship between primary rights, under-
stood as rights enshrined in the EU Treaties or in EU law having the same rank, 
and secondary rights, understood as rights enshrined in EU legislation, by an-
alysing some of the most controversial aspects of EU citizenship law over the 
past few years. This will serve as a basis for reflection on how high- level polit-
ical disagreement on such non- economic rights,6 as exemplified in the cam-
paign in favour of Brexit,7 is addressed within the EU legal order.
i.1 Mapping out the Constitutional and Legislative Framework for EU 
Citizenship Law
At the outset, it is useful to briefly map out the key legal provisions and the 
relationship between them as provided in EU primary law. Art. 18 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) prohibits any discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the treaties 
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein. The scope 
of application of the treaty is inter alia determined by Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu on 
the EU citizens’ right to move and reside freely, but this right is also subject to 
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and measures adopted to 
give them effect (i.e. legislation for our purpose, as will be explained below). 
The same holds true for Art. 20 tfeu, which establishes EU citizenship, lists a 
 4 For recent overviews and critical discussions of the matter see: Garben, S. (2017). The Consti-
tutional (Im)balance Between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the European Union. European 
Constitutional Law Review 13 (1), pp. 23– 61 and Schiek, D. (2017). Towards More Resilience for 
a Social EU – the Constitutionally Conditioned Internal Market. European Constitutional Law 
Review 13 (4), pp. 611– 640.
 5 The material scope of the research is defined by reference to the UK Settlement, see infra.
 6 It is acknowledged that political disagreement also relates to economic rights; these however 
are not the focus of the present paper as explained above.
 7 See for instance the thoughts of Barnard, C., and Butlin, S.F. (2018). The Future of Free Move-
ment of Persons in the UK (Part 1). EU Law Analysis, available at eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/ 











set of related rights and refers to the conditions and limits defined by the Treaty 
and by the measures adopted thereunder.
Adding to the constitutional dimension of EU citizens’ rights, the prohibi-
tion of nationality discrimination within the scope of application of the trea-
ties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions is mentioned in 
the Charter in Art. 21, para. 2. The right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States is also “reaffirmed” as a fundamental right in 
Art. 45, para. 1, of the Charter.8 Interestingly for our discussion below, Art. 45, 
para. 2, of the Charter states that “freedom of movement and residence may be 
granted, in accordance with the treaties, to nationals of third countries legally 
resident in the territory of a Member State”.
Art. 21 tfeu on EU citizenship has been read in conjunction with Art. 18, 
para. 1, tfeu to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality against 
certain non- economic actors.9 It has also been asserted that “Union citizenship 
is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”10 
and Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu is directly effective.11 The cjeu has repeated on mul-
tiple occasions that the treaty provisions on EU citizenship shall only be relied 
upon if it is not possible to rely on the economic freedoms,12 although it does 
not always examine the applicability of economic freedoms in detail before 
turning to Art. 21 tfeu. In the present analysis of the non- economic rights of 
EU citizens, much of our attention will be devoted to Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu.13 
Furthermore, impediments to the right conferred by Art. 21 tfeu to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States ought to be checked be-
fore relying on Art. 20, para. 1, tfeu.14 Art. 20, para. 1, tfeu is thus a “fall back” 
category to which little attention will be devoted in the present paper.
As will be further explained and as naturally derives from the wording of the 
treaty and Charter provisions thereby identified, the rights of non- economically 
active citizens are closely intertwined with EU legislation. The main legislative 
 8 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2010, case C- 162/ 09, Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions v Taous Lassal, para. 29.
 9 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C- 85/ 96, María Martínez Sala v Freista-
at Bayern.
 10 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre 
public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies- Louvain- la- Neuve, para. 31.
 11 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, para. 86.
 12 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 457/ 12, S. and G., para. 45.
 13 On the rights of economic migrants as provided for in the EU Treaties see: Arts 45, para. 2, 
49, para. 1, and 56, para. 1, tfeu.
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instrument is Directive 2004/ 3815 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
(Directive 2004/ 38). It amends and replaces a set of earlier instruments16 but 
it is the first legislative instrument designed to comprehensively regulate the 
rights of EU citizens as such. It also co- exists with Regulation 492/ 2011 (for-
merly 1612/ 68) of the European Parliament and of the Council on freedom of 
movement for workers within the EU.
Clarifying the relationship between the Directive, treaty provisions on citi-
zenship and other legislative instruments, the cjeu made clear that Directive 
2004/ 38 “aims to facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that is con-
ferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and that it aims in particular to 
strengthen that right, so that Union citizens cannot derive fewer rights from 
that directive than from the instruments of secondary legislation which it 
amends or repeals”.17 The cjeu has therefore given a distinctly positive and 
forward looking role to Directive 2004/ 38. The Directive is understood as a de-
velopment on pre- existing legislation, giving expression to the primary citi-
zenship rights.18
i.2 The Multiple Constitutional Functions of Art. 21 tfeu
The constitutional anchorage of EU citizens’ rights as just briefly described has 
important implications. Treaty articles such as Art. 21 tfeu perform three func-
tions in the EU legal order.19 First, Art. 21 tfeu can be seen as a benchmark 
against which the activities of EU and national organs falling within the scope 
of EU law may be reviewed, and in light of which such activities must be in-
terpreted. In that respect, this Treaty provision largely overlaps with relevant 
 15 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 16 As is clear from the title of Directive 2004/ 38 itself.
 17 E.g. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Taous Lassal, cit., para. 30. See also Court of 
Justice, judgment of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08, Metock, para. 59.
 18 Note that a number of EU directives give expression to the fundamental right not to be 
discriminated against; see further: Muir, E. (2018). EU Equality Law: The First Fundamental 
Rights Policy of the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter iv.
 19 Reflecting on the different functions on Treaty provisions on non- discrimination: Muir, 













Charter provisions and corresponding general principles. In addition, Art. 21, 
para. 1, tfeu defines the scope and content of EU regulatory intervention in do-
mestic policies to the extent that it is directly effective.20 Thirdly, Art. 21, para. 2, 
tfeu constitutes a legal basis for the adoption of further legislation. This mul-
tiplicity of functions distinguishes this source of rights and obligations from 
other categories of instruments which only perform some of these functions. 
This also explains why the dividing line between secondary legislation and pri-
mary rights in this field is not always clear, as will be further illustrated below.
Such ambivalence is not uncommon in the EU legal order.21 The normative 
content of the EU treaty performs the function of a constitutional benchmark 
(in the same way as the Charter). Meanwhile, as a ‘derivative’ legal order,22 
the exercise of EU powers depends upon the allocation of specific competenc-
es so that the EU constitutional charter provides a set of provisions defining 
the scope of EU regulatory intervention. The process of European integration 
has resulted in embedding an atypical amount of normative content in the 
very same provisions that define the scope for EU regulatory intervention. This 
means that the scope and content of EU intervention are often actually merged, 
leading to the high level of constitutional protection mentioned above.
The existence or absence of legislation as referred to in the treaty provisions 
on citizenship may also mark the cut- off point of active intervention by the EU. 
The interpretation of the content and scope of legislation has direct implica-
tions on the relationship between domestic and EU competences. The judicial 
interpretation of the parameters of EU legislation giving expression to EU cit-
izens’ rights is a delicate exercise: the process by which political institutions 
have thought to circumscribe EU intervention may be reviewed against the 
very primary right that the legislation is intended to shape. The cjeu’s views 
on the primary law version of the right at hand thus more ostensibly competes 
 20 On the first two functions, see Baumbast, cit., para 86: ‘the application of the limitations 
and conditions acknowledged in Art. 18, para. 1, EC in respect of the exercise of that right 
of residence is subject to judicial review. Consequently, any limitations and conditions 
imposed on that right do not prevent the provisions of Art. 18, para. 1, EC from conferring 
on individuals rights which are enforceable by them and which the national courts must 
protect (see, to that effect, Court of Justice, judgment of 4 December 1974, case 41/ 74, Van 
Duyn, para. 7).
 21 E.g. In relation to EU sex equality law see for instance Art. 157 tfeu; e.g. Hervey, T.K. 
(2005)., Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law:  Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 12 (4), pp. 307– 325.
 22 Walker, N.  (2001). Human Rights in a Post- National Order:  Reconciling Political and 
Constitutional Pluralism. In:  T. Campbell, K.  D. Ewing and A.  Tomkins, eds., Sceptical 
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with those expressed by political authorities. There is also a risk of hindering or 
swaying political debate by significantly interfering with the content and scope 
of rights defined in legislation through the interpretation of EU constitutional 
norms. In a derivative legal order such as that of the EU, the interpretation of 
legislation adopted at the supranational level therefore unquestionably raises 
questions of a constitutional nature.
As a consequence, by its very nature, Art. 21 tfeu places the constituent 
powers and the cjeu as well as the EU legislature in a position to jointly drive 
EU citizenship forward. This form of institutional collaboration is particularly 
interesting as it relates to the fleshing out of the concept of EU citizenship 
that is intended to legitimise the edifice of the European Union. However, the 
way forward may be bumpy: How does EU law address disagreement on such 
a symbolic concept?
i.3 Tensions between Primary and Secondary Law: the UK Settlement as 
an Illustration
The Settlement for the UK from 2016 (UK Settlement)23 offered an occasion 
to test the relationship between the primary and secondary rights of EU citi-
zens. It explored the boundaries of what could be adjusted within EU law in 
order to address the concerns of the UK with minimal constitutional impact. 
The nature of this exercise may remind us of similar sorts of “constitutional 
dialogues”24: such as that leading to the adoption of the Barber protocol25 or 
the insertion of Art. 157, para. 4, in the tfeu.26 Although the UK Settlement 
did not enter into force,27 it is the latest illustration of the ability to organise 
 23 Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, in 
Annex 1 of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 February 2016.
 24 See further: Muir, E. (2018). EU Equality Law: The First Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU, 
cit., Chapter iii.
 25 Protocol no. 2 concerning Art. 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
See further: Curtin, D. (1993). The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits 
and Pieces. Common Market Law Review 30 (1), pp. 17– 69.
 26 It was inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam, see also Declaration no. 28 on Art. 119(4) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. See Howard, E. (2008). The European 
Year of Equal Opportunities for All- 2007: Is the EU Moving Away from a Formal Idea of 
Equality?. European Law journal 14 (2), pp. 168– 185, 175– 176; Maduro, M. (2005). La Cour 
de justice des Communautés européennes et la législation d’anti- discrimination. Revue 
du droit Européen Relatif à la Non- Discrimination, pp. 25 et seq.
 27 Section E.2., of the Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the 
European Council, concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the 












a political response to challenges to EU citizens’ rights within existing EU pri-
mary law.28 The UK Settlement therefore provides a most useful opportunity to 
reflect on the constitutional design of EU citizenship law.29
It is noteworthy that of the various controversial aspects of the debate sur-
rounding the Brexit referendum and in the UK Settlement, two were related to 
the non- economic rights of EU citizens and tested the relationship between 
primary and secondary law in that respect – more specifically the relationship 
between Art. 21 tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38. These aspects will be the focus of 
the present chapter. Selected excerpts from the UK Settlement are reproduced 
here for the ease of the reader.30
The first aspect of the UK Settlement of interest to this paper31 relates to 
the rights of non- economically active persons and sought to address concerns 
about the burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
that these persons represent. Annex i, Section D on “Social benefits and free 
movement”, point 1, of the UK Settlement reads as follows:
(b) Free movement of EU citizens under Article 21 tfeu is to be exercised 
subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and 
the measures adopted to give them effect.
The right of economically non- active persons to reside in the host 
Member State depends under EU law on such persons having sufficient 
resources for themselves and their family members not to become a bur-
den on the social assistance system of the host Member State, and on 
those persons having comprehensive sickness insurance.
Member States have the possibility of refusing to grant social bene-
fits to persons who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely 
 28 The objective was ‘to settle, in conformity with the Treaties, certain issues raised by the 
United Kingdom’:  Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the 
European Council, concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the 
European Union, in Annex 1 of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 February 2016.
 29 Case law developed exclusively on the basis of Treaty provisions is left aside as it leaves 
little room for interaction with legislation. See for instance the line of cases developed on 
the basis of Art. 20 tfeu and the ruling in Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case 
C- 34/ 09, Zambrano. See also Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, 
M.G Tjebbes et al. v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
 30 Others related to the free movement of workers (e.g. the indexation of child benefits, alter 
and safeguard mechanism) and the notions of public policy or public security.
 31 Other important aspects of the UK Settlement such as the safeguard mechanism related 
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in order to obtain Member States’ social assistance although they do not 
have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence. […] (empha-
sis added)
The second aspect of the UK Settlement relates to the rights of third- country 
national family members of an EU citizen with no prior lawful residence, with 
a view to countering fears of circumvention of national immigration rules. An-
nex vii of the UK Settlement reads as follows:
The Commission intends to adopt a proposal to complement Directive 
2004/ 38 on free movement of Union citizens in order to exclude, from the 
scope of free movement rights, third country nationals who had no prior 
lawful residence in a Member State before marrying a Union citizen or 
who marry a Union citizen only after the Union citizen has established 
residence in the host Member State. Accordingly, in such cases, the host 
Member State’s immigration law will apply to the third country national. 
This proposal will be submitted after the above Decision has taken effect 
[…] (emphasis added)
The two themes thereby addressed by the UK Settlement and related to Art. 21 
tfeu provide interesting case studies for the purpose of examining the rela-
tionship between primary and secondary rights in the context of intense polit-
ical disagreement on non- economic rights. The challenges thereby identified – 
on the one hand, free movement of EU citizens v. fear of burdens on the social 
assistance system, and on the other, free movement of EU citizens v. national 
immigration law – have been framed in two different, if not opposing, ways in 
EU constitutional law.
On the one hand, on the issue of access to social benefits for non- 
economically active persons (Section ii), the case law of the cjeu has progres-
sively proceeded to a “deconstitutionalisation” process (i.e. shifting attention 
from the right enshrined in primary law to the rights provided for in secondary 
law) on which the UK Settlement could subsequently comfortably rely. The UK 
Settlement could indeed rely on an interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 which 
is favourable to the requests of the UK with little fear of breaching primary law.
On the other hand, the precise legal status of the rights of EU third- country 
national family members of EU citizens with no prior lawful residence was 
blurred. This allowed the UK Settlement to propose a political solution to ad-
dress the claims of the UK – i.e. of a legislative nature – but case law suggests 
that this approach could be in breach of EU primary law. Indeed, the rights of 
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third- country national family members of an EU citizen are seemingly protect-
ed by the EU Treaty rights as we shall see (Section iii).
After spelling out the constitutional setting in relation to both types of rights, 
we will seek to draw lessons for the constitutional design of non- economic 
rights of EU citizens when treaty and legislation co- exist (Section iv). It will be 
argued that whenever possible, emphasis shall be placed on legislative guid-
ance so as to allow for political dialogue.
ii Deconstitutionalising the Perimeters of EU Citizenship Law: from 
Martínez Sala to Brey et al. as Reflected in the UK Settlement
In a now well- known series of recent cases on the rights of mobile EU citizens 
that do not perform an economic activity, the cjeu “deconstitutionalised” its 
understanding of key aspects of the prohibition of nationality discrimination 
(enshrined in Art. 18, para. 1, tfeu). In other words, the cjeu moved the dis-
cussion to the secondary law level, having kept it at the primary law level for 
many years.32
ii.1 Enshrining EU Citizens’ Rights in EU Primary Law: ‘Constitutional 
Engineering’
The story starts in the late 1990s when the cjeu’s ruling in Martínez Sala33 
captured the imagination of lawyers by asserting that a mobile EU citizen34 
“lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State, can rely on [Art. 18 
tfeu] in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of [Union] 
law”.35 Furthermore, a situation would fall within the scope ratione materiae 
of Union law if the “Member State delays or refuses to grant to that claimant a 
benefit [covered by Regulations 1408/ 7136 and 1612/ 6837] that is provided to all 
 32 Elements of the following sections build on Muir, E.  (2018). EU Equality Law: The First 
Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU, cit., Chapter iii.B.2.c.ii.
 33 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, cit.
 34 Ibid., para. 61.
 35 Ibid., para. 63.
 36 Regulation (eec) 1408/ 71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social secu-
rity schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 
149, 5.7.1971, p. 2– 50.
 37 Regulation (eec) 1612/ 68 of 15 October 1968 of the Council on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2– 12. Please note that this regula-
tion has now been repealed by Regulation (EU) No 492/ 2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, 
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persons lawfully resident in the territory of that State on the ground that the 
claimant is not in possession of a document which nationals of that same State 
are not required to have and the issue of which may be delayed or refused by 
the authorities of that State”.38
The cjeu thereby decoupled the personal scope of the EU prohibition of 
nationality discrimination from specific requirements established by EU leg-
islative instruments regulating its material scope.39 It was now enough to be 
an EU citizen lawfully residing in another Member State under the law of that 
Member State40 to benefit from the prohibition of nationality discrimination 
(Art. 18, para. 1, tfeu), in order to obtain a benefit covered by specific EU legis-
lation. This was remarkable progress for non- economically active and mobile 
EU citizens. Before that, their equal treatment rights did not have constitu-
tional status in EU law and only legislative instruments setting specific ratione 
personae requirements applied to them before they could be granted a limited 
set of rights.41 This framed the debate on EU mobile and non- economically 
active citizens’ equal treatment rights in constitutional terms, despite the pro-
vision in the treaty articles on EU citizenship (Arts 20, para. 2, and 21, para. 1, 
tfeu) and the general prohibition of nationality discrimination (Art. 18, para. 
1, tfeu) referring to the limits of the Treaty and to its scope of application as 
possibly defined in legislation.
ii.2 The Adoption of New Legislation: Fresh Political Guidance
In interpreting the principle of equal treatment for mobile EU citizens in 
such an innovative way, the cjeu limited the possibility for the EU legislature 
to influence the personal scope of the said principle. In 2004, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2004/ 38.42 According to this 
Directive and building on earlier legislative guidance, a pre- condition for a 
non- economically active person to have lawful residence for more than three 
months in another Member State under EU law is to have “sufficient resources 
for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social 
 38 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, cit., para. 63.
 39 Ibid., paras 45 and 56– 62. See further O’Leary, S.  (1999). Putting Flesh on the Bones of 
European Union Citizenship. European Law Review 24 (1), pp. 68– 79, 77– 78.
 40 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, cit., para. 47.
 41 See Directive 90/ 366/ EEC of the Council of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
students, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 30– 31; Directive 90/ 365/ EEC of the Council of 28 June 1990 
on the right of residence for employees and self- employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 28– 29 and Directive 90/ 364/ EEC of the Council 
of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 26– 27.













assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence 
and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State”.43
Lawful residents would then enjoy equal treatment on the ground of na-
tionality; this was repeated in Art. 24, para. 1, of the Directive subject to certain 
conditions, including an exception to the effect that: “the host Member State 
shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first 
three months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period provided 
for in Article 14(4)(b) [establishing specific conditions for work seekers] to 
persons other than workers, self- employed persons, persons who retain such 
status and members of their families”.44 In other words, the Member States’ 
concern to protect their social assistance systems against overburdening influ-
enced both the conditions to obtain lawful residence in another Member State 
under EU law and equal treatment rights.
Although the Directive was only to apply in the Member States from 2006, 
the provisions adopted could have prompted the Court to give greater em-
phasis to the Union legislature’s attempt to circumscribe the conditions un-
der which free movement rights could be exercised. Nevertheless, the cjeu 
continued to reason directly on the basis of Treaty provisions on issues con-
cerned with equal treatment rights of mobile and non- economically active EU 
citizens.45 In doing so it largely disregarded the concern expressed by political 
institutions to make non- economically active migrants’ residence – and there-
fore equal treatment rights under EU law – conditional upon having a “suffi-
cient” level of resources.46
ii.3 Legislation Acting as a Gateway to EU Citizenship Rights
A move away from the constitutional approach described in the past section 
and towards deconstitutionalisation, or greater emphasis being placed on 
 43 Art. 7, para. 1, let. b, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
 44 Art. 24, para. 2, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
 45 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 7 September 2004, case C- 456/ 02, Trojani, para. 39 and 
Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C- 209/ 03, Bidar, para. 46. The position of 
the cjeu can usefully be contrasted to that of the Advocate General in that case: Opinion 
of AG Geelhoed delivered on 19 February 2004, case C- 456/ 02, Trojani. See further Van der 
Mei, A.P. (2005). Union Citizenship and the ‘De- Nationalisation’ of the Territorial Welfare 
State, Comments on Trojani (Case- 456/ 02 of 7 September 2004) and Bidar (Case C- 209/ 
03 of 15 March 2005). European Journal of Migration and Law 7 (2), pp. 203– 211, 209.
 46 Note that, and I am grateful to Gillian More for stressing this, there were also elements in 
the Directive intended to balance this approach such as Art. 14, para. 3, Directive 2004/ 38 
according to which: ‘An expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a 
Union citizen’s or his or her family member’s recourse to the social assistance system of 
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secondary legislation, was initiated by the Brey case of 2013.47 This redirection 
was confirmed in three subsequent cases.48 The characteristics of this new 
case law can be summarised as follows. To start with, the cjeu now declines to 
reason on the basis of treaty provisions on citizenship and nationality discrim-
ination; it focuses instead almost exclusively on guidance provided in second-
ary legislation. Although this is visible in all four cases,49 it is particularly clear 
in Dano where the cjeu had been specifically asked to reason on the basis of 
EU constitutional law but refused to do so. The cjeu indeed raised the fact that 
the Charter could only be applied within the scope of Union law. As the situ-
ation was not covered by EU secondary legislation, this condition was not ful-
filled in the case at hand.50 In other words, the cjeu refused to look at whether 
the treaty provisions on EU citizenship and nationality discrimination could 
bring the matter within the scope of EU law despite the limitations enshrined 
in secondary legislation. The cjeu further explained elsewhere in the ruling 
that protection of non- economically active mobile citizens against national-
ity discrimination when this occurred outside the scope of Directive 2004/ 38 
would run counter to one of the Directive’s objectives: to prevent such citizens 
from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the 
host Member State.51 In other words, the cjeu did a methodological U- turn 
on its earlier case law, whereby such equal treatment rights were granted to 
all with direct reference to the treaty provisions on nationality discrimination 
and EU citizenship.
Secondly, from the EU secondary law sources, the cjeu places particular 
emphasis on Directive 2004/ 38 which lays down – inter alia – the conditions 
governing the exercise of the right of free movement and residence within the 
territory of the Member States by EU citizens.52 Not only does this emphasis 
result from the move away from treaty provisions, but it can also be read as a 
 47 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 September 2013, case C- 140/ 12, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt 
v Peter Brey.
 48 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 November 2014, case C- 333/ 13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin 
Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig; Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2015, case C- 67/ 14, 
Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others; Court of Justice, judgment of 25 
February 2016, case C- 299/ 14, Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna 
García- Nieto and Others.
 49 See for instance: Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, cit., paras 46– 47 and 53– 56; 
Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, cit., para. 50; Vestische Arbeit 
Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García- Nieto and Others, cit., para. 39.
 50 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., para. 90.
 51 Ibid., para. 74, see also paras 60– 62.














clarification of certain aspects of the relationship between this Directive and 
Regulation 883/ 2004 on the coordination of social security systems.53 Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 is given precedence when it comes to defining EU citizens’ rights 
of residence in another Member State.54 As a consequence, the Directive acts 
as a gateway to EU equal treatment law on the grounds of nationality for non- 
economic actors55 which, in the view of the cjeu, is indeed in line with one of 
the central objectives of the said Directive.56
Thirdly, in seeking guidance from Directive 2004/ 38, the cjeu sticks as 
closely as possible to the spirit, wording and gradual system established by 
it when possible.57 When no such specific scheme exists, the cjeu provides 
guidance to the competent national authorities on how to ensure compliance 
with the general requirements of the Directive after closely examining its over-
all internal dynamics.58 For instance, the Directive establishes that residence 
for more than three months59 and less than five years for non- economically 
active persons who do not have a more specific and beneficial status60 is de-
pendent inter alia upon having “sufficient resources for themselves and their 
family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the 
host Member State”.61 In Brey, the cjeu indicated that this must be understood 
as requiring “an overall assessment of the specific burden which [a national 
of another Member State requesting a particular social assistance benefit62] 
would place on the national social assistance system as a whole, by reference 
to the personal circumstances characterising the individual situation of the 
 53 Regulation (EC) 883/ 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1– 123.
 54 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, cit., paras 50 and 53– 54.
 55 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., para. 83; see also: Court of Justice, 
judgment of 14 June 2016, case C- 308/ 14, European Commission v United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, para. 68. For critical comments on that approach 
see Verschueren, H.  (2015). Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: a Narrow or Broad 
Interpretation of the Possibilities Offered by Dano. Common Market Law Review 52 (2), 
pp. 363– 390, 377 et seq.
 56 Art. 1, let. a), of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
 57 See Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 11 January 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman.
 58 E.g. Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., paras 69– 73 and 77.
 59 Note that in Brey the applicant for social benefits desired to reside for more than three 
months, see Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, cit., para. 53.
 60 See the other recitals of Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, cit. The specific situation of those 
having involuntarily lost employment or workseekers is discussed further below.
 61 Art. 7, para. 1, let. b), of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
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person concerned”.63 This amounts to requiring a case- by- case evaluation 
from the perspective of: (i) the national social assistance system; as well as, (ii) 
the specific situation of the individual, and keeping in mind, (iii) the specific 
nature of the benefits requested by the applicant. This case law seems to hold 
true, although the cjeu applied this test fairly strictly in the Dano case.64
In contrast, when more detailed guidance is provided in the form of a 
‘gradual system’ the cjeu actually relies on the legislature’s choices.65 In Ali-
manovic, the cjeu referred to and stuck to the gradual system established by 
the Directive: namely the retention of the status of ‘worker’ and the relevant 
conditions to retain the right to reside and be given access to social assistance. 
That included the duration of the exercise of any economic activity.66 The 
cjeu stressed that the advantage of such a scheme is to be unambiguous. As 
it is enshrined in legislation, it guarantees a significant level of legal certain-
ty and transparency; and as it is gradual, it also complies with the principle 
of proportionality.67 The cjeu rejected further attempts to call into question 
the balance performed by the EU legislature between individuals’ right to free 
movement, and the burden that mobile EU citizens who have lost their em-
ployment status may constitute on the national system of social assistance.68
The same approach was adopted in García- Nieto in relation to jobseekers; 
the Court re- asserted that the Directive provides a set of detailed and gradual 
rights.69 The cjeu may thus be ready to accept a rather inflexible system of al-
location of rights if it is progressive and set in a way that ensures legal certainty 
and transparency.70 In that sense, the cjeu defers to political guidance and 
departs from its constitutional case law which provided more individualised 
solutions, but which were also less predictable.71
 63 E.g. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, cit., para. 64, see also the detailed analysis 
of the interplay between different provisions of the Directive at paras 65– 72 and 77.
 64 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., paras 81 and 83. Here the cjeu 
entitled a Member State to refuse to grant social benefits when the applicant exercise 
their right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain social assistance: Elisabeta 
Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., paras 76 and 78.
 65 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others, cit., paras 59– 60. See also Court 
of Justice, judgment of 11 April 2019, case C- 483/ 17 Neculai Tarola v Minister for Social 
Protection, paras. 43 and 45– 57.
 66 Ibid., para. 60.
 67 Ibid., para. 61.
 68 Ibid., paras 60 and 62.
 69 Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García- Nieto and Others, cit., 
paras 47– 48.
 70 See Opinion of AG Wathelet, Coman, cit., para. 62.
 71 Providing interesting analyses proposing to reconcile the old and new lines of 





















Some have lamented that this novel approach constitutes a step backwards 
when compared to the early cases in which the cjeu developed a protective 
approach to equal treatment for EU citizens directly grounded in primary 
law.72 Critics point out that the post- Brey case law may have been triggered 
by fears of social tourism and Eurosceptic debates in several Member States.73 
The point made here is more modest. This line of cases sheds light on the abil-
ity of the cjeu to reframe the interplay between primary and secondary law as 
well as between the judicial and political guidance. The post- Brey case law on 
access to social benefits provides a remarkable example of deconstitutionali-
sation following a period of intense constitutionalisation.
It may be added that the desire expressed in the UK Settlement from 2016 to 
“settle, in conformity with the treaties, certain issues raised by the United King-
dom in its letter of 10 November 2015”,74 sat comfortably with the post- Brey 
case law and in particular with the rulings in Dano (11 November 2014) and Ali-
manovic (15 September 2015). These cases indeed made it possible to accom-
modate the UK demands within the existing state of EU law and without there 
even being need for legislative reform. The UK Settlement recalled the word-
ing of Art. 21 tfeu referring to the limitations and conditions laid down, inter 
alia, in legislation. As allowed by the deconstitutionalisation process resulting 
from the aforementioned rulings, the right of non- economically active persons 
grounded in EU secondary law is dependent, among other things, on having 
sufficient resources for themselves and their family member. Member States 
can therefore refuse to grant social benefits to persons who exercise their right 
of movement solely in order to obtain social assistance if they do not have a 
right to residence under EU law.75
Self- Sufficiency. College of Europe Research Papers in Law, no. 2/ 2016 and Davies, G. (2018). 
Has the cjeu Changed or Have the Cases? The Deservingness of Litigants as an Element 
in cjeu of Justice Adjudication. Journal of European Public Policy 25 (10), pp. 1442– 1460.
 72 E.g. Shuibhne, N. N. (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape Of 
Union Citizenship. Common Market Law Review 52 (4), p. 889.
 73 E.g. Peers, S. (2014). Benefit Tourism by EU citizens: the CJEU Just Says No. EU Law Analysis, 
available at eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/ 2014/ 11/ benefit- tourism- by- eu- citizens- cjeu.html.
 74 Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, in 
Annex 1 of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 February 2016.
 75 Exploring how this could impact a future agreement with the UK: Barnard, C., and Butlin, 
S.F. (2018). Fair movement of people: equal treatment? (Part Two). EU Law Analysis, avail-
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iii Constitutionalising the Perimeters of EU Citizenship Law: from 
Metock to Lounes, via the UK Settlement
The relationship between treaty provisions, Directive 2004/ 38, related case 
law and the dialogue initiated by the UK Settlement took a different shape in 
relation to the rights of third- country national family members of mobile EU 
citizens.
iii.1 EU Legislation and the Rights Attached to EU Citizenship: from Singh 
to Akrich
This second part of our story starts with the Surinder Singh ruling by the cjeu 
in 1992. The cjeu asserted that a national of a Member State might be de-
terred from leaving his country of origin if, on returning, the conditions of his 
entry and residence in his home State would constitute obstacles to his right 
of movement and establishment as provided in Arts 48 and 52 eect at the 
time.76 This would be particularly so if children and spouses – nationals of a 
third country – were not permitted to enter and reside in the State of origin 
under conditions at least equivalent to those granted in the host country under 
secondary legislation available at the time.77
In Surinder Singh as well as in a number of subsequent cases,78 EU free 
movement rules were relied upon to enhance the (albeit derived) rights of 
third- country national family members. The main feature of these cases was 
the cjeu’s heavy reliance on the EU legislature’s attachment to protecting 
the family life of mobile EU citizens.79 One question however was left unan-
swered: What if the third- country national family member has not yet been 
admitted, or is within the territory of the European Union without leave to 
remain before seeking to obtain a right to enter and stay as a family member 
of a mobile EU citizen?80
The answer came, in a less protective way than third- country national fam-
ily members of a mobile EU citizen might have hoped for, in the Akrich ruling 
 76 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 370/ 90, Surinder Singh, paras 19 and 23. 
Note that the same right can now be derived from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 456/ 12, O. and B., paras 48– 49.
 77 Surinder Singh, cit., paras 20– 21.
 78 For a more exhaustive overview see Cambien, N.  (2011). Citizenship of the Union as a 
Cornerstone of European Integration: A Study of its Impact on Policies and Competences of 
the Member States, Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Law, KU Leuven, p. 207 et seq.
 79 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2002, case C- 459/ 99, MRAX, para. 53; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 14 April 2005, case C- 157/ 03, Commission v Spain, para. 26.














from 2003. Here, prior lawful residence by the third- country national family 
member of an EU citizen in the EU state of origin was deemed to constitute a 
prerequisite for reliance on Art. 10 of Regulation 1612/ 68 on freedom of move-
ment for workers, for the purpose of being able to claim residence rights against 
the state of origin.81 The regulation therefore was used to limit the rights of EU 
citizens to move with their third- country national family members. In the ab-
sence of prior lawful residence in the host state, the third- country national had 
no right under Regulation 1612/ 68 in the host state and could therefore claim 
no right “by analogy” under EU law in the state of origin.82 This approach was 
supported with reference to “the structure of Community provisions seeking 
to secure the freedom of movement for workers within the Community”.83
iii.2 Ambiguities on the Sources of Rights: the Adoption of a New 
Legislative Framework and Revirement in Metock
As is well known, the Akrich ruling was openly overruled in Metock.84 In the 
latter ruling, the cjeu made clear that the right of an EU citizen to move 
within the EU with a third- country national family member cannot depend 
on the prior lawful residence of such a family member in the EU.85 The cjeu 
explained its decision to reconsider the Akrich ruling86 with reference to po-
litical guidance taken from the text of the (then) new Citizenship Directive:87 
the Directive does not distinguish between the status of various family mem-
bers and entry to the territory of the host state must be possible even in the 
absence of a residence card. Furthermore, the Directive is understood as a tool 
that strengthens the right of free movement and residence of Union Citizens.88 
This heavy emphasis on political guidance could have indicated that the rights 
of EU citizens to move to and reside freely in another Member State with their 
third- country national spouse – with no need for prior lawful residence – are 
enshrined in the Directive.89
Yet, the ruling in Metock is ambiguous on that point. On the one hand, the 
cjeu explains that the legislature has competence to regulate the conditions 
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 September 2003, case C- 109/ 01, Akrich, para. 50.
 82 Ibid., para. 54.
 83 Ibid., para. 51.
 84 Metock, cit., para. 58.
 85 Ibid.
 86 See for instance, Metock, cit., paras 55– 57 on earlier case law of the cjeu as well as para 69 
on the comparison with family reunification for third country nationals.
 87 Ibid., paras 50– 54.
 88 Ibid., para. 59.
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for entry and residence of family members of EU citizens.90 On the other hand, 
in paragraph 62 (to which we will come back below), the cjeu stresses that “if 
Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Mem-
ber State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would 
be seriously obstructed” (emphasis added).91 As a consequence, although the 
cjeu largely reasons on the basis of Directive 2004/ 38 throughout the ruling, 
the reference to treaty protection of the right to free movement suggests a con-
stitutional anchorage of the possibility for EU citizens to move within the EU 
with third- country national family members irrespective of their prior lawful 
residence. The content of Directive 2004/ 38 on that point could thereby be 
subsumed in EU primary law. Importantly, and unlike in certain earlier cas-
es,92 there is no statement from the cjeu in that ruling according to which 
such constitutional protection should be justified with reference to the funda-
mental right to family life. In fact, the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights focusing on the fundamental right to family life was in that sense 
less generous than that of the cjeu focusing on freedom of movement. The 
European Court of Human Rights indeed limited interferences into domestic 
migration policy on behalf of family life to exceptional family circumstances; 
it built on the assumption that family life may be possible in other States than 
the one refusing entry or residence.93
The important treaty provision referred to in Metock is Art. 21 tfeu as well 
as more specific treaty provisions for mobile economic actors.94 Before delving 
further into the role of Art. 21 tfeu in the subsequent UK Settlement, it shall 
be made clear that the cjeu has consistently held that EU citizens may not rely 
on Directive 2004/ 38 against their state of nationality – as will be the case in 
several cases discussed below – as the Directive applies to “Union citizens who 
move and reside in a Member State other than that of which they are nation-
als”.95 However, Art. 21 tfeu protects the rights of mobile EU citizens to return 
to their country of origin.96 The cjeu traditionally applies the content of EU 
 90 Metock, cit., para. 61.
 91 Ibid., para. 62.
 92 I am most grateful to Jonathan Tomkin for pointing that out; eg. Baumbast, cit., para 72 
and see further: Guild, E., Peers, S. and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive: A 
Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.133.
 93 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 August 2001, no.  54273/ 00, Boultif 
v. Switzerland, paras 52– 55. See also Opinion of AG Geelhoed, Akrich, cit., para. 147. See 
further: Cambien, N. (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p. 222.
 94 Metock, cit., para. 61.
 95 Art. 3, para. 1, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
















legislation on free movement “by analogy” to rule on the rights of returning 
EU citizens under Art. 21 tfeu.97 Nevertheless, as a consequence of the lack 
of clarity of the reversal of case law in Metock, it is not clear whether the enti-
tlement of EU citizens to move freely with their third- country national family 
member with no prior lawful residence is derived from the content of Directive 
2004/ 38 applied directly (in case of movement to a host Member State), or by 
analogy (in case of movement back to the Member State of nationality), or 
from Art. 21 tfeu per se.
iii.3 Shifting to Art. 21, Para. 1, tfeu: from the UK Settlement to Lounes
The UK Settlement, as quoted in the Introduction, ignored (it may be pre-
sumed intentionally) the possible constitutional anchorage of the rights of 
third- country national family members. It built on the assumption that the 
solution in Metock was a matter of EU secondary law only. The UK Settlement 
proposed to address the challenge to EU law on that point through legisla-
tive intervention. The UK Settlement indeed included a declaration by which 
the European Commission intended to adopt a proposal to “complement” 
Directive 2004/ 38.98 The proposal to have been supported by the Member 
States within the Council would have been intended to undo the Metock rul-
ing. Indeed, a new instrument would be proposed in order to “exclude, from 
the scope of free movement rights, third country nationals who had no prior 
lawful residence in a Member State before marrying a Union citizen, or who 
marry a Union citizen only after the Union citizen has established residence 
in the host Member State”.99 The UK Settlement thereby built on the assump-
tion that reversing Metock could be achieved through legislative intervention. 
It was hoped that the European Parliament, as a co- legislator, would support 
this initiative.
Yet, in the Lounes case from 2017,100 the cjeu adopted a different reading 
of its ruling in Metock. Ms Ormazabal, a dual national from Spain and the UK, 
sought to derive a right of residence in the UK for her husband from her EU cit-
izenship status. The latter, Mr Lounes, was not lawfully residing in that country 
 97 See also early cases such as Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 291/ 
05, Eind, paras 39– 45.
 98 This was perhaps deemed as less difficult than re- opening a full negotiation of Directive 
2004/ 38 in the near future: see for instance the more distant proposal made “on the occa-
sion of a future revision of Directive 2004/ 38” in relation to the notions of public policy 
and public security (Annex 7, of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 February 2016).
 99 Annex 7 of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 February 2016.
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at the time of their marriage.101 Ms Ormazabal, in the view of the cjeu, could 
not rely on Directive 2004/ 38. Although she had moved from Spain to the UK 
in her capacity as a Spanish national, she had subsequently acquired British 
citizenship before marrying Mr Lounes. The UK had thereby become her coun-
try of nationality102 and she had an unconditional right of residence in the UK 
under international law.103
Although she could not rely on EU secondary law against her country of 
nationality, the cjeu found that Ms Ormazabal could rely on Art. 21, para. 1, 
tfeu. While in the past, similar findings were based on the risk of hindering 
the freedom of movement of EU citizens,104 the cjeu here reasoned that “[a] 
national of one Member State who has moved to and resides in another Mem-
ber State cannot be denied that right merely because he subsequently acquires 
the nationality of the second Member State in addition to his nationality of ori-
gin, otherwise the effectiveness of Article 21(1) tfeu would be undermined”.105 
The cjeu then went on to substantiate this finding.106
Leaving aside aspects of the rulings related to the specific case of mobile EU 
citizens acquiring the nationality of the host state and possibly related to the 
Draft Withdrawal Agreement107 (as discussed elsewhere by Davies),108 what 
is of particular interest in this chapter is the anchorage of Ms Ormazabal’s 
rights in Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu. These rights of EU citizens include “the right to 
lead a normal family life, together with their family members”.109 To support 
that finding, the cjeu reasoned by analogy to paragraph 62 of the ruling in 
Metock.110 The cjeu insisted that for the rights conferred by Art. 21, para. 1, 
tfeu to be effective, citizens in a situation such as Ms Ormazabal must con-
tinue to enjoy the right to “build a family life with their third- country- national 
 101 Ibid., para. 16.
 102 See supra, Eind, cit.
 103 Lounes, cit., paras 37 and 41.
 104 As acknowledged by the cjeu in Lounes, cit., para. 48. See also supra, Surinder Singh, cit.
 105 Lounes, cit., para. 53.
 106 Ibid, paras 54– 59.
 107 Art. 9, of European Commission (2018). Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community, TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to EU27.
 108 For an analysis of other aspects of the ruling in the context of Brexit see Davies, G. (2018). 
Lounes, Naturalisation and Brexit. European Law Blog, available at europeanlawblog.
eu/ 2018/ 03/ 05/ lounes- naturalisation- and- brexit/ . That discussion relates to mobile EU 
nationals having acquired the nationality of the host state, that aspect of the ruling is 
therefore beyond the scope of the current paper.
 109 Lounes, cit., para. 52.





















spouse, by means of the grant of a derived right of residence to that spouse” 
under that provision.111 Although there is no explicit reference to the lack of 
prior lawful residence, the ruling in Lounes can be read as bringing an end to 
the ambiguity created by paragraph 62 in Metock.
iii.4 Interim Conclusion: Constitutional Protection?
The rights of EU citizens to be with their family members from a third coun-
try in the host state, irrespective of the absence of prior lawful residence – as 
the facts of both Metock and Lounes indicate – would thereby be anchored in 
Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu. This approach implies that disagreement on the scope 
of free movement rights for EU citizens with third- country nationals with no 
prior lawful residence in a Member State cannot be addressed without treaty 
reform, contrary to the underlying logic of the proposal in the UK Settlement.
However, the ruling in Lounes replaces one ambiguity with another. Although 
that ruling is mostly structured around Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, the cjeu con-
cludes its reasoning in paragraph 61 by stating that the conditions for granting 
a derived right of residence to the third- country national spouse should not be 
stricter than those provided in Directive 2004/ 38, and that the Directive should 
be applied “by analogy”.112 This suggests that although the rights of EU citizens 
such as Ms Ormazabal are anchored in Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, the cjeu puts 
flesh on the bones of EU primary law with the political guidance enshrined 
in EU legislation. This raises the following questions: Would a modification of 
EU legislation (or other legal instrument of the EU ranking beyond primary 
law) favourable to domestic migration policies lead to a change of case law in a 
case such as Metock or Lounes? Or would the legislation be found to breach the 
constitutional right of EU citizens to move with their family members, even in 
the absence of prior lawful residence in a Member State?
iv Soul Searching: Acknowledging the Political Dimension of EU 
Citizenship Law and Locating the Debate at Legislative Level
The analysis of the first set of rights  – access to social benefits for non- 
economically active persons – showed how the cjeu reframed its initial ap-
proach grounded in EU constitutional provisions in order to discuss such rights 
in the context of Directive 2004/ 38. To the contrary, the analysis of the second 
 111 Ibid., para. 60.







Primary and Secondary Rights in Times of Brexit 191
set of rights – of third- country national family members of an EU citizen with 
no prior lawful residence – has shown that this set of rights is seemingly being 
elevated to EU primary law. The practical outcome of these divergent process-
es is usefully illustrated with reference to the UK Settlement: while controver-
sies to do with the first set of rights could be addressed with reference to the 
legislation, as things currently stand, controversies related to the second set of 
rights could presumably not be addressed through legislative change. How can 
we reconcile or coherently articulate these two approaches?
iv.1 Art. 21, Para. 1, tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38: the Directive as a 
Gateway to EU Primary Rights?
As noted in Section ii, the recent case law of the cjeu on access to social ben-
efits for non- economically active persons espouses the structure of Directive 
2004/ 38 and acknowledges that the Directive acts as a gateway to equal treat-
ment rights for EU citizens in the host State. In contrast, Section iii pointed 
at the possibility that the rights derived by third- country nationals with no 
prior residence from EU citizens are being anchored directly in Art. 21, para. 
1, tfeu – although the wording of paragraph 61 of the ruling in Lounes leaves 
open the possibility of articulating the relationship between Directive 2004/ 
38 and the primary right differently. It is submitted that, as far as the rights of 
EU citizens to move with third- country national family members with no pri-
or lawful residence are concerned, Directive 2004/ 38 should remain the main 
point of reference to define the scope of the rights of EU citizens – be it “by 
analogy”.113
This would allow discontent to be addressed through political dialogue as 
was proposed by the UK Settlement. This would also allow the approach of 
the cjeu in relation to third- country national family members to be brought 
closer to that adopted in the cases on social benefits examined above, while 
keeping in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to the 
fundamental right to family life.114 This would finally allow for a better align-
ment of the related case law with the general approach of the cjeu as it has 
been shaping up over the past few years in other areas of EU citizenship law 
related to Art. 21 tfeu.
 113 See for instance Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v Rozanne Banger, paras 29 et seq. Exploring the limits of rea-
soning by analogy, where requested by the wording of Directive 2004/ 38 itself, see Court 
of Justice, judgment of 10 September 2019, case C- 94/ 18, Nalini Chenchooliah v Minister for 
Justice and Equality, paras 71– 88.









The cjeu is indeed increasingly consistently115 using Directive 2004/ 38, and 
its Art. 7 in particular, as a gateway to access EU citizenship rights when the 
two layers of norms can inform each other. (Understandably, this has not been 
done in the context of rights anchored directly in treaty provisions and where 
the provisions of EU legislation were irrelevant).116 Useful recent examples are 
the three Grand Chamber rulings in O. and B., Marín and Chavez- Vilchez.117 In 
O. and B., the cjeu investigated the ability of EU citizens to derive rights for 
third- country national family members in their country of origin from the ex-
ercise of the freedom of movement. Although such rights would be anchored 
in Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu – as the Directive cannot be relied upon against the 
state of origin – the cjeu firmly asserted that the provisions of Directive 2004/ 
38 would act as a gateway to Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu.118 Directive 2004/ 38 was 
being applied by analogy119 but with a detailed analysis of its provisions.120 
Indeed, for rights to be derived from the treaty, it is necessary that “residence 
of the Union Citizen in the host Member State has been sufficiently genuine 
so as to enable that citizen to create or strengthen family life in that Member 
State”.121 For that purpose, “[r] esidence in the host Member State pursuant to 
and in conformity with the conditions set out in Art. 7(1) of that directive is, in 
principle, evidence of settling there and therefore of the Union citizen’s genu-
ine residence in the host Member State, and goes hand in hand with creating 
and strengthening family life in that Member State”.122 In contrast, residence 
 115 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 19 October 2004, case C- 200/ 02, Zhu and Chen, paras 
27– 28 and 46; Eind, cit., paras 39– 40; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 October 2013, case 
C- 86/ 12, Alokpa, paras 29– 30.
 116 See for instance Art. 20 tfeu and the case law developed on the basis of the ruling in 
Zambrano, cit. In such cases though, there is very limited space for dialogue – to which 
this contribution is devoted – between European key players on the content of the rights. 
There are also naturally cases in which EU citizenship law is not applicable; e.g. Court of 
Justice, judgment of 8 November 2012, case C- 40/ 11, Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm, paras 73 et 
seq. or judgment of 25 July 2018, case C- 679/ 16, A. It is acknowledged that there also exist 
situations where Art. 21, para. 1 tfeu cannot be used in conjunction with EU legislation. 
For recent examples see Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 2018, case C- 191/ 16, Pisciotti 
and judgment of 13 November 2018, case C- 247/ 17, Denis Raugevicius.
 117 See also for instance the ruling by the Court of Justice, judgment of 30 June 2016, case C- 
115/ 15, NA, para. 78.
 118 See also Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers: O 
and B, and S and G. Common Market Law Review 52 (3), pp.753– 777, 767 and 769.
 119 O. and B., cit., para. 50.
 120 See also: Court of Justice, judgment of 27 June 2018, case C- 230/ 17, Erdem Deha Altiner and 
Isabel Hanna Ravn v Udlaendingestyrelsen, paras 27 et seq.
 121 O. and B., cit., para. 51.
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under Art. 6, para. 1, would not be enough.123 The cjeu insists that the condi-
tions in Art. 7, paras 1 and 2, of Directive 2004/ 38 must be met for the effective-
ness of the right of the EU citizen, under Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu, to return with a 
family member who is a third- country national to be protected.124 This applies 
a fortiori for residence pursuant to Art. 16, paras 1 and 2, of Directive 2004/ 38.125
This approach of using Directive 2004/ 38 as a gateway to Art. 21, para. 1, 
tfeu is further exemplified by the cjeu’s efforts to rephrase preliminary ques-
tions raised by domestic courts so as to articulate its reasoning with reference 
to both Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38. The case in Marín con-
cerned the residence rights in Spain of a third- country national who was pri-
mary carer of two children, one with Spanish nationality, the other with Polish 
nationality. Although the domestic court asked the cjeu for guidance on Art. 
20 tfeu,126 the cjeu rephrased the question so as to be able to start the anal-
ysis with an examination of Art. 21 tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38.127 The Polish 
nationality of the daughter living in Spain brought her within the personal 
scope of Directive 2004/ 38.128 The cjeu derived from this observation that the 
daughter was therefore entitled to “rely on Article 21(1) tfeu and the measures 
adopted to give it effect”129 and, therefore, that her right to reside in Spain was 
in principle conferred by Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38.130 Hav-
ing acknowledged that the two provisions had to be read in conjunction, the 
cjeu went on to check if the conditions contained in the Directive were met 
with a particular focus on whether the daughter fulfilled the conditions un-
der Art. 7, para. 1, let. b), of the Directive.131 That provision was therefore used 
as a gateway to EU citizenship rights.132 The cjeu further relied on Directive 
 123 Ibid., paras 52 and 59. The cjeu also secures the role of Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 as an 
entry point by rejecting arguments based on the recognition of a residence card given by 
the host state to the third country national in the absence of a right derived from the EU 
citizen (para. 60). Furthermore, the third- country national must have been a family mem-
ber in the host state before being able to indirectly derive rights from the EU citizenship 
through Art. 21, para. 1 tfeu and using Directive 2004/ 38 by analogy (para. 63).
 124 O. and B., cit., para. 54.
 125 Ibid., para. 55.
 126 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 165/ 14, Marín, para. 23.
 127 Ibid., paras 34– 35.
 128 Ibid., para. 41.
 129 Ibid., para. 43.
 130 Ibid., para. 44.
 131 Ibid., para. 46.
 132 This is particularly clear at: Marín, cit., para. 52. See also: Court of Justice, judgment of 2 
October 2019, case C- 93/ 18, Ermira Bajratari v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
paras 26, 28– 29 although Article 21 tfeu is also mentioned at paras 42 and 47 to shed light 






















2004/ 38 to examine the derived rights of the third- country national family 
member.133
The Chavez- Vilchez judgment also provides an illustration of the Grand 
Chamber of the cjeu’s efforts to articulate the relationship between Art. 21, 
para. 1, tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38 in a similar way. The case arose from eight 
disputes surrounding the residence rights of third- country nationals who were 
primary carers of children in the latter’s country of nationality. Once again, 
although the domestic court asked for guidance on Art. 20 tfeu, the cjeu 
brought Art. 21 tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38 as a preliminary point for analy-
sis for the one child who had exercised his free movement right.134 The child 
had then returned to the country of nationality and Directive 2004/ 38 could 
not therefore apply as such; instead Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu would apply and the 
content of the Directive would be applied by analogy.135 The cjeu then em-
phasised that the national court would therefore have to check if the condi-
tions listed under Arts 5 to 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 were fulfilled before the child 
could claim derived rights from Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu and Directive 2004/ 38 for 
her third- country national carer. In other words, once again, the provisions of 
Directive 2004/ 38 were used as a gateway to EU citizenship rights.136
These cases illustrate not only that Art. 21 tfeu shall be given priority over 
Art. 20 tfeu, but also that Directive 2004/ 38 acts as an entry point to primary 
EU citizenship rights, even when the Directive is only applied by analogy, as in 
O. and B. and Chavez- Vilchez regarding returning EU citizens. This is precisely 
what the design of the treaty provisions call for by referring to the limitations 
and conditions defined in instruments adopted thereupon. This approach does 
not neglect the requirement for legislation to comply with primary law and 
fundamental rights such as the fundamental right to family life, this remains a 
pre- condition for the validity of EU secondary law. Nor does this approach pre-
vent direct reliance on Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu.137 It is more modestly argued that 
when legislation co- exists with primary rights, reliance on guidance enshrined 
in legislative instruments makes it possible to more easily address accusations 
 133 Marín, cit., paras 54, 57, 62 and 67. It may be noted that the reasoning on limitations to EU 
citizenships rights granted by Art. 20 tfeu in that case also seems to be strongly inspired 
from the content of Directive 2004/ 38 although the Directive is not explicitly mentioned. 
See also Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 304/ 14, CS, para. 36 et seq. 
The author is grateful to Stephen Coutts for pointing that out.
 134 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 133/ 15, Chavez- Vilchez, paras 49– 50.
 135 Ibid., paras 54– 55.
 136 This is particularly clear at: Marín, cit., para. 56.
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of over- constitutionalisation of EU law and empowers actors to address chal-
lenges through political dialogue.
It is therefore suggested that, following the trend initiated by the post- Brey 
case law in relation to social benefits, the relationship between Art. 21 tfeu 
and Directive 2004/ 38 in the context of claims in favour of third- country na-
tional residents with no prior lawful residence could be clarified by placing 
stronger emphasis on legislative guidance. The constitutional status of EU cit-
izenship would thereby be present and recognised with reference to Art. 21, 
para. 1, tfeu, but the precise scope of the rights at hand would rely on stronger 
political guidance that could be modified in case of disagreement subject to 
compliance with higher norms such as the fundamental right to family life as 
understood by the European Court of Human Rights.
It is in light of this last caveat on fundamental rights’ compliance that the 
recent ruling in Coman138 may be understood and reconciled with the ap-
proach proposed in this chapter. The Grand Chamber of the cjeu was asked 
several questions on Directive 2004/ 38, as well as the Charter.139 The national 
court asked for guidance on the possibility of a mobile EU citizen returning to 
his home country with a third- country national whose status as a family mem-
ber was unclear. Indeed, the same- sex couple had lawfully married in Belgium 
but same- sex marriage is not recognised by the Member State of origin of the 
EU citizen where the couple now wants to return. Once again, the cjeu re-
framed the dispute and focused on Art. 21 tfeu as well as Directive 2004/ 
38 applied by analogy to the situation of a returning EU citizen.140 The cjeu 
initially examines the term of “spouse” enshrined in Directive 2004/ 38 to con-
clude that national law cannot exclude same- sex couples lawfully married in 
another Member State “for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of resi-
dence to a third- country national”.141 While this first part of the ruling answers 
the call for emphasis on legislative instruments expressed above,142 the cjeu 
then moves on to examining the domestic measure restricting the EU citizen’s 
mobility in light of Art. 21 tfeu.143 This shift towards a constitutional level 
of protection of the right is surprising in light of the cases discussed above 
 138 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman.
 139 Ibid., para. 17.
 140 Ibid., paras 18– 27.
 141 Ibid., para. 36.
 142 This is irrespective of the details of the cjeu’s analysis of the actual wording of the 
Directive. See further Opinion of AG Wathelet, Coman, cit., paras 43– 76.
 143 Coman, cit., paras 40 et seq. Note the interesting reference to national identity, which is 














which were more exclusively focused on Directive 2004/ 38. Yet, reference to 
the constitutional rights of EU citizens can be understood with reference to 
the fundamental right to family and private life of same- sex couples that may 
under specific circumstances be protected in the same way as that of hetero-
sexual couples in similar situations as recognised by the European Court of 
Human Rights.144
iv.2 Concluding Remarks on the Relationship between Primary and 
Secondary Rights
Looking beyond the cases discussed so far, several broader lessons can be 
drawn from the post- Brey and post- Metock case law as regards the role of key 
EU actors in shaping the contours of EU law. To come back to the initial con-
cerns against the over- constitutionalisation of EU law, the post- Brey cases il-
lustrate that the cjeu may be ready to engage in deconstitutionalisation pro-
cesses, to thereby make more space for political dialogue. What influences the 
readiness of the EU judiciary to adopt such an approach? Several important 
factors in the hands of the drafters of the Treaty and EU political institutions 
can be identified.
Firstly, in the cases discussed above, the wording of the relevant treaty pro-
visions clearly identified the need for further political guidance. As the cjeu 
itself observed in Dano: (i) Art. 18, para. 1, tfeu prohibits any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality “[w] ithin the scope of application of the treaties, 
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein”; (ii) the 
second subparagraph of Art. 20, para. 2, tfeu expressly states that the rights 
conferred on EU citizens by that article are to be exercised “in accordance with 
the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
thereunder”, and; (iii) under Art. 21, para. 1, tfeu the right of EU citizens to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to 
compliance with the “limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and 
by the measures adopted to give them effect”.145 All key treaty provisions thus 
call for further political guidance.
Secondly, and importantly, the secondary legislation relied upon in the de-
constitutionalisation process described above has a strong organic link with 
the relevant treaty provisions (Arts 18, 20 and 21 tfeu). Arts 18 and 21 tfeu 
 144 Coman, cit., paras 48 (Charter) and 50 (European Court of Human Rights). See in par-
ticular European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 14 December 2017, nos. 26431/ 12, 
26742/ 12, 44057/ 12 and 60088/ 12, Orlandi and others v. Italy. The Court of Justice does not 
however elaborate further on its approach to the fundamental rights at hand.
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count among the legal bases for Directive 2004/ 38.146 Furthermore, Art. 24 of 
Directive 2004/ 38 constitutes a specific expression of the principle of non- 
discrimination laid down generally in Art. 18 tfeu147 for the benefit of EU citi-
zens (as defined in Art. 20 tfeu), who exercise their right to move by virtue of 
Art. 21 tfeu. This organic link may make it easier for the judiciary to shift from 
one level of analysis to the other; that is from primary to secondary law. Now, 
this observation can work the other way around as illustrated by the ambigu-
ities created by the rulings in Metock and Lounes examined above. It is submit-
ted that, when treaty provisions and legislative guidance co- exist, emphasis 
shall be placed on the latter.
Thirdly, the cjeu places specific emphasis on the quality of the legislative 
materials it is relying upon and deferring to. In cases such as Alimanovic and 
García- Nieto, the cjeu indeed endeavours to highlight the progressive (and 
thus presumably proportionate) nature of the system of allocation of rights 
under Directive 2004/ 38; it also stresses the unambiguous wording that en-
sures transparency and legal certainty.148 A similar emphasis on the gradual 
approach enshrined in Directive 2004/ 38 is clear from the O. and B. case. The 
cjeu emphasised the link between settling in another Member State in accor-
dance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 – and a fortiori under Art. 16 (permanent 
residence after five years) of that instrument – and creating and strengthen-
ing family life in that same Member State.149 On the contrary, the absence of 
an intention to settle when movement is based on Art. 6 of Directive 2004/ 38 
(residence of less than three months) excludes the possibility of residence that 
would be “sufficiently genuine so as to enable that citizen to create or strength-
en family life in that Member State”.150 Importantly, in establishing the gradual 
system in Directive 2004/ 38, and on which the Lounes case also insists,151 the 
EU legislature made the policy implications of its choices sufficiently clear for 
the Court to be willing to defer to it. Critics of the system established by the 
Directive may then argue for changes in the legislation itself.
This analysis of the respective role of the drafters of the treaty, the EU’s 
judicial, and political institutions in shaping EU citizenship law therefore 
sheds light on three elements that determine the pre- conditions for a healthy 
 146 Recital 1, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit. (note that the numbering of Treaty articles mentioned 
herein is pre- Lisbon).
 147 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, cit., para. 61.
 148 See supra, n. 65 et seq.
 149 O. and B., cit., paras 51– 56 and 59.
 150 Ibid., paras 51 and 59.














balance between the constitutional value of the relevant right, and the polit-
ical dimension of decision- making on fundamental rights: the constitutional 
norm itself ought to explicitly call for political guidance. Building on such a 
constitutional mandate, political institutions ought to achieve a fine balance 
between acknowledging the existence of the constitutional right and giving it 
shape through legislation. It is submitted that this may be best done by assert-
ing the policy implications of decision- making in the field and the policy argu-
ments justifying choices made in EU legislation. Furthermore, the internal co-
herence, clarity and nuanced nature of the rights thereby regulated will make 
it easier for political guidance to be deferred to. As for the judiciary, when the 
constitutional framework is clear and the relevant political guidance fulfils the 
procedural requirements set therein, it may be encouraged to defer to that leg-
islative framework.
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Around the time of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, there were around 
3.6 million citizens from other EU Member States living in the United King-
dom1 and likely around one million UK nationals living in other EU Member 
States.2 Until Brexit, all these citizens were EU citizens and enjoyed, in that 
capacity, together with their family members, far- reaching rights of free move-
ment and residence. In this connection, it was not required that EU citizens 
were economically active. EU citizenship grants even non- economically active 
EU citizens and their family members the right to reside in another Member 
State under certain conditions. A well- known example are the numerous Brit-
ish pensioners residing in southern Europe: according to estimates, around the 
time of the Brexit referendum, there were 247,000 UK nationals aged 65 and 
 * Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Union; Assistant Professor, University 
of Antwerp. Many thanks to Elise Muir and Mirna Romić for their valuable comments on an 
earlier draft. All views expressed are strictly personal.
 1 Based on Eurostat figures: see http:// appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ nui/ show.do?dataset=mi-
gr_ pop1ctz&lang=en.
 2 A precise estimate is not, to my knowledge available. According the Office for National Sta-
tistics (ons), around 900,000 UK citizens were long- term residents in other EU countries 
in 2010 and 2011 (Office for National Statistics (2017). What information is there on British 
migrants living in Europe?. Section 5.  Number of British citizens living in Europe in 2011, 
by age. https:// www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopulationandcommunity/ populationandmigration/ 
internationalmigration/ articles/ whatinformationisthereonbritishmigrantslivingineurope/ 
jan2017#number- of- british- citizens- living- in- europe- in- 2011- by- age). More recent figures 
from the UN show that, in 2017, around 1.3 million people born in the UK were living in other 
EU Member States (Full Fact (2018). Brits abroad: how many people from the UK live in other 
EU countries? https:// fullfact.org/ europe/ how- many- uk- citizens- live- other- eu- countries/ ). 
See also the discussion in Carrera, S., Guild, E. and Luk, N.C. (2016). What does Brexit mean 











over living in other EU countries, around 121,000 of which were living in Spain 
alone.3
The fate of these rights after Brexit is most uncertain, and has been intense-
ly debated in academic and political circles ever since the Brexit referendum 
was announced. At the moment of writing this chapter, free movement and 
residence rights are fully guaranteed by the Withdrawal Agreement until the 
end of the transition period4, but the full set of arrangements governing these 
rights after that period will still need to be fleshed out. In this chapter, I will try 
to shed some light on the legal arguments underlying this debate. On the one 
hand, I will examine arguments deriving from international law or EU law on 
the basis of which, according to some authors, EU citizens, UK nationals and 
their family members could continue to enjoy the residence rights attached 
to citizenship after Brexit. On the other, I  will analyse arguments according 
to which these rights can be protected under an agreement between the UK 
and the EU and, in particular, legal principles the parties to such an agreement 
have to take into account.
Throughout this chapter, I will use the expression “EU citizens” to refer 
to persons having the nationality of one or more of the EU Member States 
and the expression “UK nationals” to refer to British nationals who, before 
Brexit, were EU citizens.5 Since I  will be specifically examining the situa-
tion of UK nationals who have lost their EU citizenship after Brexit, I will 
not analyse the situation of UK nationals who also have the nationality of 
one or more of the EU Member States. Moreover, as far as the family mem-
bers of EU citizens are concerned, I will focus on family members coming 
from third countries, in order to distinguish their situation from that of EU 
 citizens.6
 3 Office for National Statistics (2017). Pensioners in the EU and the UK. https:// www.ons.
gov.uk/ economy/ investmentspensionsandtrusts/ articles/ pensionersintheeuanduk/ 2017- 
09- 05.
 4 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, 
p. 1– 184. The transition period will in principle end on 31 December 2020, but it may be ex-
tended. For a detailed discussion, see the Chapter by G. More.
 5 Due to the complexity of British nationality laws, not all categories of UK nationals had EU 
citizenship. See in this regard, the declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland on the definition of the term “nationals”, annexed to the final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 Decem-
ber 2007.
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ii EU Citizens and Their Family Members: “Autonomous” vs. 
“Derived” Residence Rights?
The provisions on EU citizenship, as first introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, 
are set out in Part Two of the tfeu. It follows from Art. 20(1) tfeu that every 
national of a Member State is also an EU citizen.7 That provision also sets out 
the rights enjoyed by EU citizens, the most prominent of which is without a 
doubt the right to move and reside freely, subject to certain limitations and 
conditions, within the territory of the Member States.8
Not only EU citizens themselves, but also their close family members enjoy 
a right of free movement and residence in the EU Member States, regard-
less of whether those family members are EU citizens themselves or not. The 
categories of family members which enjoy these rights are listed in Art. 2(2) 
of Directive 2004/ 38.9 There are three categories of such “privileged family 
members”: (i) the spouse or the registered partner of the EU citizen; (ii) the 
direct descendants of the EU citizen who are under the age of 21 or are de-
pendent and those of the spouse or partner; and (iii) the dependent direct 
ascendants and those of the spouse or registered partner.10 Besides, Art. 3(2) 
of Directive 2004/ 38 provides that the Member States have to facilitate entry 
and residence for what one could call “non- privileged family members”, i.e. 
(i) other family members who, in the country from which they have come, 
are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having 
the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds strictly re-
quire the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen and (ii) 
 7 See also Art. 9 teu.
 8 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgment of 13 July 2017, case C- 193/ 16, E, para. 16.
 9 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and re-
side freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 
1612/ 68 and repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 
75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, 
p. 77– 123.
 10 There is some scope for discussion about the precise extent of this category. For 
instance, according to some authors, the category of ascendant- primary carer could 
be interpreted broadly to cover non- biological ascendants such as a stepparent or an 
adoptive parent or even foster parents or unmarried partners. See Barrett, G. (2003). 
Family Matters:  European Community law and Third- country Family Members. 
Common Market Law Review 40 (2), pp.  369– 421, 391, footnote 81, Toner, H.  (2004). 












the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly 
attested.11 In this chapter, I  focus exclusively on the category of “privileged 
family members”.
The conditions governing the right of residence for EU citizens and their 
family members are further fleshed out in Directive 2004/ 38. In the most basic 
terms, every EU citizen is entitled to move to another Member State and reside 
there, together with his family members for periods exceeding three months if 
he can prove that he is either economically active or has sufficient financial re-
sources at his disposal.12 Essentially, therefore, the right to free movement and 
residence of EU citizens is subject to two main conditions.13 First, it can only 
be invoked by EU citizens once they leave their Member State and move to an-
other Member State.14 Second, EU citizens can only reside in another Member 
State for longer periods of time if they are self- sufficient, i.e. if they have a job 
or can fall back on sufficient personal means to support themselves and their 
family members.
However, in its seminal Ruiz Zambrano judgment,15 the Court of Justice held 
that Art. 20 tfeu, in exceptional circumstances, grants even residence rights 
to EU citizens who do not satisfy these conditions. Indeed, the Court ruled that 
Art. 20 tfeu precludes national measures, including decisions refusing a right 
of residence to the family members of an EU citizen, which have the effect of 
depriving EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred on them by virtue of their status as EU citizens.16 Accordingly, an EU 
citizen can derive family reunification rights from EU law where the denial of 
such rights would deprive him of the genuine enjoyment of his EU citizenship 
rights even in a situation where he has not left the territory of its Member 
State and even where he is not economically active or self- sufficient. The Court 
 11 See, in this regard, Court of Justice, judgment of 5 September 2012, case C- 83/ 11, Rahman 
and Others. See also Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 11 January 2018, case C- 673/ 16, 
Coman and Others, paras. 83– 84.
 12 See Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38.
 13 For a discussion, see Cambien, N. (2012). Union Citizenship and Immigration: Re- Thinking 
the Classics? European Journal of Legal Studies 5 (1), pp. 10– 37.
 14 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 457/ 12, S. and G., para. 34.
 15 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEm). For a detailed discussion of the case see Hailbronner, K., 
and Thym, D. (2011). Case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi 
(ONEm), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011. Common 
Market Law Review 48(4), pp. 1253– 1270.
 16 There is an abundant literature on this case law. See, e.g. the contributions in Kochenov, 
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of Justice has confirmed and clarified this principle in a number of follow- up 
cases.17
In this connection, the Court has made an important distinction between 
the nature of the free movement and residence rights of EU citizens, on the 
one hand, and those enjoyed by their family members who are not EU citizens 
themselves, on the other hand. While the Treaties confer autonomous rights 
on EU citizens, the rights conferred on third- country family members are not 
autonomous rights but rights derived from those enjoyed by the EU citizen.18 
The purpose and justification of those derived rights are based on the fact that 
a refusal to allow them would be such as to interfere, in particular, with an EU 
citizen’s freedom of movement.19 This distinction is also relevant in the con-
text of the debate about the residence rights that will be enjoyed by EU citizens 
and their family members after the end of the transition period.
In the following, I will first analyse arguments according to which the resi-
dence rights enjoyed by EU citizens and their family members could be con-
sidered to be “inalienable” rights which, as such, “survive” Brexit and the transi-
tion period. Next, I will analyse the possibility of protecting these rights under 
an agreement negotiated between the UK and the EU.
iii Residence Rights Enjoyed by EU Citizens as Inalienable Rights?
The first question to ask is whether or to what extent the residence rights cur-
rently enjoyed by EU citizens and their family members can still be enjoyed after 
 17 Some of these cases deal with (third country) family members of adult EU citizens: e.g. 
Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Court of Justice, judgment of 15 November 2011, case C- 
256/ 11, Murat Dereçi and Others v.  Bundesministerium für Inneres. For a discussion, see 
Shuibhne, N.N. (2012). Case C- 434/ 09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2011; Case C- 256/ 
11, Dereci and others v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Grand Chamber) of 15 November 2011. Common Market Law Review 49 (1), pp. 349– 379, 
and Adam, S., and Van Elsuwege, P.  (2012). Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance 
between the European Union and its Member States: Comment on Dereci. European Law 
Review (37) 2, pp.  176– 190. Other cases deal with minor EU citizens and their primary 
carer: e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, joined cases C- 356/ 11 and C- 
357/ 11, O. and S. v. Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v. L., Court of Justice, 
judgment of 10 October 2013, case C- 86/ 12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa and Others v. Ministre 
du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration.
 18 See, e.g., Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 457/ 12, S. and G., para. 33.
 19 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 133/ 15, Chavez- Vilchez and Others, para. 









the end of the transition period in the absence of an agreement guaranteeing the 
continued enjoyment of these rights. In this context, it is necessary to make a dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, the residence rights enjoyed by UK nationals 
and their family members in the EU Member States and, on the other hand, the 
residence rights enjoyed by EU citizens and their family members in the UK.
1 Residence Rights of UK Nationals and Their Family Members 
in the EU
A number of scholars have argued that the rights attached to EU citizenship are 
of such a fundamental nature that, once acquired, they can no longer be taken 
away.20 This would mean that the rights enjoyed by UK nationals residing in 
the EU Member States, would continue to exist after the end of the transition 
period. Consequently, UK nationals and their family members would continue 
to have a right of residence in these Member States under the same conditions 
as those applicable before Brexit.
Two lines of argument have been put forward to defend this point of view. 
In the first place, it has been pointed out that EU citizenship is, according to 
settled case law of the Court of Justice, the “fundamental status” of nationals 
of the Member States.21 In its Rottmann judgment, the Court has famously 
held that a Member State cannot under EU law withdraw its nationality if 
such withdrawal entails the loss of EU citizenship, unless that withdrawal 
is in line with general principles of EU law, such as the principle of propor-
tionality.22 Hence, it could be argued that once EU citizenship has been ac-
quired, it can no longer be withdrawn, and that, consequently, Brexit cannot 
entail, for UK nationals, a loss of EU citizenship.23 However, according to 
other authors, this argument fails to convince. One principal reason for this 
is that, after Brexit, UK nationals are no longer nationals of a Member State, 
 20 See, e.g., the arguments discussed in the report by Roeben, V., Snell, J., Minnerop, P., Telles, 
P., and Bush, K. (2017). The Feasibility of associate EU citizenship for UK citizens post- 
Brexit, A study for Jill Evans mep, available at http:// www.jillevans.net/ the_ feasibility_ of_ 
associate_ eu_ citizenship_ for_ uk_ citizens_ post_ brexit.pdf.
 21 See, for an early example, Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, 
Grzelczyk, para. 31.
 22 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat 
Bayern, paras. 41– 59, as recently confirmed in Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, 
case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes. For an analysis, see Cambien, N. (2011). Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat 
Bayern. Columbia Journal of European Law 17 (2), pp. 375– 394.
 23 See the discussion in Davies, G. (2016). Union Citizenship – Still Europeans’ Destiny After 
Brexit. European Law Blog, available at http:// europeanlawblog.eu/ 2016/ 07/ 07/ union- 
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and, as a logical consequence, no longer EU citizens.24 That consequence 
does not derive from the action of a Member State, but flows directly from 
the Treaties. Indeed, in accordance with Art. 20 tfeu, “Every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. Moreover, 
it has been argued that there is nothing in Art. 50 teu which provides that, 
in the event of a withdrawal, the rights attached to EU citizenship should 
continue to be guaranteed. As Eeckhout and Frantziou point out, at the Con-
stitutional Convention, a number of delegates had proposed amendments 
that safeguarded existing rights, but these were not adopted.25 It can be con-
cluded, therefore, that, considered purely from the perspective of EU law as 
it currently stands, it is most doubtful that the residence rights enjoyed by 
UK nationals in the EU in their capacity of EU citizens will survive the end 
of the transition period.
It should be remarked that there is a possibility that the Court of Justice will 
have the opportunity to pronounce itself on the legal consequences of Brexit 
for the rights enjoyed by UK nationals and their family members residing in the 
EU Member States, if questions for a preliminary ruling on that matter were 
referred to it. With this purpose, a group of UK nationals living in the Neth-
erlands had seized a Dutch court, which, initially, had agreed to questions to 
ask the cjeu if Brexit would lead to an automatic loss of rights attached to EU 
citizenship, in the absence of a negotiated solution agreed between the EU and 
the UK.26 However, after an appeal by the Dutch government, the Dutch court 
eventually decided not to refer the said questions.27 The possibility cannot be 
 24 See, e.g. Kochenov, D.  (2016). Brexit and the Argentinianisation of British 
Citizenship: Taking Care Not to Overstay Your 90 Days in Rome, Amsterdam or Paris. 
Verfassungsblog, available at http:// verfassungsblog.de/ brexit- and- the- argentinisation- 
of- british- citizenship- taking- care- not- to- overstay- your- 90- days- in- rome- amsterdam- 
or- paris/ .
 25 Eeckhout, P., and Frantziou, E.  (2017). Brexit and Article 50 teu:  A Constitutionalist 
Reading. Common Market Law Review54 (3), pp.  695– 733, 718. See List of Proposed 
Amendments to the Text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, “Part I  of the Constitution:  Article 59”, 39, http:// european- convention.europa.
eu/ docs/ Treaty/ pdf/ 46/ global46.pdf.
 26 Court of Amsterdam, judgment of 7 February 2018, C/ 13/ 640244 / KG ZA 17– 1327, available 
at https:// uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/ inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:605& 
showbutton=true&keyword=brexit.
 27 For a discussion, see Garner, O. (2018). Does Member State Withdrawal from the European 
Union Extinguish EU Citizenship? C/ 13/ 640244 / KG ZA 17– 1327 of the Rechtbank Amsterdam 
(‘The Amsterdam Case’). European Law Blog available at https:// europeanlawblog.eu/ 
2018/ 02/ 19/ does- member- state- withdrawal- from- the- european- union- extinguish- eu- 










ruled out, however, that the matter will come before the Court of Justice or the 
General Court in the context of a different case.28
In the second place, it has been argued that the rights attached to EU citi-
zenship, such as the residence rights for EU citizens and their family members, 
are covered by the international law doctrine of “acquired rights”.29 In accor-
dance with that doctrine, international law protects certain rights acquired 
under a Treaty, notwithstanding the termination of the Treaty.30 This doctrine 
is not only vested in customary international law,31 but is also codified to some 
extent in Art. 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt), 
which provides as follows: “Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties 
otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accor-
dance with the present Convention, does not affect any right, obligation or le-
gal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to 
its termination”. There is little doubt that the vclt applies to a Member State 
withdrawing from the EU Treaties under Art. 50 teu.
Some authors argue, on this basis, that certain EU citizenship rights, such 
as the right of permanent residence, are protected acquired rights.32 Most 
commentators agree, however, that the rights enjoyed by EU citizens under 
the Treaties are not protected under the doctrine of acquired rights.33 On one 
view, this is because Art. 50 teu forms a lex specialis which contracts out on 
international rules on acquired rights, rendering the latter inapplicable in the 
 28 For a more detailed discussion, see the Chapter by A.P. van der Mei.
 29 See, on this issue, European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2017). 
The impact and consequences of Brexit on acquired rights of EU citizens living in the 
UK and British citizens living in the EU- 27, available at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/ etudes/ STUD/ 2017/ 583135/ IPOL_ STU(2017)583135_ EN.pdf; the arguments dis-
cussed in the report by Roeben, V., Snell, J., Minnerop, P., Telles, P., and Bush, K. (2017). The 
Feasibility of associate EU citizenship for UK citizens post- Brexit, A study for Jill Evans 
mep, cit.; the arguments discussed in House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016). 
Brexit: Acquired Rights. House of Lords Paper 82, available at https:// publications.parlia-
ment.uk/ pa/ ld201617/ ldselect/ ldeucom/ 82/ 82.pdf.
 30 For a discussion, see, e.g., Sik, K. (1977). The Concept of Acquired Rights in International 
Law: A Survey. Netherlands International Law Review 24 (1– 2), pp. 120– 142.
 31 See Lalive, P.A. (1965). The Doctrine of Acquired Rights. In: Bender, ed., Rights and duties 
of private investors abroad. New York: International and comparative law center, p. 183.
 32 Waibel, M. (2017). Brexit and Acquired Rights. AJIL Unbound 111, available at https:// www.
researchgate.net/ publication/ 322311461_ Brexit_ and_ Acquired_ Rights, pp. 440– 444.
 33 See, e.g., Repasi, R.  (2017). Die Rechte der Unionsbürger und ihr Fortbestehen nach 
dem Brexit. ifo Schnelldienst 70 (11), pp. 30– 33, Douglas- Scott, S.  (2016). What Happens 
to “Acquired Rights” in the Event of a Brexit? U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, available at 
https:// ukconstitutionallaw.org/ ; Piris, J.C. (2015). Should the UK withdraw from the 
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case of a Member State withdrawal from the EU. In this connection, it has been 
observed that Art. 70(1) vclt explicitly states “Unless the treaty otherwise pro-
vides or the parties otherwise agree”.34 Another reason relied on to support this 
view is that under the vclt, EU citizens are third parties with respect to the EU 
treaties, while Art. 70(1)(b) of the vclt only applies to the rights, obligations, 
or legal situations of the state parties to the EU Treaties. In this connection, it 
can be pointed out that the International Law Commission, in its commentary 
on the scope of the identically worded predecessor to Art. 70.1(b) (Art. 66 draft 
Vienna Convention) clarified that:
On the other hand, by the words ‘any right, obligation or legal situation 
of the parties created through the execution of the treaty’, the Commis-
sion wished to make it clear that paragraph l(b) relates only to the right, 
obligation or legal situation of the States parties to the treaties created 
through the execution, and is not in any way concerned with the ques-
tion of the ‘vested interests’ of individuals.35
It follows that it is unlikely that the international law doctrine of acquired 
rights could be successfully relied upon after the end of the transition peri-
od by UK nationals and their family members residing in the EU Member 
State in order to preserve the full spectrum of residence rights attached to EU 
 citizenship.
2 Residence Rights of EU Citizens and Their Family Members in the UK
The situation, after Brexit, of EU citizens residing in the UK is different 
from that of UK nationals residing in one of the 27 Member States. Indeed, 
in contrast to the latter group, EU citizens preserve their EU citizenship, in 
 accordance with Art. 20 tfeu and Art. 9 teu, even after Brexit. However, the 
arguments for considering that EU citizens could preserve the full spectrum 
of their residence rights in the UK on the basis of EU law in the absence of a 
negotiated solution, would not appear to be altogether convincing.
First of all, since the UK is no longer a Member State after Brexit, it is no 
longer bound by EU law, neither by primary law provisions on EU citizenship 
nor by secondary EU law, such as Directive 2004/ 38. Consequently, EU citizens 
residing in the UK will no longer be able to rely on their EU citizenship rights 
 34 See, e.g., House of Lords (2017). Brexit and the EU Budget. House of Lords Paper 125, avail-
able at https:// publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ ld201617/ ldselect/ ldeucom/ 125/ 125.pdf.
 35 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, 







in the UK, which in, in effect, has become a third country. It does not appear 
that there is a provision of EU law, including Art. 50 tfeu, which allows them 
to continue to enforce these rights before national courts in the UK or before 
the cjeu, which will no longer have jurisdiction over the UK.
Second, it is not evident, for the same reasons as those outlined above, that 
the international law doctrine of acquired rights could be successfully relied 
upon after Brexit by EU citizens and their family members residing in the UK 
in order to preserve the full spectrum of their residence rights attached to EU 
citizenship.
3 Intermediary Conclusion
It follows from the analysis above that it is far from certain that the various 
arguments discussed in order for EU citizens and their family members to be 
able to continue to rely (fully) on the residence rights would succeed if they 
were invoked before a national court, for instance by a UK national who want-
ed to continue to enjoy his residence rights as an EU citizen in one of the EU 
Member States after the end of the transition period. If, indeed, the residence 
rights attached to EU citizenship cannot be considered to be “acquired” rights, 
which continue to be enforceable after Brexit, these rights only continue to be 
enjoyed if that is provided for in an agreement negotiated between the EU and 
the UK. That possibility will be analysed in part 4, below.
For the sake of completeness, it must be pointed out that, if no negotiated 
solution would be reached between the EU and the UK governing the situation 
after the end of the transition period, UK nationals and their family members, 
residing in the EU Member States, would, in any event, still enjoy the rights 
conferred by the EU on third country nationals. More in particular, they would 
enjoy the residence rights governed by a number of directives, such as the 
Family Reunification Directive,36 the Long Term Residence Directive37 or the 
Blue Card Directive.38 The conditions laid down in these directives are, how-
ever, less beneficial than those governing the residence rights of EU citizens 
and their family members.39 EU citizens residing in the UK, by contrast, would 
 36 Council Directive 2003/ 86/ EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, 
OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12– 18.
 37 Council Directive 2003/ 109/ EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third- 
country nationals who are long- term residents, OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, p. 44– 53.
 38 Council Directive 2009/ 50/ EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third- country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155, 
18.6.2009, p. 17– 29.
 39 For an analysis, see inter alia Mindus, P. (2017). European Citizenship after Brexit: Freedom 
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no longer have a claim to any rights derived under EU law. As third country 
nationals, they could still derive residence rights under UK law, but the con-
ditions governing these would likely be stricter in many circumstances than 
those governing their prior residence rights as EU citizens.40
Moreover, both groups of citizens could still derive rights from the echr, 
since both the UK and all the EU Member States are party to that convention 
and will continue to be parties for the foreseeable future. In this connection, 
some scholars have argued that the rights enjoyed by EU citizens up until 
Brexit will be “cemented” and protected after Brexit under the echr.41 More 
particularly, as far as residence rights are concerned, reference is made to the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Case Kurić and others 
v. Slovenia,42 which concerns the rights of former nationals of Yugoslavia in 
Slovenia. In that case, that Court held that Slovenia had breached Art. 8 echr 
by suddenly taking away the rights of certain groups of these nationals. In this 
connection, it pointed out (at para. 355 of the judgment) that “measures re-
stricting the right to reside in a country may, in certain cases, entail a violation 
of Art. 8 of the Convention if they create disproportionate repercussions on 
the private or family life, or both, of the individuals concerned”. However, it is 
well- known that Art. 8 echr allows Member States a rather broad margin of 
discretion and it seems fair to say that the residence rights enjoyed by EU citi-
zens and their family members are not entirely protected under Art. 8 echr.43 
In addition, specifically as regards UK nationals, it is sometimes argued that 
the echr can be relied upon, in certain circumstances, to prevent the with-
drawal of EU citizenship. While it is true that the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that, in certain circumstances, the loss of citizenship may fall 
within the ambit of Art. 8 echr,44 it cannot be inferred with certainty from 
 40 See the discussion in Schrauwen, A. (2017). (Not) losing out from Brexit. Europe and the 
World: A Law Review 1 (1), available at http:// hdl.handle.net/ 11245.1/ c8ab4b3b- eedf- 4b67- 
bf56- 23b3ea053f20, pp.  8– 13 and in Kilkey, M.  (2017). Conditioning Family- life at the 
Intersection of Migration and Welfare: The Implications for ‘Brexit Families’. Journal of 
Social Policy 46(4), pp. 797– 814.
 41 See, e.g., González, G.M. (2016). “Brexit” Consequences for Citizenship of the Union and 
Residence Rights. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23 (5), pp. 796– 811.
 42 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 26 June 2012, no.  26828/ 06, Kurić and 
Others v. Slovenia.
 43 See Schrauwen, A. (2017). (Not) losing out from Brexit, cit., p. 6: “Thus in any event the 
doctrine would not apply to those who have not yet acquired the right to permanent 
residence, and might imply a weaker position for those who recently decided to move 
abroad, arguably for the most part young people”.













that case law that the loss of EU citizenship would be in breach of Art. 8 echr, 
especially given the fact that the said case law is concerned with national citi-
zenship. According to the House of Lords European Union Committee, it may 
be concluded that Art. 8 echr cannot be relied on to prevent the status of EU 
citizenship from being removed as a consequence of Brexit.45
In conclusion: while arguments derived from the echr would perhaps be 
more successful than arguments relying exclusively on EU law or the interna-
tional law doctrine of acquired rights, these arguments do not provide a solid 
basis to fully protect the residence rights currently enjoyed by EU citizens and 
their family members. A comprehensive solution could only be reached by an 
agreement concluded between the UK and the EU.
iv Brexit and Residence Rights: an Essential Issue for Any Negotiated 
Solution
The idea of negotiating a new set of rules to resolve some of the UK’s concerns 
regarding the EU legal framework is not a new phenomenon, of course. It is 
well- known that the UK has managed to negotiate so- called “op- outs” in im-
portant areas of EU law, including in the so- called Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice. When then Prime Minister David Cameron decided to hold the 
“Brexit” referendum, his idea was to achieve a new “deal” with the EU before 
the date of that referendum, a deal intended to sway many of the UK con-
cerns regarding the impact and working of the EU, and, as a consequence, to 
convince a majority of voters to stay in the EU. Not surprisingly, the new deal 
focused to a large extent on free movement and EU citizenship related issues. 
The European Council conclusions of February 2016 stated, inter alia, that the 
references in the Treaties and their preambles to the process of creating “an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” would not apply to the United 
Kingdom, and they proposed to amend the existing rules on EU citizens and 
their family members in order to make them somewhat more restrictive.46 An-
nexed to these conclusions was a declaration in which the Commission set out 
 45 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016). Brexit:  Acquired Rights, cit;, 
Mindus, P. (2017). European Citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of Movement and Rights of 
Residencecit., ch. 7, p. 108.
 46 See the European Council Conclusions of 18 and 19 February 2016, A new settlement for 
the United Kingdom within the European Union and the Decision of the Heads of State 
or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a new settlement 
for the United Kingdom within the European Union, in Annex 1 of European Council 
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its intention to adopt a proposal to complement Directive 2004/ 38 in order to 
exclude from the scope of free movement rights certain third country nation-
als resorting to an abuse of rights.47
However, the proposed settlement was rejected when, on 23 June 2016, a 
small majority of British votes was cast in favour Brexit. On 29 March 2017, 
the United Kingdom officially notified the European Council of its intention 
to leave the European Union. In accordance with Art. 50 teu this notification 
was followed by negotiations to set out the precise arrangements for withdraw-
al. These negotiations could last, in principle, no more than two years,48 but 
they could be extended in common accord. Accordingly, the initial deadline of 
29 March 2019 was extended to 31 October 2019.49 Moreover, both sides have 
agreed to have subsequent to the negations a so- called “transition period” in 
order to avoid an abrupt change of the legal regime applicable to the UK and 
the EU Member States.
As far as the EU is concerned, it was apparent from the outset that EU cit-
izenship would have to play a central role in these negotiations, as is clearly 
stated, for instance, in the guidelines for Brexit negotiations of the European 
Council50 and the negotiation directives of the Council.51 In fact, the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission repeatedly stated that one of 
the first priorities for the negotiations would be to agree on guarantees to pro-
tect the rights of EU citizens, and their family members, that are affected by 
Brexit. For instance, the Council’s press release of 22 May 2017 explicitly stated 
that the first priority for the negotiations is to agree on guarantees to protect 
the rights of EU and UK citizens, and their family members, that are affected 
 47 See the Declaration of the European Commission on issues related to the abuse of the 
right of free movement of persons, in Annex 7 of European Council Conclusions of 18– 19 
February 2016. For a more in- depth analysis, see the chapter by E. Muir.
 48 See Art. 50(3) teu, which provides:  “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in 
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, 
two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, 
in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this 
period”.
 49 See European Council decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom of 11 April 
2019 extending the period under Article 50(3)teu.
 50 European Council Guidelines of 29 April 2017, following the United Kingdom’s notifica-
tion under Article 50 teu, available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/ press/ press- 
releases/ 2017/ 04/ 29- euco- brexit- guidelines/ .
 51 Council Directives of 22 May 2017 for the negotiation of an agreement with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal from the European Union, available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/ 











by Brexit.52 At the same time, the UK made it clear from the outset that it wants 
to limit the rights of EU citizens and their family members in the UK, in par-
ticular their right to free movement and residence. Accordingly, a white paper 
published in February 2017 by the UK government stated unequivocally: “We 
will design our immigration system to ensure that we are able to control the 
numbers of people who come here from the EU. In future, therefore, the Free 
Movement Directive will no longer apply and the migration of EU nationals 
will be subject to UK law”.53
It is inevitable, therefore, that, in the context of the Brexit negotiations, the 
concept of EU citizenship, which is destined to be the fundamental status of 
all Member State nationals, was deeply challenged. It remains to be seen how 
the concept of EU citizenship and the rights attached to it emerge from the 
negotiations.
While Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement governs the residence rights 
of EU citizens, UK nationals and their family members which were triggered 
before of the end of the transition period, arrangements governing future 
residence rights will have to be set out in an agreement on the future EU- UK 
Partnership, to be negotiated and concluded during the transition period. The 
aim of this section is not to provide a critical analysis of the current state of 
negotiations, and neither to predict their outcome. At the moment of the writ-
ing of this chapter, it is impossible to know what the outcome of the negotia-
tions will be, or even to know whether a negotiated solution will be reached, 
in particular since, in order to do so, a number of important hurdles must still 
be overcome.54 Moreover, even the arrangements set out in the Withdrawal 
Agreement could (partially) disappear, if a pending challenge against it be-
fore the General Court would be successful55. Rather, this section purports to 
examine, from a legal point of view, some of the legal principles that any ne-
gotiated solution would have to take into account, including the Withdrawal 
Agreement and its implementation schemes.
 52 Council (Art 50) authorises the start of Brexit talks and adopts negotiating directives, in 
Council Press release 286/ 17 of 22 May 2017, available at http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/ press/ press- releases/ 2017/ 05/ 22/ brexit- negotiating- directives/ .
 53 See, the Government of the United Kingdom (2017). The United Kingdom’s exit from 
and new partnership with the European Union – White Paper, available at https:// www.
gov.uk/ government/ publications/ the- united- kingdoms- exit- from- and- new- partnership- 
with- the- european- union- white- paper, 5.4.
 54 For a general discussion of some of these hurdles, see Editorial comments: Polar explora-
tion: Brexit and the emerging frontiers of EU law (2018). Common Market Law Review 55 
(1), p. 1– 16.
 55 Available at https:// www.thelondoneconomic.com/ politics/ exclusive- uk- campaigners- 
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1 Changing Citizenship Statuses at the EU Level
One radical – though given the current political context mostly theoretical – 
way of dealing with the issue of residence rights for EU citizens after Brexit 
would be to change the status of citizenship at the EU level, or the access to 
it, in such a way that after Brexit, UK nationals remain citizens of the EU, and 
preserve the current rights associated to that status. Various options can be 
considered in this connection.56 I will limit myself to discussing the three most 
important ones.
The first option would be to turn EU citizenship into a truly independent 
form of citizenship, by decoupling it from Member State nationality.57 In other 
words: having the nationality of a Member State would no longer be required 
in order for a person to be an EU citizen. Such an arrangement could allow UK 
nationals to remain EU citizens after Brexit, and hence to continue to enjoy 
the residence rights attached to that status in the EU Member States. This first 
option might be very interesting from an academic point of view, but it is, to 
my mind, not viable from a political perspective, for a number of reasons. First 
of all, implementing this option would require changing the Treaties, and in 
particular Art. 9 teu and Art. 20 tfeu. However, it is clear from the available 
documents that the Member States, at the time of the conclusion of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, were not prepared to have an independent form of EU citizenship 
which would potentially become more important than their own nationality. 
Hence the clear wording of Art. 9 teu and Art. 20 tfeu to the effect that “Cit-
izenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizen-
ship”. It is unlikely that in the current context, in which anti- EU feelings have 
grown in intensity compared to past decades, Member States would change 
their mind on this issue. Moreover, even in the implausible event that Member 
States would be willing to make the said Treaty changes, those changes would 
not do anything to guarantee the residence rights of EU citizens in the UK, 
which will become a third country after Brexit. From a political perspective, 
the said Treaty changes would only be acceptable, therefore, if the UK would 
reciprocate by accepting to continue to guarantee the current residence and 
 56 See the discussion in Kochenov, D.  (2016). EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the 
Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical Downgrading of Rights?. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ 
Discussion Papers Series No.111/ 2016., available at http:// www.lse.ac.uk/ europeanInsti-
tute/ LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/ LEQSPaper111.pdf.
 57 This idea has been suggested for a long time by some legal scholars. See the literature 
referred to in Kostakopoulou, D.  (2017). Scala Civium:  Citizenship Templates Post‐Brexit 








free movement rights attached to EU citizenship for EU citizens. However, that 
commitment would clearly go against the intentions repeatedly stated by the 
UK government and would, at least for some people, defeat the purpose of 
Brexit.
A second option would be to create a form of “associate citizenship” for 
UK nationals, which would allow UK nationals to keep (some of) the rights 
associated with EU citizenship after Brexit.58 This option would be less far- 
reaching than the first one, as it would not change the EU citizenship status 
as such, but would entail the creation of a separate status, with possibly more 
limited and a more static set of rights.59 Moreover, acquiring this status could 
be made subject to an individual opt- in, by UK nationals satisfying certain 
conditions, such as, for instance, the payment of a fee.60 This second- option, 
while it would most likely also require an amendment of the Treaties,61 
would not require an overhaul of the existing EU citizenship concept, as in-
terpreted in the case law of the European Court of Justice. Still, from a politi-
cal level, granting associate citizenship to (certain) UK nationals would likely 
be acceptable only if the UK reciprocated, for instance by granting a form of 
associate British citizenship.62 However, such reciprocal commitments are 
considered to be problematic by many observers,63 for the same reasons as 
outlined above.
A third option would be to facilitate access to EU citizenship for UK na-
tionals after Brexit, for instance by granting the right to UK nationals residing 
for more than five years in a given Member State to obtain the nationality of 
that Member State – and, therefore, EU citizenship – by mere registration or 
 58 See the discussion in Miller, V. (2018) Brexit and European Citizenship. House of Commons 
Briefing Paper n° 8365, available at https:// researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/ docu-
ments/ CBP- 8365/ CBP- 8365.pdf, pp. 24 et seq.
 59 For a critical discussion, see Van den Brink, M, and Kochenov, D. (2019) Against Associate 
EU Citizenship. Journal of Common Market Studies.
 60 See e.g. European Parliament Draft Report of 9 November 2016, Possible evolutions of 
and adjustments to the current institutional set- up of the European Union, amendment 
nr. 882 by mep Charles Goerens, available at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=- // EP// NONSGML+COMPARL+PE- 592.348+02+DOC+PDF+V0// 
EN&language=DE.
 61 See the discussion in Roeben, V., Snell, J., Minnerop, P., Telles, P., and Bush, K. (2017). The 
Feasibility of associate EU citizenship for UK citizens post- Brexit, A study for Jill Evans 
mep, cit.
 62 See the discussion in Roeben, V., Snell, J., Minnerop, P., Telles, P., and Bush, K. (2017). The 
Feasibility of associate EU citizenship for UK citizens post- Brexit, A study for Jill Evans 
mep, cit.
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declaration.64 This option, while again interesting from an academic perspec-
tive, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it would require harmonisa-
tion, to some extent, of Member State nationality laws, something that is un-
likely to be accepted by the Member States. Indeed, so far the Member States 
have always resisted any interference of EU legislation in their nationality laws. 
This has led the Court of Justice to hold that it is for each Member State to lay 
down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality, while at the 
same time, Member States must unconditionally recognize each other’s na-
tionality.65 Second, this solution could be problematic in Member States which 
do not allow dual nationality, because in those Member States UK nationals 
would lose their UK nationality upon acquiring the nationality of their host 
Member State, which would present them with a difficult choice between two 
less than satisfactory options. Third, there is the issue of the absence of reci-
procity on behalf of the UK.
2 Preserving Residence Rights for EU Citizens/ UK Nationals and Their 
Family Members
If the (access to the) citizenship status at EU level is left unchanged, the resi-
dence rights of EU citizens and UK nationals after Brexit become the subject 
of the negotiations between the EU and the UK. The content of any agreement 
will be based to a large extent on political considerations. Yet, the negotiators 
also have to take into account a number of legal principles which are, argu-
ably, relevant for the subject of residence rights after Brexit, as I will examine 
in what follows. The negotiated solution has to deal, on the one hand, with 
the situation of EU citizens who have moved to the UK or UK nationals who 
have moved to another Member State before Brexit (or before the end of the 
transition period) and, on the other hand, of those EU citizens or UK nationals 
who will move after Brexit (or after the end of the transition period). In this 
section, I am dealing mostly with the situation of persons who have moved 
before Brexit (or before the end of the transition period), as, in my view, this 
group has the strongest claims on the basis of the said principles.
EU citizens and their family members who move to another Member State 
can enjoy three different types of residence rights, which are subject to differ-
ent conditions. First, EU citizens and their family members can move to an-
other Member State and reside there for periods up to three months without 
any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid 
 64 Kostakopoulou, D. (2017). Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post‐Brexit and the European 
Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens, cit., p. 8.







identity card or passport (see Art. 6 of Directive 2004/ 38). Second, for periods 
of residence longer than three months, they must, as was pointed out above, be 
economically active or self- sufficient (see Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38). Third, 
the strongest, most complete form of residence right is the so- called “perma-
nent residence”, which is acquired, in principle, after the Union citizen has re-
sided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State.66
As I  will analyse in what follows, there are a number of legal principles 
which the Withdrawal Agreement and its implementation schemes would, ac-
cording to some scholars, have to respect and which, arguably, could provide 
arguments to the effect that EU citizens who reside in the UK or UK nationals 
having a right of residence in one of the EU Member States, especially those 
having acquired of right of permanent residence, would be entitled to preserve 
this under the agreement. Some of these legal principles are, in my view, bind-
ing on both the UK and the EU Member States, whereas other legal principles 
only bind the latter.
First of all, the Withdrawal Agreement and its implementation schemes 
have to respect fundamental rights as laid down in the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights, to which both the UK and the EU Member States are 
a  party.67 The right to protection of family life laid down in Art. 8 echr pre-
cludes, under certain circumstances, residence rights being taken away. In this 
regard, the degree of integration in the host State certainly is a relevant consid-
eration in assessing whether deportation is allowed under Art. 8 echr. Hence, 
this argument could work in favour, especially of UK nationals having acquired 
a right of permanent residence in one of the EU Member States or EU citizens 
who are integrated in the UK.
Second, one could argue that “integration” itself is a guiding legal principle 
of EU law. In this context, one could refer to the objective stated in the pre-
amble to the teu of continuing “the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe”. The free movement of EU citizens plays a very 
important role for the achievement of this objective, and one could argue that 
respecting this principle requires to some extent guaranteeing residence rights 
for UK nationals in the EU Member States after the end of the transition peri-
od. Again, this argument seems to be most convincing with regard to UK na-
tionals having acquired a right of permanent residence. In this connection, 
it should be pointed out that recitals 17 and 18 of the preamble to Directive 
 66 See Art. 16 of Directive 2004/ 38. See also the derogations laid down in Art. 17 of the 
Directive 2004/ 38.
 67 See also supra, under iii.3. for an analysis of the implications of the echr even in the 
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2004/ 38 make it clear that permanent residence is a key element in promoting 
social cohesion, which is one of the fundamental objectives of the Union and 
that in order to be a genuine vehicle for integration into the society of the host 
Member State in which the Union citizen resides, the right of permanent res-
idence, once obtained, should not be subject to any conditions. As such, this 
legal principle could provide some support for the view that, UK nationals who 
are sufficiently integrated in the society of one of the home Member States 
should be entitled to residence in the EU even after Brexit. A similar argument 
could not be made in favour of EU citizens residing in the UK, since the UK will 
no longer be bound by any “integration” principle.
Third, the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement should take into 
account the principle of legitimate expectations to claim a continued right of 
residence.68 According to settled case- law of the Court, the principle of the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the 
European Union and must be observed not only by the EU institutions, but also 
by Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them under EU 
directives. The right to rely on that principle extends to any person in a situation 
in which an administrative authority has caused that person to entertain expec-
tations which are justified by precise assurances provided to him.69 It could be 
argued, on this basis, that UK nationals and their family members who had ac-
quired a permanent right of residence in one of the EU Member States or were 
on track to acquire this, have a legitimate expectations that they would be able 
to continue to reside there. However, it would seem that the principle would 
not have to be taken into account by the UK as regards EU 27 citizens residing 
in the UK. This argument is implicit in the policy paper of the UK government, 
entitled “Safeguarding the position of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals 
in the EU”,70 which states that “those EU citizens who arrived after the specified 
date will be allowed to remain in the UK for at least a temporary period and may 
become eligible to settle permanently, depending on their circumstances – but 
this group should have no expectation of guaranteed settled status”71.
 68 See in this regard the discussion in Garner, O.  (2018). Does Member State Withdrawal 
from the European Union Extinguish EU Citizenship? C/ 13/ 640244 / KG ZA 17– 1327 of the 
Rechtbank Amsterdam (‘The Amsterdam Case’), cit.
 69 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 July 2017, case C- 560/ 15, Europa Way and Persidera, 
paras 79– 80.
 70 Government of the United Kingdom(2017). The United Kingdom’s exit from the 
European Union:  safeguarding the position of EU citizens living in the UK and UK 
nationals living in the EU, available at https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ publications/ 
safeguarding- the- position- of- eu- citizens- in- the- uk- and- uk- nationals- in- the- eu.










Fourth, one could add that if the Withdrawal Agreement would not guaran-
tee the continued right of permanent residence after Brexit for UK nationals 
in the EU Member States under the same conditions as currently applicable, 
the effet utile of that right would be compromised. Admittedly, that right, as 
such would no longer be applicable to them. However, one could argue that, 
by suddenly taking away this right, one would compromise the effet utile of 
the build- up of that right which happened in tempore non suspecto, i.e. before 
Brexit. Indeed, UK nationals who moved to one of the EU Member States with 
a view to residing there in accordance with the conditions laid down in Di-
rective 2004/ 38 will have done so with a view to settling in that Member State 
and to creating and strengthening family life in that State.72 This whole pur-
pose, which was in most case undertaken before any realistic prospect of Brex-
it came about, would, arguably be defeated if, after Brexit, the said nationals 
would be stripped of their right of residence. The effet utile of EU law is, there-
fore, another principle which the negotiating parties have to take into account 
when reaching an agreement on the residence rights of EU citizens and their 
family members. As was the case for the second principle discussed above, this 
principle could be invoked by UK nationals living in the EU, but not, converse-
ly, by EU citizens in the UK, as the UK will arguably no longer have an obliga-
tion under EU law to respect the effet utile of provisions of EU law.
In this connection, it must be pointed out that, since Directive 2004/ 38 will 
no longer apply as such to UK nationals after the end of the transition period, 
they could be made subject to certain administrative formalities in order to 
have their permanent right of residence as an EU citizen transformed into a 
similar right on the basis of the withdrawal agreement. However, those formal-
ities should not be overly burdensome, in order not to compromise the effet 
utile of the right of permanent residence. Interesting to note in this regard is 
that paragraph 23 of the joint technical notes on EU- UK positions on citizens’ 
rights that have been published after the second and third round of negotia-
tions73 stated: “In order to obtain status under the Withdrawal Agreement by 
application, those already holding a permanent residence document issued 
under Union law at the specified date will have that document converted into 
 72 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 560/ 15, O., para. 54. For a discussion, 
see Cambien, N.  (2014). Cases C- 456/ 12 O. and B. and C- 457/ 12 S. and G.: Clarifying the 
inter- state requirement for EU citizens?. European Law Blog, available at http:// europe-
anlawblog.eu/ 2014/ 04/ 11/ cases- c- 45612- o- and- b- and- c- 45712- s- and- g- clarifying- the- inter- 
state- requirement- for- eu- citizens/ .
 73 These joint technical notes are available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ commission/ brexit- 
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the new document free of charge, subject only to verification of identity, a 
criminality and security check and confirmation of ongoing residence”. Sim-
ilarly, Art. 18(1)(h) of the Withdrawal Agreement provides that “persons who, 
before the end of the transition period, hold a valid permanent residence doc-
ument issued under Article 19 or 20 of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC or hold a valid 
domestic immigration document conferring a permanent right to reside in the 
host State, shall have the right to exchange that document […] for a new resi-
dence document upon application after a verification of their identity, a crim-
inality and security check […] and confirmation of ongoing residence; such 
new residence documents shall be issued free of charge”. It could be wondered 
whether, in order fully to preserve the effet utile of the right to permanent res-
idence, this exchange of documents should not happen in a more automatic 
fashion.74
Fifth, another principle which has to be taken into account, by the EU side, 
is the principle of equal treatment and non- discrimination, which is a general 
principle of EU law, and which is also laid down in Arts 20 and 21 of the Char-
ter. More in particular, the arrangements governing the residence rights for UK 
nationals and their family members should obviously not be more disadvan-
tageous than those applying to other third country nationals, except where 
these nationals can benefit from certain advantageous arrangements in, for 
instance, association agreements with the EU.75 As such, the principle of equal 
treatment and non- discrimination provides a sort of lower limit: negotiating 
residence rights for UK nationals after the transition period which fall short of 
those already enjoyed by third country nationals, does not seem to be possible.
v Concluding Remarks
The precise arrangements governing the residence rights of EU citizens and 
their family members after the transition period will be governed by the With-
drawal agreement and, possibly, by an agreement on the future EU- UK Part-
nership to be concluded between the EU and the UK. Those arrangements will 
in any event have to respect a number of key legal principles discussed in this 
 74 See the criticisms voiced by Peers, S. (2018). EU and UK citizens’ acquired rights in the Brexit 
withdrawal agreement: detailed analysis and annotation. EU Law Analysis, available at 
http:// eulawanalysis.blogspot.lu/ 2018/ 03/ eu27- and- uk- citizens- acquired- rights- in.html.
 75 See the examples given in Kochenov, D.  (2016). Brexit and the Argentinianisation of 








chapter. Moreover, there is little doubt that, on a political level, any residence 
rights granted to UK nationals and their family members would only be ac-
cepted by the EU if the UK reciprocates and grants equal residence rights to 
EU citizens and their family members. This paper has not examined in detail 
the situation of EU citizens and UK nationals who move after Brexit. It would 
seem that they cannot, or not to the same extent, rely on the legal principles 
examined to continue to enjoy the same residence rights as those applicable 
before Brexit and it is likely that their rights will be restricted compared to the 
current residence rights enjoyed by EU citizens.
This chapter has focused on the issue of residence rights. For the sake of com-
pleteness, it should be pointed out that, besides residence rights, there is the issue 
of the free movement between Member States. The most pressing question in 
this regard, is the following one: will UK nationals and their family members who 
enjoy a right of residence in one of the EU Member States after the end of the 
transition period, equally have the right to freely move between and reside in oth-
er EU Member States? This issue may find a negotiated solution in an agreement 
on the future EU- UK Partnership. It would seem that the arguments examined 
above are not conclusive in this regard. Obviously, the principle of equal treat-
ment precludes granting UK nationals more restrictive free movement rights 
than those generally enjoyed by third country nationals. Yet those rights are con-
siderably less in scope than those enjoyed by EU citizens. Moreover, as Kochenov 
has pointed out, the UK is not in a position to reciprocate on free movement 
rights, since it is leaving the EU on its own.76 Interesting to note in this connec-
tion is that Art. 32 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement of 15 March 2018 provided 
as follows: “In respect of United Kingdom nationals and their family members, 
the rights provided for by this Part shall not include further free movement to the 
territory of another Member State, the right of establishment in the territory of 
another Member State, or the right to provide services on the territory of another 
Member State or to persons established in other Member States”.
One option that could be envisaged as a solution to the residence and free 
movement- related issues after the end of the transition period is a carefully tai-
lored most favoured nation clause and a requirement of reciprocal treatment. 
In international law, reciprocal treatment is primarily envisaged as a means 
of protecting nationals or things,77 although most- favoured- nation clauses 
 76 Kochenov, D.  (2018). Misguided ‘Associate EU Citizenship’ Talk as a Denial of EU Values. 
Verfassungsblog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ misguided- associate- eu- citizenship- 
talk- as- a- denial- of- eu- values/ .
 77 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on most- favoured- nation clauses with com-
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are nowadays primarily used in the wto context, as well as in the bilateral 
trade and investment treaties.78 The said clauses are defined in the broadest 
of terms79 which is why they should be used with caution.80 When it comes to 
the EU, these types of clauses are often found in bilateral cooperation agree-
ments, such as the one between the EU and the member parties to the Cart-
agena Agreement.81 The downside of these types of clauses is that they can 
seldom be relied upon directly by the individuals.82 If this type of a clause were 
to be introduced into an agreement with the UK, UK citizens moving to and 
living in the EU, but also EU citizens moving to and living in the UK could be 
granted preferential treatment in certain respects (e.g. free movement and res-
idence rights similar to those enjoyed by EU citizens in the EU Member States) 
while no longer being entitled to the rights currently enjoyed by EU citizens 
in  others.
 78 International Law Commission, Final Report of the Study Group on the Most- Favoured- 
Nation Clause, Yearbook of International Law Commission, Vol. ii., part two, 2015, p. 2.
 79 Radi, Y.  (2007). The Application of the Most- Favoured- Nation Clause to the Dispute 
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the “Trojan Horse” 
European Journal of International Law 18 (4), pp. 757– 774, 758.
 80 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on most- favoured- nation clauses with 
commentaries, cit., p. 20.
 81 Council Regulation 1591/ 84 of 4 June 1984 concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Economic Community, of the one part, and the 
Cartagena Agreement and the member countries thereof – Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela – of the other part, OJ L 153, 8.6.1984, p. 1– 1.
 82 Although the Court of Justice did not definitively exclude such a possibility for the most- 
favoured- nation clause in general, the clause was not given direct effect in its judgment of 
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 chapter 10
Distinguishing between Use and Abuse of EU Free 
Movement Law: Evaluating Use of the “Europe- route” 




The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked “a new stage in the process of creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.1 Before 1992, European 
integration was built upon economic premises, which translated into the 
four fundamental freedoms of goods, persons, services and capital.2 Rights 
that were given to individuals were aimed at realizing the economic goals 
that were part of the eec’s design.3 The right to family reunification for 
workers, for instance, was granted to facilitate their integration into the host 
 * PhD Researcher, Ghent European Law Institute of Ghent University (Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence). The author is grateful to Dimitry Kochenov, Alina Tryfonidou, Peter Van Elsu-
wege, and Michaela McCown for their comments on earlier versions of this contribution.
 1 Art. A  of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). It is debated whether 
the Maastricht promise has realized its full potential. See e.g. Kochenov, D., and Plender, 
R. (2012). EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? European Law 
Review 37, pp. 369– 396.
 2 Now Arts 30, 34, 45, 49, 56 and 63 tfeu. Barnard, C.  (2013). The Substantive Law of the 
EU:  The Four Freedoms. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Despite its economic premises, 
the European Economic Community (eec) was a political project that was meant to fur-
ther peace and welfare after the Second World War. An economic approach was chosen, 
however, because political integration was not feasible, and the original plan to establish a 
European Political Community and/ or a European Defence Community was rejected by the 
French Parliament. Koopmans, R., and Statham, P., eds. (2010). The Making of a European 
Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 16 et seq.
 3 First the eec, later the Economic Community (EC), and now the European Union. Try-
fonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, p. 5 et seq.; Croon- Gestefeld, J. (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law: A 
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Member State and to further the economic purpose of their movement.4 
Therefore, it was only available to those who move to or reside in a Member 
State of which they are not a national.5 The Maastricht Treaty broadened the 
sphere of European cooperation by establishing the EU, and introduced EU 
citizenship.6
This contribution departs from the premise that one of the qualities that 
citizenship confers is equality before the law.7 It is shown, however, that equal-
ity before the law collides with another constitutional principle of EU law. The 
principle of conferral implies that some competences are conferred to the EU 
and others are retained by the Member States.8 As a result, the legal position 
of citizens differs, depending on whether they are subject to national or Euro-
pean rules. This differentiation may cause inequality.9
Because of its unique position at the intersection of free movement, immi-
gration policy, fundamental rights, limited Union competence, and political 
controversy, familly reunification is one of the areas in which differentation 
between citizens occurs on the basis of whether they are a subject to EU law or 
 4 Berneri, C.  (2017). Family Reunification in the EU:  The Movement and Residence Rights of 
Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 8; 
Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, K. (2014). European Migration Law. Cam-
bridge: Intersentia, p. 30.
 5 Now: Art. 3 of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 6 Among other institutional changes, such as the introduction of new policy areas by the 
Maastricht Treaty.
 7 Kochenov, D.  (2010). Citizenship Without Respect:  The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal. Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 8, p. 12 et seq.; Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citi-
zenship as a Federal Denominator. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role 
of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5, 9; De Búrca, G. (1997). The Role of 
Equality in European Community Law. In: Dashwood and O’Leary, eds., The Principle of Equal 
Treatment in EC Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 16; Marshall, T.H. (1992). Citizenship and 
Social Class. London: Pluto Press.
 8 Art. 4, para. 1, and Art. 5, paras 1– 2, teu and Arts 2– 6 tfeu.
 9 Garben, S., and Govaere, I.  (2017). The Division of Competences Between the EU and the 
Member States Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future. In: Garben and Govaere, 
eds., The Division of Competences Between the EU and the Member States Reflections on the 
Past, the Present and the Future. Oxford: Hart, p. 3 et seq.; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Dis-
crimination in EC Law, cit., p. 6; Also see the contribution of H.U. Jessurun D’Oliveira in this 















not.10 Family reunification in the EU is defined as the situation in which a third- 
country national family member of a resident of one of the Member States ac-
quires a residence title to reside with the family member who is already legally 
in the EU.11 The family member in the EU can either be a third- country na-
tional or an EU citizen. This contribution only examines family reunification 
between third- country nationals and EU citizens. The legal regime for family 
reunification between third- country nationals who are legally residing in the 
EU and their third- country national family members is not discussed.12
Directive 2004/ 38 regulates the right of EU citizens and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. EU 
citizens who move to or reside in a Member State of which they are not a na-
tional benefit from its protection, which includes the possibility for family 
reunification under very lenient conditions.13 Family reunification between 
third- country nationals and EU citizens who do not move to or reside in a 
Member State of which they are not a national is regulated by the Member 
State of which the EU citizens is a national. Some Member States impose re-
quirements for family reunification for their own nationals that are far stricter 
than the requirements EU law imposes on EU citizens who exercise their free 
movements rights.14 This phenomenon is called reverse discrimination.15
 10 Faull, J. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law. In: De La 
Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. A New General Principle of EU Law? 
Oxford: Hart, p. 291 et seq., especially p. 293.
 11 The term “third- country national” refers to anyone who does not have the nationality of 
one of the Member States.
 12 Third- country national residents in the EU can rely on Directive 2003/ 86/ EC of the 
Council of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, 
p. 12– 18.
 13 When an EU citizen resides in a Member State in compliance with Directive 2004/ 38, his 
family members can join him without the need to fulfill any conditions, except for the 
obligation to have health insurance. See Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
 14 See Neergaard, U., Jacqueson, C., and Holst- Christensen, N., eds. (2014). Union 
Citizenship: Development Impact and Challenges. The xxvi fide Congress in Copenhagen. 
Copenhagen:  djøf Publishing, available at fide2014.eu; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse 
Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 120 et seq.; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the 
European Union: A Recurring Balancing Act. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 4 et seq., 39 et seq.; 
Berneri, C. (2017). Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p. 7.
 15 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 13 et seq., p. 117 et seq.; Verbist, 
V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 3 et seq.; Davies, G. (2003). 
Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International; Poiares Maduro, M.  (2000). The Scope of European Remedies:  The 
Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination. In:  Kilpatrick, Novitz, 
and Skidmore, eds., The Future of European Remedies. London: Bloomsbury Publishing; 
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When a national of a Member State cannot comply with the strict condi-
tions for family reunification in national law, EU law allows to benefit from 
more lenient rules by moving to another Member State, after which EU law is 
applicable. Case- law of the Court of Justice provides that upon return to the 
home Member State of the EU citizen (in a return situation), his family mem-
bers retain their residence rights. The only condition to retain these rights is 
that residence in the host Member State must have been genuine. If that is 
the case, the family continues to fall within the scope of EU law and does not 
need to comply with the conditions for family reunification that are posed by 
the national law of that Member State.16 If the conditions are fulfilled, this 
Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights. European Journal of Migration and Law 
13 (4), pp.  443– 466; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations:  An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
35 (1), pp.  43– 67; Hanf, D.  (2011). Reverse Discrimination in EU Law:  Constitutional 
Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice? Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 18 (1– 2), pp.  29– 61; Oosterom- Staples, H.  (2012). To What Extent 
Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed? European Journal of Migration and Law 14 
(2), pp.  151– 172; Groenendijk, K.  (2014). Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification 
and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin. In: Guild, Rotaeche, and Kostakopoulou, eds., 
The Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship. Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers; O’Leary, S. (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in 
EU Law. Irish Jurist 44, pp. 13– 46; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, 
On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects. Common Market Law 
Review 45(1), pp. 13– 45; Costello, C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union: Above Abuse? In: De 
La Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. 321 et seq.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 370/ 90, Singh; judgment of 23 September 
2003, case C- 109/ 01, Akrich; judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 291/ 05, Eind; judgment 
of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08, Metock and Others; judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 
456/ 12, O. and B., paras. 51– 61; judgment of 5 June 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman and Others, 
paras. 24, 40, 51– 53; judgment of 27 June 2018, case C- 230/ 17, Altiner and Ravn; judgment 
of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, Banger; Watson, P. (1993). Free Movement of Workers – A One 
Way Ticket? Case C- 370/ 90 The Queen v. Immigation Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh. 
Industrial Law Journal 22 (1), pp.  68– 77; Bierbach, J.  (2008). European Citizens’ Third- 
Country Family Members and Community Law: Grand Chamber decision of 11 December 
2007, Case C- 291/ 05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. Eind – The 
return of the member state national and the destiny of the European citizen. European 
Constitutional Law Review 4 (2), pp. 344– 362.; Costello, C. (2009). Metock: Free Movement 
and “Normal Family Life” in the Union. Common Market Law Review 46 (2), pp. 587– 622; 
Cambien, N.  (2009). Case C- 127/ 08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v.  Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Columbia Journal of European Law 15 (2), pp. 321– 342; 
Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers: O and B, 
and S and G. Common Market Law Review 52 (3), pp. 753– 777; Van Eijken, H. (2014). De 
Zaken S. en G. & O. en B.: Grenzeloze Gezinnen en Afgeleide Verblijfsrechten. Nederlands 




construction makes it possible to circumvent the national family reunification 
rules by temporarily moving to another Member State and then come back, 
which exempts the family from the applicability of national law.
Circumventing national legislation on family reunification by acquiring res-
idence rights in another Member State and then return with them without 
intervention of national law17 is called the “Europe- route”.18 The availability 
of the Europe- route empowers EU citizens to change the legal regime that ap-
plies to them and thereby partly remedies the inequality that exists between 
EU citizens that benefit from EU law and those who do not. Thereby it could 
offer a form of reconciliation for reverse discrimination. At the same time, 
however, the availability of the Europe- route curtails the competence of the 
Member States to regulate the position of their own nationals.19 To prevent 
express circumvention of applicable national immigration law through use of 
the Europe- route, art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 gives Member States the possi-
bility to classify the use of EU rights as abuse of law and refuse or withdraw the 
residence rights EU citizens’ family members derive thereof.20 The legitimate 
 17 Faull, J. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 291 et seq., especially p. 293; COSTELLO, 
C.  (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p.  321 et seq.; Groenendijk, K.  (2014). Reverse 
Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, cit., 
p.  169 et seq.; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  117 et seq. 
Circumvention of EU law may also be relevant when national law does not allow for gay 
marriage. In Coman and Others, cit., the Court decided that gay marriage and the per-
taining rights that are obtained in another Member State can also be brought back to the 
home Member State, thereby evading the impossibility of gay marriage that exists in some 
Member States. See: Tryfonidou, A. (2018). Free Movement of Same- sex Spouses Within 
the EU: The ECJ’s Coman Judgment. European Law Blog, available at europeanlawblog.eu; 
Kroeze, H.H.C., and Safradin, B. (2019). Een Overwinning voor vrij Verkeersrechten van 
Regenboogfamilies in Europa: Het Langverwachte Coman Arrest. Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor Europees Recht 1– 2, pp. 51– 59. A precondition that is set to bring rights back home is 
that residence in the host Member State has been genuine. See O. and B. cit., paras. 51– 61 
and Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 18 Member States did not receive this decrease in their competence with open arms, and 
a discourse arose about “closing the Europe- route”. In this discourse it is suggested that 
(purposeful) circumvention of national family reunification rules by temporarily mov-
ing to another Member States to fall within the application of the more lenient EU law 
on family reunification should be a ground to refuse the rights that are pursued. Most 
notably in the Netherlands. See Parliamentary Document 29 700, Amendment of the 
Immigration Law 2000 with regard to the integration requirement, no. 31: Letter from the 
Minister for Immigration and Integration to the Parliament, zoek.officielebekendmakin-
gen.nl. Also see: Costello, C. (2009). Metock, cit., p. 587 et seq.
 19 And it makes less favorable treatment of nationals who cannot bring themselves within 
the scope of EU law even more pronounced. See the argument below.
 20 Singh, cit., para. 24, see infra; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship 
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concern of Member States to avoid circumvention of their national laws can 
be contrasted with the individual’s wish to live together with his family, which 
is protected by human rights law. The European Convention of Human Rights 
protects the right to family life and the right to marry. These rights are not abso-
lute and do not impose “a general obligation […] to respect the choice by mar-
ried couples of the country of their matrimonial residence or to authorise fam-
ily reunification on its territory”.21 Yet, since the beginning of the 21st century, 
the European Court of Human Rights demonstrated a “readiness to extend the 
protective reach of Article 8 [of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr)] in the field of immigration”.22 In light of the protection of the family, 
it is uncomfortable in itself that the EU legal system is so fragmented that EU 
citizens are in need of circumventing their national laws to be together with 
their loved ones in the first place.23 A tension exists between the citizen’s right 
to love,24 and the Member State’s “right to control the entry of non- nationals 
into its territory”, which limits the possibilities the circumvent their national 
law.25 To protect the Member States’ discretion in defining and maintaining 
 21 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/ 80, 9473/ 81 and 
9474/ 81, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, para. 68; judgment of 
31 January 2006, no. 50435/ 99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 
39; judgment of 3 October 2014, no. 12738/ 10, Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, para. 107.
 22 THYM, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases:  A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay? International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 57 (1), pp.  87– 112, 111; e.g. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 
December 2001, no.  31465/ 96, Sen v.  the Netherlands; judgment of 1 December 2005, 
no. 60665/ 00, Tuquabo- Tekle et al v. the Netherlands.
 23 Much can be said about this perspective. One insight is that EU law is an institute of 
exclusion, be- ause it only privileges the “good citizens” who add to the establishment 
of the internal market. Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 59– 62; Azoulai, 
L.  (2017). Transfiguring European Citizenship:  From Member State Territory to Union 
Territory. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit.; Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned 
Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship Through Its Scope. In: Kochenov, ed., EU 
Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p.  220 et seq.; O’Brien, C.  (2017). Unity in Adversity:  EU 
Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK. London:  Bloomsbury 
Publishing. Also see:  Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2017). A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right 
Not to Move in a Union Based on Free Movement. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit.
 24 D’Aoust, A.M. (2014). Love as Project of (Im)Mobility:  Love, Sovereignty and 
Governmentality in Marriage Migration Management Practices. Global Society 28 (3), 
pp. 317– 335; Karst, K.L. (1980). The Freedom of Intimate Association. The Yale Law Journal 
89 (4), pp. 624– 692.
 25 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.  the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da 













their national policy choices, they can us the concept of abuse of rights26 to 
limit the circumvention of national law. Abuse of law is defined as a situation 
in which the conditions to acquire a right are formally fulfilled, whereas the 
conduct that led to conferral of the right does not meet the purpose for which 
the right was conferred.27 Since abuse of law is characterized by the fact that 
the conditions to acquire a right are formally fulfilled, limiting those rights on 
the ground of that abuse may be contrary to the principle of legal certainty.28 
In the interest of legal certainty, and in the interest of the individual’s right to 
love and live with his family, it is therefore necessary to carefully delineate the 
scope of application of abuse of law in the context of EU family reunification, 
which is the main purpose of this contribution. By determining the width of 
the scope of EU law, the remaining discretionary competence that is left to the 
Member States also becomes clearer.29 When abuse of law is given a broad in-
terpretation, Member States can more easily rely on it and have more leeway in 
enforcing their national rules at the expense of limiting the rights that derive 
from EU law. Conversely, when abuse of law is given a narrow interpretation, 
it is more difficult for Member States to rely on it and is more difficult to take 
away EU rights. A broad interpretation of abuse of law thus favours Member 
States’ interests in protecting their competence to regulate the legal position 
of their nationals, and a narrow interpretation favours the effectiveness of EU 
law, and the individual’s right to love and live with his family.
This research addresses abuse of EU law in the context of family reunifica-
tion between a third- country national and an EU citizen to acquire a residence 
right. The main research question is how genuine use of EU law for the pur-
pose of family reunification, and abuse of EU law that is used to circumvent 
national immigration law can be distinguished. Two types of possible abuse 
are considered, the conclusion of marriages of convenience and the circum-
vention of national law through use of the Europe- route. Both types of con-
duct are aimed at bringing a case of immigration or family reunification within 
the scope of EU law to benefit from a more lenient immigration/ family reuni-
fication regime. Social welfare tourism as a form of abuse of free movement 
law is excluded from the analysis, with the exception of those cases that are 
 26 Abuse of law and abuse of rights are used interchangeable in this contribution.
 27 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers. In: De 
La Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. 296. See infra.
 28 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 295 et seq., especially p. 296; Poiares Maduro, M. (2011). Foreword. In: De La Feria, and 
Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. vii.
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conducive to understanding the concept of abuse of law in the context of fam-
ily reunification.30 Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 also mentions fraud a a reason 
to refuse, terminate or withdraw rights. Fraud “may be defined as deliberate 
deception or contrivance made to obtain the right of free movement and resi-
dence under the Directive. In the context of the Directive, fraud is likely to be 
limited to forgery of documents or false representation of a material fact con-
cerning the conditions attached to the right of residence”.31 Abuse of law, on 
the other hand, refers to “an artificial conduct entered into solely with the pur-
pose of obtaining the right of free movement and residence under Community 
law which, albeit formally observing of the conditions laid down by Commu-
nity rules, does not comply with the purpose of those rules”.32 Therefore, the 
difference between fraud and abuse is that in case of abuse, the conditions for 
acquiring a right are fulfilled, whilst in the case of fraud, information is falsified 
to make it seem like they are fulfilled when they are not. This contribution only 
deals with abuse of law and not with fraud.
The second chapter of the contribution will introduce the legal and political 
context in which reverse discrimination and (ab)use of rights for the purpose 
of family reunification are positioned. Particular attention will be given to the 
federalist- citizenship contraposition that is apparent in the EU constitutional 
struggle and mitigated by the introduction of the concept of abuse of law. This 
part will also explore the role of the echr as a complementary source of pro-
tection when situations fall outside the scope of EU law. The third chapter of 
this contribution addresses the Member States’ concern about circumvention 
of their national immigration laws. To deal with this circumvention, they may 
classify the use of free movement rights as abuse of EU law and refuse or with-
draw residence rights that are derived thereof. Doing so, however, may com-
promise legal certainty. Chapters four until seven apply the concept of abuse 
in a family reunification context, and aims to delineate te scope of abuse in 
 30 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 295 et seq., especially p. 300 et seq.; Mantu, S.A., and Minderhoud, P.E. (2016). Exploring 
the Limits of Social Solidarity. Welfare Tourism and EU Citizenship. UNIO  – EU Law 
Journal 2 (2), pp. 4– 19.
 31 Communication com(2009) 313 final of 2 July 2009 from the Commission on the appli-
cation of Directive 2004/ 38, p. 15, point 4.1.1; Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 1997, 
case C- 285/ 95, Kol v. Land Berlin, para. 29; judgment of 27 September 2001, case C- 63/ 99, 
Gloszczuk, para. 75; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement 
of Workers, cit., p. 295 et seq. especially p. 296.
 32 Communication com(2009) 313, cit., p.  15, point 4.1.2; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 
December 2000, case C- 110/ 99, Emsland- Stärke, para. 52 et seq.; judgment of 9 March 1999, 








this area of the law. The seventh chapter elaborates on the question when res-
idence in another Member State is sufficiently genuine to retain family mem-
bers’ residence rights upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen. 
It is demonstrated that the creation and strengthening of family life is the cen-
tral criterion that needs to be taken into account. The eighth section evaluates 
these conditions and further elaborates upon the distinction between abuse 
of law and noncompliance with the applicable conditions for family reunifi-
cation. The nineth and last section, finally, discusses the most recent case- law 
of the Court which deals with the personal scope of family reunification under 
EU free movement law in return situations, and in general. The importance of 
the research is to add to the understanding of abuse of law in a family reuni-
fication context and to inquire about its implications for legal certainty and 
judicial protection in the EU. In addition, the research aims to position the 
theme of reverse discrimination in a broader constitutional context. Last but 
not least, the contribution sheds light on the complexities of the return situ-
ation and further discusses under which circumstances a residence right can 
be derived after the exercise of free movement rights upon return in the home 
Member State of the EU citizen.
ii Reverse Discrimination: Colliding Constitutional Principles 
in EU Law
It can be deduced from the text of the Treaties,33 and many sources of second-
ary law, that European law- makers in the past and in the present have attached 
great importance to equality in EU law.34 In fact, it is considered to be “one of 
the fundamental values people throughout Europe can agree upon” as a result 
of a “longstanding tradition of egalitarian discourse […] on the old continent”.35 
“As a consequence, European equality law opens up a space in which Europe-
an citizens feel included in the broader integration project”.36 Citizenship as 
the manifestation of equality may, however, collide with other constitutional 
principles of the EU, which as an international organization goes further than 
merely intergovernmental cooperation and very much resembles a federalist 
 33 E.g. Art. 2 teu; Art. 18 tfeu; Title iii on Equality, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter).
 34 Croon- Gestefeld, J.  (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p.  1 et seq.; 
Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 162– 166.
 35 Croon- Gestefeld, J. (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p. 3.
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entity.37 Upholding the federal balance requires a compromise between the 
need of the EU to have sufficient competences to achieve the common goals 
for which it was established, and preserving the sovereignty of its Member 
States.38 The competences of the EU are, therefore, limited by the principle of 
conferral, which is translated into the division of competences.39 Through this 
principle, the EU is shaped into a type of multi- level governance system, which 
pursues an optimal allocation of regulatory competences. Allocation of these 
competences is directed by the principle of subsidiarity, which means that 
competences are exercised at the level of government that is best positioned 
to regulate a specific issue. The EU may only intervene if it is able to act more 
effectively than the Member States at their respective national or local levels.40
Contrary to the notion of equal citizenship, the division of competences 
implies the possibility of unequal treatment among citizens, because the rules 
that are applicable to an individual may vary according to the level of gover-
nance where the competence to regulate the situation rests. The attachment of 
European decision- makers to equality does not preclude differentiation, since 
“the simple fact that we may agree that equality takes up a prominent place in 
European law tells us little about its functioning or how we should evaluate its 
application”.41 Its functioning seems to be limited to the protection of equality 
within a legal regime – either in the EU or in a Member State – without real 
consideration for the differences that exist between these legal regimes. Thus, 
a tension exists between equal citizenship and the division of competences. In 
the EU this tension is particularly noticeable when EU citizens who reside in 
their own Member State and do not fall within the scope of EU law enjoy less 
protection than those who reside in a Member State of which they are not a 
 37 Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., p. 1 et seq., especially pp. 16– 35; Nic Shuibhne, 
N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the Implications for 
the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged? In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit., p.  147 et seq., especially p.  148; Zweifel, T.D. (2002). Democratic Deficit? 
Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States in 
Comparative Perspective. Oxford:  Lexington Books; Menon, A., and Schain, M.  (2006). 
Comparative Federalism:  The European Union and the United States in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford:  Oxford University Press; Lenaerts, K.  (1997). Federalism:  Essential 
Concepts in Evolution. Fordham International Law Journal 21 (3), pp. 746– 798.
 38 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship, cit., p. 147 et seq., 
especially p. 149; Lenaerts, K. (1997). Federalism, cit., p. 746 et seq., 775.
 39 Arts 4, para. 1, and 5, paras. 1– 2, teu, Arts 2– 6 tfeu.
 40 Art. 5, para. 3, teu; Protocol no.  2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality; SCHÜTZE, R.  (2009). Subsidiarity After Lisbon:  Reinforcing the 
Safeguards of Federalism? The Cambridge Law Journal 68 (3), pp. 525– 536.












national. The occurrence of this inequality causes the reverse discrimination, 
which was mentioned in the introduction.42 “Reverse” means that the group 
that is being discriminated against is an unexpected group, which is treated 
less favourably in comparison with another group which normally would re-
ceive the inferior treatment.43 More specifically, it is normally expected that 
“insiders” enjoy more privileges than “outsiders”, but when citizens are reverse-
ly discriminated, the opposite situation exists.44
Reverse discrimination occurs
due to the fact that, in order to further the Community’s central aim of es-
tablishing a common market, [EU] law […] grants rights to [persons] that 
fall within its scope by virtue of their contribution to the construction of 
the internal market, that are more generous or flexible than those that are 
provided by national laws to persons […] that are deemed to fall within the 
scope of application of national law, as a result of the application of the pure-
ly internal rule. […] Accordingly, there may be a difference in treatment.45
In other words, because the EU originated from an economic rationale, the 
Union’s competence only extends to the legal position of EU citizens who 
move between Member States, because they contribute to the establishment 
of the internal market.46 Purely internal situations, which are confined in all 
 42 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 13– 18; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., pp. 3– 10; Davies, G. (2003). Nationality 
Discrimination in the European Internal Market, cit.; Poiares Maduro, M. (2000). The Scope 
of European Remedies, cit.; Van Elsuwege, P., and Kochenov, D.  (2011). On the Limits 
of Judicial Intervention, cit.; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely 
Internal Situations, cit.; Hanf, D. (2011). Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional 
Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?, cit.; Oosterom- Staples, H. (2012). 
To What Extent Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed?, cit.; Groenendijk, K. (2014). 
Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, 
cit.; O’Leary, S.  (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU 
Law, cit.; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, cit.; Costello, C. (2011). 
Citizenship of the Union, cit.
 43 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 3, 14; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 3.
 44 Carens, J.H. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, p.  185 
et seq.
 45 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 14.
 46 Ibid., p.  7, 129 et seq., p.  166; Verbist, V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European 
Union, cit., pp. 69– 70; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We 
the Burden? London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p.  15 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The 
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relevant aspects to a single Member States, on the other hand, fall outside the 
scope of EU law.47
The purpose of introducing the right to family reunification as an an-
cillary to free movement rights was to facilitate the movement that would 
contribute to the establishment of the internal market. Not being able to 
bring one’s family was considered to be an obstacle to move, and removing 
that obstacle by facilitating family reunification was expected to increase 
the chance that workers and self- employed would go abroad. Moreover, it 
was thought that being able to enjoy family life in the host country would 
diminish the need to retain strong ties to the home Member State, which 
would stimulate integration in the host Member State and, again, facilitate 
free movement.48 Nationals who resided in their own Member State, on the 
other hand, did not contribute to the establishment of the internal mar-
ket. They were thus not protected by EU law and not eligible for the family 
1614; Dautricourt, C., and Thomas, S. (2009). Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement 
of Persons Under Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope? European Law 
Review 34 (4), pp. 433– 454, 454, 436; O’Leary, S. (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the 
Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2002). Free Movement 
of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On. Common Market Law Review 
39 (4), pp. 731– 771. An exception to this economic rationale for conferring family reunifi-
cation rights seems to have emerged in the Ruiz Zambrano case- law, in which a residence 
right was granted to the Colombian parents of Belgian children by virtue of them being 
an EU citizen and enjoying the right to reside, rather than contributing to the economic 
objectives of the internal market. To discuss these rights falls outside the scope of this 
contribution, however, which focuses only on the applicability and analogous applica-
bility of Directive 2004/ 38, after exercising free movement rights. For reliance on these 
rights the requirement to make use of free movement rights has persisted. Also see infra, 
footnote 58.
 47 Art. 3, para. 1, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.; case- law e.g., Court of Justice, judgment of 7 
February 1979, case 115/ 78, Knoors v.  Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, para. 24; 
judgment of 28 March 1979, case 175/ 78, The Queen v. Saunders, para. 11; judgment of 27 
October 1982, joined cases 35 and 36/ 82, Morson and Jhanjan, para. 18; judgment of 5 June 
1997, joined cases C- 64/ 96 and C- 65/ 96, Land Nordrhein- Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet, 
para. 16; O. and B., cit., para. 36; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, 
cit., pp.  7– 10, 42– 44, 49– 50; Verbist, V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European 
Union, cit., pp. 5– 6, 19, 21– 26, 69– 70; Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, 
K.  (2014). European Migration Law, cit., p. 49; O’Leary, S.  (2009). The Past, Present and 
Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2002). 
Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule, cit., p. 731.
 48 Berneri, C.  (2017). Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p.  8; Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., 
Lodder, G., and Wouters, K.  (2014). European Migration Law, cit., p.  30; Tryfonidou, 
A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  96 et seq.; Recitals 18, 23– 24 of the 






reunification rights guaranteed by EU free movement law. Additionally, it 
was assumed they did not need EU law protection to secure their right to 
reside and work, because by virtue of their national citizenship they already 
enjoy those rights indiscriminately.49 The rights that were provided to them 
by national law did not always, however, include a right to family reunifi-
cation that was comparable to the equivalent right in EU law. As a result, 
when the national legislation that applies to these citizens offers other or 
less rights than EU law does, they are reversely discriminated in comparison 
with nationals from other Member States who do benefit from EU law for 
the purpose of family  reunification.50
In general, Member States do not “want to discriminate against their own 
nationals”, but reverse discrimination occurs “because [Union] law obliges 
States to treat nationals of other Member States in a way which – by reasons of 
their own policies and aims – they did not originally intend to treat their own 
nationals”.51 Thus, when national legislation infringes EU free movement law, 
it must only be set aside for EU citizens who, by virtue of their movement to 
another Member State, fall within the scope of EU law. Nationals of the con-
cerned Member State who did not make use of free movement rights, on the 
other hand, fall outside the protection of EU law, so to them the national legis-
lation continues to apply and as a result they are reversely discriminated. “Re-
verse discrimination is [thus] a side effect of the limited scope of application 
of EU law”.52 In other cases, reverse discrimination may be “a deliberate choice 
of the national legislator to (continue to) apply stricter conditions to purely 
internal situations in order to pursue their own national policy”.53 For family 
reunification, this deliberate choice is made by several of the Member States, 
including Belgium and the Netherlands.54
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, McCarthy, paras. 28– 29; O. and 
B., cit., para. 42; Art. 3 of Protocol no. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms securing certain rights and freedoms other than those 
already included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto.
 50 Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  7; Verbist, V.  (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p.  69 et seq.; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). 
Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 15 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The 
Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, cit., p. 1597 et seq., especially p. 1614.
 51 Poiares Maduro, M. (2000). The Scope of European Remedies, cit., p. 127; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 4.
 52 Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 42.
 53 Ibid., pp.  4– 5. In some cases, Member States may introduce stricter requirements to 
advantage their own nationals (i.e. requiring stricter qualifications of specific profession-
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The viability of continuing to uphold the economic premises on which the 
EU was built and to continue to allow the existence of reverse discrimination 
can be questioned, of course, and if the EU does not start to prioritize the in-
clusion of its citizens more than it does now, its legitimacy may be seriously 
undermined.55 At the same time, the EU Treaties provide constitutional pro-
tection to EU citizenship and the principle of equality, as well as to the divi-
sion of competences. Reconciliation of these principles should, therefore, take 
place within the boundaries of those Treaties, within the EU’s constitutional 
system. In exploring possible reconciliation, some scholars have examined 
whether reverse discrimination should fall within the scope of Art. 18 tfeu, 
which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality.56 The Court of 
Justice rejected this possibility, however, because the difference in treatment 
did not constitute “an obstacle to the construction of the internal market”.57
 55 E.g. Kochenov, D.  (2010). Citizenship Without Respect, cit.; Kochenov, D.  (2008) 
Ius Tractum of Many Faces:  European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
Between Status and Rights. Columbia Journal of European Law 15 (2), pp.  169– 238; 
Kostakopoulou, D.  (2007). European Union Citizenship:  Writing the Future. European 
Law Journal 13 (5), pp. 623– 646; Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European 
Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change. The Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp. 233– 267; 
Kostakopoulou, D., and Kostakopoulou, T. (2001). Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration in 
the European Union: Between Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 
O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Adversity, cit.
 56 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 18 et seq.; Opinion of AG 
Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 123– 150; 
Spaventa, E. (2004). From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non- )Economic European 
Constitution. Common Market Law Review 41(3), pp.  743– 773, 771; Spaventa, E.  (2017). 
Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 204 et seq., especially p. 204; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the 
Wood Despite the Trees, cit., pp.  13– 45; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its 
Limits in EU Law, cit., pp. 16– 19; Adam, S., and Van Elsuwege, P. (2012). Citizenship Rights 
and the Federal Balance Between the European Union and Its Member States: Comment 
on Dereci. European Law Review 37 (2), pp. 176– 190, 188 et seq.
 57 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 February 1987, case 98/ 86, Ministére public v.  Mathot, 
paras. 7– 8; judgment of 15 January 1986, case 44/ 84, Hurd v. Jones, paras. 54– 56; judgment 
of 23 October 1986, case 355/ 85, Driancourt v. Cognet, paras. 10– 11; judgment of 16 June 
1994, case C- 132/ 93, Steen v.  Deutsche Bundespost; judgment of 29 January 2004, case 
C- 253/ 01, Krüger; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  18 et 
seq.; VERBIST, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 25 et seq.; 
Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 16 et seq.; Adam, 
S., and Van Elsuwege, P. (2012). Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance Between the 
European Union and Its Member States, cit., p.  188 et seq.; Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned 
Citizenship, cit., p.  204 et seq. The restricted applicability of Art. 18 TFEU is also men-
tioned in the provision itself, which limits its applicability to those cases that fall “within 
the scope of the Treaties”. See: Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU 








An alternative option for reconciliation could be that reverse discrimina-
tion can exist within reasonable boundaries of equality. These reasonable 
boundaries are not to be considered as fixed limits to reverse discrimination 
that should be enforced by the EU or its Member States, but as a balancing ex-
ercise that mitigates some of the inequality that is caused by the system with-
out defying the division of competences. In this way, a solution could be found 
in finding “a way around” reverse discrimination and become more equal, so 
to say. For family reunification rights, the Court seems to have adopted such an 
approach in its case- law.58 It did so, for instance, by making the entitlement 
to the status of a worker dependent on a communitarian concept of being a 
worker instead, which ruled out the relevance of national interpretations.59 
Expanding the scope of the freedom of workers also expanded the scope of 
potential beneficiaries to the family reunification rights that are attached to 
 58 Here I only discuss family reunification rights on the basis of Art. 21 tfeu and Directive 
2004/ 38, cit. Family reunification rights derived from Art. 20 tfeu pursuant to the Ruiz 
Zambrano line of case- law is left out of the analysis. Ruiz Zambrano concerned a purely 
internal situation which was brought within the scope of EU law, because expulsion of 
the Colombian parents would force their Belgian children to leave the territory of the EU 
(in order to follow the parents), which would deprive them of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights they enjoy by virtue of their citizenship. In literature it 
has been discussed extensively whether and to what extent the Art. 20 tfeu case- law 
could remedy the lack of protection for EU citizens who reside in their own Member State 
and have never made use of free movement law. E.g. Kochenov, ed. (2017). EU Citizenship 
and Federalism, cit., discusses among other issues the question to what extent this line 
of case- law has added to give true meaning to European citizenship through a critical 
lens. Other examples of relevant sources are: Hailbronner, K., and Thym, D. (2011), Case C- 
34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National de l’Emploi. Common Market Law Review 
48 (4), pp. 1253– 1270; Van Elsuwege, P. (2011). Shifting the Boundaries? European Union 
Citizenship and the Scope of Application of EU Law – Case No. C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v. Office National de l’Emploi. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38 (3), pp. 263– 
276; Adam, S., and Van Elsuwege, P.  (2012). Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance 
Between the European Union and Its Member States, cit., p. 176 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P., 
and Kochenov, D. (2011). On the Limits of Judicial Intervention, cit.; Van Eijken, H., and DE 
Vries, S. (2011). A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European Citizen After Ruiz 
Zambrano. European Law Review 36 (5), pp. 704– 721; Kochenov, D.  (2013). The Right to 
Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification. European Law Journal 19 (4), 
pp. 502– 516; Kochenov, D. (2011). A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A 
Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European 
Law 18 (1), pp. 56– 109; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights – New Pieces of the 
Ruiz Zambrano Puzzle. European Law Review 41 (2), pp. 238– 256.
 59 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 July 1986, case 66/ 85, Lawrie- Blum v.  Land Baden- 
Wüttemberg, para. 21; judgment of 23 March 1983, case 53/ 81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie, para. 23; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of 
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the status of a worker. Similarly, the Court has always refused to introduce a 
fixed income requirement for family reunification. Instead, sufficient resourc-
es are assessed on a case- by- case basis.60 Additionally, and most important 
for this contribution is the earlier mentioned line of case- law which entails 
that when an EU citizen who has made use of the free movement of persons 
rights returns to his home Member State, the situation is no longer considered 
purely internal and is brought within the scope of Union law. The benefit that 
stems from continuing to fall within the scope of EU law is that EU citizens’ 
family members who acquired a residence right in the host state can retain 
those rights when they return to the home Member State of their EU family 
member. The only condition to retain these rights is that residence in the host 
Member State must have been genuine.61 If that is the case, the family member 
does not need to comply with the conditions for family reunification that are 
posed by the national law of that Member State.62 The case- law is motivated 
by the same economic discourse on which European integration was built, and 
in essence, entails that effectively exercising economic freedoms also implies 
the possibility to rely on EU law upon return to the home Member State. Safe-
guarding the effectiveness of EU law is critical because otherwise an individual 
could be deterred from using his rights in the first place.63
 60 Art. 7, para. 1, let. b), of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 2008, 
case C- 398/ 06, Commission v. Netherlands; judgment of 19 September 2013, case C- 140/ 12, 
Brey; Minderhoud, P.E. (2015). Sufficient Resources and Residence Rights Under Directive 
2004/ 38. Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series 3/ 2015.
 61 O. and B., cit., paras. 51– 61; Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 62 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit.; Akrich, cit.; Eind, cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., 
cit.; Coman and Others, cit.; Altiner and Ravn, cit.; Banger, cit.; Watson, P. (1993). Free 
Movement of Workers – A One Way Ticket? Case C- 370/ 90 The Queen v. Immigation 
Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh. Industrial Law Journal 22 (1), pp. 68– 77; Bierbach, 
J. (2008). European Citizens’ Third- Country Family Members and Community Law, cit., 
p. 344 et seq.; Costello, C. (2009). Metock, cit.; Cambien, N. (2009). Case C- 127/ 08, Blaise 
Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, cit., p. 321 
et seq.; Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers, 
cit., p.  753 et seq.; Van Eijken, H.  (2014). De Zaken S.  en G.  & O.  en B.:  Grenzeloze 
Gezinnen en Afgeleide Verblijfsrechten. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 10, 
pp. 319– 324.
 63 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State 
for Home Department, cit., paras. 19– 20; Akrich, cit., paras. 53– 54; Eind, cit., paras. 35– 36; 
Metock and Others, cit., paras. 64, 89– 92; O.  and B., cit., paras. 46, 52– 54; Coman and 
Others, cit., para. 24; Altiner and Ravn, cit., Banger, cit., para. 28; for a closer look upon the 
rationale of this doctrine, see the Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 10 April 2018, case 
C- 89/ 17, Rozanne Banger, paras. 27– 47; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in 










The case- law of the Court empowers individual citizens to bring them-
selves within the scope of EU law and benefit from more lenient rules ap-
plicable to family reunification, and can, thus, be considered as a form of 
reconciliation for those who are reversely discriminated. At the same time, 
this reconciliation requires movement to another Member State which can 
be unaffordable (due to finances or language barriers), in particular, because 
residence in the host state must be genuine before rights can be retained in 
the home Member State.64 This means that EU citizenship and the pertaining 
family reunification rights are reserved for the privileged “good” citizens who 
can afford to move and thus contribute to the internal market.65 Another is-
sue that is revealed when the scope of EU law is enhanced, is that it becomes 
increasingly difficult to justify why some citizens are still not included.66 It is 
acknowledged that the approximation of legal regimes and the empowerment 
of citizens is limited and compromised by these liabilities but it may be as 
much as is feasible within the constitutional limitations of EU law. Further 
remedies to reverse discrimination should then come from the legislator and 
ultimately from the Member States.67 They should take their responsibility in 
the EU as a co- legislator in the Council of Ministers or – when the EU lacks 
the competence to do so – outside the EU by resolving reverse discrimination 
on the basis of national law. Some of the Member States such as France, Italy 
and Austria, indeed, assumed this responsibility when their respective nation-
al courts decided that the principle of equality, that is protected by their own 
constitution, prohibits reverse discrimination.68 This approach has led to the 
extended application of EU law to those situations, on the basis of national 
law. The solution does not eliminate the purely internal rule but it does elim-
inate reverse discrimination. It is called “voluntary adoption”, “spontaneous 
harmonization” or “renvoi”.69
the European Internal Market, cit., p. 119 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience 
of EU Market Citizenship, cit., p. 1612.
 64 O. and B., cit., paras. 51– 61; Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 65 Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 59– 62; Azoulai, L. (2017). Transfiguring 
European Citizenship, cit., p. 178 et seq.; Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 220 
et seq.; O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Adversity, cit.
 66 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 116 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, 
N.  (2002). Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule, p.  731 et seq.; Nic 
Shuibhne, N.  (2002). The European Union and Fundamental Rights:  Well in Spirit but 
Considerably Rumpled in Body? In: Beaumont, Lyons, and Walker, eds., Convergence and 
Divergence in European Public Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002, pp. 177, 192.
 67 For instance on the basis of Art. 79 tfeu.
 68 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 121– 123.
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Another component of the protection of the family that mustn’t be forgotten, 
lastly, is the protection of Art. 8 echr. The Court of Justice recalled in its case- law 
that if EU law does not provide entitlement to a residence right “regard must be 
had to respect for family life under Article 8” of the echr.70 As was mentioned 
in the introduction, the protection of family life does not give an entitlement to 
choose the country of matrimonial residence.71 Quite the opposite, the echr is 
intentionally silent on matters of immigration. Admission to a Member State 
can, therefore, only be examined “through the effects of state measures on other 
human rights of the foreigners concerned”.72 In addition, the Member States are 
awarded a margin of appreciation in their decision- making. As a result, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights only examines whether the decision was reasonable, 
and does not go into the choices of national policy, which are made by the Mem-
ber States.73 Nevertheless, the Court shows a readiness to “correct intolerable out-
comes in individual cases”,74 which gives an alternative prospect to those who do 
not and cannot benefit from EU law for the purpose of family reunification.75
iii Abuse of EU Law – Definition and Background
Since 1974, the concept of law abuse is part of EU law.76 Its coming into being 
was inspired by the use of the concept in some of the Member States, even 
 70 Akrich, cit., para. 58; a few years later it mentioned in Metock and Others, cit., para. 
79, that even though reverse discrimination does not fall within the scope of EU law, 
the Member States are all parties to the echr. In more recent cases such as O.  and 
B., cit., Coman and Others, cit., Altiner and Ravn, cit., and Banger, cit. the Court has 
neglected to refer to the echr but this does not mean that its complementarity ceased 
to exist.
 71 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da Silva 
and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, cit., para. 39; Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit., para. 107.
 72 Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases, cit., p. 103.
 73 Ibid. p.  103 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P., and Kochenov, D.  (2011). On the Limits of Judicial 
Intervention:  EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights. European Journal of 
Migration and Law 13 (4), pp. 443– 466, 461 et seq.
 74 Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases, cit., p. 107.
 75 Van Elsuwege, P. and Adam, S. (2017). EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge 
Through the Prism of Family Reunification. In: Kochenov, ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit., pp. 443– 467, especially p. 460 et seq.
 76 Either as a general principle or as a “principle of construction” but, in any case, the Court 
of Justice takes recourse to the principle in its case- law, e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 

















though, not all Member States are familiar with it in the same way.77 As was 
mentioned above, abuse of law was introduced to resolve some of the tension 
between the effective use of EU law and judicial protection of those who use 
it while maintaining the preservation of the Member States’ competence to 
regulate internal situations. This helps to distinguish between genuine use of 
EU law within the limits that are set by the Court of Justice and use of EU law 
that is meant to circumvent national law, which is, therefore, not a genuine use 
of EU rights. Member States’ reliance on abuse of law thus protects the division 
of competences in a sensitive area of law. Nevertheless, applying abuse of law 
in an EU context also causes the restriction of EU rights. Therefore, invoking 
abuse of law is dependent on the scope of interpretation of abuse of law that is 
given by the Court of Justice. When EU rights are constructed and interpreted 
extensively by the Court, it is more difficult for the Member States to invoke 
abuse of law, even when their national laws are being circumvented. When 
these rights are more narrowly defined by the Court, it is easier to invoke abuse 
of law to restrict rights that go beyond their original purpose.78 In other words, 
the broader the interpretation of EU free movement law, the less discretion 
there is to rely on abuse of law for the Member States and vice versa.79
This sensitivity is reflected in the development of the principle of abuse in 
EU law. In the course of the relevant case- law on abuse of law, a paradigm- 
shift can be observed from the essential purpose towards the sole purpose 
doctrine. The first doctrine entails that when the essential reason to invoke 
Union law does not tally with its purpose, this is classified as abuse of law, 
regardless of whether an additional legitimate purpose – which was not the 
essential purpose – for invoking the law can be found. Abuse of law is easily 
assumed.80 The sole purpose doctrine, on the other hand, entails that abuse of 
law can only be ascertained when there is no other objective distinguishable 
De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit.; De La Feria, 
R.  (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law:  The Creation of a New General 
Principle of EC Law Through Tax. Common Market Law Review 45 (2), pp. 395– 441, 436.
 77 And those who do use the principle show considerable differences in the scope with 
which they apply it. De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, 
cit., p. 395.
 78 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 297.
 79 Ibid.
 80 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 June 1988, case 39/ 86, Lair v.  Universität Hannover; 
Vanistendael, F. (2011). Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse from an EU Tax Law Perspective. 
In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 295– 314; Ziegler, 
K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit.; Costello, 
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but the circumvention of national law.81 In that understanding of abuse of law, 
the mere fact that a person consciously places himself in a situation through 
which a certain right can be obtained does not in itself constitute sufficient 
basis to assume that there is an abuse of law.82 This doctrine is based on the no-
tion that as long as a right is invoked in a genuine and effective manner, there 
can be no abuse.83 Thus here, the scope of the concept’s applicability is narrow.
The Court first introduced the concept of abuse of law in 1974 in Van Bins-
bergen. The case concerned a Dutch lawyer who wanted to circumvent the 
professional rules of conduct that were applicable to him in the Netherlands 
by establishing himself in Belgium. Dutch law provided, however, that legal 
representatives should reside in the Netherlands. Van Binsbergen argued that 
this rule was contrary to the freedom to provide services. The Court of Justice 
did not follow this argument and ruled that “[a] Member State cannot be de-
nied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing 
services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory 
[…] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would 
be applicable to him if he were established within that state”.84 The formula-
tion of the Court in Van Binsbergen seemed to award a broad discretion to the 
Member States, by implying that all circumvention of national rules could be 
contested and give reason to restrict the individual’s rights.85
Van Binsbergen was followed by the so- called “Greek Challenge” cases. 
These cases concerned the reliance of shareholders of Greek public limited 
liability companies on Directive 77/ 91/ EEC on the protection of their rights in 
the context of alterations in the capital of the company. The Greek government 
classified these claims as abuse of EU law, and the national courts asked for 
clarification from the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice considered that, 
despite the right of the Member States to combat abuse of law, reliance on this 
concept should not undermine the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law.86 
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 February 2006, case C- 255/ 02, Halifax and Others; Ziegler, 
K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit.; Costello, 
C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p. 321 et seq.
 82 Centros, cit., para. 27.
 83 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, 
case C- 196/ 04, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas.
 84 Van Binsbergen v.  Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, cit., para. 13; De La Feria, 
R.  (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p.  399 et seq.; Tryfonidou, 
A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 54 et seq.
 85 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 403 et seq.
 86 Court of Justice: judgment of 12 March 1996, case C- 441/ 93, Patifis and Others, para. 68; 














Hence, the discretionary competence to apply abuse of law was restricted and 
the concept started to obtain a communitarian meaning. In Centros, the Court 
further restricted the Member States’ discretion to invoke abuse of law. The 
case concerned Danish entrepreneurs who established their company in the 
United Kingdom with the sole aim of avoiding Danish law on minimum capi-
tal.87 When the company wanted to open a branch in Denmark, the Danish au-
thorities refused access to the Danish market, because according to them the 
company had abused EU law on freedom of establishment. The Court decided 
differently and considered that the mere fact that a person consciously places 
himself in a situation through which a certain right can be obtained, does not 
in itself constitute an abuse of law. The right to choose the Member State with 
the least restrictive company law to establish a company is “inherent in the 
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
the Treaty”.88 Similarly to Van Binsbergen, the company in Centros had made 
use of a U- turn construction to circumvent national law. Because the Court 
allowed this, it follows from its judgment that circumvention of national law 
does not always qualify as abuse of law.89 Where Van Binsbergen was an exam-
ple of the essential purpose doctrine, with Centros the Court started to move 
towards a sole purpose doctrine.
It also follows from Centros that a distinction is made between use and 
abuse of EU law. Use of EU law cannot lead to restriction of rights, whilst 
abuse can. The question arose how it is possible to distinguish between use 
and abuse of rights. The Court answered this question in Emsland- Stärke, 
which can be used to determine whether a case can be classified as abuse of 
law. Like the earlier cases, Emsland- Stärke concerned a U- turn construction. 
The company exported a potato- based product from Germany to Switzerland 
for which it received an export refund. After the export, they immediately 
returned the products to Germany and sold them there. The question was 
whether this practice was abuse of EU law, which could justify the denial of 
the export refund. The Court considered:  “A finding of abuse requires, first, 
a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal obser-
vance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element 
23 March 2000, C- 373/ 97, Diamantis, paras. 34– 39; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of 
Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 404.
 87 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 405 et seq.
 88 Centros, cit., para. 27; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, 
cit., p. 405 et seq.
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consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules 
by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it”.90 By intro-
ducing this two- component test to assess possible abuse of law, the Court 
strongly restricted the discretionary competence of the Member State to de-
cide on the lawfulness of the use of EU law and gave the concept of abuse 
a communitarian meaning.91 Emsland- Stärke was broadly discussed. The 
subjective element of the test was contested because of the difficulty to de-
termine subjective intentions, and the question was asked whether Emsland- 
Stärke could be transposed to other fields of EU law.92 The Court responded 
to these questions and criticism in Halifax.93 This case concerned a banking 
company whose financial services were tax- exempted. Accordingly, when the 
company established new call- centres, Halifax could only recover 5 per cent 
of the Value Added Tax (vat) paid on the construction works. By developing a 
system of a series of transactions involving different companies of the Halifax 
group, it was, nevertheless, able to recover effectively the full amount of vat. 
The question in this case was whether reliance on the right to deduct vat, 
when the transactions on which the right was based were solely effected for 
that particular purpose, would be an abuse of rights. By applying the Emsland- 
Stärke test to the area of vat, it was understood that the two components test 
would become the standardized test for abuse of law.94 Furthermore, Halifax 
seemed to respond to the criticism about the subjective element of the test 
by objectifying it. The Court considered: “An abusive practice will be found to 
exist where […] it is apparent from a number of objective factors, such as the 
 90 Emsland- Stärke, cit., para. 52. Up until today the test is repeated in cases such as Court of 
Justice, judgment of 22 December 2010, case C- 303/ 08, Bozkurt, para. 47; judgment of 16 
October 2012, case C- 364/ 10, Hungary v. Slovakia, para. 58; O. and B., cit., para. 58; De La 
Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 408 et seq.
 91 Vanistendael, F. (2011). Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse from an EU Tax Law Perspective, 
cit., p. 295 et seq.; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., 
p. 408 et seq.
 92 Weber, D. (2004). Abuse of Law – European Court of Justice, 14 December 2000, Case C- 
110/ 99, EmslandStärke. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), pp. 43– 55.
 93 Halifax and Others, cit.; De La Feria, R.  (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition 
of Abuse of Law. In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 
xv- xvi; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 421 et seq.; 
Lenaerts, A. (2010). The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical 
Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law. European Review of Private Law 
18 (6), pp. 1121– 1154.
 94 Halifax and Others, cit.; Lenaerts, A. (2010). The General Principle of the Prohibition of 
Abuse of Rights, cit.; De La Feria, R.  (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of 
Abuse of Law, cit., pp. xv- xvi; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) 












purely artificial nature of the transactions and the links between operators 
involved in the scheme, that the essential aim of those transactions concerned 
was to obtain a tax advantage”.95
In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court extended the scope of application of the 
Emsland- Stärke test, again, to the field of corporate taxation. The case was 
similar to Centros and concerned a UK based company that exercised an eco-
nomic activity on the Irish market. To counter tax- avoidance, the UK had es-
tablished a tax on the income from Ireland, which was disputed before the 
Court of Justice. The Court reiterated the doctrine it had developed until then. 
It considered that nationals of a Member State are not supposed to “improp-
erly circumvent national legislation” or “improperly or fraudulently take ad-
vantage of provisions of Community law”. Yet, the establishment of a branch 
in another Member State “for the purpose of benefitting from the favourable 
tax regime […] does not in itself constitute abuse”.96 The freedom of establish-
ment may, thus, only be restricted to prevent “wholly artificial arrangements”, 
equated with abuse.97 To establish the existence of a “wholly artificial arrange-
ment”, the EmslandStärke test should be applied.98 Cadbury Schweppes can 
be understood as another step of the Court from the essential purpose to-
wards the sole purpose doctrine. This is because the existence of a purpose 
aside from constructing a “wholly artificial” situation to benefit from EU rights 
precludes classification as abuse of law. The existence of such an additional 
purpose, which legitimizes the use of EU law, is recognized when the objective 
of free movement rights has been achieved and reflected in economic reali-
ty.99 “ ‘[P] lanning without abuse’ is a legitimate activity, [and] is reminiscent 
of the idea of ‘legitimate circumvention’ expressed both in Centros, and in the 
post- Centros decisions on establishment”, as long as the rights are effectively 
exercised.100
 95 Halifax and Others, cit., paras. 74, 75, 81; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of 
(Community) Law, cit., p. 422.
 96 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit., paras. 35– 37.
 97 Ibid., para. 57.
 98 Ibid., paras. 64– 65; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., 
p. 425 et seq.
 99 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit., paras. 64– 65; De La Feria, 
R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 427.
 100 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 423 et seq.; For a 
more recent analysis of circumvention of national law for economic purposes by corpora-
tions see Costamagna, F. (2019). At the Roots of Regulatory Competition in the EU: Cross- 
border Movement of Companies as a Way to Exercise a Genuine Economic Activity or 
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iv Abuse in the Context of Family Reunification Rights
In comparison with abuse of law in the context of tax law and free movement 
of services, abuse of law in the context of free movement of persons is a bit of 
an oddity. Scholars tend to either observe the “full rejection of the impact of 
the concept of abuse of law within the field of free movement of workers and 
citizenship”101 or its reduction to a “merely verbal acceptance as a legal prin-
ciple” in free movement law.102 The first case in which this became apparent 
was Lair.103 The question was whether a short period of being a worker was 
sufficient to be eligible for student assistance in the host state on the basis of 
non- discrimination in comparison with the population of that State. German 
law provided that a worker would only be eligible after a period of five years of 
employment. The Court considered that
[i] n so far as […] the three Member States […] are motivated by a desire 
to prevent certain abuses, for example where it may be established on 
the basis of objective evidence that a worker has entered a Member State 
for the sole purpose of enjoying, after a very short period of occupation-
al activity, the benefit of the student assistance system in that State, it 
should be observed that such abuses are not covered by the Community 
provisions in question.104
In the field of free movement, the Court, thus, relied on the sole purpose doc-
trine avant la lettre, about a decade before it was further developed in Centros 
and subsequent case- law.
This dichotomy between free movement of persons and the other freedoms 
is not unique105 and it is often defended on the basis that human beings should, 
indeed, be treated differently than economic transactions.106 Nevertheless, 
 101 La Feria, R. (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. xviii.
 102 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 306.
 103 Lair v. Universität Hannover, cit.
 104 Ibid., para. 43.
 105 Snell, J.  (2004). And then There Were Two:  Products and Citizens in Community Law. 
In: Tridimas and Nebbia, eds., European Union Law for the Twenty- first Century: Volume ii. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing.
 106 De La Feria, R. (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. xix.; 
Opinion of AG Jacobs delivered on 8 March 1989, case 344/ 87, Bettray v. Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie, paras. 28- 19, referring to recital 7 of Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 of the 
Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement of workers within the Community, 















even in the context of free movement rights, the Court does not preclude the 
existence of abuse and the discretion of the Member State to take measures 
against it. On the contrary, it has repeatedly confirmed that Member States are 
allowed to take measures to prevent possible abuse. The question remains how 
such a situation can be distinguished from a genuine use of free movement 
rights. To answer this question, the text of Directive 2004/ 38 and the pertain-
ing Communication on its application, that is issued by the Commission, are 
further examined, as well as the case- law of the Court of Justice.
Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 holds that “Member States may adopt the nec-
essary measures to refuse, terminate, or withdraw any right conferred by this 
Directive in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of conve-
nience”.107 One type of abuse of EU law is already mentioned in the provi-
sion, namely the attainment of a residence right on the basis of a marriage 
of convenience.108 The wording of Art. 35 implies, however, that potentially 
other unspecified usages of the Directive could also be classified as abuse. The 
legislator thereby created an – additional – open possibility for the limitation 
of rights, which leaves a legislative gap.109 The question that is answered here 
is whether the U- turn construction to acquire a residence right for a family 
member, by relying on EU law and thereby circumventing national law, also 
constitutes such an abuse of law or not.
v The Case- Law of the Court of Justice on Family Reunification 
Law Abuse
The first case of the Court of Justice that mentioned the possibility that law 
may be abused in the context of family reunification was Surinder Singh.110 
In this case, the Court recognized the possibility that relying on family reuni-
fication rules, in the context of free movement, can constitute abuse of law 
and that Member States can act against it. It considered: “the facilities created 
 107 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 297 et seq.
 108 Akrich, cit., para. 57.
 109 Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, K. (2014). European Migration Law, cit., 
p. 63; Costello, C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p. 321 et seq.
 110 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State 
for Home Department, cit. This case took place before Directive 2004/ 38 was adopted. 
Hence, there was no general legislative provision for abuse yet. It may even be per-
ceived that Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38, cit., is a codification of this aspect of Surinder 
Singh. Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 298; 
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by the Treaty cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from 
them to evade the application of national legislation and of prohibiting Mem-
ber States from taking the measures necessary to prevent such abuse”.111 The 
Court did not yet specify what types of behaviour could constitute such abuse. 
Instead, it created the possibility for the use of EU law to circumvent national 
family reunification rules, by establishing that once a family member acquires 
a residence right in the host state, where an EU citizen resides, he is able to 
retain these rights upon return to the home state of the EU citizen, which was 
discussed above. Years later, the Surinder Singh exception to the purely inter-
nal situation was confirmed in Akrich, Eind, Metock and in O. and B. and con-
tinues to be applicable law.112 How does the possibility to apply this U- turn 
construction in the field of family reunification relate to the general doctrine 
on abuse of law? Can it be considered to be abuse of law, and if yes, under 
which circumstances?113
Akrich was a first test- case in the context of free movement and family reuni-
fication and involved a British- Moroccan couple who applied the U- turn con-
struction to legalize the residence status of the Moroccan spouse. To achieve 
this, the couple moved to Ireland where the British spouse took up a temporary 
job, entitling the Moroccan partner to a residence right. When they wanted to 
return to the UK, they admitted that the only reason they moved to Ireland was 
to acquire a residence right for the Moroccan spouse on the basis of EU law. 
 111 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit., para. 24; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the 
European Union, cit., p. 101.
 112 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit.; Akrich, cit.; Eind, cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., 
cit.; Coman and Others, cit.; Altiner and Ravn, cit.; Banger, cit.; Guild, E., Peers, S., and 
Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 58 et seq.; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse 
Discrimination in the European Union, cit., pp.  101– 114; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse 
Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 103– 106.
 113 must also be noted that Art. 35, on abuse, was not in the original legislative proposal 
of the Commission and was added by the Council in a later stage of the negotiations 
(Council Common Position (EC) 6/ 2004 of 5 December 2003 adopted by the Council, act-
ing in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, with a view to adopting a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, statement of reasons on 
Art. 35). Although the Court had identified the issue of abuse before, it appears that its 
assertion by the Council was mainly symbolic, as a manifestation of their sovereignty, and 
they had not thought through which cases aside from marriages of convenience could 
constitute abuse. It is, thus, logical that this question arose later. Guild, E., Peers, S., and 








The Court considered that when an EU citizen “pursues or wishes to pursue an 
effective and genuine activity”,114 this cannot constitute an abuse within the 
meaning of the Surinder Singh judgment. “If there is a genuine exercise of an 
economic activity as defined by the Court of Justice, its preconditions cannot 
at the same time be created artificially”.115 Moreover, for the evaluation of the 
nature of the activity that is pursued, “the motives […] are of no account […] 
nor are [they] relevant in assessing the legal situation of the couple at the time 
of their return to the Member State of which the worker is a national”.116 The 
Court, thus, seemed to deviate from the two- step abuse of law test that was 
formulated in Emsland- Stärke because, in Akrich, the subjective element of 
this test had become inoperative.117 At the same time, the subjective element 
of the test was hollowed in Halifax and would be hollowed even further in Cad-
bury Schweppes, a couple of years after Akrich. Did the Court in Akrich deviate 
from its standing practice by completely excluding the relevance of motive to 
establish abuse of law in the context of free movement law? Or should the 
Court’s leniency in this case be attributed to the general development of the 
EU’s case law on abuse of law, in which the subjective element of the two- step 
abuse test from Emsland- Stärke was declining anyway?
It followed from Akrich that the use of free movement law to acquire the 
rights that are attached to it cannot be qualified as abuse, as long as the use 
of these rights is effective and genuine. This criterion is derived from the 
case- law on free movement of workers, which is laid down in Art. 45 tfeu. In 
Lawrie- Blum, the Court reiterated that the concept of a “worker” should have 
a communitarian meaning to avoid discrepancies in interpretation among the 
Member States. One of the criteria to qualify as a worker under EU law is that 
the provided services are effective and genuine and rewarded with a remu-
neration.118 When the exercise of free movement rights is effective and genu-
ine, there cannot be an abuse of EU law.119 By defining a broad scope for free 
 114 In Akrich, cit., para. 55 (emphasis added).
 115 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 305 et seq.
 116 Akrich, cit. paras 55– 56; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J.  (2014). The EU Citizenship 
Directive, cit., pp. 59, 298; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, 
cit., p. 102.
 117 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 305 et seq.
 118 Lawrie- Blum v. Land Baden- Wüttemberg, cit., para. 21; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in 
the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., p. 300 et seq.; Barnard, C. (2013). The 
Substantive Law of the EU, cit., p. 240.
 119 Levin v.  Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., para. 23; Akrich, cit., para. 55; Ziegler, K.S. 
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movement law, the Member States do not have much leeway to invoke abuse 
of law to annul the rights that are attached to having the status of a worker 
in EU law.120 The circumvention of national law is permitted, provided that 
the use of EU law is genuine and effective. The Court did not clarify, however, 
under what circumstances the use of free movement right is genuine and ef-
fective, and when it is not.
The shift in the Court’s approach is in line with the development of its case- 
law more generally. The focus on genuine use of EU law is understandable in 
the light of the principle of effectiveness, which precludes easy derogation 
from EU law by the Member States. A  narrow construction of abuse of law 
fits these principles because otherwise, Member States could rely on abuse of 
law to undermine EU law. The increasing role of fundamental rights protection 
in the EU is also reflected in the Court’s case- law. A narrow understanding of 
abuse of law benefits certainty about their rights and future. Maybe that is why 
the Court first relied on a sole purpose approach to abuse of law in the context 
of free movement and family reunification law.
vi The Commission Communication with Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Directive 2004/ 38
A few years after the adoption of Directive 2004/ 38, the European Commis-
sion undertook an investigation into the implementation of the Directive in 
the Member States, which showed that uniformity was lacking and that much 
ambiguity still existed about the obligations it imposes.121 To remedy the faulty 
implementation, the European Commission drafted its guidelines “for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/ 38”.122
seq.; Barnard, C. (2013). The Substantive Law of the EU, cit. p. 241. The question is raised, 
however, how the Court came up with the criterion of a genuine use of EU law, consid-
ering that it does not appear anywhere in the Treaties or in Directive 2004/ 38, see: Nic 
Shuibhne, N. (2014). The “Constitutional Weight” of Adjectives. European Law Review 39 
(2), pp. 153– 154, 154.
 120 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 297.
 121 Report of 10 December 2008 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, com(2008) 840 final.
 122 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit.; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The 









The Communication recites the general principle that “Community law 
cannot be relied on in case of abuse”.123 Nevertheless,
[EU] law promotes the mobility of EU citizens and protects those who 
have made use of it. There is no abuse where EU citizens and their fam-
ily members obtain a right of residence under [EU] law in a Member 
State other than that of the EU citizen’s nationality as they are benefiting 
from an advantage inherent in the exercise of the right of free movement 
protected by the Treaty, regardless of the purpose of their move to that 
State.124
The sole purpose doctrine which the Court developed in Akrich and subse-
quent case- law is clearly recognizable.
The Communication continues with a description of what behaviour could 
constitute abuse of law. Pursuant to the text of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38, it 
starts with the definition of marriages of convenience. “Recital 28 defines mar-
riages of convenience for the purpose of the Directive as marriages contract-
ed for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence 
under the Directive that someone would not have otherwise”.125 Nevertheless, 
when the marriage is genuine, it “cannot be considered as a marriage of con-
venience simply because it brings an immigration advantage, or indeed any 
other advantage”.126 Neither is the quality of the relationship decisive for the 
application of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38. Analogously, other relationships 
that came into being “for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free move-
ment and residence” can be the subject of national measures to combat abuse, 
such as a (registered) partnership of convenience or the adoption or recogni-
tion of a child with the sole purpose to rely on the free movement legislation 
to acquire a residence right.127 On the other hand, the Commission recalls that 
“[m] easures taken by Member States to fight against marriages of convenience 
may not be such as to deter EU citizens and their family members from mak-
ing use of their right to free movement or unduly encroach on their legitimate 
 123 Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, cit.; The Queen v. Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department, cit.; 
Centros, cit.
 124 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 15.
 125 Ibid., p. 15.
 126 Ibid.
 127 Verhellen, J.  (2016). Schijnerkenningen:  Internationale Families Opnieuw in de 
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rights. They must not undermine the effectiveness of Community law or dis-
criminate on grounds of nationality”.128
Subsequently, a set of indicative criteria is given that can be used to deter-
mine whether there is an abuse of EU law. Among these are the duration of the 
relationship, whether the spouses share a common language, their knowledge 
about each other, the existence of long- term commitments such as concluding 
a mortgage and cohabitation – although it follows from the Court’s case- law 
that cohabitation is not a requirement to qualify for a residence right on the 
basis of family reunification.129 Member States must give due attention to all 
circumstances of the individual case and may not base a decision on one single 
element of the situation.130 The Commission omits to support these instruc-
tions with reference to case- law. Nevertheless, several elements are recogniz-
able. The instructions are clearly based on the sole purpose doctrine that is 
developed by the Court.131 The genuine nature of the marriage is decisive, re-
gardless of whether it brings any advantage to the spouses. The unimportance 
of the quality of the relationship for the classification of abuse, furthermore, 
follows from the case- law in Diatta and Ogieriakhi.132 The amplification to oth-
er relationships of convenience, on the other hand, seems to be an addition by 
the Commission itself. In 2014, the Commission renewed the instructions on 
 128 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p.  15. It is notable that marriages of conve-
nience are only annulled when they are concluded for a migration purpose. The legality 
of marriages concluded for tax advantages, housing advantages, or any other reason out-
side of reciprocal affection, on the other hand, is never disputed.
 129 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 February 1985, case 267/ 83, Diatta v. Land Berlin, para. 15; 
judgment of 10 July 2014, case C- 244/ 13, Ogieriakhi, para. 37.
 130 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 16 et seq.; McCarthy, cit.
 131 Applying the sole- purpose approach also corresponds with the rights that are laid down 
in the Family Reunification Directive 2003/ 86 which is applicable to family members of 
third- country nationals legally residing in the EU. Art. 16, para, 2, let. b), gives Member 
States the possibility to reject, withdraw, or refuse residence to a family member, when 
the marriage was “contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to 
enter or reside in a Member State” (emphasis added). According to the Court in Metock 
and Others, cit. it would be paradoxical if Directive 2004/ 38 would not minimally offer 
the same protection as Directive 2003/ 86. In this light it makes sense to assume that if a 
residence right derived from Directive 2003/ 86 is only annulled when the marriage that 
brought about that entitlement was concluded for the sole purpose of acquiring a resi-
dence title, the same rule can be applied to residence rights derived from Directive 2004/ 
38. Following this logic, these residence rights can only be annulled when the marriage 
that brought about this entitlement was concluded for that sole purpose. Even though, 
remarkably, Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 itself does not provide a definition of a marriage 
of convenience.












the consequences of marriages of convenience in the “Handbook on address-
ing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU citizens and 
non- EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citizens”. 
This handbook mostly contains the same principles and instructions which 
were included in the Commission Communication of 2009.133
In addition, according to the Commission,
[a] buse could also occur when EU citizens, unable to be joined by their 
third country family members in their Member State of origin because 
of the application of national immigration rules preventing it, move to 
another Member State with the sole purpose to evade, upon returning to 
their home Member State, the national law that frustrated their family 
reunification efforts, invoking their rights under [EU] law. The defining 
characteristics of the line between genuine and abusive use of [EU] law 
should be based on the assessment of whether the exercise of [EU] rights 
in a Member State from which the EU citizens and their family mem-
ber(s) return was genuine and effective.134
Once again, the codification of the Court’s case- law in Akrich, Levin, and 
Lawrie- Blum, which were discussed in the above, is apparent, as well as the 
applicability of the sole purpose approach to abuse in family reunification law. 
Genuine use of EU rights can never constitute abuse of law, regardless of the 
purpose for which the rights are used. If a planned circumvention of national 
immigration law is realized through such genuine use of EU rights, the circum-
vention is legitimate.
The assessment of whether the use of EU law is genuine and effective “can 
only be made on a case- by- case basis” and can be carried out on the basis of 
another set of criteria provided by the Commission Communication. Previous 
unsuccessful attempts to acquire residence for a third- country spouse under 
national law can be taken into account, as well as efforts made to establish 
in the host Member State, including national registration formalities and se-
curing accommodation, enrolling children at an educational establishment 
and acquiring a job. Also here, due attention must be paid to all the relevant 
 133 Communication com(2014) 604 of 26 September 2014 from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on helping national authorities fight abuses of the 
right to free movement: Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of con-
venience between EU citizens and non- EU nationals in the context of EU law on free 
movement of EU citizens.
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circumstances and a decision may not be based on one single element of the 
case.135 Moreover, “[i] t cannot be inferred that the residence in the host Mem-
ber State is not genuine and effective only because an EU citizen maintains 
some ties to the home Member State […] [and] [t]he mere fact that a person 
consciously places himself in a situation conferring a right does not in itself 
constitute a sufficient basis for assuming that there is abuse”.136
Lastly, the Communication mentions that “the Directive must be interpret-
ed and applied in accordance with fundamental rights […] as guaranteed in 
the European Convention of Human Rights (echr) and as reflected in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights”.137 And that investigations into alleged abuse 
situations “must be carried out in accordance with fundamental rights, in par-
ticular with Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 12 (right 
to marry) of the echr (Articles 7 and 9 of the EU Charter)”.138 In the light of 
this obligation and the interest of the families involved to live together with 
their loved ones, it is sequacious that abuse of law is interpreted narrowly and 
in accordance with the sole purpose approach.139 Families thus enjoy more 
certainty about their rights and about their future.
vii Defining Genuine Use of EU Law – O. and B.
In the years after Akrich and the publiction of the Commission Communi-
cation, the Court of Justice was relatively silent on the doctrine of abuse of 
law in the context of family reunification,140 until 2014, when O. and B. was 
handed down.141 In this case, the Court reiterated its abuse of law doctrine and 
 considered:
[T] he scope of Union law cannot be extended to cover abuses […]. Proof 
of such an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances 
in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the 
European Union rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved, 
 135 Ibid., p. 18– 19.
 136 Ibid., p. 18, with reference to Centros, cit., para. 27.
 137 Ibid., p. 3; Metock and Others, cit., para. 79.
 138 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 17.
 139 See supra.
 140 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 60 et seq; Eind, 
cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., cit.


















and, secondly, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain 
an advantage from the European Union rules by artificially creating the 
conditions laid down for obtaining it.142
The Court, thus, re- established the Emsland- Stärke test to determine whether 
there is an abuse of law but also reiterated that there can only be abuse when 
the conditions under which a right is obtained are wholly artificial, which fol-
lowed from Cadbury Schweppes.143
In O. and B., the Court clarified the condition that residence in the host Mem-
ber State must have been effective and genuine before rights can be retained in 
a return situation. Effective and genuine exercise of EU rights requires:
to settle in the host Member State in a way which would be such as to cre-
ate or strengthen family life in that Member State […]. [A] Union citizen 
who exercises his rights under Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/ 38 does not 
intend to settle in the host Member State […]. […] Residence in the host 
Member State pursuant to and in conformity with the con ditions set out 
in Article 7(1) of that directive is, in principle, evidence of settling there 
and therefore of the Union citizen’s genuine residence in the host Mem-
ber State and goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening family 
life in that Member State.144
A distinction is made between short- term travel and long- term settling in the 
host Member State in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38. This provi-
sion determines that “[a] ll Union citizens shall have the right of residence on 
the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months 
if they” qualify as a worker, selfemployed, economically not active with suffi-
cient resources or as a student. The text of this provision seems to imply that Art. 
7 can only be applicable after a minimum of three months of residence. O. and 
B. was, therefore, understood as the introduction of a requirement of a three 
months residence in the host- state, before a family member’s residence right 
can be retained upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen.145  
 142 O. and B., cit.; para. 58 with reference to Emsland- Stärke, cit., para. 52; Bozkurt, cit., para. 
47; Hungary v. Slovakia, cit., para. 58.
 143 Emsland- Stärke, cit.; Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit.
 144 O. and B., cit., paras. 52– 53.
 145 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 303; Verbist, 
V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p.  110 et seq.; Van Eijken, 
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Such an interpretation means that the genuineness of the exercise of free 
movement rights is made dependent on a set period of three months of res-
idence. However, is it sensible to link duration of residence with its genuine-
ness in itself? And – if it is installed anyway – how can a minimum period of 
residence be determined for the use of rights to be genuine, without being 
inevitably arbitrary in posing this condition? “Why can a Union citizen who 
has lived for 3.5 months in another Member State, in which he met his partner 
be joined by her when he returns to this Member State of origin and why is 
this not possible for the Union citizen who visits another Member State for a 
period of many consecutive years?”.146 It seems hard to accept that the period 
of residence is decisive in itself for residence to be genuine, rather than being 
one of the relevant criteria to decide so.147
This contribution proposes a different interpretation of O. and B. Article 6 of 
Directive 2004/ 38 provides the right to visit any Member State for up to three 
months, without the need to fulfil any conditions to exercise that right. Art. 7 
of Directive 2004/ 38 provides the right to reside in another Member State for a 
period of longer than three months when certain criteria are fulfilled. Accord-
ingly, when an EU citizen wishes to have a right to reside in the territory of an-
other Member States for a period of longer than three months, he must comply 
with the criteria in Art. 7. That does not mean that an individual cannot rely on 
Art. 7 and reside in a Member State in accordance with the criteria in that pro-
vision before those three months elapse. Any other conclusion would imply 
that exercising the rights derived from Art. 6 for three months is a precondition 
to rely on Art. 7 and to register at the municipality of residence. This is not the 
case. Such a condition is not included in Directive 2004/ 38 and would also be 
very difficult to enforce. As a result, it is already possible from the first day of 
arrival to register as a resident in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38. 
Does this mean that even one day of residence in conformity with Art. 7 would 
already be sufficient to derive family reunification rights in the host Member 
State and upon return in the home Member State of the EU citizen?148 And 
a family who resides in the host Member State for much longer than three 
months without complying with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, 
12 O. and B. and C- 457/ 12 S. and G.: Clarifying the Inter- State Requirement for EU Citizens? 
European Law Blog, available at europeanlawblog.eu.
 146 Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 112.
 147 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 12 December 2013, joined cases C- 456/ 12 and C- 
457/ 12, O. and B. and S. and G., para. 111.
 148 Although such a claim would give difficulty in regard of proving the existence of that right 








on the other hand, would be deprived of the rights provided by the directive 
in the host state and after return in the EU citizen’s home Member State?149
Considering the Court’s wording, it seems that the decisive criterion to re-
tain a residence right upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen 
is not the duration of residence but whether residence in the host state is “such 
as to create or strengthen family life in that Member State”, which should be 
assessed on a case- by- case basis. Three months of residence in the host Mem-
ber State in accordance with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 could 
then be used as a presumption of having created or strengthened family life, 
rather than as a precondition. This interpretation is in line with the Court’s 
wording in O. and B., in which it considered that “[r] esidence in the host Mem-
ber State pursuant to and in conformity with the conditions set out in Article 
7(1) of that directive […] goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening 
family life in that Member State”.150 Thus, creation and strengthening of family 
life is presumed when there is a three months residence that is in conformity 
with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, but this does not exclude the possibility that 
a period of less than three months could also create or strengthen family life, 
provided that the residence is still exercised in conformity with Art. 7 of the 
Directive. This approach would allow for real case- by- case assessment of the 
use of rights, which, aside from the duration of residence, could take other 
parameters into account including cohabitation, intensity of the contact and 
the duration of the relationship. Residence for more than three months would 
not automatically lead to the retention of residence rights but would need to 
be complemented with other evidence that family life was created or strength-
ened. In addition, residence for less than three months would not automatical-
ly lead to the denial of the retention of residence rights but would need to be 
compensated with other evidence that family life was created or strengthened 
to be entitled to those rights. This reading furthermore excludes the possibil-
ity that a simple one day visit across the border would be sufficient to rely on 
the Court’s case- law for return situations, which fits the objectives of EU law. 
Family reunification rights and the continuation thereof are meant to facilitate 
free movement, and this free movement is not hindered if family can not be 
brought for a single day visit to another Member State.
The proposed reading of O. and B. is further supported by a more recent case 
of the Court of Justice, which stems from 2018. Altiner and Ravn was about a 
Danish- Turkish couple who resided in Sweden for a couple of years. During 
 149 Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers, cit., p. 769 
et seq.
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this time, Altiner’s Turkish son visited them twice for a total period of about 
3,5 months with a valid Schengen visa, and stayed with them. When Ravn and 
Altiner returned to Denmark, the son applied for a residence permit as a family 
member of a Danish citizen in a return situation. Between their return and the 
son’s application was a time window of little less than nine months. His re-
quest was denied, because according to the Danish authorities, his application 
was not ‘a natural consequence’ of Ms Ravn’s return to Denmark. The author-
ities did not take a position on the question of whether the stay of the son in 
Sweden had created or strengthened family life between him and Ms Ravn.151 
The national court therefore asked the Court of Justice whether the Member 
State may require that the entry of a family member is a ‘natural consequence’ 
of the Union citizen’s return?152
In answering the preliminary question, the Court considered that it ‘is true 
that it is the genuine residence [in accordance with Article 7(1) and (2) of Di-
rective 2004/ 38] of the Union citizen and of the family member who is a third- 
country national in the host Member State which creates, on the return of that 
Union citizen to the Member State of which he is a national, a derived right of 
residence on the basis of Article 21(1) tfeu for the third- country national with 
whom that citizen has live as a family in the host Member State’.153 The Court 
of Justice then recalls that to obtain a derived residence right in the host Mem-
ber State, it is not relevant at what time the family member joins the EU citi-
zen, so an elapse of time between the arrival of the EU citizen and his family 
member should not stand in the way of family reunification.154 The residence 
right that is granted in the Member State of origin of the EU citizen is, how-
ever, different in nature, and is meant to continue family life which has been 
created or strengthened in the host Member State. If this family life has been 
interrupted before the entry of the third- country national into the Member 
State of which the EU citizen is a national, this may affect the residence right 
in that Member State. Member States are allowed to verify whether such an 
interruption exists, and for that purpose they may take into account that the 
third- country national family member entered the territory of the EU citizen’s 
home Member State a significant period of time after that citizen’s return to 
 151 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 10– 14. For an analysis of this case see in this volume De Groot, 
D.A. Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens; Oosterom- Staples, H. (2018). Noot bij HvJ EU 27 
juni 2018, zaak C- 230/ 17 (Altiner en Ravn) en HvJ EU 12 juli 2018, zaak C- 246/ 17 (Banger). 
Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 22 (11).
 152 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 18.
 153 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 20 and 26.










that territory. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that a family life, created 
or strengthened between a Union citizen and a third- country national family 
member in the host Member State might continue despite the fact that the EU 
citizen has returned to the Member State of which she is a national without 
being accompanied by the family member in question, who may have been 
obliged, for reasons relating to his personal situation, profession or education, 
to delay his arrival in the home Member State of the EU citizen.155
The Court concluded that the decisive criterion for a continuation of rights 
would be the existence of a link between the application for a residence right 
and the exercise by that citizen of his freedom of movement, which should 
be assessed as such. The fact that the submission of the application for a res-
idence permit was not ‘a natural consequence’ of the return of the EU citizen 
is a relevant, but not a decisive factor in this assessment. Hence, the national 
authorities are allowed to weigh the question whether the application of the 
family member is ‘a natural consequence’ of the return of the EU citizen to the 
Member State of which he is a national, provided that other factors are also 
taken into account in the context of an overall assessment. This assessment 
should particularly take account of factors that are capable of showing that 
family life created and strengthened in the host Member State has not ended, 
in spite of the time which elapsed between the return of the Union citizen to 
that Member State and the entry of her third- country national family mem-
ber. If family life continues to exist, this would justify the acknowledgment 
of a derived right of residence in the home Member State of the EU citizen to 
continue family life that was created or strengthened in the host Member State 
during the period of residence that was spend there.156
Altiner and Ravn confirms the conclusion that was derived from O.  and 
B. The decisive criterion to retain a derived residence right for a family mem-
ber of an EU citizen after a period of residence in another Member State is the 
existence of family life that was created or strengthened in the host Member 
State and continuated after the return to the EU citizen’s home Member State. 
All other circumstances, such as the moment in time when the family mem-
ber enters the Member State, or the period of residence of the EU citizen in 
the host Member State (provided that this residence was in accordance with 
Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 38), are relevant to be taken into account as part 
of the overall assessment of the creation, strengthening and continuation of 
family life in the home Member State. These factors cannot, however, be used 
 155 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 30– 33.
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as fixed criteria on the basis of which an automatically generated decision on 
the legality of residence after return is issued.
viii Abuse v. Non- Applicability of EU Law
Considering the abuse of law doctrine and the case- law of the Court in the 
field of family reunification, the question arises how abuse of law can be dis-
tinguished from the lack of fulfilment for the conditions of a right.157 In O. and 
B., the Court reiterated the Member States’ competence to combat abuse of 
law but it did not link abuse of law to the non- fulfilment of the criterion to 
have created or strengthened family life in the host Member State. Rather, it 
formulated a condition for the possibility to rely on Directive 2004/ 38 by anal-
ogy for family reunification after return to the home Member State. When this 
condition is not fulfilled, it is not a matter of abuse of EU law but a matter of 
non- compliance with the conditions for retaining a residence right in the EU 
citizen’s home Member State after his return. In that case there is no entitle-
ment to a right, so there cannot be an abuse of rights either. Mutatis mutandis, 
when the conditions for family reunification are fulfilled, there is a right to 
family reunification which cannot be considered to be abuse, even if national 
law was circumvented.158
When considering the difference between failing to fulfill the applicable 
conditions to retain a residence right and abuse of law, there is a difference 
between marriages of convenience and the Europe- route. When national law 
is circumvented, it depends on the circumstances of the case whether it can be 
classified as abuse or not. When a marriage of convenience is discovered, on 
the other hand, then Article 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 automatically labels this 
practice as an abuse.159 Even then, however, the question about the distinction 
between non- applicability and abuse can be raised. Annulment of a marriage 
means that there was never a family relationship.160 Since the rights that are 
granted by Directive 2004/ 38 are declaratory, this annulment implies that the 
conditions for family reunification were never fulfilled and the residence right 
 157 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, 
cit., p. 296; Spaventa, E. (2011). Comments on Abuse of Law and the Free Movement of 
Workers. In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 315– 320; 
Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 310.
 158 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 15.
 159 Akrich, cit.; McCarthy, cit.











never existed in the first place. Consequently, the residence right would not be 
withdrawn on the basis of abuse of law, but because Directive 2004/ 38 would 
simply not be applicable. This reading of Directive 2004/ 38 is problematic, 
because it positions the withdrawal or termination of a residence right that 
results from the discovery of a marriage of convenience outside the scope of 
EU law altogether, which takes away the obligation to take account of the pro-
cedural safeguards which the directive provides. The mere existence of Article 
35 of Directive 2004/ 38 opposes this view, because it provides that the termi-
nation or withdrawal of a residence right due to the discovery of a marriage of 
convenience should take place in accordance with the safeguards the directive 
provides for. It is thus suggested that the conclusion of a marriage of conve-
nience and the pursuant – faulty – recognition of a residence right precludes 
the existence of this right ex tunc but still brings the situation within the scope 
of Directive 2004/ 38. The national measures to withdraw the residence right 
should, therefore, be taken in accordance with Art. 35 of the Directive.161 This 
means that safeguards of proportionality should be applied,162 which are not 
applicable if the withdrawal of a residence right would fall outside the scope of 
the Directive altogether.163 In that case, the only safeguard that would still be 
available for the third- country national who lost his residence right is found in 
general international law, most notably in Art. 8 echr. As was mentioned ear-
lier, the de facto protection of residence by Art. 8 echr is limited because its 
basic premise is very different than under EU law. Art. 8 echr departs from the 
 161 This reading of Directive 2004/ 38 corresponds with the rights that are laid down in 
Directive 2003/ 86, which is applicable to family members of third- country nationals 
legally residing in the EU. In accordance with Art. 17 of Directive 2003/ 86, residence 
rights can only be rejected, withdrawn or refused when due account is taken of the per-
sonal circumstances of the person concerned and a proportionality assessment is carried 
out. Directive 2004/ 38 should minimally offer the same protection as Directive 2003/ 86 
(Metock and Others, cit., para. 69). Thus, withdrawal of a residence right that was con-
ferred upon the third- country national through concluding a marriage of convenience, 
should be subject to the procedural safeguards in Directive 2004/ 38 as well.
 162 Arts 30– 31 of Directive 2004/ 38., cit.
 163 A distinction is made between non- existence of a right and non- applicability of the 
Directive, and national authorities may struggle with the distinction. In Belgium, for 
instance, there is a divergence in responses to the discovery of a marriage of convenience. 
Some decisions place the withdrawal of residence rights derived from Directive 2004/ 
38 outside the scope of the Directive and the implementing law (Vreemdelingenwet), 
while other decisions do apply the safeguards in the law that implements the Directive. 
See Kroeze, H.H.C. (2018). De Link Tussen Familierecht en Europees Migratierecht: De 
Route van de Vernietiging van een Schijnhuwelijk naar de Intrekking van Verblijfsrecht. 
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authority of the Member States to decide on the entry of non- nationals into 
their territory.164 Only when there are strong social and family ties in the Mem-
ber State of residence non- admission or expulsion breaches the immigrant’s 
right to family life.165 To determine whether this is the case, a balance must 
be struck between the interest of the State and the interest of the individual. 
Art. 8 echr may provide a safety net for residence for those who fall outside 
the scope of EU law, but this does not compensate the loss of procedural rights 
that would be enjoyed on the basis of Directive 2004/ 38.166
A similar reasoning can be used for an EU citizen and his family member 
who want to rely on Directive 2004/ 38 in a return situation but fail to comply 
with the criterion of creating or strengthening family life in the host Mem-
ber State before their return. If the criteria in O. and B. are considered to be 
a threshold for the applicability of EU law, noncompliance with those crite-
ria results in non- applicability of EU law. Classifying reliance on the case- law 
of the Court in Surinder Singh and O. and B. when the condition to create or 
strengthen family life is not fulfilled as a form of abuse of law, on the other 
hand, does trigger the applicability and the procedural safeguards of Art. 35 
of Directive 2004/ 38. In that case, the refusal of a residence right must be pro-
portionate and must observe the procedural requirements in the Directive.167 
Hence, it seems in the interest of the involved families in cases of marriages 
of convenience and in return situations to apply the concept of abuse, rather 
than conclude that Directive 2004/ 38 is not applicable. Because if Directive 
2004/ 38 is not applicable, the implication is that a situation is purely internal 
to the Member State and falls outside the scope of EU law. As was explained 
above, in that case only Art. 8 echr is left to provide protection and safeguards 
against expulsion or non- admission, but to qualify for residence under this 
provision is a high threshold. When a situation is qualified as abuse of rights, 
on the other hand, it comes within the scope of EU law and is, therefore, no 
longer a purely internal situation. As a result, safeguards derived from EU law 
are applicable before a residence right can be refused or withdrawn, for the 
better of the families involved.
 164 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da Silva 
and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, cit., para. 39; Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit., para. 107.
 165 E.g., Sen v. the Netherlands, cit.; Tuquabo- Tekle et al v. the Netherlands, cit.
 166 E.g., Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit.; Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life 
Under Article 8 echr in Immigration Cases, cit., p. 87 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P. and Adam, 
S.  (2017). EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge Through the Prism of 
Family Reunification, cit., pp. 443– 467; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights, cit.










ix Personal Scope of Family Life
If the possibility to derive a residence right in a return situation is defined 
by the question whether family life was created or strengthened during the 
exercise of free movement rights abroad, the next question is which family 
members are eligible to have a family life with.168 This question is particularly 
relevant, because Member States have different practices concerning which 
family members they entitle for family reunification, and with regard to the 
recognition of family relationships that originated in other (Member) States. 
Recently, a few cases provided new insights on this matter.
In Banger, the Court of Justice ruled on the question whether the possibility 
to retain a residence right in a return situation also applies to the partner with 
whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, when the Member State 
of the Union citizen does not grant family reunification to the unmarried and 
unregistered partner.169 The case at hand was about Mr. Rado, a UK nation-
al, who had resided in the Netherlands with his South- African partner, Mrs. 
Banger, and now wished to return to the UK with her. The Court considered 
that in principle, Directive 2004/ 38 does not require the Member States to ad-
mit the partner of an EU citizen with whom he enjoys a durable relationship. 
The Court’s case- law on return situations, however, should be applied without 
any reservations.170 Thus, even though the UK lacks a right to family reunifica-
tion between EU citizens and the partner with whom they have a durable re-
lationship, it is still obliged to recognize the validity of this relationship under 
EU law, for the purpose of deriving a residence right from EU law in a return 
situation.171
Coman was about the return of a Romanian national from Belgium to his 
home Member State, who wanted to be accompanied by his husband – a US 
 168 Another question that is relevant in the context of family reunification derived from exer-
cising free movement rights in return situations and in general, concerns the applicability 
of EU law on citizens with multiple EU nationalities. If such an individual moves between 
two Member States of which he is a national, is he eligible for family reunification rights 
in both countries or in neither of them? And is it possible to rely on the Court’s doctrine 
about return situations after having resided in a Member State of which the EU citizen is 
also a national? The current chapter does not elaborate on this issue, but David de Groot 
does discuss these questions in the contribution he added to this volume: Free Movement 
of Dual EU Citizens.
 169 Banger, cit., para. 19. For an analysis on this case see Oosterom- Staples, H. (2018). Noot bij 
HvJ EU 27 juni 2018, zaak C- 230/ 17 (Altiner en Ravn) en HvJ EU 12 juli 2018, zaak C- 246/ 17 
(Banger), cit.
 170 Banger, cit., para. 24- 34.
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citizen. Romania refused the application, because it does not recognize gay 
marriages, and therefore excluded the couple from the applicability of EU 
free movement law after Coman’s return. The Romanian Constiutional Court 
referred the case to the Court of Justice to ask whether this practice was in 
accordance with EU law.172 The Court of Justice reiterated the possibility to re-
tain residence rights of an EU citizen’s family member after the EU citizen has 
exercised his free movement rights and then returns to his Member State of 
origin. It then dealt with the question whether same- sex spouses are included 
within the personal scope of these rights, which are awarded under the condi-
tions that are set by Directive 2004/ 38, which applies by analogy. In doing so, 
it observed that the term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/ 38 is 
gender- netural and may therefore cover the same- sex spouse of the Union cit-
izen concerned. This reading is furthermore supported by the fact that spouse 
is a communitarian concept, for the interpretation of which no reference is 
made to the Member State legislation. Therefore, Member States cannot rely 
on their national laws to refuse a residence right to the same- sex spouse of 
an EU citizen that is derived from EU law. It is therefore bound to recognize 
the marriages concluded in another Member State.173 This obligation does not 
impose an obligation for the Member States to provide for the possibility of 
same- sex marriages in their national family law, which is a competence of each 
Member State. Nevertheless, the exercise of those competences is limited by 
the obligations that stem from EU law. Most notably, Member States should 
ensure freedom of movement for all EU citizens, and acknowledge the rights 
that are attached to exercising this freedom.174
Both cases oblige the Member State to acknowledge a residence right to 
family members of EU citizens, who they do not recognize as family members 
in their national law. In Banger, a residence right was awarded to the partner 
in a durable relationhip with the returning UK national who exercised his free 
movement rights, even though the UK does not grant this right to its own cit-
izens or to EU citizens residing in the UK, and neither does EU law impose 
that obligation. Yet, rights that were acquired in another Member State should 
 172 Coman, cit., para. 9– 12 and 17. For an analysis on this case see Tryfonidou, A.  (2018). 
Free Movement of Same- sex Spouses Within the EU:  The ecj’s Coman Judgment, cit.; 
Kroeze, H.H.C., and Safradin, B. (2019). Een Overwinning voor vrij Verkeersrechten van 
Regenboogfamilies in Europa: Het Langverwachte Coman Arrest, cit.; Kochenov, D., and 
Belavusau, U. (2019). Same- sex spouses in the EU after Coman: More free movement, but 
what about marriage? EUI Department of Law Research Paper 2019.
 173 Coman, cit., para. 29– 36.








be preserved, despite national policy choices that would indicate otherwise.175 
In the light of constitutional EU law this case- law of the Court is not surpris-
ing and seems to be connected to the principle of mutual recognition.176 If a 
durable relationship is recognized in one Member State as eligible to enjoy a 
residence right, the other Member States must recognize the rights that are 
derived thereof, which is an affluent of the principles of effectiveness and loyal 
cooperation.177 The same goes for the residence right of the same- sex spouse 
of an EU citizen who created or strengthened family life with that spouse in 
another Member State and then returns to his home Member State as in Co-
man. The case- law is understandable from a European constitutional perspec-
tive and fits the internal market logic of mutual recognition, but it does have 
a serious impact on the family law and private international law competences 
of the Member States.
Under international law and private international law, states have the com-
petence to decide which family relationships they recognize. Mutatis mutan-
dis, if a state does not recognize gay marriage, or it does not attach any legal 
consequences to a durable relationship between unmarried partners, it is with-
in its discretion to allow or disallow access to its territory and to attach rights 
to these personal status or not. The discussed case- law reduces this compe-
tence by dictating that for the purpose of deriving rights form EU law, certain 
relationships must be recognized, regardless of the recognition of these rela-
tionships in the national law of the Member State. In Coman, Member States 
opposed this approach, and argued that Member States should be allowed to 
refuse a residence right to a family member that is not recognized as such un-
der their national law, on the basis of objective public- interest considerations 
 175 It is asserted here that the obligation for the Member States to recognize rights that were 
acquired under EU law in another Member State should not only extend to citizens who 
return to their home Member State, but also to citizens who move between two Member 
States of which they are not a national. For them the same principle applies. Rights 
acquired on the basis of EU law through the exercise of free movement rights should be 
retained, also when they are brought with to another Member State of which the benefi-
ciary is not a national.
 176 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 February 1979, case 120/ 78, Cassis de Dijon, para. 14.
 177 Article 4(3) teu. The possiblity to preserve acquired rights is also interesting from the 
perspective of the international law doctrine of ‘acquired rights’, which provides that 
rights obtained on the basis of a Treaty cannot be taken away. See Sik, K.  (1977). The 
Concept of Acquired Rights in International Law:  A Survey. Netherlands International 
Law Review 24 (1– 2), pp.  120– 142; For the application in a Brexit context see Cambien, 
N.  (2018). Residence Rights for EU Citizens and Their Family Members: Navigating the 
New Normal. European Papers 3 (3), pp. 1333– 1352. Cambien also explains that the appli-
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or to preserve the national identity of a Member State that is protected by Ar-
ticle 4(2) teu, but the Court of Justice rejected their arguments. It considered 
thereto that its decision in Coman does not oblige Member States to provide 
the institution of marriage between two persons of the same sex in its national 
law. It only requires the recognition of these marriages for the sole purpose of 
enabling such persons to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law.178
Indeed, the Court’s judgment is an affluent of long- standing constitution-
al principles, but the application thereof seems not only to perpetuate these 
principles. Through its case- law, the Court may in fact have created a new 
space in EU law. By defining which relationships should be recognized by the 
Member State, even if only for the purpose of maintaining rights that were 
acquired under EU law, a European family law may develop to define which 
relationships are eligible for rights derived from EU law.
Another argument for this thesis can be found in the case of SM. SM con-
cerned an Algerian child which was placed under kafala with a French couple 
who resided in the UK. Kafala is an Islamic institution that resembles foster 
parentship, but it does not create legal descendence. The French couple ap-
plied for family reunification with the Algerian child under EU free move-
ment law, but this was refused, because the UK does not recognize children 
placed under kafala as family member that qualify for family reunification.179 
The Court of Justice did agree that a child placed under kafala cannot be con-
sidered a ‘direct descendant’ within the meaning of Article 2(2c) of Directive 
2004/ 38.180 It can, however, be qualified as ‘other family member’ within the 
meaning of Article 3(2a) of Directive 2004/ 38, whose entrance into the host 
Member State of an EU citizen must be facilitated.181 SM did not concern a 
return situation, but the approach of the Court is similar to its approach in the 
two cases that were discussed above. The Court decided whether and under 
which conditions a family relationship qualifies for family reunification un-
der EU free movement law, regardless of whether national law recognizes that 
relationship or not. Furthermore, if family reunification with the child who is 
placed under kafala is granted in the UK, the reading of Banger and Coman 
 178 Coman, cit., para. 42– 46.
 179 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 March 2019, case C- 129/ 18, SM, para. 23– 30. For an analy-
sis on this case see Strumia, F. (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling: Variable 
Geometry and Conditional Deference. European Papers 4(1), pp. 389– 393; Den Haese, S., 
and Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Emergence of a European Family Law? The ‘Right’ of a 
Child Placed under Kafala Care to Reside within the EU with his Guardian(s). Tijdschrift 
Internationaal Privaatrecht, forthcoming.
 180 SM, cit., para. 49– 56.










implies that when the couple returns to France, France is held to recognize this 
relationship as well, regardless of their national recognition of children placed 
under kafala under private international law.
Still, the qualification of family relationships that are eligible for family re-
unification under EU free movement law is not arbitrary. The aforegoing chap-
ters elaborated upon the criterion of having created or strengthened family 
life in order to retain a residence right that was obtained in the host Member 
State upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen. It was observed 
that the use of this criterion is coherent with the objectives of free movement 
law, which provides for family reunification rights to facilitate movement of 
EU citizens between Member States. It follows from the more recent case- law 
that the scope of family members who could potentially benefit from family 
reunification under EU law in a return situation and in general, is also con-
nected to the existence of family life. Whereas in O. and B., Altiner and Ravn, 
and Banger, the Court mentioned the existence of family life in abstracto as a 
criterion for family members of EU citizens to qualify for a residence right in 
a return situation, in Coman and SM, the Court made reference to the ECtHR. 
It reiterated that the free movement provisions should be interpreted in the 
light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union, which protect family life and the interest of the child. Pursuant to 
Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
rights in the Charter that correspond to rights in the European Convention of 
Human Rights should be interpreted accordingly and minimally offer the same 
protection. Furthermore, the Court reasons, the protection of Article 8 echr 
also extends to same- sex relationships and children placed under kafala. Thus, 
if Article 7 Charter should be interpreted accordingly, then same- sex relation-
ships and children placed under kafala should enjoy protection under EU law 
as well.182 The only difference between the echr and the EU regime, is that the 
existence of family life under the echr does not create an entitlement to fam-
ily reunification, whereas the recent case- law of the Court of Justice indicates 
that EU law does create such an entitlement.183
 182 For same- sex relationships: Coman, cit., para. 48– 51; European Court of Human Rights, 
judgment of 7 November 2013, no.  29381/ 09 and 32684/ 09, Vallianatos and Others 
v. Greece, para. 73; judgment of 14 December 2017, no. 26431/ 12, 26742/ 12, 44057/ 12, and 
60088/ 12, Orlandi and Others v.  Italy, para. 143. For kafala:  SM, cit., para. 66; European 
Court of Human Rights, judgment of 4 October 2012, no.  43631/ 09, Harroudj v.  France, 
para. 40– 41; judgment of 16 December 2014, no.  52265/ 10, Chbihi Loudoudi and Others 
v. Belgium, para. 88– 89.
 183 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/ 80, 9473/ 81 and 
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If Coman and SM indeed predict an understanding of EU law in which the 
existence of family life within the meaning of Article 8 echr is sufficient to be-
come eligible for family reunification rights when free movement rights are re-
lied upon, its potential scope is not necessarily limited to blood relationships. 
It is perceivable that family life exists with a non- family member, for instance 
when two friends live together and run a household together and support each 
other in the same way a family would. If the development in Coman and SM is 
drawn further upon, such a situation may qualify for family reunification un-
der EU law as well, including after the exercise of free movement rights upon 
return to the home Member State of the EU citizen.184 This approach ‘relies, 
for these purposes, on a flexible, pragmatic idea of family that leaves potential 
room to several models of cohabitation and reciprocal responsibility, and to a 
variety of underlying bonds, from the biological, to the legal, to the factual and 
affective.’185 Time will tell if EU law indeed develops in that direction or not.186
x Concluding Remarks
The beginning of this contribution problematized the tension between the 
principle of equality and the division of competences in the EU. Equality is an 
ideal to strive for that is anchored in the EU Treaties but is contrasted with the 
preservation of Member States’ sovereignty. This tension is particularly preva-
lent in family reunification. The EU is competent to regulate family reunifica-
tion for EU citizens who make use of their free movement rights, while those 
January 2006, no. 50435/ 99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 39; 
judgment of 3 October 2014, no. 12738/ 10, Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, para. 107; Kroeze, 
H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights, cit., p. 253 et seq.
 184 Strumia, F.  (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling:  Variable Geometry and 
Conditional Deference, cit., p.  390– 391; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). De zin van het gezins-
leven:  gezinshereniging op grond van een “duurzame relatie” en de implicaties van 
rechtsmisbruik. Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht 3, pp. 258– 266.
 185 Strumia, F.  (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling:  Variable Geometry and 
Conditional Deference, cit., p. 392.
 186 If so, it would mirror the development of family reunification rights derived from Article 
20 tfeu. Family reunification on the basis of this provision is granted on the basis of 
dependency between an EU citizen and his family member, but case- law shows that this 
does not need to be a family member that is bloodrelated. In theory, all relationships of 
dependency are potentially eligible for family reunification on these grounds. See Court 
of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, joined cases C- 356/ 11 and C- 357/ 11, O.S. and L.; 









who do not use their free movement rights fall under the competence of the 
Member States. Member States often impose stricter requirements for fami-
ly reunification than the EU, whereby they reversely discriminate their own 
nationals, insofar as they did not use free movement rights. The existence of 
reverse discrimination is counter intuitive and if the EU and its Member States 
do not take up the responsibility to remedy this inequality it may seriously 
undermine the EU’s legitimacy. In the meantime, however, this contribution 
explored another partial remedy to reverse discrimination within the consti-
tutional limits of the EU.
In its case- law, the Court of Justice decided that residence rights for a fam-
ily member of an EU citizen, who made use of free movement rights, can be 
retained after return to the home Member State of the EU citizen, provided 
that the exercise of those rights was effective and genuine. This means that an 
EU citizen can circumvent national family reunification law by temporarily 
moving to another Member State and then return with residence rights for 
his family member. This possibility empowers EU citizens who face reverse 
discrimination to escape from it. It remains a liability that only EU citizens 
who are already empowered can benefit from this route which requires fi-
nancial investment and knowledgeability, but it is a partial solution to re-
verse discrimination which stays within the constitutional limits of EU law. 
Member States may want to act against circumvention of their national laws. 
Therefore, they have the possibility to classify circumvention of national law 
as an abuse of rights, which legitimizes the refusal or withdrawal of residence 
rights. The downside thereof is that reliance on abuse of law undermines le-
gal certainty and the certainty for families about whether or not they are able 
to live with their loved ones. For these reasons, the definition of the scope 
of abuse of law is very important. A broad scope of abuse of law gives way 
to frequent intervention by the Member States to protect themselves from 
circumvention of their national law. A narrow scope of abuse of law limits 
the scope of application by the Member States and offers more legal certain-
ty and protection of citizens’ rights. In the case- law of the Court, a move-
ment can be observed, from a broad essential purpose construction of abuse 
of law, towards a narrower sole purpose construction of abuse of law. The 
shift in the general abuse of law doctrine is especially strong in the field of 
family reunification, where reliance on abuse of law is almost fully rejected 
and reduced to a merely theoretical legal principle. The crucial criterion for a 
legitimate use of EU law that was formulated in cases such as Akrich, O. and 
B., and Coman is that use of EU rights is effective and genuine. More con-
cretely, to retain residence rights upon return to the home Member State of 
the EU citizen, residence in the host Member State must be such as to have 
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created or strengthened family life. Following the Court’s decision in O. and 
B. and Altiner and Ravn, a new interpretation of this criterion was suggested. 
It was proposed to adopt a presumption of having created or strengthened 
family life when residence in the host Member State had a duration of more 
than three months in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, rather than 
making the three months a fixed condition to retain a residence right. Periods 
of residence less than three months, in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 
2004/ 38, would then not automatically lead to the refusal of a residence right 
in the home Member State upon return but require additional evidence of 
having created or strengthened family life.
The focus on genuine use of EU law and the impact of the movement on 
family life is quite understandable. Considering the importance the Court at-
taches to the principle of effectiveness in EU law, it is unsurprising that it does 
not easily allow for derogation by the Member States through invoking abuse 
of law. In addition, it is in line with the increasing role of fundamental rights 
protection, provided by the echr and by the Charter, in the EU legal order 
that protection of the family is prioritized over protecting the enforcement of 
national migration law. That may also be the reason why the Court, first, shift-
ed towards the sole purpose doctrine in the context of free movement rights, 
several years before it did so in other fields of EU law.
Although the protection of the family by EU law is commended, construct-
ing the scope of abuse of law too narrowly could also backfire. The decisions of 
the Court in its most recent case- law could suggest that there is no more place 
for abuse of law, and noncompliance with the conditions to retain residence 
rights upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen simply results 
in non- applicability of EU law. That interpretation would, however, reduce a 
return situation in which the requirement of genuine residence is not fulfilled 
to a purely internal situation, without any protection provided by EU law. In 
that case, protection by the echr might offer solace, but this protection is less 
extensive than the protection by EU law. Classifying non- compliance with the 
conditions for reliance on EU law in a return situation as abuse of rights, on the 
other hand, brings the situation within the scope of EU law and requires that 
procedural safeguards provided by the directive are observed. Thus, arguably, 
a narrow construction of abuse of law benefits EU citizens and their family 
members, because it provides certainty about their rights and future, but when 
the requirements for a right are not fulfilled they are better off when it is qual-
ified as abuse than when EU law is considered not to be applicable. This is also 
a better solution in the light of of reconciling the principle of equality and the 
principle of the division of competences in EU law. To protect the competence 
of the Member States, more cases could be qualified as abuse, but once people 
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fall within the scope of EU law the safeguards against deprivation of the rights 
they obtained are equal for everyone .
The final part of this contribution concerned the definition of family mem-
bers that are eligible for family reunification under EU free movement law 
and in return situations. Traditionally these are the family members defined 
in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, but differentiation in definitions among 
the Member States still causes uncertainty about which family members of 
EU citizens may derive a residence right from EU law. It was shown that recent 
case- law could remedy this uncertainty through the development of a type of 
European family law, which defines which family members should qualify for 
family reunification on the basis of Article 2(2) or 3(2) of Directive 2004/ 38. 
Although Member States remain competent in principle to define the catego-
ries of family members that are mentioned in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, 
they are also in principle obliged to recognize derived residence rights that are 
obtained in other Member States in accordance with the law and definition of 
the family of those Member States. This was the case in Banger and Coman, in 
which a residence right for the partner with whom the EU citizen maintained 
a durable relationship, and a residence right for the partner of the same sex as 
the EU citizen had to be recognized, even though the Member States in those 
cases did not themselves grant these rights to those categories of family mem-
bers. The same happened in the case of SM, in which the Court considered that 
a child placed under kafala should be eligible for family reunification with his 
legal guardians under Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, regardless of the na-
tional recognition of kafala guardianship. This development impacts the com-
petence of the Member State in family law and private international law, but it 
does provide more legal certainty and the Court is wary to limit the impact of 
its decisions to the EU sphere.
The main purpose of this contribution was to further understand the con-
ditions under which EU law can be legally used for family reunification, even 
if national immigration law is circumvented. It was demonstrated that the cre-
ation, strengthening and continuation of family life is central to this exercise, 
which is welcomed from a perspective of legal certainty, and from a human 
rights angle.
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 chapter 11
The Revised Posting of Workers Directive: Curbing 
or Ensuring Free Movement?
Piet Van Nuffel* and Sofia Afanasjeva**
i Introduction
Free movement is one of the fundamental rights of EU citizens. While con-
stituting the cornerstone of the internal market, free movement often stirs 
political controversy, in particular in those specific situations where the 
moving citizen is liable to be perceived as a threat to the welfare system of 
the host Member State. The obvious example is the situation of economi-
cally inactive persons that seek access to a host Member State on the basis 
of the free movement right of a family member. The case of the posting of 
workers demonstrates that controversy may also arise when economically 
active EU citizens rely on free movement rights to take up work in another 
Member State.
Workers who are “posted” remain employed by their employer in the home 
Member State and are sent abroad only temporarily. Their situation is there-
fore covered by the freedom to provide services, not the free movement of 
workers.1 Where such posted workers constitute cheaper work force than 
local workers, local undertakings and workforce may perceive such exercise 
of the free movement of services as unfair competition, or even as “social 
dumping”. Regulating the increasing use of posted workers, a phenomenon 
that finds itself at the intersection of internal market and labour protection 
rules, has turned out to be politically sensitive. It was Jean- Claude Juncker 
who as candidate for President of the European Commission announced in 
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July 2014 before the European Parliament a “targeted review” of the Posting 
of Workers Directive2 (the “PoW Directive”), indicating that “the same work at 
the same place should be remunerated in the same manner”.3 In March 2016, 
with the express support of several Member States and considering that with 
the enlargement of the Union the existing legal framework for posted workers 
was not suitable anymore, the European Commission presented its proposal 
for that review.
Being high on the political agenda of many Member States, it was no sur-
prise that this proposal became the subject of much controversy. Witness to 
this is the fact that French President Macron turned posting of workers into 
an important selling point of his campaign for the 2017 presidential elections. 
Together with other Western European Member States, France has been facing 
wage competition from workers posted from Eastern European Member States 
with lower wage levels, leading to the perception of posting of workers as an 
issue that directly opposes East to West within the EU. It is therefore a success 
that the Commission’s proposal led in spring 2018 to a widely supported polit-
ical agreement on a revised PoW Directive.4
This contribution seeks to explain how this reform builds on the principles 
developed in the case law of the Court of Justice and eventually managed to 
upgrade the PoW Directive, which is based on the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of services, into an extended package of protective labour rules 
that nevertheless remains within the boundaries of internal market legisla-
tion. By prescribing Member States to what extent the exercise of free move-
ment by foreign employers may be regulated, the rules on posting lay down a 
level playing field in which all workers receive the necessary protection. Given 
the tensions caused by the increased use of posted workers in certain Member 
States that considered introducing measures to protect their labour markets, 
this recent harmonisation of the rules on posting thus also contributed to pre-
serving, and not merely limiting, free movement and the internal market.
 2 Directive 96/ 71/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 con-
cerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, 
p. 1– 6.
 3 Juncker, J- C (2014). A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Demo-
cratic Change – Political Guidelines for the next European Commission – Opening Statement 
in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, p. 8, available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ commission/ 
sites/ beta- political/ files/ juncker- political- guidelines- speech_ en.pdf.
 4 Directive (EU) 2018/ 957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 
amending Directive 96/ 71/ EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
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ii Posting of Workers on European Labour Markets
The term “posted workers” refers to workers who are legally employed by an 
undertaking established in one Member State (the sending or home Member 
State) and sent by that undertaking to another (receiving or host) Member 
State in order to carry out work in the host Member State. Typically, such work 
is carried out under a contract concluded by the sending undertaking for the 
provision of services in the host Member State. There may also be “intra- group 
posting”, when an undertaking sends an employee to work in a subsidiary in 
another Member State. A  third category of posted workers covers workers 
hired out by temporary work agencies established in the home Member State 
to a user undertaking in the host Member State.5
Since posted workers are sent abroad only temporarily, they do not intend 
to integrate in the labour market of the host Member State and thus remain 
covered by the social security system of the home Member State. Such workers 
will be issued a Portable Document A1 in their home Member State, confirming 
that contributions are paid for them in that Member State.6 Under the Regula-
tion on the coordination of social security systems, a posted worker continues 
to be subject to the social security legislation of the home Member State if the 
duration of the work in the host Member State does not exceed 24 months.7 
This prevents excessive administrative burden for posting undertakings and 
national authorities, which would otherwise have to change the applicable so-
cial security system for every worker performing services in another Member 
State for a limited time.
Posting of workers is an increasing phenomenon within the EU. Since 2011, 
the overall number of Portable Documents A1 issued has almost doubled.8 
Posted workers are highly concentrated in specific sectors, in particular the 
construction sector and, to a lesser extent, in education, health, social work 
services and business services.9 Still, only a limited number of Member States 
 5 See the categories of workers covered by the PoW Directive, Art. 1(3).
 6 See the Decision No A1 of 12 June 2009 the Administrative Commission for the Coordination 
of national social security systems. For that purpose, the Portable Document A1 has replaced 
since May 2010 the previous E101 document.
 7 Art. 12(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/ 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1– 123.
 8 De Wispelaere, F., De Smedt, L. and Pacolet, J – HIVA- KU Leuven (2019). Posting of work-
ers – Report on A1 Portable Documents issued in 2018, European Commission, p. 9, available 
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is affected by the presence of posted workers. In 2018, the pre- 2004 Member 
States constituted the destination of 84 per cent of total postings10:  among 
the countries most affected are Germany, France and Belgium as top 3 receiv-
ing countries (which altogether received almost 50 per cent of total EU post-
ings) and Germany, Poland and Spain as top sending countries.11 In particu-
lar, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Austria received far more 
workers posted than they sent.12 In several sectors, Member States face an 
increasing number of workers being posted from Central or Eastern Europe 
Member States with generally lower wage levels. Most postings from low- wage 
Member States occur in the industry sector, with 40 per cent to be situated in 
the construction sector. In that sector, Member States such as Luxembourg, 
Austria and Belgium have been experiencing a particularly large number of 
posted workers.13
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that looking at the general labour market, 
posting of workers remains a relatively limited phenomenon. It is estimated 
that around 0.8 per cent of the EU workforce can be considered to have been 
issued with a Portable Document A1, which is less than three million people.14 
Not more than one third of these postings concern postings from low- wage to 
high- wage Member States.15 There are indeed also a large number of postings 
between high- wage Member States, in particular in the services sector. The av-
erage duration of the posting period is less than four months.16
iii Introducing Workers’ Protection through the Posting of Workers 
Directive
It was the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 that started fuelling fears 
of large groups of workers from low- wage Member States entering the labour 
market of high- wage Member States after the Court of Justice had confirmed 
that companies could rely on the free movement of services to temporarily 





 14 Ibid., p. 10 and 15.
 15 Ibid., p. 26.
 16 Ibid., p. 11 (average of 91 days in 2018 per A1 document).
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between free movement and workers’ protection inspired the adoption of the 
PoW Directive in 1996 and also the Commission’s 2016 proposal to revise that 
Directive.
iii.1 The Court of Justice and Workers’ Protection in the Context of  
Cross- Border Services
In the absence of legislative guidance, the Court of Justice was tasked with 
a challenging role. On the one hand, the free movement of services as a fun-
damental freedom had to be preserved against undue regulatory obstacles. 
On the other hand, the protection of workers and social policy goals had to 
be recognised as legitimate interests capable of justifying restrictions to that 
economic freedom. The Court could not escape the finding that measures im-
posed by a host Member State that put an obstacle to undertakings established 
in another Member State in their provision of services in the host Member 
State have to be qualified as “restrictions” to free movement. However, under 
the Court’s established case law on free movement, such finding does not im-
ply that any measures laid down by the host Member State to protect workers 
becomes subordinated to the objective of market liberalisation underpinning 
the Treaty provisions on free movement. Restrictions to free movement may 
indeed be justified provided that they apply without distinction to all under-
takings operating in the host Member State and remain proportionate to the 
pursued objective.18
In a number of cases, the Court concluded that social legislation restricting 
the provision of services from other Member States went beyond what was 
necessary to safeguard workers’ rights, for example, because service provid-
ers were required to pay social contributions for social benefits to which the 
undertakings already contributed in the home Member State.19 At the same 
time, however, the Court confirmed that a host Member State may invoke so-
cial policy objectives to impose requirements that effectively ensure workers’ 
protection. Thus, the Court considered in Seco that the free movement of ser-
vices does not prevent a host Member State from applying legislation or col-
lective labour agreements setting minimum wages to be paid to any person 
employed, even temporarily, within its territory, irrespective of the Member 
 18 See Finalarte, cit., paras. 31– 32; Court of Justice, judgment of 24 January 2002, case C- 164/ 
99, Portugaia Construções, para. 19; Court of Justice, judgment of 12 October 2004, case 
C- 60/ 03, Wolff & Müller, para. 34.
 19 See Court of Justice, judgment of 3 February 1982, joined cases 62/ 81 and 63/ 81, Seco and 
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State where the employer is established, and from enforcing such rules by ap-
propriate means.20 In Rush Portuguesa the Court confirmed the host Member 
State’s freedom to apply legislation protecting workers, without limiting it to 
minimum wages.21 Those rulings prompted the Commission to come up in 
1991 with a proposal for legislation “to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules 
for minimum protection to be observed in the host country”.22
iii.2 The Posting of Workers Directive Laying Down a Nucleus of 
Protective Rights
The Commission’s proposal of August 1991 acknowledged that a balance need-
ed to be struck between opposing principles: free competition across the bor-
ders to realise the full potential of the internal market, even when the main 
comparative advantage of some Member States is a lower wage cost, and hav-
ing Member States set minimum pay levels applicable to all workers on their 
territory to ensure a minimum standard of living.23 It led to an exhaustive24 
list of rights set out in Article 3(1) of the PoW Directive, which not only aims at 
protecting the posted workers, but also at guaranteeing that the level of protec-
tion ensured by the PoW Directive does not render the cross- border provision 
of services too burdensome or costly for foreign undertakings. The “nucleus” 
of rights deals with those issues which are of immediate interest to the work-
er and the posting undertaking during the posting assignment, such as min-
imum rates of pay, including overtime pay, paid annual holidays, maximum 
work periods, and health, safety and hygiene at work. These terms and con-
ditions have to be guaranteed by the posting undertaking based on the legal 
framework applicable in the host Member State. The list excludes provisions 
on dismissal and standards relating to the representation of workers, as those 
are not relevant for the short- term duration of the work provided in the host 
Member State.
The PoW Directive introduced that nucleus of mandatory rules for all post-
ed workers, leaving the definition of a worker to be determined by the host 
 20 Seco and Desquenne & Giral, cit., para. 14. See also Guiot, cit., para. 12; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 23 November 1999, joined cases C- 369/ 96, Arblade, and C- 376/ 96, Leloup, 
para. 43.
 21 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 1990, case C- 113/ 89, Rush Portuguesa, para.18.
 22 PoW Directive, recital 13.
 23 Proposal of 1 August 1991 for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, com(91) 230 final. Amended Proposal com(93) 
225 final was submitted in June 1993.
 24 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2007, case C- 341/ 05, Laval un Partneri, para. 
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Member State’s legislation. Since the nucleus of the protective rights is applied 
in accordance with the host Member State rules, it would indeed not have 
made sense to regulate situations for which no protection is provided under 
that Member State’s law. The PoW Directive does not set any maximum period 
for the posting activities falling within its scope. Likewise, it does not define 
any minimum duration, although it contains an exemption for workers posted 
less than eight days for assembling or installing goods and also allows Member 
States to exempt posting activities which do not exceed one month or which 
concern “not significant work”. The Court of Justice however indicated that 
there may be circumstances, with several and brief crossing of borders, where 
it could be disproportionate for a host Member State to apply its legislation on 
minimum wages.25 In the sector of international road transport, a host Mem-
ber State can indeed be expected to require minimum wages only for posted 
workers having established a sufficient link with the territory of that Member 
State.26
The issue that stirred most debate in the adoption process of the PoW Di-
rective, and continued to do so after its transposition, has been the application 
of the requirement to pay posted workers minimum rates of pay. The PoW Di-
rective specifies that it is for the host Member State’s law and practice to define 
the concept of minimum rates of pay (Article 3(1)), indicating that allowances 
specific to the posting must be considered part of the minimum wage, unless 
they are paid in reimbursement of expenditure actually incurred by workers, 
such as expenditure on travel, board and lodging (Article 3(7)). As the PoW 
Directive does not indicate what exactly falls under the notion of minimum 
rates of pay, it has been for the national courts to determine that notion on 
a case- by- case basis. When asked to clarify that notion, the Court of Justice 
held that it is for the host Member State’s law to define the constituent ele-
ments of minimum rates of pay, while indicating that national legislation or 
collective agreements should not have the effect of impeding the freedom to 
 25 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2001, case C- 165/ 98, Mazzoleni and ISA, paras. 
30– 39.
 26 See rec. 10 of the Commission’s 2016 Proposal (see infra fn. 63). Accordingly, the spe-
cific rules on which the negotiators from the European Parliament and the Council 
agreed on 12 December 2019 foresee that drivers are not considered ‘posted’ if they per-
form bilateral transport operations from the Member State of establishment to another 
State or are merely transiting through such other State. See Article 1 of the Directive 
laying down specific rules for the application of Directive 96/ 71/ EC and Directive 2014/ 
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provide services.27 The notion of minimum wage does not include allowances 
or supplements, which the law or practice of the host Member State does not 
define as constituent elements of the minimum wage and which alter the re-
lationship between the service provided by the worker and the consideration 
received in return.28
Further clarification on the notion of minimum wage resulted from the Fin-
ish case Sähköalojen ammattiliitto29 concerning a trade union in the electricity 
sector bringing pay claims assigned to it by workers posted to Finland by a 
Polish undertaking. Several allowances included in a collective agreement had 
not been taken into account by the Polish employer. The Court qualified the 
daily allowances imposed by the agreement as allowances specific to the post-
ing within the meaning of Article 3(7) of the PoW Directive, as they intended 
to make up for the disadvantages entailed by the worker being removed from 
his usual working environment.30 Thus, these allowances had to be consid-
ered part of minimum wage and had to be paid to posted workers without 
discrimination. The same applied to travelling time compensation, applicable 
whenever a worker had to travel every day for more than one hour from his 
lodging to the place of work, provided that the posted workers were in such 
situation.31 However, other elements, like coverage for accommodation costs 
and meal vouchers were not considered constituent elements of pay, as they 
were paid to compensate for living costs actually incurred by workers during 
the posting assignment.32
iii.3 Continued Controversy in the Balance between Free Movement and 
Social Protection
At the time of adoption of the PoW Directive, the Commission considered that 
legal framework fit for the purpose of ensuring a fair balance amongst the in-
terests concerned by removing obstacles to the freedom to provide services 
 27 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2015, case C- 396/ 13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, 
para. 34.
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 April 2005, case C- 341/ 02, Commission v. Germany, paras. 
31– 39 (considering regularly paid “13th and 14th months” supplements as elements of min-
imum rates of pay, but not quality bonuses or bonuses for dangerous and heavy work paid 
to workers when they are required to carry out additional work or work under certain 
conditions). See also Court of Justice, judgment of 7 November 2013, case C- 522/ 12, Tevfik 
Isbir, paras. 40– 44.
 29 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, cit.
 30 Ibid., para. 49.
 31 Ibid., paras. 53– 57.
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and at the same time providing legal clarity on the nucleus of the working con-
ditions applicable to posted workers.33 However, the subsequent enlargement 
from 15 to 25 and eventually 28 Member States brought enormous diversity 
to the Union, bringing together countries with very different wage levels and 
social security coverage.
At the same time, the Court of Justice had had to rule on several cases involv-
ing national legislation protecting workers, and some of these measures were 
found to be inconsistent with the Treaty provisions on free movement and/ or 
the provisions of the PoW Directive. Most often, the proportionality test proved 
not to be fulfilled.34 Various administrative requirements, such as requirements 
to obtain work permits for posted workers, were considered disproportionate as 
alternative measures were available that would be less restrictive to free move-
ment, such as obligations to report beforehand on the presence of posted work-
ers, the anticipated duration of their presence and the provision of services justi-
fying the posting.35 The Court considered other measures justified for the proper 
enforcement of the posting rules, including requirements for posting undertak-
ings to facilitate controls by retaining on the work site essential documents, such 
as the employment contract, pay- slips and time- sheets, as well as the obligation 
to have these documents available in the language of the host Member State.36
Importantly, the Court of Justice also recognised that a host Member State 
may not only invoke the objective of workers’ protection, but also the objec-
tive to prevent unfair competition on the part of posting undertakings paying 
their workers at a rate less than the minimum rate of pay.37 The Court also 
 33 Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services, com(91) 230 final, p.14. See also Maslauskaite, K. (2014). Posted 
Workers in the EU: State of Play and Regulatory Evolution. Paris: Jacques Delors Institute, 
Policy Paper 107, available at http:// www.institutdelors.eu/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2018/ 01/ 
postedworkers- maslauskaite- ne- jdi- mar14.pdf?pdf=ok; Dhéret, C. and Ghimis, A. (2016). 
The Revision of the Posted Workers Directive:  Towards a Sufficient Policy Adjustment? 
Brussels:  European Policy Centre, available at http:// www.epc.eu/ documents/ uploads/ 
pub_ 6475_ revision_ of_ the_ posted_ workers_ directive.pdf?doc_ id=1726.
 34 See also Syrpis, P. (2016). EU Secondary Legislation and its Impact on Derogations from 
Free Movement. In:  Nic Shuibhne, Koutrakos and Syrpis, eds., Exceptions from EU Free 
Movement Law: Derogation, Justification and Proportionality. Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, pp. 278– 296.
 35 See, for example, Court of Justice, judgment of 21 October 2004, case C- 445/ 03, Commission 
v. Luxembourg, para. 31; Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2010, case C- 515/ 08, dos 
Santos Palhota, paras. 51– 60.
 36 Commission v. Germany, cit., para. 71.
 37 Wolff & Müller, cit., para. 41. To be noted that the PoW Directive, in recital 5, already 











280 Van Nuffel and Afanasjeva
made clear that in so far a host Member State applies measures pursuing an 
objective of public interest, such as minimum rates of pay, measures intended 
to facilitate posted workers to usefully assert their rights against their employ-
er should equally be accepted. This is the case, for example, for provisions en-
abling, in case of contractors making use of a subcontractor, the subcontrac-
tor’s workers to hold the first undertaking liable for payment of the minimum 
rate of pay.38
Although these rulings confirmed the Court’s willingness to preserve work-
ers’ protection and fair competition when assessing national measures un-
der the PoW Directive, full trust in the Court’s willingness to give adequate 
weight to workers’ rights became undermined by 2007 and 2008 case law on 
the protection of collective bargaining and collective action in a context of 
cross- border provision of services. It should be noted that in many Member 
States matters of pay, including minimum rates of pay, as well as other working 
conditions are traditionally determined by social partners through collective 
labour agreements. In its Article 3(1), the PoW Directive already provided that 
in the construction sector, an undertaking posting workers must not only ap-
ply the rights set out in the host Member State’s legislation, but also those laid 
down by collective agreements that have been declared universally applica-
ble.39 In addition, the increasing presence of workers posted by undertakings 
from low- wage Member States prompted trade unions to take collective action 
against such undertakings, amongst which the famous Laval case40 concerning 
a Latvian undertaking posting workers to Swedish construction sites. Swedish 
trade unions had initiated negotiations requiring Laval to pay its posted work-
ers the Swedish usual hourly wage. The break- up of these negotiations lead to a 
blockage of the construction site, following which the dispute was brought to a 
Swedish court, which referred questions on the compatibility of the collective 
action with the freedom to provide services to the Court of Justice. Amongst 
others, the Court had to clarify whether the PoW Directive allows imposing 
conditions that do not result from universally applicable collective agreements 
and whether, more generally, other conditions can be imposed than the nucle-
us of protective rights set out in the PoW Directive.
On the first point, it was indicated above that Article 3(1) of the PoW Di-
rective allows collective agreements that have been declared universally 
 38 Wolff & Müller, cit., paras. 37– 40.
 39 Under Art. 3(1), this is the case for “the activities referred to in the Annex”. The Annex 
clarifies that this concerns building work relating to the construction, repair, upkeep, 
alteration or demolition of buildings.
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applicable to be taken into account when imposing minimum rates of pay 
in the construction sector. Article 3(8) of the PoW Directive allows Member 
States to rely also on collective agreements in the absence of a system to de-
clare such agreements universally applicable, provided that these agreements 
are de facto generally applicable to all undertakings in the industry concerned. 
The purpose of both provisions is to prevent posted workers from being made 
subject to collective agreements that local undertakings are not obliged to ap-
ply. However, the Swedish situation was rather particular in the sense that no 
legislation or collective agreements existed containing minimum rates of pay, 
but only a practice whereby management and labour set the applicable wage 
rates (not the minimum rates) by way of collective negotiations on a case- by- 
case basis, at the place of work. In the absence of any public or collectively 
agreed provision on which foreign service providers could have relied, the 
Court concluded that there was no question of minimum rates of pay deter-
mined in accordance with Article 3(1) and (8) of the PoW Directive.41 Since the 
collective action could not be justified by the PoW Directive, it had to be as-
sessed in the light of the Treaty provision on free movement of services. In that 
context, the Court considered that the negotiations which the collective action 
sought to impose on Laval were not justified as this employer was already, pur-
suant to the PoW Directive, required to comply with a nucleus of mandatory 
rules and faced, in the absence of any transparent regulatory system, excessive 
difficulties to determine the additional obligations with which it was required 
to comply as regards pay.42
Second, the Court considered in Laval that by establishing the minimum 
protective rights that have to be respected by posting undertaking, Article 
3(1) of the PoW Directive does not allow the host Member State to make the 
provision of services in its territory conditional on the observance of other 
terms and conditions.43 Some authors consider that the Court’s ruling went 
against indications in the PoW Directive that the Directive does not prevent 
conditions which are more favourable to workers,44 arguing that the Court 
 41 Ibid., paras. 69– 71. See also Feenstra, S. (2009). Detachering van werknemers in het kader 
van het verrichten van diensten  – Het arbeidsrechtelijke kader  – Richtlijn 96/ 71/ EG. 
In:  Jorens, ed., Handboek Europese detachering en vrij verkeer van diensten. Bruges:  Die 
Keure, p. 268.
 42 Laval un Partneri, cit., paras. 108– 110.
 43 Ibid., paras. 80– 81.
 44 Art. 3(7) and recital 17 of PoW Directive indicate that the mandatory rules for minimum 
protection must not prevent the application of terms and conditions of employment, 
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transformed into a ‘ceiling’ what was supposed to be a ‘floor’.45 This alternative 
interpretation of the PoW Directive is however difficult to square with the PoW 
Directive’s objective to create legal certainty on the rules that a host Member 
State may impose on foreign service providers. The level of protection which 
must be ensured to posted workers has indeed been limited to the protective 
rights set out in Article 3(1) of the PoW Directive, without prejudice to any 
further- going protection that the posting undertaking would accord them on 
its own volition or in accordance with the terms and conditions required un-
der the law of the home Member State.46
Whereas both conclusions could thus arguably be derived from the PoW 
Directive’s provisions, the Laval judgment was badly received in trade unions’ 
circles. For a large part, this can be explained by the fact that the judgment 
was pronounced only one week after the judgment in the Viking case,47 where 
the Court equally considered collective action by a trade union to constitute 
a restriction of free movement that could not be justified by the objective of 
protecting workers’ rights. In two subsequent judgments (Rüffert48 and Com-
mission v Luxembourg),49 the Court also concluded that a host Member State’s 
protective measures were not justified under the PoW Directive.50 In the light 
of the increasing posting of workers from low- wage Member States to high- wage 
Member States, the frustration of trade unions and other advocates of more ex-
tensive instruments against “social dumping” can be understood. Still, it can rea-
sonably be argued that the Court did no more than interpret the PoW Directive 
in accordance with the PoW Directive’s double objective to create legal certain-
ty for service providers and ensure workers’ protection by laying down a nucleus 
of protective rights that the host Member State must guarantee to all workers 
carrying out work on its territory.51 Interpreting the PoW Directive as allowing 
 45 See, e.g., Hatzopoulos, V.  (2013). Actively talking to each other:  the Court and political 
institutions. In: Dawson, De Witte and Muir, eds., Judicial Activism at the European Court 
of Justice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 121– 122.
 46 Laval un Partneri, cit., para. 81. See also Watson, P. (2014). EU Social and Employment Law, 
cit., p. 299; Feenstra, S. (2009). Detachering van werknemers in het kader van het verrichten 
van diensten, cit., p. 293 et seq.
 47 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 438/ 05 Viking.
 48 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 April 2008, case C- 346/ 06, Rüffert.
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2008, case C- 319/ 06, Commission v. Luxembourg.
 50 These four judgments are also referred to as the “Laval- Quartet”. See Malmberg, J. (2010). 
The Impact of the ECJ Judgments on Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg on the Practice of 
Collective Bargaining and the Effectiveness of Social Action. Brussels: European Parliament.
 51 For alternative views on the “Laval- Quartet” rulings, see, for example, Davies, A.  C. 
L.  (2008). One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ecj. 
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host Member States to impose further- going protective rules would have under-
mined the effectiveness of the PoW Directive and opened the door to discrimi-
nation against service providers exercising their free movement right.52
For example, in Rüffert53 the Court had to rule on German legislation, which 
allowed public tenders for construction projects to be awarded only to under-
takings committing to pay their employees the minimum wage prescribed by 
the collective agreement in the place where the service is provided. In the case 
at hand, a contract with a German undertaking had been terminated when 
that undertaking’s Polish subcontractor turned out to be paying wages below 
the level indicated in the collective agreement covering the sector. That agree-
ment had however not been declared universally applicable within the mean-
ing of Article 3(1) of the PoW Directive. Neither could the agreement fall within 
the scope of Article 3(8) of the PoW Directive, which only applies where – un-
like in Germany – there is no system to declare collective agreements univer-
sally applicable. Therefore, the Court concluded that the rates of pay fixed by 
the collective agreement in question could not be considered minimum rates 
of pay and could under the PoW Directive not be imposed on the posting un-
dertaking.54 Otherwise, the Court would indeed have allowed the host Mem-
ber State to impose conditions on posted workers that were not obligatory to 
local undertakings. In its later RegioPost judgment55 the Court made clear that 
where minimum wage conditions are effectively fixed by law, even only within 
a region of the host Member State, it is not against the PoW Directive or free 
movement to require contractors and their subcontractors to respect those 
conditions. Unlike in Rüffert, the obligation for the employer had in RegioPost 
also been laid down in a transparent and non- discriminatory manner.
iv Clarification of the Rules through the Enforcement Directive
The wage differences that caused posting of workers to increase have unfor-
tunately also led to increased attempts at fraud or circumvention of the rules 
and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to Their Reconciliation. 
European Law Review 33 (3), pp.  411– 426, and Barnard, C.  (2008). Social Dumping or 
Dumping Socialism? Cambridge Law Journal 67 (2), pp. 262– 264.
 52 See also Rosas, A.  (2010). Finis Europae socialis?. In:  Cohen- Jonathan, Constantinesco, 
Michel, eds., Chemins d’Europe – Mélanges en honneur de Jean- Paul Jacqué. Paris: Dalloz, 
p. 591 et seq.
 53 Rüffert, cit.
 54 Ibid., para. 31.
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by undertakings seeking to exploit business opportunities with underpaid 
workers. Circumvention of the posting rules goes from non- compliance with 
the labour law or social security regulations, which is left undetected due to 
limited or vague requirements of cooperation and information exchange for 
national authorities, all the way to the setting up of “letterbox companies” in 
a Member State with low- wage levels in order to have work carried out in a 
high- wage Member State by workers posted from the first Member State. To 
strengthen the enforcement of the PoW Directive, but also to address the de-
velopments in the case law on the right to take collective action (read: Viking 
and Laval), the Commission started working on two proposals. In March 2012 
it proposed a Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
(the so- called Monti ii proposal)56 and a Directive on the enforcement of the 
PoW Directive, which avoided reopening negotiations on the provisions of 
the PoW Directive itself.57 The first proposal was withdrawn after huge oppo-
sition from trade unions and national parliaments making use of the yellow 
card procedure foreseen in the Subsidiarity Protocol.58 The second proposal 
was adopted in May 2014 by the European Parliament and the Council as Di-
rective 2014/ 67/ EU on the enforcement of Directive 96/ 71/ EC (the “Enforce-
ment Directive”).59
In order to prevent abuse and circumvention of the posting rules, the En-
forcement Directive calls upon national authorities to assess whether workers 
posted on their territory are genuinely posted, that is have a genuine employ-
ment relationship with the posting undertaking established in the home Mem-
ber State, which in turn should genuinely perform substantial activities in that 
home Member State.60 The host Member State must make information on the 
terms and conditions imposed on posted workers available free of charge in a 
clear, transparent, comprehensive and easily accessible way, including on an 
 56 Proposal of 21 March 2012 for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services, com(2012) 130 final.
 57 Proposal of 21 March 2012 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the enforcement of Directive 96/ 71/ EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, com(2012) 131 final.
 58 See Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity, Art. 7(2).
 59 Directive 2014/ 67/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
Enforcement of Directive 96/ 71/ EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/ 2012 on administra-
tive cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the imi Regulation’), 
OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 11– 31.
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official national website.61 The Enforcement Directive further lays down obli-
gations on mutual assistance, cooperation and monitoring and on the cross- 
border enforcement of administrative penalties and fines. Importantly, the 
Enforcement Directive also introduced rules on subcontracting.62
v Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive
The Enforcement Directive laid the ground for improved information of ser-
vice providers and better enforcement of the protective rules set out in the 
PoW Directive but did not lead to any changes in these rules. Since the PoW Di-
rective requires posted workers to be guaranteed only minimal rates of pay in 
the host Member State, posted workers do not necessarily benefit from similar 
protection in terms of wages as local workers. As indicated above, differences 
in wage levels have been more marked following the accession of Eastern Eu-
ropean Member States. Against that background, the Juncker Commission is-
sued in March 2016 a proposal for a “targeted review” of the PoW Directive (the 
“2016 Proposal”).63 The Commission put forward further clarifications of social 
security rules in situations of posting in a proposal submitted in December 
2016 for a revision of Regulations 883/ 2004 and 987/ 2009 on the coordination 
of social security systems.64
v.1 The Commission’s 2016 Proposal
As already announced by Jean- Claude Juncker in July 2014, the Commission’s 
proposal was presented as a “targeted” revision of the PoW Directive in view of 
ensuring fair working conditions for all workers. The essence of the proposal 
has been to replace the host Member State’s obligation to impose minimum 
rates of pay by the requirement to have all legislation and collective agree-
ments on remuneration applicable to posted workers, that is to say to have 
posted workers receiving wages determined in accordance with the same rules 
as local workers. For that purpose, relevant provisions of collective agreements 
 61 Ibid., Art. 5.
 62 See fn. 100 and accompanying text.
 63 Proposal of 16 December 1996 for a Directive amending Directive 96/ 71/ EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the posting of workers in the frame-
work of the provision of services, com(2016) 128 final.
 64 Proposal of 13 December 2016 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EC) No 883/ 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems and regulation (EC) No 987/ 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing 
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declared universally applicable should be applied also outside the construc-
tion sector.65 Guaranteeing the principle of “equal pay for equal work at the 
same place” not only aims at ensuring adequate protection of workers’ rights, 
but also at strengthening the legitimacy of the internal market by ensuring 
fairness in the market. Since so- called social dumping can lead to the down-
grade of existing labour rights and wage levels, the initiative also aimed at pre-
venting distortion of national labour markets and promoting upwards social 
convergence.
Since it had already been difficult in 1991 to convince the Member States of 
the need to introduce rules for posted workers, it came as no surprise that in a 
Union with twice as many Member States, the appetite for another change of 
the rules applied to posted workers was not universally shared. Applying the 
Subsidiarity Protocol, fourteen parliamentary chambers from eleven mostly 
Eastern European Member States66 issued reasoned opinions alleging that the 
revision would breach the principle of subsidiarity. Arguing that wage differ-
ences constitute a legitimate factor for competition between service providers, 
they considered the principle of equal pay for equal work at the same place to 
violate the Treaty provisions on the internal market. Again, the parliaments 
collected sufficient negative opinions to trigger the “yellow card” procedure, 
requiring the Commission to review its proposal. In its response,67 the Com-
mission pointed out that the proposal was not in breach of subsidiarity since 
posting of workers is by nature a cross- border so that an obligation to apply 
rules in all the Member States and across sectors could only be established at 
Union level. In the Commission’s view, its proposal also remains in line with 
the spirit of the internal market as applying the same mandatory rules to all 
workers performing work at the same place also ensures undertakings to be 
subject to the same rules across the Union.
Since the Commission did not amend or withdraw its proposal, the leg-
islative discussions on the 2016 Proposal could start, both in the Council, 
under successive Presidencies, and in the European Parliament, within its 
Employment Committee. Early 2017, an agreement in the Council seemed 
within reach until certain Member States hardened their position, including 
France (following President Macron’s election), but also other Member States 
 65 See also below for the situations under which certain agreements that have not been 
declared universally applicable may be taken into account.
 66 Negative opinions came from Denmark and 10 Central and Eastern European Member 
States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and the Slovak Republic).
 67 Communication com(2016) 505 final of 27 July 2016 from the Commission on the posting 
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expressing discontent with the proposals on specific rules for posting in the 
road transport sector that the Commission tabled end May 2017.68 By October 
2017, however, the way had been paved for each of the co- legislators to find 
agreement on a position on the basis of which interinstitutional negotiations 
could start: the Council in a general approach adopted late- night after a mem-
orable discussion on 23 October 2017 in the Employment and Social Affairs 
Council,69 the Parliament’s Employment Committee with the adoption on 16 
October 2017 of a report prepared by the two co- rapporteurs.70 Importantly, 
these provisional agreements also received support in several Eastern Euro-
pean Member States,71 attesting to the balance struck between the interests of 
enhancing workers protection and preserving free movement opportunities.
Under the Estonian and then the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council, the 
negotiators of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission met 
in eight “trilogue” sessions, the Commission being represented by the Commis-
sioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, Marianne 
Thyssen, who had initiated the revision in 2016. After a breakthrough on the 
main political issues in the early hours of 1 March 2018, a provisional agreement 
was reached on 19 March 2018 on the full text of the Directive revising the PoW 
Directive (referred to hereinafter as the “Revising Directive”72; the amended 
provisions of the PoW Directive are referred to as the “Revised PoW Directive”). 
Crucial for reaching that final agreement was the fact that the Revising Direc-
tive will only become applicable to the sector of road transport once the pro-
posed specific rules for posting in that sector have been adopted and become 
applicable.73 Following the endorsement of that provisional agreement in the 
 68 Proposal of 31 May 2017 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2006/ 22/ EC as regards enforcement requirements and laying down 
specific rules with respect to Directive 96/ 71/ EC and Directive 2014/ 67/ EU for posting 
drivers in the road transport sector, com(2017) 278 final. At the time of writing, the 
political agreement reached on this proposal in December 2019 still had to be formally 
approved by the European Parliament and the Council, see fn. 26 supra.
 69 General approach agreed by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
Council on 23 October 2017, Council doc. 13612/ 17 of 24.10.2017.
 70 Report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, doc. A8- 0319/ 2017 of 19 
October 2017 (Rapporteurs: Elisabeth Morin- Chartier and Agnes Jongerius).
 71 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and the Slovak Republic voted in favour in 
the October Council, whereas Croatia (together with Ireland and the UK) abstained and 
only Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland voted against. Pursuant to Art. 53 tfeu, the 
ordinary legislative procedure applied, in which the Council votes by qualified majority.
 72 Directive 2018/ 957, cit.
 73 See Revising Directive, Art. 3(3). The review that the Commission must undertake within 
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European Parliament on 29 May 2018 and in the Council on 21 June 2018 – with 
even broader geographical support than the negotiation mandates74  – the 
PoW Directive was adopted on 28 June 2018. Meanwhile, Hungary and Poland 
have sought the annulment of the Revised PoW Directive, considering that the 
protection granted to workers exceeds what is possible under the Treaty pro-
visions on free movement of services.75 This legal challenge does not suspend 
the application of the PoW Directive, which will apply as from 30 July 2020.76 
As set out below, this contribution argues that the Revised PoW Directive has 
duly remained within the boundaries of its legal basis and does not conflict 
with the Treaty provisions on free movement.
v.2 Revised Rules for the Posting of Workers
Besides replacing the requirement to pay posted workers at least “minimum 
rates of pay” by the requirement of having posted workers’ wages complete-
ly defined in accordance with the host Member State’s laws and (universally 
applicable) collective agreements, the 2016 Proposal also put forward a higher 
level of protection for workers posted for a long- term period, defined as any 
period exceeding the 24 months period during which workers remain covered 
by the social security legislation of the home Member State. In addition, the 
Commission proposed allowing Member States to extend the Directive’s re-
quirements on wages to workers employed in subcontracting. In the course of 
the legislative discussions, those issues have been intensively debated while 
new issues were put on the table, such as the clarification of the status of post-
ing allowances and collective agreements, guarantees of enforcement with re-
spect to certain categories of posted workers, the conditions under which the 
posting rules would become applicable to the road transport sector and the 
general conditions for transposition and entry into force of the proposed Di-
rective. Interestingly, the European Parliament initially also requested to have 
the objective of increased workers protection reflected in the legal basis of the 
need for further measures in the light of developments concerning this “lex specialis” 
(for example, in case the legislative negotiations on that “lex specialis” would not yet 
have been successful). Ibid., Art. 2(2). For all other sectors, the Revising Directive will be 
applicable in all Member States at the expiry of the two year transposition period. Ibid., 
Art. 3(1).
 74 Compared to the vote in Council of October 2017 (see fn. 71), at the June 2018 meeting of 
the Council just Hungary and Poland voted against, with only Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and the UK abstaining.
 75 Case C- 620/ 18 Hungary v European Parliament and Council (see OJ C 428, 26.11.2018, p. 31) 
and case C- 626/ 18 Poland v European Parliament and Council (see OJ C 4, 07.01.2019, p. 12).
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proposed Directive, which, in its view, had to be considered not merely as the 
implementation of free movement provisions but also as pursuing social pol-
icy. However, as explained below, the increase in workers protection resulting 
from the revision has remained within the internal market legal basis of the 
initial PoW Directive.
v.3 Remuneration, Posting Allowances and Collective Agreements
As indicated above, the essential change of the revision has been to change the 
notion of “minimum rates of pay” applicable to posted workers under Article 
3(1)(c) of the PoW Directive to the notion of “remuneration”, defined as “all 
the constituent elements of remuneration rendered mandatory by national law, 
regulation or administrative provisions, or by collective agreements or arbitration 
awards, which, in that Member State, have been declared universally applicable”. 
With the revised Article 3(1)(c) the nucleus of rights guaranteed to posted 
workers therefore includes all the elements of remuneration as defined in the 
host Member State, and not only minimum rates of pay. Whereas this provi-
sion eliminates wage competition between posted workers and local workers, 
it will lead to a wage increase for workers posted to high- wage Member States. 
By reducing the risk of unfair competition based on low working conditions, 
the Revised Directive also ensures a “level playing field” for all businesses con-
cerned. All in all, the revision therefore does not change the character of the 
PoW Directive as an instrument ensuring legal certainty for cross- border ser-
vice providers, but it increases the level of ambition of that instrument from 
a social perspective, going from requiring employers to guarantee a minimum 
level of protection of posted workers to a requirement to make posted workers 
benefit from the same rules on wages that apply to other workers carrying out 
the same kind of work.
Clearly, the proposed provision on “remuneration” does not align the levels 
of wages across the Member States, which is an area that the Treaty expressly 
excludes from the Union’s harmonisation powers in social matters.77 During 
the legislative discussions, both the European Parliament and the Council had 
no difficulty in accepting the notion of “remuneration”, not however without 
emphasizing in the agreed text that setting rules on remuneration and wages 
remains an exclusive competence of the Member States and social partners.78 
Wages of posted workers will still be set by their employment contract, which 
is usually concluded under the law of the home Member State, and workers’ 
 77 Art. 153(5) tfeu, according to which the powers set out in this Article do not apply to pay.






290 Van Nuffel and Afanasjeva
salaries may therefore still differ, depending on the rules and practices of the 
Member States in question and of their employer. Still, once the Revised Di-
rective applies, employers will have to pay their posted workers not only by 
complying with the rules on remuneration of the law applicable to the em-
ployment contract (home Member State legislation) but also by ensuring that 
the remuneration paid during the posting assignment is at least equivalent to 
the remuneration that worker would be entitled to under the relevant legis-
lation and collective agreements of the host Member State. Upon the Coun-
cil’s request, the preamble to the Revised Directive clarifies how to assess the 
compatibility of the salary paid under the home Member State’s rules with the 
elements of remuneration set by the host Member State’s rules. In line with 
the Court’s case law on minimum pay,79 the posted worker’s gross salary will 
need to be matched up to the gross amounts of pay required by the rules on 
“remuneration” rather than to individual elements of remuneration required 
by the host Member State.80 As under the existing rules,81 allowances specif-
ic to the posting should be considered part of the remuneration, unless they 
compensate for expenditure actually incurred on account of the posting, such 
as expenditure on travel, board and lodging.82 If, for example, the relevant col-
lective agreement in the host Member State requires the posted worker to be 
paid a monthly salary of 1500 eur and daily allowances of 300 eur, where-
as that worker is, under home Member State rules, entitled to a salary of 500 
eur but also to a seniority allowance and a flat- rate posting allowance of 100 
eur and 1200 eur, respectively, it is the gross amount of 1800 eur paid to the 
worker under home Member State rules that must be compared with the gross 
amount of remuneration required under the host Member State rules (also 
1800 eur in the example).
By having posted workers benefit from the elements of “remuneration” ap-
plicable to local workers in the host Member State – translated politically as 
the principle of equal pay for equal work at the same workplace – the Revis-
ing Directive is likely to increase salaries for posted workers, especially those 
posted from lower- wage Member States to higher- wage Member States. During 
the legislative discussions, both the European Parliament and the Council also 
insisted on introducing amendments and clarifications on what constitutes re-
muneration and on the precise status of allowances paid on the top of salaries. 
The sensitivity of the issue of allowances may be explained, to a certain extent, 
 79 Commission v. Germany, cit., para. 29.
 80 Revising Directive, recital 18.
 81 PoW Directive, Art. 3(7).
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by the phenomenon of posting undertakings seeking to increase their compet-
itive advantage by paying lower social contributions and/ or taxes and, for that 
purpose, preferring to pay their workers relatively low salaries supplemented 
with high allowances. To the extent that posting allowances do not concern 
expenditure actually incurred, they do qualify as remuneration for the purpose 
of the host Member State rules. This does not mean that the host Member 
State determines whether such allowances must be paid. It is indeed for the 
law or collective agreements of the home Member State to determine whether 
such allowances are to be paid at all, together with the amount of such allow-
ances. In order to ensure that posting allowances taken into account for the 
purposes of remuneration under host Member State rules genuinely consti-
tute part of the workers’ remuneration, and not compensation for incurred 
expenditure, an amendment from the Council has been adopted according to 
which posting allowances are presumed to be compensation for expenditure 
actually incurred. Indeed, for an allowance to be considered part of remuner-
ation, this must clearly result from the terms and conditions applicable to the 
employment relationship.83 If the parts of the allowance constituting either 
reimbursement or remuneration are not defined in the applicable legislation, 
collective agreement or contractual arrangements, the entire allowance will be 
considered to be paid in reimbursement.84
Concerning allowances that constitute reimbursement of expenditure, the 
co- legislators added two more elements in the Revising Directive. First, upon a 
request from the Council, the nucleus of protective rights in Article 3(1) of the 
PoW Directive is complemented with a reference to allowances reimbursing 
travel, board and lodging expenditure incurred by posted workers that have to 
travel to and from their regular place of work within the host Member State.85 
In the above- mentioned Finnish case, the Court of Justice had already clari-
fied that where a host Member State requires such posting allowances to be 
paid, they are part of the minimum wage that under the PoW Directive must 
be paid to local workers and posted workers alike.86 This will now also be the 
case for the application of the notion of “remuneration”. It has also been clar-
ified that all this should not lead to posted workers receiving double payment 
for the same expenses.87 Second, with respect to all allowances reimbursing 
expenditure for travel, board or lodging, the Revising Directive confirms the 
 83 Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(7), new third subparagraph.
 84 See also Revising Directive, recital 19.
 85 See Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(1)(i).
 86 See supra fn. 30 and accompanying text.
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employers’ obligation to reimburse the workers for the expenditure incurred, 
in accordance with the national law applicable to the employment relation-
ship, which is normally the home Member State law.88 This confirmation has 
been requested by the European Parliament.89
Regarding the nucleus of protective rights, it should also be mentioned that 
a request of the Council has been accepted to also include in Article 3(1) of the 
PoW Directive the “conditions of workers’ accommodation where provided by 
the employer to workers away from their regular place of work”.90
In the Commission’s proposal, posted workers’ rights were to be increased 
not only by imposing the host Member State’s rules on “remuneration”, but also 
by making wage and working conditions laid down in collective labour agree-
ments applicable. Under the existing PoW Directive, that was already the case 
in the construction sector, but not in other sectors. The Commission’s proposal 
left the conditions unchanged allowing collective agreements to be applica-
ble, that is to say only those agreements which have been declared universally 
applicable or, in the absence of a system for declaring agreements universally 
applicable, those which are generally applicable in the geographical area or 
in the industry concerned.91 In order to avoid discrimination between local 
and posted workers, Article 3(8) of the PoW Directive allows for the applica-
tion of collective agreements in a Member State where no system of declar-
ing agreements universally applicable exists (read: Sweden) only if equality of 
treatment is ensured in their application. The European Parliament insisted 
that also working conditions set out in non- universally applicable collective 
agreements should be applied to posted workers. This would have allowed for 
the reversal of the Court’s ruling in the above- mentioned Rüffert case, where 
the Court did not allow Germany to impose minimum rates of pay set out in an 
agreement that was not declared universally applicable.92 Eventually, the co- 
legislators agreed to slightly extend the conditions set out in Article 3(8) to col-
lective agreements that have not been declared universally applicable, so that, 
even in a Member State where that possibility exists, collective agreements 
that have not been declared universally applicable can be applied to posted 
workers falling within their sectorial or geographical scope of application, but 
 88 See Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(7), second subparagraph.
 89 Initially, the European Parliament proposed language that remained unclear as to the 
basis for the obligation to reimburse, leaving it open whether the host Member State 
could introduce such obligation (see amendment 32 of the Report, supra fn. 70).
 90 See Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(1)(h).
 91 PoW Directive, Art. 3(1) and (8).
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still only if the conditions of equal treatment set out in Article 3(8) are ful-
filled.93
It follows that, although the Commission’s proposal already provided for in-
creased protection of workers, the co- legislators accepted further provisions 
that are even more beneficial for the posted workers, while also introducing 
more clarity and transparency.
v.4 Long Term Posting
Whereas the PoW Directive states that posting of workers is of a temporary 
nature, it does not clarify the notion “temporary”. In Regulation (EC) No 883/ 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems, workers posted from a 
Member State for a period longer than 24 months are considered no longer 
having the required link with that Member State to be subject to that Member 
State’s legislation for the purposes of social security coverage. By reference to 
that rule, the Commission had proposed to consider workers posted for longer 
than 24 months as falling under the host Member State’s legislation for the pur-
poses of determining their working conditions.94 This alignment would have 
provided full legal clarity to the workers, the employers and the authorities.
During the legislative discussions, the Council agreed with the principle of 
having long- term postings made subject to the labour law of the host Member 
State, with exceptions as regards application of the rules on the conclusion 
and termination of contracts and on contributions for supplementary pension 
schemes. That text made it into the final agreement of the co- legislators.95 
However, the actual duration of the period triggering the change in regime has 
been the source of fierce debates, particularly because that period has been 
communicated by many governments and stakeholders as a maximum period 
that would prohibit longer posting assignments instead of being a trigger to-
wards a (slightly) different legal regime.96 In the 2016 campaign for the French 
 93 See the changes in Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(1) and (8).
 94 The 2016 Proposal considered that, in case of an anticipated or effective duration of the 
posting exceeding 24 months, the worker should be deemed to habitually carry out its 
work in that Member State, which is the default connecting factor to determine the law 
applicable to an employment relationship. See Art. 8 of Regulation (EC) No 593/ 2008 of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome i), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, 
p. 6– 16.
 95 See Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(1a). The co- legislators also changed the Commission 
proposal so as to take account only of the effective duration of a posting assignment, not 
its anticipated duration, which probably would have been difficult to monitor.
 96 Given the extensive list of areas already covered by the nucleus of protective rights appli-
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presidency, Emmanuel Macron thus defended the need for a maximum period 
of 12 months. Following long and difficult discussions, the Council eventually 
agreed on 23 October 2017 to lower the 24 months threshold proposed by the 
Commission to 12 months, with an extension of 6 months to be granted to ser-
vice providers submitting a “motivated notification” to the host Member State 
authorities. At the same time, the European Parliament had agreed to keep 
the Commission’s reference to 24 months, while allowing for an extension of 
that period, but only upon assessment by the authorities of a reasoned request 
thereto. That amendment relied on the consideration that although the aver-
age duration of posting assignments does not exceed 4 months, high skilled 
professionals are sometimes seconded for longer periods than two years, so 
that lowering the threshold would create unreasonable burden for that kind 
of posting assignments. Eventually, the co- legislators agreed to keep the refer-
ence for the long- term posting at 12 months, with a quasi- automatic extension 
of 6 months upon a “motivated notification” by the service provider. In order 
to emphasize that Member States cannot prohibit posting assignments longer 
than 12 (or 18) months, a recital has been inserted which reminds the Member 
States that any measure restricting such posting assignments must be compat-
ible with the freedom to provide services.97
v.5 Abuse and Strengthened Enforcement of the Posting of Workers 
Directive
Given the strengthened framework laid down in the 2014 Enforcement Directive, 
the 2016 Proposal did not as such tackle issues of enforcement of the posting 
rules. It however included a provision on subcontracting since posting of work-
ers through subcontracting chains is often used to circumvent posting rules.
The system whereby a principal contractor outsources tasks or activities to 
other companies or self- employed workers is a common business model across 
the Union, especially in sectors like construction and road transport, where 
there is also a high involvement of posted workers. The Commission estimated 
that in the construction sector, in 2011, payments by undertakings to subcon-
tractors ranged between less than 15 per cent (in Romania, Poland, Portugal, It-
aly and Denmark) to over 30 per cent (Slovakia, Czech Republic and the UK) of 
turnover.98 In a cross- border subcontracting chain, an undertaking providing 
for which long- term posted workers would see a shift in applicable law is indeed limited 
(for example, entitlements to leaves, such as parental leave, not included in Art. 3(1)(b)).
 97 Revising Directive, recital 10.
 98 See Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment accompanying the 2016 
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services may outsource an activity to another company to which workers are 
posted from another Member State or directly to a subcontractor established 
in another Member State. In a context of weak cooperation between national 
authorities in matters of social security and labour law, subcontracting may 
be instrumental in organising circumvention of rules and fraud.99 The PoW 
Directive does not contain specific rules for subcontracting chains, leaving 
certain posted workers in sub- contracting chains in a situation of particular 
vulnerability. The 2014 Enforcement Directive covered the gap in subcontrac-
tors’ liability by providing a legal framework for posted workers to hold the 
undertaking that subcontracted with their employer liable for any outstanding 
payments.100 Still, it only provided for joint liability in direct subcontracting 
situations, without ensuring protection of posted workers throughout the en-
tire subcontracting chain. It indicated however that Member States may adopt 
further going measures if that is done on a non- discriminatory and proportion-
ate basis.101
To better protect posted workers in subcontracting situations, the Commis-
sion had proposed to broaden the possibility for Member States to regulate 
subcontracting. The Proposal provided that, whenever a host Member State 
requires undertakings to subcontract only to companies that guarantee certain 
terms and conditions of employment covering remuneration, that Member 
State could extend such obligation also to undertakings subcontracting with 
companies established in another Member State that post workers to the host 
Member State. The proposed provision only contained a possibility, not an 
obligation for Member States to extend workers’ protection to subcontracting 
involving posted workers. However, it did not receive any support in the Coun-
cil and, even though the Parliament supported it, the widespread opposition 
amongst the Member States made it impossible for the co- legislators to intro-
duce any obligation for subcontractors to follow the rules on remuneration. 
As a matter of compromise, the co- legislators agreed that in the context of a 
future revision of the Directive, the Commission is to assess whether further 
measures in subcontracting are needed to ensure workers’ protection and a 
level playing field for businesses.102
In its Proposal, the Commission also tackled another situation in which 
posting of workers is prone to abuse, that is posting of workers by temporary 
 99 See, for example, Court of Justice, judgment of 6 February 2018, case C- 359/ 16, Altun and 
Others.
 100 Enforcement Directive, Art. 12.
 101 See Enforcement Directive, recital 36, in fine.
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work or placement agencies, which hire out workers to user undertakings 
established or operating in another Member State. The PoW Directive also 
applies to such posted workers, subjecting them to the host Member State’s 
minimum rates of pay and other working conditions set out in Article 3(1). 
Article 3(9) of the PoW Directive also goes further by allowing Member States 
to provide that temporary agency workers posted on their territory must be 
fully subject to the same working conditions as local temporary workers. In the 
2016 Proposal, the Commission suggested to make this option obligatory, in 
line with Article 5 of the Temporary Agency Work Directive,103 which already 
establishes the obligation for a user undertaking to grant domestic temporary 
workers the same basic working and employment conditions as permanent 
workers in the same job. The co- legislators agreed with this proposal,104 so 
that, with respect to the basic working and employment conditions set out in 
the Temporary Agency Work Directive, posted workers are to be guaranteed 
equal treatment with local workers. Moreover, the co- legislators added an op-
tional clause according to which Member States may ensure posted temporary 
workers also equal treatment with respect to the other working and employ-
ment conditions.105 All this does not only improve the situation of the workers 
concerned, but also ensures a level- playing field for the agencies concerned. 
Through this equal treatment clause, posted temporary workers may actually 
benefit from provisions in collective agreements that would otherwise not be 
applicable to them, for example, collective agreements concluded only at com-
pany level or sectorial agreements that have not been declared universally ap-
plicable, thereby going beyond the more circumscribed application foreseen 
for collective agreements under Article 3(8) of the Revised PoW Directive.106
The co- legislators added the obligation for the user undertaking to inform 
the temporary work agencies of the terms and conditions applied by it.107
Another issue related to the temporary working agencies, is so called “dou-
ble” or “chain” posting, which occurs when a worker posted by an agency to a 
user undertaking in a host Member State, is then asked by that user undertak-
ing to carry out work in a third Member State. This situation often creates legal 
uncertainty as, first, the agency is not always informed of the “double” posting, 
and, second, national authorities have difficulties in determining the rights on 
 103 Directive 2008/ 104/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 on temporary agency work, OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9– 14.
 104 Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(1b).
 105 See Revised PoW Directive, Art. 3(9).
 106 See supra fn. 93 and accompanying text.
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remuneration and working conditions applicable to such worker. Since Arti-
cle 1(3) of the PoW Directive requires the existence of an employment rela-
tionship between the undertaking making the posting and the posted work-
er during the whole period of posting, it could be argued that the “second” 
sending abroad of the worker is not “genuine” and should not be considered 
to be posting within the meaning of the Directive. The question then arises, 
however, which working conditions are applicable to that worker in the third 
Member State. Building upon amendments suggested by the European Parlia-
ment, the co- legislators agreed to provide that in such a situation of double 
posting it must be considered that the worker is posted in the third Member 
State and that the temporary agency is the posting undertaking responsible for 
guaranteeing that worker the rights to which he or she is entitled under the 
PoW Directive and the Enforcement Directive.108 In order to make that rule en-
forceable, a provision has been added according to which the user undertaking 
must inform the temporary agency of posted workers that will be temporarily 
carrying out work in a Member State other than the one to which they have 
been posted. These provisions will make a real difference on the ground by 
clarifying the application of the posting rules in situations currently in a “grey 
zone”. By making the temporary agency as employer responsible for any subse-
quent posting, the PoW Directive will contribute to preventing circumvention 
of rules through chain posting of temporary workers.
In addition to these changes regarding temporary agency workers and 
chain posting, the Revised Directive also contains strengthened rules on 
access to information and fighting fraud and abuse in situations of non- 
genuine posting. As indicated above, the Enforcement Directive already es-
tablishes an obligation for a host Member State to ensure that information 
on the applicable terms and conditions of employment is made generally 
available in a transparent way. The co- legislators agreed that the host Mem-
ber State’s authorities must publish on the official website foreseen in the 
Enforcement Directive accurate and up to date information on the constitu-
ent elements of remuneration.109 Upon request of the European Parliament, 
a provision was added to ensure that workers that are not genuinely posted 
are not left without any protection. The difficulty of such provision is that 
workers which are found not to be in a situation covered by the PoW Direc-
tive may, for example, be permanently employed in a host Member State in-
stead of temporarily posted, or self- employed. Article 4 of the Enforcement 
 108 Revised PoW Directive, Art. 1(3), new second and third subparagraphs.
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Directive already provides the Member States with criteria for assessing 
whether the relationship between an undertaking and a worker is a genuine 
employment relationship. The co- legislators eventually agreed that in a situ-
ation where after such assessment by the host Member State it is established 
that an undertaking is improperly or fraudulently creating the impression 
that a worker is posted in accordance with the PoW Directive, that Member 
State shall ensure that the worker benefits from “relevant law and practice” 
and not be subject to “less favourable conditions than those applicable to 
posted workers”.110 Whereas this provision does not clearly indicate which 
conditions should be applied to a worker who, by definition, falls outside the 
scope of the PoW Directive, it nonetheless requires Member States to ensure 
that such workers do not stay in a disadvantaged situation as compared to 
posted workers.
As posting of workers is by definition a transnational issue, certain cases of 
circumvention and abuses may remain undetected or not penalised due to lack 
of cooperation and adequate information exchange between the competent 
authorities of the Member State concerned. The PoW Directive already created 
in Article 4(1) an obligation for the Member States to provide for cooperation 
between public authorities and to share information in fighting unlawful and 
abusive transnational activities. The Enforcement Directive further developed 
these cooperation requirements. Also the Commission’s proposal on revision 
of the Regulations on social security coordination provides for a strengthening 
of the requirements on information exchange and verification of the socials 
security status of posted workers to prevent unfair practices or abuse.111 To 
enhance cooperation and ensure better enforcement of cross- border mobility 
situations, the Commission submitted on 13 March 2018 a proposal for estab-
lishing a European Labour Authority (ela),112 which Commissioner Thyssen 
managed to have adopted by the European Parliament and the Council be-
fore the 2019 European elections.113 Although this agency is meant to facilitate 
cooperation between the Member States’ enforcement authorities in all areas 
of labour mobility and social security coordination, its expertise and network 
should certainly ensure enhanced enforcement of the posting rules, more 
 110 Revised PoW Directive, Art. 5, fourth and fifth subparagraph.
 111 See the proposed revision of Arts 5, 14, 16 and 19 of Regulation 987/ 2009, cit.
 112 Proposal of 13 March 2018 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Labour Authority, com(2018) 131 final.
 113 Regulation (EU) 2019/ 1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 
establishing a European Labour Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/ 2004, (EU) 
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intense cooperation between the competent national authorities through liai-
son officers working within the Authority and eventually stronger protection 
of posted workers against abuses and fraud.114 Cooperation at Union level be-
tween the authorities responsible for labour law and social security issues is 
essential to guarantee proper enforcement of the existing rules and prevent 
fraud and abuse.
Given its relevance for the situation of posted workers, it is unfortunate that 
the co- legislators have not been able to finalise the revision of the social se-
curity coordination Regulation before the 2019 elections. In March 2019, the 
negotiators for the Council and the European Parliament reached a compro-
mise agreement, which was supported in the Council by a coalition of Eastern 
European and Mediterranean states but eventually did not obtain the required 
qualified majority to be formally adopted.115 Likewise, a political agreement 
on the proposed reform of road transport rules could not be reached before 
the elections, but only in December 2019 – a file in which the opposition of 
interests between “sending” and “receiving” Member States has been exacer-
bated by differences between centrally located and more peripheral Member 
States.116 The sensitivity of these two other labour mobility files demonstrates 
the difficulties that the Juncker Commission surpassed when reaching agree-
ments on the Revised PoW Directive and the European Labour Authority. As 
regards the ela – for which the founding Regulation has been adopted within 
a very short period of time – it is important to note that the Commission de-
liberately avoided to reduce it to an enforcement tool for ‘receiving’ Member 
States focused on combating breaches of EU rules by foreign employers.117 The 
 114 See Van Nuffel, P. (2019). De Europese Arbeidsautoriteit: een nieuw agentschap voor eerli-
jke arbeidsmobiliteit binnen de interne markt. In: Verschueren, ed., Detachering – Nieuwe 
ontwikkelingen in het Europees recht vanuit Belgisch en Nederlands perspectief. Brugge: Die 
Keure, pp. 227- 258.
 115 On 21 June 2018, the Council approved a negotiating mandate (“general approach”) 
whereby only Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta and the 
Netherlands voted against or abstained. After the European Parliament also approved a 
negotiating agreement, the negotiators of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
reached a provisional agreement on 19 March 2019, for which however there was no quali-
fied majority among Member States on 29 March 2019 when, in addition to the aforemen-
tioned Member States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Sweden also indicated 
that they could not support the agreement. The European Parliament decided at its last 
plenary session on 18 April 2019 not to vote on the provisional agreement.
 116 The Council and the European Parliament had adopted a negotiating position on this 
file on 4 December 2018 and 4 April 2019 respectively, and found an agreement on 12 
December 2019, see fn. 26 supra.
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Commission rather sought to market the ela as an agency whose first task is 
to support, guide and inform employers and employees about their rights and 
obligations in cross- border situations, including by making the ela respon-
sible for promoting cross- border employment and coordinating the existing 
European network of employment services (eures).118 The ela should thus 
support rather than restrict cross- border services and labour mobility in the 
internal market. The ela will in addition provide national enforcement au-
thorities with a range of tools to facilitate the application of EU legislation in 
situations of cross- border labour mobility. As follows from its mandate, those 
situations includes posting of workers but also free movement of workers and 
the coordination of social security systems – thereby essentially ensuring the 
social protection of all mobile citizens across the Union.
vi Conclusion
The PoW Directive remains a delicate piece of legislation as it constitutes a 
compromise struck between the conflicting interests behind opening up the 
internal market and safeguarding national protective social standards. It re-
mains therefore a significant achievement that a revision of that Directive has 
been agreed upon without unduly sharpening the divisions between lower- 
wage and higher- wage Member States and with express support from many 
low- wage Member States.
Towards those who advocate that the Revised PoW Directive should have 
been transformed into a social policy instrument based on the Treaty’s social 
policy legal basis, it must be stressed that the fact that the PoW Directive also 
promotes the internal market and free movement should not be perceived as 
making workers’ rights subordinate to economic interests. It is true that the 
Court of Justice, when interpreting the PoW Directive, has found several na-
tional measures aimed at protecting workers’ rights to be contrary to the PoW 
Directive. However, the Court has been interpreting the available legal texts in 
the light of the Treaty provisions, with the principles of non- discrimination and 
proportionality as guiding values. Moreover, the Court has equally recognised 
that the social goals pursued by the PoW Directive are not only the protection 
of posted workers’ rights, but also the preservation of fair labour markets and 
combating social dumping,119 implying that social rights of local workers and, 
 118 See Regulation 2019/ 1149, Art. 2.
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more generally, the preservation of Member States’ social protection systems 
are to be taken into account as well. Together with the Enforcement Directive, 
the Revised PoW Directive has now stepped up the level of social protection 
by introducing the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same place, 
while still attaining the objective of preserving legal certainty for undertakings 
providing services in the internal market. Time will show how the provisions of 
the Revised PoW Directive will be interpreted, but the stronger social dimen-
sion will not be left unnoticed.
As indicated, the 2016 revision of the PoW Directive must be seen in the 
larger framework of the Juncker Commission’s ambitions for ensuring fairer 
labour mobility, which also included the proposed reform of the Regulations 
on social security coordination, the “lex specialis” on the application of the 
posting rules on the road transport sector and the establishment of the ela. 
Compared to the initial hostile reactions that the 2016 Proposal received, 
there is now broad acceptance, also in many low- wage Member States, that 
stepping up the social protection of posted workers is not an expression of 
economic protectionism, but a change necessary for the internal market to 
preserve its social legitimacy. The conditions imposed by the PoW Directive 
to cross- border service providers are also in line with changes made by the 
Lisbon Treaty to certain parameters in the Treaty framework with the rec-
ognition of the legally binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
including its Article 31 on fair and just working conditions, and the introduc-
tion of Article 9 teu, according to which the Union is to take the requirement 
of adequate social protection into account in defining and implementing 
its policies and activities. These changes reflect the understanding that eco-
nomic growth and liberalisation must go hand in hand with adequate social 
protection. The same understanding led the European Parliament and the 
Council to accept in November 2017 the Commission’s call for a joint procla-
mation of a European Pillar of Social Rights,120 which constitutes a political 
confirmation of the recognition of the need for upward social convergence 
across the Union. The European Pillar of Social Rights is indeed based on 
the understanding that economic and social progress go hand- in- hand and 
that upward social convergence in the Union is not opposed to, but rather 
dependent on the further development of the internal market, the moderni-
sation of labour markets and the enhanced sustainability of social security 
 120 For the text, see https:// ec.europa.eu/ commission/ sites/ beta- political/ files/ social- summit- 
european- pillar- social- rights- booklet_ en.pdf.
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systems. It is against this background that, as Jean- Claude Juncker indicated 
when announcing the reform of the Pow Directive,121 free movement should 
be seen as an economic opportunity, and not as a threat, and that labour mo-
bility should be promoted, especially where there are persistent vacancies 
and skills mismatches.
 121 See Juncker, J- C (2014). A New Start for Europe, cit. 
 
∵





This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 license.
 chapter 12
The Pernicious Influence of Citizenship Rights 




The need to move beyond an understanding of EU citizenship as a com-
ponent of freedom of movement within the internal market is emphasized 
throughout EU Citizenship and Federalism:  The Role of Rights. As Dimit-
ry Kochenov writes, EU citizenship cannot be restricted to such a role and 
must take on a different meaning if it is to fulfil its potential.1 However, this 
is not, as it often appears to be, only apparent in the case law related to 
‘inactive’ or static Union citizens. The free movement of workers can also 
suffer from the current uncertainties through the insidious influence of in-
tegration tests initially applicable only outside the scope of Art. 45 tfeu. In 
that sense, it is not entirely true that the cjeu ‘might reasonably now believe 
that it has done its job’2 in creating a single physical space in the Union 
through free movement rules. Such a statement does not take into account 
the potential for reversal in the rights associated with free movement within 
the internal market. Indeed, the absence of a true shift towards a new vision 
of citizenship and solidarity within the European Union can also produce 
unfortunate regressions in citizens’ rights where they used to be most well- 
established.
 * Maître de conférences, University of Nantes. I would like to thank in particular Professors 
Dimitry Kochenov and Eleftheria Neframi for inviting me to the conference in Luxembourg 
where an earlier version of this Article was presented, and the anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments.
 1 Kochenov, D., On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator. In Kochenov, D., 
ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, pp. 3– 81.
 2 To borrow the phrase used in Sarmiento, D., Sharpston, E. (2017), European Citizenship and 











Since the early 2000s, a limited, but noticeable trend of European Court of 
Justice (cjeu) case law has extended the application of the ‘sufficient link of 
integration’ test to the social advantages of workers exercising their free move-
ment rights, more specifically frontier workers. The most problematic aspect 
of this case law concerns an admission of restrictions of the right of students 
to benefit from funding in the Member State where their parents work, un-
der the same conditions as the children of nationals and migrant workers, 
in order to study in another Member State.3 This trend clearly clashes with 
the traditional approach to the free movement of workers, which under the 
fifth recital of Regulation 492/ 20114 ‘should be enjoyed without discrimination 
by permanent, seasonal and frontier workers’. This freedom includes the right 
to equal treatment concerning enjoyment of social advantages under Article 
7(2) of the Regulation. Facing resistance from Member States, the Court of Jus-
tice has long confirmed that access to such social advantages should extend 
without discrimination to frontier workers.5 The Court had also ruled that the 
dependent child of a national of a Member State who is employed in another 
Member State as a frontier worker could rely on this provision in order to ob-
tain study finance under the same conditions as the child of a national of the 
State of employment.6
Frontier workers have doubtless long been a problematic category in EU 
law. Although Article 45 tfeu and Regulation 492/ 2011 are, in principle, ap-
plicable to both migrant and frontier workers, granting the full benefit of the 
right to equal treatment to frontier workers had previously been perceived 
as less necessary or more questionable.7 Indeed, frontier workers often re-
tain their residence in their State of origin8 and cannot truly be considered 
‘migrants’, which means it is not as necessary to grant them advantages that 
 3 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2012, case C- 542/ 09, Commission v. Netherlands; judg-
ment of 20 June 2013, case C- 20/ 12, Giersch e.a. v.  Luxembourg; judgment of 14 December 
2016, case C- 238/ 15, Bragança Linares Verruga e.a.; judgment of 15 December 2016, joined cas-
es C- 401 to 402/ 15, Depesme and Kerrou e.a.; judgment of 10 July 2019, case C- 410/ 18, Nicolas 
Aubriet.
 4 Regulation (EU) 492/ 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union.
 5 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 November 1997, case C- 57/ 96, Meints v. Minister van Land-
bouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, paras 49– 50.
 6 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 June 1999, case C- 337/ 97, Meeusen v.  Hoofddirectie van de 
Informatie Beheer Groep, para. 21 ss.
 7 Iliopoulou, A. (2013). Le rattachement à l’Etat comme critère de l’intégration sociale. Revue 
des affaires européennes n. 4, pp. 651– 666, 655.
 8 The ecj has, however, held that EU citizens who work in their State of origin but reside in 
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will allow them to truly integrate in another Member State. The use of the 
‘sufficient link of integration’ test in these cases is nevertheless surprising, 
since Regulation 492/ 2011 does not allow for any additional requirements re-
lated to a worker’s integration in another Member State, instead clearly stat-
ing that frontier worker status is in and of itself sufficient to enjoy full equal 
treatment. This type of test comes from the case law concerning the right 
of non- economically active citizens to benefit from social programmes: job- 
seekers,9 students,10 civilian war victims11 and disabled European citizens12 
can be required to prove that they have a real or sufficient link to the society 
of the Member State in which they applied for benefits. These tests were 
introduced by Member States and accepted by the European Court of Jus-
tice as a form of compensation for the right to equal treatment granted, in 
principle, to all European citizens lawfully residing in other Member States 
regardless of their economic activity. As such rights were granted to new 
categories of European citizens, they were immediately curtailed by new 
‘entry tests’ into the welfare State.13 However, this was initially always done 
under the premise that it was justified only insofar as it helped prevent ‘so-
cial tourism’, and did not apply to economically productive members of the 
employment market.
The extension of such tests to workers’ access to social advantages such 
as student funding constitutes a worrying new encroachment of protection-
ist views on EU citizens’ right to equal treatment. It will be argued that the 
requirement of ‘sufficient links’ for the children of frontier workers is not 
only contra legem (i), but also highly questionable regarding both its legit-
imacy and actual effectiveness (ii), and is due to an evolution of the law 
concerning the rights of Union citizens that requires ambitious legislative 
reforms (iii).
 9 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 July 2002, case C- 224/ 98, Marie- Nathalie D’Hoop v. Office 
national de l’emploi; judgment of 23 March 2004, case C- 138/ 02, Brian Francis Collins v. Sec-
retary of State for Work and Pensions; Court of Justice, judgment of 25 october 2012, case 
C- 367/ 11, Déborah Prete v. Office national de l’emploi.
 10 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C- 209/ 03, The Queen, on the application 
of Dany Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills; 
judgment of 18 November 2008, case C- 158/ 07, Förster v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie 
Beheer Groep.
 11 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 October 2006, case C- 192/ 05, K. Tas- Hagen and R. A. Tas 
v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad.
 12 Court of Justice, judgment of 1 October 2009, case C- 103/ 08, Gottwald 
v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bregenz.












ii The Perplexing Extension of ‘Sufficient Links’ Tests to Frontier 
Workers’ Social Advantages
cjeu case law shows a very gradual, and perhaps not entirely intentional, pro-
gression towards fully accepting the use of ‘sufficient links of integration’ tests 
previously reserved for economically inactive citizens to frontier workers. The 
initial transfer was made in three questionable rulings in 2007, but its explicit 
validation appears later, in case law concerning the rights of the children of 
frontier workers to apply for study finance in the Member State where their 
parent works. These developments appear to run contrary to secondary law, 
and to previous case law concerning the rights which workers derive from the 
Treaties.
ii.1 A Questionable but Minor Initial Development
Before the rulings concerning student finance, there was one previous line of 
case law, that was noticed at the time,14 which seemed to extend ‘sufficient 
links’ tests to migrant workers. This line is in fact limited to three rulings made 
in 2007 concerning provisions excluding non- residents from the German 
child- raising allowance15 and the Wajong, a Dutch incapacity benefit for young 
people.16 Child- raising allowances typically constitute social advantages with-
in Art. 7(2) of Regulation 1612/ 68,17 whereas the Wajong had been found to be 
a special non- contributory benefit within Art. 10a of Regulation 1408/ 71.18 Two 
of these cases dealt with “reverse frontier workers”, nationals of the Member 
State where they worked who had simply changed their residence to another 
Member State. This could reasonably have been held to exclude them from 
migrant worker status, however, it did not seem to have a significant impact on 
the cjeu’s assessment of the applicability of free movement rights as it held 
 14 See, in particular, the Comment on all three rulings by O’Brien, C. (2008). Comment on 
Case C- 212/ 05, Gertraud Hartmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Grand Chamber 
of 18 July 2007, nyr; Case C- 213/ 05, Wendy Geven v. Land Nordrhein- Westfalen, Judgment of 
the Grand Chamber of 18 July 2007, nyr; Case C- 287/ 05, D.P.W. Hendrix v. Raad van Bestuur 
van het Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, Judgment of the Grand Chamber 
of 11 September 2007, nyr. Common Market Law Review 45 (2), pp. 499– 514.
 15 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 July 2007, case C- 212/ 05, Gertraud Hartmann v. Freistaat 
Bayern; judgment of 18 July 2007, case C- 213/ 05, Wendy Geven v. Land Nordrhein- Westfalen.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 September 2007, case C- 287/ 05, D.P.W. Hendrix v. Raad 
van Bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstitut Werknemersverzekeringen.
 17 Now Art. 7(2) of Regulation 492/ 2011.
 18 ‘Special non- contributory cash benefits’ are now covered by Art. 70 and Annex x of 
Regulation 883/ 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
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that both applicants could claim the status of migrant workers.19 Moreover, in 
all three cases, reliance upon Regulation 1612/ 68 and worker status for these 
frontier workers is combined with the acceptance of ‘sufficient links’ tests in 
an effort to mitigate the extension of the scope of such benefits to non- resident 
citizens. The result is a problematic series of precedents which would later be 
used as a foundation for an entirely different line of case law, concerning stu-
dent finance.
The main issue at stake was whether Member States could restrict access to 
these advantages and benefits to residents, regardless of the claimants’ nation-
alities. The German Government argued that the child- raising allowance was 
granted in order to benefit persons who, ‘by their choice of residence, [had] es-
tablished a real link with German society’.20 An exception was provided for fron-
tier workers who had more than a “minor occupation” in Germany. This was 
not rejected by the Court, which held that the fact that this exception meant 
that frontier workers with more than minor occupations could, as it were, au-
tomatically pass the “real links” test. As the Court put it, the rule applicable to 
frontier workers meant that ‘residence was not regarded as the only connecting 
link […] a substantial contribution to the national labour market also constituted 
a valid factor of integration’.21 The result was that, while Mrs Hartmann must be 
granted the allowance because her spouse had a full- time job in Germany, Mrs 
Geven who was only in minor employment could be considered ineligible.22
Distinctions among migrant EU citizens based on the number of hours 
worked or the nature of the employment in a Member State were not new to 
the cjeu which had already admitted that migrant worker status depended 
on genuine and effective employment.23 The test applied here to determine 
whether someone was in minor employment nevertheless seems stricter than 
the traditional test defining workers under 45 tfeu. The main issue however is 
that non- resident EU citizens with “major” and “minor” occupations are both 
submitted to a test which does not apply to people who reside in Germany. 
There simply appears to be a presumption that frontier workers with major 
occupations meet the requirement of a real link with German society. This 
test was accepted in relation to a stated objective of increasing natality rates 
in Germany. The Court does not call into question the legitimacy of such an 
 19 Hartmann, cit., para. 18; Hendrix, cit., para. 46.
 20 Hartmann, cit., para. 33.
 21 Ibid., para. 36.
 22 Geven, cit., para. 8.
 23 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 March 1982, case 53/ 81, Levin v. Secrétaire d’Etat à la jus-












objective, nor its link with the number of hours worked in that Member State, 
which seems tenuous at best.24 Nor does the Court criticise the fact that this 
German law establishes a distinction between migrant workers and frontier 
workers. It seems to accept the idea that frontier workers who only have a mi-
nor occupation in Germany are not “sufficiently integrated” in German society.
The discrimination between frontier workers and residents constitutes a 
break with long- established case law which the Court does not even attempt 
to justify. The criterion chosen in this German legislation shows how awkward 
the attempt to apply ‘real link’ tests to workers can become. Here the cjeu 
requires the Member State to extend the territorial scope of a social advantage 
whose objective can only really be understood within the domestic territory. 
This is necessary for frontier workers because they benefit from equal treat-
ment under Regulation 1612/ 68. However, proving that a frontier worker has a 
“sufficient link” with German society to the extent that they will contribute to 
increasing natality rates in that State is nigh impossible. The Court neverthe-
less has to accept a link between residence and the stated objective, as well as 
the unequal treatment between frontier workers and migrants. Yet this issue 
only arises because the Court accepts the ‘sufficient link’ test as a valid ap-
proach to determine whether frontier workers should benefit from social ad-
vantages in the Member State where they work. If one accepts that the child- 
raising allowance at issue constitutes a social advantage within the meaning 
of Art. 7(2) of Regulation 1612/ 68, no difference should be established between 
migrant and frontier workers. Even if such a difference must be introduced, 
there is no justification for applying a type of ‘sufficient link’ test to frontier 
workers. Moreover, within the framework of the justification + proportionality 
test, the Member State has the upper hand in suggesting the type of test they 
deem appropriate. Here, the number of hours worked in Germany is the main 
criterion and could almost be understood as seeking to determine whether 
the person is in genuine and effective employment in the host State. However 
this was not the type of criterion relied upon in the later case law concerning 
student finance.
In the Hendrix Case, although Regulation 1408/ 71 enabled Member States 
to establish residence requirements for special non- contributory benefits, the 
Court held that since the Wajong also constituted a social advantage under Art. 
7(2) of Regulation 1612/ 68 such a requirement, which does not ensure equal 
 24 Geven, cit., paras 21– 23. In fact, the Court refuses to engage with the issues of the legiti-
macy of the objective and the link with a residence criterion, and instead chooses to focus 
on the fact that the residence criterion is not strictly applied so as to allow certain frontier 
workers to benefit from the child- raising allowance.
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treatment, must be proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by the 
Dutch legislation.25 According to the cjeu, national courts must interpret the 
national provisions in such a way as to take into account the worker’s ‘eco-
nomic and social links’ to the State in which they applied for the benefit.26 
The situation was somewhat different in this last case, and called into ques-
tion the overlap between Regulation 1408/ 71, which allows Member States to 
restrict access to certain benefits to residents, and Regulation 1612/ 68, which 
relies upon the principle of equal treatment for workers exercising their free-
dom of movement. At first glance, the priority given to the scope of Art. 7(2) 
of Regulation 1612/ 68, thus including frontier workers, appears to grant better 
protection to EU citizens who do not reside in the State in which they have 
applied for a specific benefit.27 However here too the problem lies in the way 
in which the Court frames the ratio decidendi, which grants significant leeway 
to the Member State in establishing a ‘sufficient links’ test restricting frontier 
workers’ access to a social advantage.
The ease with which Member States got the cjeu to accept the legitimacy 
of their aims, the pertinence of ‘sufficient link’ tests and the criteria introduced 
to carry them out seems to indicate a lack of awareness on the Court’s part of 
the importance of the break with previous case law concerning frontier work-
ers. The Court certainly insisted upon applying equal treatment under the free 
movement of workers to borderline cases, and upon a proportionality test un-
der which the citizen’s personal circumstances must be examined. This could 
prima facie be considered a positive development for Union citizen’s rights28 
but the problem lies in the broader impact of allowing Member States to re-
quire frontier workers to prove their integration into the society in which they 
work. Despite these cases’ peculiarities, the three rulings created precedents 
which the Court relied upon in later cases, a reference made easier by the in-
sufficient care given to the processes by which precedents create norms in EU 
law.29 In these rulings, the Court enabled Member States to introduce differ-
ences between migrant workers and frontier workers, as well as among frontier 
workers, based on tests aiming to establish whether their links with the Mem-
ber State are ‘sufficient’ to deserve access to social advantages. These rulings 
 25 Hendrix, cit., para. 54.
 26 Ibid., para. 57.
 27 Dougan, M.  (2009). Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship by Dismantling the 
Territorial Boundaries of the National Welfare States. In Barnard, C., Odudu, O., eds. The 
Outer Limits of European Union Law. Oxford: Hart, pp. 119– 166, pp. 127– 128.
 28 Dougan, M. (2009). Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship, cit., pp. 159– 161.












seemed relatively innocuous until they reappeared in the case law relating to 
portable student finance.
ii.2 A Problematic Extension to Student Finance
One unfortunate aspect of the right of students to free movement is that it 
does not create a uniform status for Union citizens travelling to other Mem-
ber States to study. Rather, students benefit from very different rights, espe-
cially regarding access to certain forms of financial support from their host 
Member State or their State of origin, depending on whether they themselves 
or their parents are exercising their free movement rights as economically ac-
tive Union citizens. Indeed, many forms of financial support for students are 
considered social advantages for their parents under Art. 7(2) of Regulation 
492/ 2011. A student will therefore benefit from support from the Member State 
where at least one of his/ her parents works, whether they are nationals of that 
State or not, as long as the worker continues to support the student. In this 
respect, as with other types of social advantages, frontier workers and migrant 
workers must in principle benefit from equal treatment under Art. 7(2).
A specific line of case law deals with the right of the children of frontier 
workers to benefit from a Member State’s financial support for university stud-
ies abroad. Once again, we find Member States granting social advantages to 
residents first, thus restricting frontier workers’ access to the same advantages. 
Here, the criterion based on major vs minor work in the host State has disap-
peared. The Member States, and the Court, seamlessly transition to “duration 
of work” criteria based on the “duration of residence” criteria applied to eco-
nomically inactive citizens – another step in the pernicious influence of citi-
zenship case law within the scope of the free movement of workers. The use 
of criteria based on the duration of the worker’s employment in the host State 
makes it clear in these later cases that the Court is not inviting national author-
ities to determine whether there is a sufficient economic link, in the sense of 
genuine employment, justifying the application of Art. 7(2), but whether there 
is a sufficient link to the society as a whole, an integration within the national 
community.
The first ruling to apply the ‘sufficient link’ test to such cases is Commission v 
Netherlands. The Netherlands had made portable student funding conditional 
on the student having resided in the Netherlands for at least three of the six 
years preceding his/ her enrolment for higher education abroad.30 This con-
stituted indirect discrimination against frontier workers and migrant workers. 




Pernicious Influence of Citizenship Rights on Workers’ Rights 313
This discrimination could not be justified by budgetary considerations in and 
of themselves, but the cjeu somewhat surprisingly stated that it had already 
recognised Member States’ power to require nationals of other Member States 
to show a certain degree of integration in their societies in order to receive so-
cial advantages, even when they are economically active – while recalling that 
in principle, such a requirement for migrant and frontier workers is “inappro-
priate”.31 In fact, Advocate General Sharpston examined whether evidence of 
a sufficient degree of integration could be required by a transfer of the Court’s 
reasoning in the Förster and Bidar rulings, neither of which dealt with the free 
movement of workers.32 She refused to transfer the reasoning in these rulings 
to migrant workers insofar as it was invoked to avert an unreasonable financial 
burden, insisting that residence could not be the only acceptable evidence of 
connection with the Member State.33 She also warned of the dangers of al-
lowing Member States to ‘justify less favourable treatment of (both economically 
active and inactive) EU citizens in terms of social policy (integration) by applying 
access criteria such as length of residence’.34
The Court did not follow its Advocate General and returned to the idea that 
the “link of integration” is to be presumed, but is an appropriate criterion, in 
cases involving migrant and frontier workers. The reasoning was similar to that 
followed in the three 2007 rulings: there is a discrimination, but it may be jus-
tified if the Member State uses criteria conducive to identifying the person’s in-
tegration in its society and based on a legitimate overriding requirement. The 
cjeu proceeded to reject the Netherlands’ justification based on the risk of an 
unreasonable financial burden, but accept the government’s reasoning con-
cerning the second justification, that of increasing student mobility. In a rather 
counterintuitive line of reasoning, the Court agreed that student mobility was 
indeed an overriding reason relating to the public interest35 and that a resi-
dence requirement was appropriate to meet that aim because it could ensure 
that the scheme was aimed first at students who would, in its absence, study 
in the Netherlands, and because Dutch authorities could legitimately expect 
students who benefit from the scheme to return to the Netherlands to enrich 
that Member State’s job market.36 Advocate General Sharpston had, indeed, 
 31 Ibid., paras 63 and 65– 66.
 32 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 February 2012, case C- 542/ 09, Commission v 
Netherlands, para. 74.
 33 Ibid., paras 87 and 122.
 34 Ibid., para. 85.
 35 Commission v. Netherlands, cit., para. 72.
 36 Ibid., paras 76– 77. The Court accepts the appropriateness of the residence requirement 














stated that requiring a degree of integration from migrant workers was possi-
ble if justified by a legitimate social objective but did not support this with any 
reference to previous case law – in fact, the most explicit occurrence of this 
statement appears in a footnote.37
Despite the rejection of the actual criteria used in the Netherlands this rul-
ing creates another precedent allowing Member States to apply ‘sufficient link’ 
tests to frontier workers. Indeed, the rejection of the actual criteria used by 
Member States in applying a ‘real link’ test does not constitute a rejection of 
the test itself, of its pertinence in a given situation, nor of the aims which the 
Member States rely upon. The force of the precedent lies in the ratio, thus the 
motives given by the Court for rejecting the specific rules at issue (or their later 
interpretation) are more important than the rejection itself. Once the Court ac-
cepts that Member States can look for “sufficient links” between frontier work-
ers and their societies, the issue of legitimacy of such requirements transforms 
into a search for the appropriately worded overriding requirements and, more 
importantly, the specific threshold which the Court will deem proportionate.
A good illustration appears in Caves Krier Frères,38 concerning Luxembour-
gish subsidies for the recruitment of older unemployed persons. In this case, 
the cjeu seemed to firmly reject discrimination against a Luxembourgish fron-
tier worker who had always worked in that State, but lived in another Member 
State. However the idea that a frontier worker’s integration in the State where 
they work is not automatic but only to be presumed makes another appear-
ance. The Court cites Commission v Netherlands as precedent in order to allow 
the use of integration tests but holds that, in the case at hand, ‘Ms Schmidt- Krier 
is a frontier worker and a national of that Member State who has spent her entire 
working life there. Accordingly, she would appear to be integrated into the Lux-
embourg labour market’.39 Although this ruling appears to confirm that frontier 
rephrasing the government’s argument based notably on the fact that ‘the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands expects that students who benefit from that scheme will return to the 
Netherlands after completing their studies, in order to reside and work there’. No further 
justification or any explanation is given as to the basis for this expectation, however both 
the Commission and Advocate General Sharpston seem to have found the aim of target-
ing students likely to enrich the Dutch employment market legitimate, see Opinion of AG 
Sharpston, Commission v. Netherlands, cit., paras 135– 136.
 37 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Commission v. Netherlands, cit., para. 91, footnote 54: ‘This con-
clusion does not mean that I consider that in all circumstances Member States are precluded 
from requiring a degree of connection from migrant workers. Indeed, the social objective 
invoked by the Netherlands Government as justifying a degree of connection from all appli-
cants is a legitimate aim which is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest’.
 38 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 December 2012, case C- 379/ 11, Caves Krier Frères Sàrl.
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workers should be treated as migrant workers, it in fact consolidates the case 
law according to which such an equivalence is only based on a presumption 
that frontier workers have sufficient links with the State where they work. As 
later rulings show, this presumption is not absolute and perhaps only citizens 
whose links with the host Member State are as strong as Ms Schmidt- Krier’s 
can safely assume they will fulfil the criteria. For instance, in its 2019 judgment 
in Aubriet, the Court recalls that ‘the fact that migrant and frontier workers have 
participated in the labour market of a Member State creates, in principle, a suffi-
cient link of integration with the society of that State’, derived in particular from 
the worker’s contribution to the financing of the social policies in question, 
but goes on to state that ‘the Court has already accepted that indirectly discrim-
inatory national legislation […] where there is not a sufficient connection to the 
society […] may be objectively justified’.40 Exactly why this contradictory status 
affecting the rights of frontier workers should exist is never explained. In this 
latest judgment, made without an Opinion, the Court’s position seems to be 
that quoting the previous case law is entirely sufficient and no further expla-
nation or justification is required.
The surprising combination of EU public interest objectives and purely na-
tional aims found in Commission v Netherlands was seized upon by Luxem-
bourg in the legislation at issue in the infamous Giersch case, now confirmed 
in two 2016 rulings, Depesme and Kerrou e.a. and Bragança Linares Verruga, 
and again in 2019 in Aubriet. A piece of Luxembourgish legislation introduced 
in 2010 put an end to the previous system of family allowances for children 
older than 18 and introduced financial support mechanisms based on schol-
arships and loans with a residence requirement for nationals of other Mem-
ber States wishing to benefit from portable student funding. aleba,41 a trade 
union in the finance sector, supported hundreds of judicial actions by frontier 
workers who were thus excluded from this financial aid, which led to the four 
preliminary rulings.42 Luxembourgish legislation clearly created a discrimina-
tion against frontier workers, which the Court held to be incompatible with EU 
law – but in so doing, the Court reaffirmed that unequal treatment between 
 40 Nicolas Aubriet, paras 32, 33 and 34.
 41 Association Luxembourgeoise des Employés de Banque et Assurance (Luxembourg 
Association of Banking and Insurance Employees). For an overview of the union’s 
involvement in supporting families’ efforts to challenge the legislative reform, see its Press 
release ‘L’ALEBA fait le point dans le dossier CEDIES’, 29 March 2018, available at: https:// 
www.aleba.lu/ laleba- fait- le- point- dans- le- dossier- cedies/ .
 42 The union’s lawyer, Maître Stéphanie Jacquet, was involved in the proceedings before the 








resident and frontier workers was possible, provided the criteria were based 
on a legitimate aim and were proportionate. The reasoning followed in Com-
mission v Netherlands seemed coherent insofar as portable funding should rea-
sonably not be used by students residing in other Member States for studies 
carried out in these States. However, the second stage of that reasoning was 
much more problematic as it implies that States are entitled to expect students 
to come back to the State which (partly) funded their studies in order to, as it 
were, justify the investment made. This seems to run absolutely contrary to 
the stated objective, since if students are expected to take full advantage of 
freedom of movement, they should be able to choose which part of the Euro-
pean Union they want to work in. The Luxembourgish justification set out in 
Giersch is slightly different. Instead of encouraging student mobility, the stated 
objective here is the promotion of the development of the national economy.43 
Having all but abandoned any pretence that these rulings are based on Euro-
pean Union public interest objectives,44 the Court accepts a straightforwardly 
protectionist justification to the indirect discrimination caused by a residence 
requirement for financial aid for higher education studies in another Mem-
ber State.
In both Commission v Netherlands and the Giersch line of cases, the Court 
finds that the national provisions are not proportionate to the objective pur-
sued by the Member State if they set residence requirements which exclude 
frontier workers, or if they establish criteria which do not enable national au-
thorities to take into account the specific circumstances of each case, e.g. by 
requiring an uninterrupted five year period of work in the Member State.45 
However, it allows Member States to use the fear of social tourism to establish 
a potentially damaging distinction between migrant and frontier workers un-
der Art. 45 tfeu.
ii.3 A Clear Break with Established Case Law and Secondary Law
The case law concerning the access of frontier workers’ children to portable 
study finance clearly appears to be contrary to the traditional understanding 
of frontier workers’ rights. Despite the Court’s  – unsubstantiated  – claim in 
 43 Giersch, cit., para. 48.
 44 The Court and Advocate General Mengozzi do tie this objective to the promotion of ter-
tiary education in the Europe 2020 strategy (Giersch, cit., paras 53– 55; Opinion of AG 
Mengozzi delivered on 7 February 2013, para. 42 ss).
 45 Bragança, cit., para. 69 – it must be noted that this Luxembourgish rule was an attempt to 
conform to the Court’s earlier ruling in Giersch, whose para. 80 seemed to encourage such 
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Commission v Netherlands, apart from the 2007 rulings which could otherwise 
have been considered an anomaly, there was no indication in previous case law 
that ‘sufficient links’ tests could be applied to frontier workers. Indeed, such 
tests should in principle be impossible if frontier workers are to benefit from 
migrant worker status under Regulation 492/ 2011.46
As Advocate General Wathelet put it, ‘there is, as it were, a presumption that 
the migrant or frontier worker is integrated into the Member State in which he 
works and to which he pays taxes and social contributions which contribute to 
the financing of the social policies of that State’.47 But this presumption is not 
equivalent to automatic equal treatment deriving from migrant worker status 
under Article 45 tfeu. The Court stated in Commission v Netherlands that the 
link between migrant workers and frontier workers arises from their contribu-
tion to the financing of the State’s social policies through taxes.48 This was the 
position which justified equal treatment in access to social advantages for all 
workers exercising their free movement rights, regardless of the duration of 
their residence or employment in the Member State.
Requiring proof of integration for frontier workers thus amounts to ignor-
ing their contribution to the costs of the social policies they want to benefit 
from. By considering such criteria as a valid step in the proportionality test 
of a justification, the Court has therefore introduced a new requirement that 
is clearly incompatible with Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/ 2011. In doing so, 
despite its insistence on the presumption of integration and on a case- by- case 
examination of individual situations, the Court has created the risk of further 
differentiation between migrant workers and frontier workers. The difficul-
ties in articulating the territorial and personal scopes of Regulations 492/ 2011 
and 1408/ 71 emphasize the issues posed by the status of frontier workers. They 
cannot fully be considered members of the national community of the host 
Member State in the sense associated with traditional understandings of soli-
darity within the national community, and do not fulfil the residence criteria 
often used to extend that solidarity within Union citizenship on the basis of 
‘real link’ tests. However, by including them in the scope of the free movement 
of workers, EU law requires Member States to find different mechanisms to al-
low them to benefit from social welfare. The use of “duration of work” criteria 
 46 Contra, Hoogenboom, A. (2012), Export of Study Grants and the Lawfulness of Durational 
Residency Requirements:  Comments on Case C- 542/ 09, Commission v the Netherlands. 
European Journal of Migration Law 14 (4), pp. 417– 438, 427.
 47 Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 2 June 2016, case C- 238/ 15, Bragança Linares Verruga 
e.a., para. 69.








for frontier workers seems to be an ill- conceived attempt to solve this issue 
by resorting to ‘sufficient link’ tests that are applied without sufficient care or 
rigour.49 Another risk in applying contra legem criteria linked to the duration 
of work to determine whether frontier workers can access social advantages is 
that it is difficult to see why such requirements should only apply to frontier 
workers and not to resident migrants. In any case, the Court’s reasoning is 
insufficient to establish a clear motive for different implementations of Regu-
lation 492/ 2011 based on the worker’s place of residence. This line of case law 
is based on a highly problematic approach whose viability in practice has not 
been proven.
iii A Contentious ‘Investor’s Approach’ to Social Advantages
The case law derived from Commission v Netherlands is not only questionable 
because of its practical implications for the rights of frontier workers and their 
children. Its social and political consequences are unfortunate but they remain 
rather limited to this day. More worrying are the facts that this case law does 
not rely on a convincing line of argument and that the leeway it grants Mem-
ber States could have unpredictable consequences considering the often insuf-
ficiently reasoned use of precedent in cjeu case law.50 Both the legitimacy of 
the objectives presented as overriding reasons of public interest and the logical 
connection between them and the tests used to establish ‘sufficient links’ are 
highly contentious.
iii.1 Questionable Legitimacy
The reasoning followed by the Court in cases Commission v Netherlands and 
Giersch seems to be that the difference between cases concerning migrant 
workers and those concerning economically inactive citizens is not that mi-
grant workers do not need to prove their degree of integration, but that such a 
requirement cannot be based on purely budgetary preoccupations such as an 
unreasonable burden on financial assistance programmes and must instead 
be linked to a social objective.51 Even if one accepts the introduction of such 
 49 We are certainly very far from the ‘rigorous comparability model’ advocated for in Dougan, 
M., Spaventa, E.  (2005). ‘Wish You Weren’t Here’… New Models of Social Solidarity 
in the European Union. In Dougan, M., Spaventa, E.  (eds). Social Welfare and EU Law. 
Oxford: Hart, pp. 181– 218.
 50 See infra, section iii.1.
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a criterion to restrict frontier workers’ access to certain social advantages, the 
validity of the governments’ reasonings is highly doubtful.
First, the objectives put forward by both governments are clearly linked to 
protectionist concerns that are almost indistinguishable from the financial 
objectives which the Court purports to reject. This was already clear in Com-
mission v Netherlands since, although the objective recognised by the Court of 
Justice was to increase student mobility, which is indeed a matter of public in-
terest for the European Union as a whole, the Court also seemed to accept the 
idea that Member States could legitimately expect students who benefit from 
financial support to return to the country that funded their studies.52 Funding 
student mobility thus becomes an investment in the State’s own economy53 
and not a contribution to the general European Union objective of promoting 
the free movement of persons. The ruling does not appear to take into account 
the flagrant contradiction between these objectives, only one of which could 
reasonably be linked to an overriding requirement. To the contrary, the Court 
almost seems to be encouraging Member States to establish rules which al-
low them to restrict funding to students who are likely to later enter their job 
 markets.
The leniency towards Member States appears even more clearly in the Gi-
ersch line of cases, in which the Court accepts as an overriding requirement not 
the promotion of student mobility, but an increase in the percentage of Lux-
embourg residents with a higher education degree. A justification of the way 
in which this national objective is supposed to contribute to European public 
interest is nowhere to be found, beyond the very loose connection drawn by 
Advocate General Mengozzi and the Court with the Europe 2020 strategy pro-
moting a knowledge economy.54 However, the strategy promotes higher edu-
cation as an aim for the European Union job market as a whole, not for each 
Member State individually. Why this European strategy can be more effectively 
pursued by promoting the return of students having obtained such degrees to 
Luxembourg rather than allowing them to choose the Member State where 
they wish to work is never explained. Similarly, the Court never explains why 
Luxembourg should legitimately expect to meet aims related to the composi-
tion of its labour market by promoting the return of students whose parents 
 52 See supra, section i.2.
 53 Skovgaard- Petersen, H.  (2013). There and Back Again:  Portability of Student Loans, 
Grants and Fee Support in a Free Movement Perspective. European Law Review 38 (6), 
pp. 783– 804, 798.








already have links with its economy rather than by attracting other graduates.55 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that such an explanation can be found. And yet, the 
Court of Justice keeps insisting that the link exists or rather blindly quoting its 
own previous rulings as sufficient proof that it does. In Aubriet, the Court thus 
states that it has already “accepted” that a length of employment requirement 
in the State granting the aid on the part of the frontier worker parent ‘is such 
as to establish such a connection on the part of those workers to the society of that 
Member State and a reasonable probability that the student will return to that 
granting Member State after completing his studies’.56 Hence, a connection that 
entered the case law without any logical justification is now being quoted as 
valid simply because it has entered the case law.
Commission v Netherlands thus seems to have opened Pandora’s box in al-
lowing Member States to present the funding of portable student finance 
as an investment on which they can legitimately expect a return. This is not 
only problematic in that it serves as the basis for the application of ‘sufficient 
links’ tests implementing a justification to an indirect discrimination, it goes 
against the Court’s usual position on overriding requirements. In principle, 
there must be a clear European public interest aim to justify obstacles to free 
movement, and protectionist or purely national aims are not acceptable – 
this is the basis for the exclusion of budgetary concerns as an overriding re-
quirement except in certain specific areas of cjeu case law. The admission of 
the “investor’s approach” to student funding raises serious questions. Firstly, 
the aim of ensuring the return of students who have benefited from finan-
cial support seems to run contrary to the aims of Union citizenship and free 
movement rights, if one accepts that citizens should be encouraged to think 
of the whole of the single market as a space in which they can freely choose 
where to study or work. Secondly, it omits the other costs related to higher 
education, for instance those incurred by the Member State where the work-
er’s child wishes to study. Even in States where higher education is not free, 
universities depend to a very large extent on government spending and the 
costs of hosting students from another Member State was the basis for pre-
vious rulings relating to student mobility within the EU. Thirdly, it is difficult 
to determine how far beyond portable student finance this type of reasoning 
could become acceptable. Since these cases partly rely on precedents con-
cerning child- raising allowances and incapacity benefits, it is conceivable 
 55 Turmo, A.  (2016). Accès des frontaliers aux aides aux études luxembourgeoises  – Des 
précisions insatisfaisantes sur l’arrêt Giersch. Revue des affaires européennes, n.  4, 
pp. 701– 712, 706.
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that Member States will try to use similar criteria to restrict frontier workers’ 
access to all types of social advantages.
iii.2 Questionable Workability
The aims which the Netherlands and Luxembourg relied upon to justify resi-
dence or duration of work requirements do not merely appear to be of ques-
tionable legitimacy in and of themselves. The connection established between 
them and the ‘sufficient link’- based proportionality tests, and the appropriate-
ness of the criteria chosen by the Member States in order to establish whether 
such a link exists, are both highly doubtful. Even if one were to accept that 
the investor’s approach to student finance can form the basis for overriding 
reasons of public interest, it seems unlikely that Member States can in fact 
implement this approach while complying with freedom of movement, by es-
tablishing objective criteria which Union citizens may rely on.
The two Member States’ reasoning appears to be based on the postulate that 
a student whose parent has a ‘sufficient link’ with the Member State in which 
she applies for student funding is extremely likely to join that State’s labour 
force after she has obtained her degree, thus benefiting the national economy. 
However, not only does this expectation seem contrary to the aims of freedom 
of movement within the internal market which should prevent Member States 
from trying to force graduates to enter their own employment markets,57 but as 
Advocate General Sharpston wrote in Commission v Netherlands, ‘it is not self- 
evident that past residence is a good way of predicting where students will reside 
and work in the future’.58 Indeed, it seems just as likely that the student will seek 
their first job in the very Member State where they have obtained their degree.
This is made all the more obvious by the fact that, since these cases deal 
with student finance understood as a social advantage granted to the student’s 
parent, the test seeking to establish integration in the State’s society applies 
not to the student but to their parent.59 Significantly, the Court itself had re-
jected the opposite argument that a person residing close to the border with 
 57 Van der Mei, A.  (2005). EU Law and Education:  Promotion of Student Mobility versus 
Protection of Education Systems. In Dougan, M., Spaventa, E. eds, Social Welfare and EU 
Law, cit., pp. 219– 240, p. 228.
 58 Opinion of AG Sharpston, cit., para. 147, see also para. 43. The Advocate General was ‘not 
convinced that there is an obvious link between where students reside prior to pursuing fur-
ther education and the likelihood that they will return to that Member State after completing 
their studies abroad’.
 59 Ibid., para. 43:  ‘the Kingdom of the Netherlands cannot legitimately assert that the place 
where the migrant worker or his dependent children will study will be determined, in a quasi- 









the State where they completed their studies is more likely to enter that State’s 
labour market, because ‘the knowledge acquired by a student in the course of his 
higher education does not in general assign him to a particular geographical em-
ployment market’.60 If the place where a person studies cannot be considered 
a systematic indication of the labour market they will join, the same must be 
true for the place(s) where their parents live, or where they have worked in 
recent years as frontier workers. Moreover, even if it were possible to prove 
that a student whose parents work in a Member State is more likely to seek 
employment there after obtaining a degree, the very nature of the single mar-
ket means that there is no way to predict whether they will remain there for 
a long period of time. The “return on investment” can only be presumed in 
the short term, if at all. Inversely, the claimant in Aubriet, who did not receive 
any financial aid from Luxembourg for his studies in France and continues to 
reside in that country like his father, carried out his professional training with 
a Luxembourgish employer which went on to recruit him.61
Systems which make the grant (or the non- reimbursement) of portable 
funding conditional upon the student’s ‘return’ to join a State’s labour market 
would establish a much clearer logical foundation for the investor’s approach. 
Member States in fact seem to be encouraged to resort to such solutions. While 
Advocate General Sharpston noted that she was not convinced that past resi-
dence was a good way of predicting where students would reside and work in 
the future, she referred in a footnote to ‘ways of encouraging that to happen’ 
such as making the grant of funding ‘conditional upon the student returning to 
the Netherlands to work there for a minimum period of time’.62 Although such 
rules again appear to clash with the aims of freedom of movement, they at 
least have the advantage of relying on a demonstrable logical connection be-
tween the criterion used and the expected short- term results.
Nowhere in this case law do we find any proof that the Member States gave 
concrete and precise evidence of the link between the parents’ previous resi-
dence or work in a State and their children’s integration in that State’s labour 
market after pursuing higher education abroad. This is mostly apparent in the 
Court’s examination of the proportionality of the specific requirements that 
are supposed to establish the ‘sufficient link’. The Court’s Commission v Neth-
erlands and Giersch rulings clearly exclude residence requirements which dis-
criminate against frontier workers, but do not exclude the use of criteria based 
on the duration of the link with a Member State in order to prove integration. 
 60 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 October 2012, case C-367/ 11, Prete, para. 45.
 61 Nicolas Aubriet, para. 17.
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The question then becomes how many years constitute “sufficient” integration, 
and whether non- continuous periods of residence and/ or work can be taken 
into account. The fact that in the specific cases at issue the Court found criteria 
that excluded frontier workers incompatible with the Treaty does not suffice 
since the later case law shows that certain criteria, which are discriminatory 
towards frontier workers, can be acceptable.
In Bragança, the Court held that the requirement of an uninterrupted five 
years period of work in the Member State was discriminatory because it did 
not apply to residents, and disproportionate to the objective already set out 
in Giersch. According to the Court, the five year residence criterion did not 
permit ‘the competent authorities to grant that aid where, as in the main pro-
ceedings, the parents, notwithstanding a few short breaks, have worked in Lux-
embourg for a significant period of time, in this case for almost eight years, in the 
period preceding that application, involves a restriction that goes beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain the legitimate objective of increasing the number of 
residents holding a higher education degree, inasmuch as such breaks are not lia-
ble to sever the connection between the applicant for financial aid and the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg’.63
Current Luxembourgish law, introduced before the Bragança and Depesme 
and Kerrou rulings, requires the non- resident student’s parent to have worked 
in the Member State for five out of the seven years preceding the application 
for financial support.64 Previous case law seemed to indicate that such a rule 
could be compatible with EU law since, as the Luxembourgish Government 
argued, it made it possible to take into account cases of quasi- continuous em-
ployment in that Member State over the previous years. Although the Govern-
ment was confident that this was a good way to take into account the Court’s 
case law, the ruling in Aubriet forcefully contradicts this view. In a relatively 
short judgment, without an Opinion and where most of the argument is based 
on repeating the last three rulings concerning Luxembourg, the Court found 
that the five out of seven year rule did not meet the requirements of the “ne-
cessity” stage of the proportionality test.
One must admit that the five- out- of- seven- years rule seems a very high 
threshold considering the children of migrant workers are in principle able 
to benefit from the grant regardless of the duration of their parent’s work in 
Luxembourg. Moreover, the Bragança ruling contains no evidence that the 
Luxembourgish government had showed how such a criterion would be better 
 63 Bragança, cit., para. 69.







suited than another to ensure that the students join its labour market after 
obtaining their degrees abroad. The Court’s lax approach to the proof of the 
appropriateness of national measures discriminating against frontier workers 
in these rulings clashes with the general trend in the case law.65 Indeed, the 
situation of Mr Aubriet’s father, who, as the Court remarks, had been working 
in Luxembourg for more than 17 years out of the previous 23 when his son sub-
mitted his application, demonstrates the negative effects of a rigid criterion 
such as the one set out in 2014 and, more broadly, of allowing Member States 
to establish such limitations to the rights of frontier workers.
The only explanation for the explicit admission of a protectionist goal as an 
overriding requirement (after less explicit admission in Commission v Nether-
lands) and the lack of proper examination of the appropriateness of the na-
tional provisions must be the specific sociological and economic circumstanc-
es visible in Luxembourg today. These factors are only mentioned in passing in 
Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion in Giersch66 but they must have played 
a significant role in the Court’s understanding of the Luxembourgish justifica-
tion for such restrictions to frontier workers’ rights. In 2016, Luxembourg’s pop-
ulation included 46, 71% foreign residents and, in the second trimester of 2017, 
45% frontier workers among its employees.67 Previous case law has shown that 
this State’s small size and large proportion of migrant and frontier workers 
leads to specific issues regarding the application of freedom of movement un-
der EU Law.68 Fears that the stability of a portable student finance programme 
could be threatened by full access for the children of frontier workers indeed 
seem more reasonable in the Luxembourgish context than in most Member 
States. However, precisely because the Court does not consider budgetary con-
cerns acceptable overriding reasons in the public interest, no reference is ever 
made to the true motives of Luxembourg’s restrictive criteria.
If the Luxembourgish context was a deciding factor in these three rulings, 
this was not made explicit by the Court. The lack of any indication within the 
 65 O’Leary, S.  (2014). The Curious Case of Frontier Workers and Study Finance:  Giersch. 
Case C- 20/ 12, Elodie Giersch v.  État du Grand- Duché de Luxembourg, Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Fifth chamber) of 20 June 2013, nyr. Common Market Law Review 51 (2), 
pp. 601– 622, 612, quoting Nic Shuibhne, N., Maci, M. (2013). Proving Public Interest: The 
Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement Cases. Common Market Law Review 50 
(4), pp. 965– 1005.
 66 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, Giersch, cit., para. 46:  the Advocate General only refers to 
Luxembourg’s atypical economic history and current situation.
 67 According to data collected by Statec, Luxembourg’s National Institute of Statistics (www.
statistiques.public.lu).









Pernicious Influence of Citizenship Rights on Workers’ Rights 325
rulings themselves that the admissibility of the overriding reason in the public 
interest, or any other aspect of the Court’s reasoning, is only applicable in the 
very specific circumstances found in Luxembourg, leaves the rulings open for 
wider interpretation and creates dangerous precedents. The more or less im-
plicit admission of similar national goals in Commission v Netherlands and the 
lack of circumscription of the Luxembourg rulings to a specific local context 
could lead to a multiplication of similar provisions restricting access to social 
advantages such as student finance for frontier workers. Once again the lack 
of sufficient care in construing and creating precedents is at the root of the 
problem. A clear indication of the scope the Court wanted to give these rulings 
would have significantly reduced the potential impact of this ruling and the 
gravity of the contra legem rule being created.
Perhaps even more alarmingly, the case law as constructed by the Court of 
Justice is impossible to apply in practice. Aubriet is a perfect illustration of the 
impractical nature of the Court of Justice’s precedents on this issue. Luxem-
bourg reminded the Court that applications for student financial aid are pro-
cessed through a “standardised mass procedure”.69 This means that objective 
and neutral criteria are required because the competent authorities cannot be 
expected to carry out a literal case- by- case analysis of each application. Re-
quiring an authority, that has to process hundreds of applications within a 
relatively short time period every year, to carry out a full assessment of the par-
ticular circumstances of each case and to look for a “sufficient connection with 
Luxembourg society”, a subjective element, is simply unrealistic. Moreover, as 
they could have added, such a procedure could, in the absence of objective 
criteria, significantly affect the rights of EU citizens as it would cause too much 
uncertainty.
What Aubriet proves, therefore, is not only the ill- suited nature of the crite-
rion chosen by Luxembourg (5 out of the previous 7 years) but the serious dan-
ger which results from allowing such ‘sufficient links’ tests to be carried out on 
frontier workers in the first place. Luxembourg is perfectly justified in insisting 
that a true case- by- case analysis is ill- suited to the type of application process 
at issue. National authorities and applicants need clear, objective criteria. The 
Aubriet ruling produces is an insoluble problem: it seems that no objective cri-
terion based on a reasonable duration of employment in the Member State can 
meet the Court’s requirements for a case- by- case analysis, however any other 
type of assessment leads to excessive uncertainties and workloads at the na-
tional level. The Court states that the current criterion ‘is not sufficient to make 
 69 Aubriet, paras 41– 43. 
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full assessment of the significance of that cross- border worker’s connections with 
the Luxembourg labour market’,70 but what would? The Court gives no clues as 
to what the preferable options would be.
How far in the past should competent national authorities go in assessing the 
applicant’s parents’ ties to the national labour market? Five out of the last seven 
years seemed just as pertinent a criterion as seven out of the last ten, or four 
out of the last six. A wider time frame also implies a greater burden placed on 
applicants to prove their parents’ ties over a longer time period. Is it truly better 
to require students wishing to apply for financial support for studies in a neigh-
bouring State to provide evidence that one of their parents was already working 
in Luxembourg fifteen years ago? Perhaps in this case it seems too harsh to re-
ject an application made by a student whose father had worked in Luxembourg 
for the greater part of 23 years, but it seems just as harsh to force every non- 
resident applicant to submit evidence covering a twenty- year period, bearing in 
mind this is already a contra legem exception to the rights of frontier workers.
The real issue is that, while Member States have been allowed to introduce 
duration of residence criteria to prove ‘substantive links’ in the field of citi-
zenship, such criteria, once set, are bound to exclude a number of citizens in 
a somewhat arbitrary fashion even when, as was the case here, they allow for 
some flexibility. This exclusionary effect seems even more difficult to justify 
when applied to citizens who should in principle benefit from the rights at 
issue not by virtue of the duration or solidity of their “links” with a society but 
simply because they are frontier workers. This is an easily foreseeable conse-
quence of allowing Member States to introduce such criteria to begin with, as 
true case- by- case analysis of the subjective links between an individual and 
the society of the Member State is out of the question in the assessment of 
student applications for financial aid (and, realistically, in most other cases). 
In Aubriet the Court seems to renounce its own case law’s actual capacity for 
implementation as the easiest option to comply with it seems to be to abandon 
duration of work criteria for frontier workers altogether. The case law remains, 
however, and its potential full impact is difficult to predict.
iv A Problematic Case Law Caused by the Absence of Ambitious 
Legislative Reforms
The five rulings concerning student finance could have major consequences 
for portable student finance in the European Union, encouraging Member 
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States to introduce provisions that could make such funding conditional upon 
the student’s return and integration into their own labour markets after hav-
ing completed their studies. However, more importantly, this case law could 
have wide- ranging consequences for frontier workers and the status of migrant 
workers as a whole. The access to social advantages under Regulation 492/ 2011 
is being restricted on the basis of criteria such as the duration of one’s resi-
dence or work in the host Member State, which were developed in the second-
ary law and case law applicable to economically inactive Union citizens. This 
appears to be an involuntary result of Member States’ adaptation to the Court’s 
case law. As new rights become available for economically inactive Union citi-
zens, and as the duration of one’s stay in a Member State becomes a determin-
ing factor to establish one’s status under instruments such as Directive 2004/ 
38, worker status is losing the power it once had. As Member States prioritise 
the rights derived from Union citizen resident status, legislative reform is nec-
essary to establish a new balance between these rights and those derived from 
migrant worker status.
iv.1 The Uncertain Development of a Specific Status for Frontier Workers
The first consequence of this case law, beyond the specific case of student fi-
nance, is an explicit admission by the Court of Justice that unequal treatment 
between frontier and migrant workers may be justified in relation to social ad-
vantages. Indeed, the Court has not yet held that ‘sufficient links’ tests are ap-
plicable to migrant workers who reside in the Member State where they work.
This difference cannot be based on Regulation 492/ 2011 nor on traditional 
case law on the free movement of workers, but seems to have been introduced 
by the Court in 2007 Cases Hartmann and Geven, which are referred to in Gi-
ersch, and in Commission v Netherlands which itself does not refer to any sourc-
es on this issue but can only be understood if one takes into account those rul-
ings.71 In these three rulings, the Court certainly tried to resist Member States’ 
attempts to exclude frontier workers from access to social advantages. Howev-
er, in doing so by introducing a proportionality test linked to a justification, it 
enabled States to reason in terms of ‘sufficient links’ to their labour markets. 
The Court thus introduced a fundamental shift in the understanding of the 
status of frontier workers in EU law and of the basis for their access to equal 
treatment regarding social advantages.
 71 Advocate General Sharpston did refer to Geven, but only in support of the statement 
that Art. 7(2) of Regulation 1612/ 68 expresses the principle of equal treatment set out 
in Article 45 tfeu. The Court referred to the same ruling in support of the equality of 





The Court in fact accepts this inequality between migrant and frontier 
workers as a valid option for Member States. For instance, there is nothing in 
the case law to suggest that the new Luxembourgish rules on student finance, 
introduced before the 2016 rulings, are incompatible with either the treaties 
or secondary law, despite the fact that they explicitly grant different rights to 
the children of migrant workers (or of Union citizens having acquired perma-
nent residence) and to the children of frontier workers, with only the latter be-
ing submitted to a test establishing the duration of employment.72 The Court 
states that such a difference can lead to indirect discrimination,73 but may be 
justified by an objective in the public interest if the distinction is based on cri-
teria aiming to establish the student’s parents’ integration in Luxembourgish 
society. The fact that frontier workers contribute to paying for these social ad-
vantages through taxes in the same way as migrant workers no longer seems to 
shield them from requirements that do not apply to residents. To what extent 
such distinctions can affect the integrity of frontier worker rights under Art. 45 
tfeu is as yet unclear. But there is no reason to suppose that they will remain 
restricted to the specific cases dealt with in the 2007 rulings and to student 
finance.
The uncertainty associated with the risk of extending such exceptions be-
yond the limited scope of the current case law is due to the cjeu’s insufficient 
rigour in developing and applying precedent. There can be no doubt that the 
Court does rely on precedent, but this line of case law is a good illustration of 
the deficiencies of the current absence of any clear doctrine of precedent in 
European Union law.74 For instance, note the ease with which the 2007 cases 
are quoted as precedent in para. 64 of Giersch as a sufficient basis for the state-
ment according to which ‘with regard inter alia to frontier workers, the Court 
has allowed certain grounds of justification concerning legislation which distin-
guishes between residents and non- residents carrying out a professional activity 
in the State concerned, depending on the extent of their integration in the society 
of that Member State or their attachment to that State’.75 The facts that two of 
these cases concerned ‘reverse’ frontier workers, that they did not deal with 
 72 Art. 3 (2) and (5) of the 24 July 2014 Loi concernant l’aide financière de l’État pour études 
supérieures, Mémorial A n° 139.
 73 Bragança Linares Verruga, cit., para. 47.
 74 On the use of precedent by the Court of Justice, see the brilliant analyses by Komárek, 
J.  (2007). Precedent in European Union Law:  Reasoning with Previous Decisions of the 
Court of Justice. Thesis (D.Phil.). University of Oxford; and Jacob, M.  (2014). Precedents 
and Case- Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice:  Unfinished Business. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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student grants, or that the German legislation at issue in two of them based 
the criterion applicable to frontier workers on the intensity of the economic 
activity pursued in the host state are not mentioned. No attempt is made to 
justify the analogy and a general rule is derived from three peculiar rulings 
made 6 years earlier, which seem to allow Member States to impose ‘real link’ 
tests which discriminate against non- resident workers. In Giersch, this seems 
to be introduced as a wide- ranging exception to the presumption, restated in 
Caves Krier Frères, that frontier workers have established sufficient integration 
through participation in the employment market.76
Similarly, although the Luxembourgish cases clearly seem linked to the spe-
cific circumstances in that Member State, the rulings do not make any refer-
ence to a specific economic or social context justifying an exception but ap-
pear to state a general rule. This means that they could potentially be quoted as 
precedent by any Member State seeking to restrict frontier workers’ access to 
social advantages. Such transfers from one line of case law (or one area of the 
law) to another are frequent in cjeu case law, and do not meet the standards 
of rigour and justification that should be expected in a complex precedent- 
based system. Citations of Giersch appear to have taken on a life of their own, 
with Advocates General and the Court now referring to it as a precedent for 
the rule that the free movement of workers prohibits all forms of discrimina-
tion, including cases where the national measure does not place all nationals 
of other Member States at a disadvantage, or also affects some nationals of the 
State in question.77 These citations have little to do with the actual preceden-
tial value of Giersch in the Court’s overall case law on freedom of movement. 
However, they could produce serious consequences by normalising references 
to a very specific and controversial line of cases. Greater care in formulating 
new case law and, most importantly, in engaging explicitly with precedent 
would probably have allowed the Court to restrict the impact of the 2007 rul-
ings, as well as that of Commission v Netherlands and Giersch. Aubriet provides 
excellent evidence of this, as the Court appears to assume that previous case 
law is entirely sufficient to answer the preliminary reference, while giving the 
national judges a new ruling which contradicts previous assumptions as to the 
type of national rule that would be compatible with EU law, and leaves little 
room to find a workable alternative.
 76 This is quoted in Giersch, cit., para. 63.
 77 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 March 2019, case C- 437/ 17, Gemeinsamer Betriebsrat 
EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach, para. 31 (see also the Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard 
Øe, delivered on 25 July 2018, paras 8 and 34); Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 23 May 






iv.2 A Consequence of Member States’ Adaptation to Union Citizen Rights
One interesting aspect of all these rulings is that the Member States were 
clearly trying to comply with Directive 2004/ 38. They agreed to grant full equal 
treatment to migrant workers and to citizens who had acquired permanent 
residence, as is the case in the legislation passed in Luxembourg following Gi-
ersch. A test related to the “major” or “minor” nature of the work carried out in 
the host Member State only appears in the 2007 cases and we see a clear shift 
towards criteria based on the duration of one’s integration in the host state. 
Even in Commission v Netherlands, where national authorities wanted to apply 
a criterion related to the duration of residence to all migrant workers, such a 
solution was clearly inspired by previous case law concerning the ‘sufficient 
links’ tests applicable to economically inactive citizens and by Article 24(2) of 
Directive 2004/ 38.78
The link between frontier workers’ rights and the rights derived from per-
manent residence under the Directive was brought up by the Court of Justice 
itself in Giersch, when it suggested that Member States could make financial 
support conditional on the parent of the student having worked in Luxem-
bourg for a minimum period of time. The Court seemed to add an indication as 
to what that period could be by referring to the five years’ residence condition 
set in Art. 16(1) of Directive 2004/ 38,79 although it then denied this analogy’s 
relevance and rejected such a strict criterion in Bragança.80 Despite this appar-
ent contradiction in the case law, the relevance of analogies between the status 
of frontier workers and that of all citizens under Directive 2004/ 38 is made 
clear by the introduction of a test developed within the case law concerning 
economically inactive citizens into the interpretation of Article 45 tfeu and 
of Regulation 492/ 2011.
These rulings clearly show an influence of the case law and legislation con-
cerning economically inactive citizens over the status of certain workers exer-
cising their free movement rights. Although migrant workers’ rights appear to 
be guaranteed, frontier workers find themselves excluded from the full benefit 
of equal treatment simply because they do not reside in the Member State. 
This criterion is contrary to the traditional approach which links rights granted 
 78 ‘By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be obliged […] prior 
to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, 
including vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to persons other 
than workers, self- employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of their 
families’.
 79 Giersch, cit., para. 80.
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under Article 45 tfeu not to residence, but exclusively to worker status. The 
‘sufficient links’ test, which is typically based on the duration of residence, 
finds itself being implemented through duration of work criteria which bear 
no relation to the principle that the very status of migrant or frontier worker is 
sufficient, in and of itself, to justify equal treatment.
The transfer of tests constructed in the context of economically inactive 
citizens’ rights to frontier workers also leads to a clear restriction of the rights 
associated with migrant worker status, a reversal which gives priority to the 
rights derived from long- term residence in a Member State. Although migrant 
workers are not necessarily impacted by this case law in the short- term, there 
seems to be a shift from the higher protection granted to workers to a distinc-
tion between migrant workers and other citizens residing in a Member State, 
and those workers who do not permanently reside there. This is a fundamental 
shift in the traditional hierarchy among categories of citizens exercising free 
movement rights, and it could eventually lead to significant restrictions of 
frontier workers’ rights, as well as those of all citizens exercising their Article 
45 tfeu rights if duration of work or residence criteria became the general 
rule for economically active citizens too. This would not be a major issue if it 
was part of a more general and well- reasoned shift towards granting priority 
to Union citizenship rights and applying tests derived from the idea of a ‘real 
link’ with sufficient rigour and legal certainty.81 However, the case law provides 
no clear indication that this is the case and, instead, gives the impression that 
the cjeu is almost unwittingly expanding the scope of an exception that was 
highly questionable in the first place.
iv.3 The Need for Legislative Reform
One of the root causes for this case law is clearly the attempt by many Mem-
ber States to introduce restrictions on Union citizens’ access to social benefits 
while conforming to Directive 2004/ 38, and the European Court of Justice’s 
attempt to assuage fears of “social tourism” or, more specifically, “study grant 
forum shopping”.82 By trying to take into account what it felt were legitimate 
concerns about granting access to social benefits to people who were not truly 
migrant workers, in the sense that they were “reverse” frontier workers or that 
they only had a minor professional occupation in the host Member State, the 
Court of Justice made three very awkward rulings which have served as a prec-
edent for a potentially far- reaching limitation of all frontier workers’ rights. As 
 81 See Dougan, M., Spaventa, E., ‘Wish You Weren’t Here’, cit., pp. 217– 218.








in other aspects of free movement law, it has transformed an issue related to 
the applicability of free movement rights and the appropriateness of national 
measures to their stated objectives into one of proportionality,83 using a test 
which the Court itself considers inapplicable, in principle, to the free move-
ment of workers. This will lead Member States to construct ever more complex 
legislation establishing criteria designed to prove the (lack of) integration into 
their societies of Union citizens who are already working there. Unfortunately, 
the Court’s efforts to maintain frontier workers’ rights do not fully compensate 
for the impact of allowing such a distinction with migrant workers to develop 
in the first place.84
In relation to student finance, one cannot help noticing that this is the re-
sult of the absence of an EU- wide mechanism to determine which State should 
be responsible for funding access to higher education for mobile EU citizens. 
The case law already shows the absurd complexity of a system designed to 
fund student mobility which depends on one the student’s parents being suf-
ficiently “integrated” in a State’s economy. Depesme & Kerrou shows that proof 
of what constitutes a parent- child relationship for the purposes of determin-
ing access to social advantages is not always easy. The frontier worker may be 
a step parent but they must actually contribute to the maintenance of the stu-
dent, whereas student finance is in principle designed specifically so that stu-
dents whose parents cannot support them have access to higher education.85
The specific examples which appear in the Depesme & Kerrou cases show 
how problematic the existence of separate categories of mobile students un-
der EU law can become. At the very least, it seems excessively convoluted to 
have the right to access higher education in another Member State or to ben-
efit from financial support for such studies depend on whether one or one’s 
parents are migrant workers, frontier workers, inactive citizens with perma-
nent residence in another Member State, or “static” Union citizens. Moreover, 
the Court almost seems to be encouraging Member States to set up systems 
which restrict access to full financial support to students who return to join 
their labour markets.
Such schemes indeed answer Member States’ concerns but they are con-
trary to the aims of free movement. These issues clearly derive from the lack 
 83 Nic Shuibhne, N., Maci, M., Proving Public Interest, cit., p. 1005.
 84 Regarding the 2007 cases, see contra Dougan, M., Expanding the Frontiers of Union 
Citizenship, cit., p. 158.
 85 De Witte, F.  (2013). Who Funds the Mobile Student? Shedding some Light on the 
Normative Assumptions Underlying EU Free Movement Law: Commission v Netherlands. 
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of a sufficient legislative or regulatory framework for student mobility in the 
EU.86 The same could be said for the whole of EU citizenship rights, among 
which the differentiation of separate categories of mobile Union citizens is 
now rendered even more complex by the apparent pre- eminence of rights de-
rived from residence over those derived from the historical worker status un-
der Art. 45 tfeu. The specific treatment of frontier workers and their children 
in these rulings defines the ‘ideal citizen’ in an even more restrictive sense than 
the one identified by Sara Iglesias Sánchez.87 If the ideal citizen is generally 
defined as one who moves to another Member State to pursue an economic 
activity, the ideal student, from the point of view of a Member State providing 
funding, is one who moves to another Member State temporarily, in order to 
return and enrich the first State’s employment market. While the general aim 
of promoting free movement remains, the continuing understanding of free 
movement and exportable welfare as essentially exchanges between Member 
States rather than rights associated with EU citizenship across a common ter-
ritory creates limitations on citizens’ right to move across the Union.
v Concluding Remarks
A major overhaul of secondary law concerning the free movement of citizens 
is long overdue. Unfortunately, the current political climate does not seem to 
indicate any progress on this issue. In the absence of an ambitious legislative 
reform, it is nevertheless imperative that the differentiation between migrant 
and frontier workers is curtailed if we are to avoid unacceptable restrictions 
on the rights granted to Union citizens under Art. 45 tfeu. Of course, a more 
desirable reform should not only concern students or frontier workers but 
the concept of EU citizenship itself. However, as Niamh Nic Shuibhne writes, 
such a change would in reality require a new federal bargain.88 In the mean-
time, she rightly states that ‘Union citizenship is overburdened with expecta-
tions, both polity- related and rights- related, which it simply cannot deliver’89 
 86 Skovgaard- Petersen, H., There and Back Again, cit., p. 802.
 87 Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2017). A  Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a 
Union Based on Free Movement. In Kochenov, D. ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., 
pp. 371– 393.
 88 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the 
Implications for the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged?. In Kochenov, D. ed., 
EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., pp. 147– 177, p. 176.











and this will remain so for as long as such a fundamental political change 
remains unlikely. However, while the Court tries to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the rights derived from citizenship and Member States’ con-
cerns, we must be careful not to weaken those rights which do have a firm 
footing in the Treaties.
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It seems that for a long time, in European higher education at least, the UK 
could have its cake and eat it too. One of the four original architects of the 
European Higher Education Area (ehea; which is the culmination of the 1998 
intergovernmental Sorbonne Declaration and ensuing Bologna Process), the 
UK has successfully exported the main features of its higher education model 
to the other EU Member States and beyond, without having to concede any 
powers to the EU level in that regard, as the Bologna Process remains formal-
ly outside the EU’s institutional and legal framework.1 With the participating 
countries mainly converging to the UK system, embracing its Bachelor- Master- 
Doctorate degree structure as well as more implicitly its overall liberal, market- 
driven approach to higher education, the UK reaped all the benefits of an en-
larged higher education “market” on which its higher education institutions 
could successfully compete, at minimal administrative, political or other cost.
Furthermore, in EU higher education law and policy, the UK has occupied 
an equally advantageous position. In the specific context of the EU’s Europe-
an Research Area (era), the UK’s higher education sector has been very suc-
cessful in obtaining EU research funding. This could potentially be linked to 
the fact that, as a major net importer of mobile EU students, researchers and 
academics – who flocked to the UK as a result of a combination of inter alia 
linguistics, the reputation of its universities and international outlook, as well 
 * Professor of EU Law at the College of Europe, Bruges, and on leave from the European Com-
mission. The views expressed in this chapter are entirely personal and in no way reflect the 
official position of the European Commission. The author wishes to thank the participants of 
the workshop on “EU Citizenship in Times of Brexit” at the University of Leuven on 30 March 
2018 for their feedback on a previous draft of the paper, and in particular Christa Tobler for 
very useful comments.
 1 See for a general discussion Garben, S. (2014). EU Higher Education Law – The Bologna Process 








as its open labour market – the UK has profited from a major brain- gain. At the 
same time, because of the UK’s liberal, fee- paying model, this imported wealth 
and talent has come at a very low cost. This is because the EU’s case law on 
student mobility and diploma recognition has worked mainly to the benefit of 
the UK model, where it requires equal treatment as regards tuition fees but not 
maintenance grants. Although the Court developed students’ mobility rights 
already before the introduction of EU citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, it 
has since then relied on this ‘fundamental status’ of Member State nationals to 
further strengthen its protective approach.2 The (ideal- type) mobile student, 
with its youthful ambition and potential to develop a pan- European career, 
life and identify, is in many ways the embodiment of both the aspirational and 
instrumental aspects of EU citizenship.
What will be the impact of Brexit? While we shall leave concrete predictions 
to futurologists, this paper will reflect on the underlying dynamics in this area, 
from a legal and political point of view, and will thereby indicate the relevant 
“stakes” and “pressure points” which are likely to come to the fore in the Brexit 
negotiations in respect of the area of higher education. It will be argued that 
while the ehea is independent from EU membership, and the UK will thus 
presumably remain party to it post- Brexit, a country’s successful performance 
within the ehea is deeply connected to (and dependent on) the EU’s “hard” 
free movement rights deriving from EU citizenship and the internal market. In 
addition, in terms of the era, it is clear that UK universities stand a lot to lose 
if Brexit would bar them from obtaining EU research funding, making this an 
important bargaining chip for the EU, both within the negotiations and poten-
tially as leverage for the UK’s compliance with its obligations under any future 
relationship. As such, the UK’s current strength in higher education is one of 
its weak spots in the Brexit negotiations.
Part  2 of the paper will set out the general elements of European higher 
education law and policy, Part 3 will consider the current position of the UK 
in both this context, while part 4 will explore the possible implications of, and 
for, Brexit. Part v concludes.
ii European Higher Education Law and Policy
Over the past two decades, a remarkable amount of Europeanization has oc-
curred in higher education, an area that has traditionally been closely guarded 
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by EU Member States as one of the remaining bastions of national identity and 
autonomy. This Europeanization has taken place, and continues to develop, in 
two main forums. The most fundamental European influence on national high-
er education systems has come from the intergovernmental Bologna Process, 
which has resulted in the so- called European Higher Education Area (ehea). 
The second source of Europeanization is the EU, which since the Maastricht 
Treaty possesses a direct competence in education in the form of (what is now, 
since the Lisbon Treaty) Article 165 tfeu.
ii.1 The Bologna Process and the ehea
The Bologna Process was initiated in 1998, when at an international forum 
organized in connection with the celebration of the 800th anniversary of the 
Sorbonne University, the Ministers of education of France, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom decided on a “Joint Declaration on harmonisation of the 
architecture of the European higher education system”. It was open for the oth-
er Member States of the EU as well as for third countries to join. Belgium, Swit-
zerland, Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark accepted and signed immediately. 
The Italian minister for education extended an invitation to fellow Europe-
an ministers to a follow- up conference, taking place in Bologna the following 
year.3 On this occasion, in June of 1999, 29 European countries agreed on a dec-
laration that would fundamentally change the future of their higher education 
systems. From this Bologna Declaration ensued the Bologna Process, which 
now includes 48 countries and the European Commission as “members”.4
The Process is an on- going platform for policy- exchange and policy- making 
in higher education, organized around regular (bi- or triannual) ministerial 
conferences, which assess the progress made in reference to the various pre-
viously established Bologna policy objectives and which add new aims and 
elements. The original deadline of the Process was the creation of a European 
Area of Higher Education by 2010, but the Process has continued despite the 
ehea’s official launch in March 2010 during the Budapest- Vienna Ministerial 
Conference. While the Process has significantly branched out in terms of scope 
and objectives over the years, at its heart is still the structural “harmonisation”5 
 3 Hackl, E. (2001). Towards a European Area of Higher Education: Change and Convergence in 
European Higher Education. EUI Working Paper, no. 9, p. 21.
 4 All EU Member States, as well as Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Holy See, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and the Ukraine.
 5 The Sorbonne Declaration, which is seen as the basis for the Bologna Declaration and Pro-









of Europe’s higher education systems, through the introduction of a common 
higher education system consisting in three (Bachelor- Master- Doctorate) cy-
cles. The Bologna Declaration states that “access to the second cycle shall require 
successful completion of first cycle studies, lasting a minimum of three years. The 
degree awarded after the first cycle shall also be relevant to the European labour 
market as an appropriate level of qualification. The second cycle should lead to 
the master and/ or doctorate degree as in many European countries”. The main 
aim of this common system, and of the Bologna Process more generally, is to 
facilitate mobility in higher education and to improve the employability of 
graduates. The standardized degrees should be recognized in the participating 
countries, and to this end the Lisbon Recognition Convention of the Council 
of Europe6 is integrated into the Process by making its ratification an explicit 
Bologna “requirement”. As an extension of the common three- tier structure 
and commitment to diploma recognition, the Process has increasingly focused 
on quality assurance mechanisms and standards, within which “employabili-
ty” plays an important role.
It should be stressed that the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations and the 
ensuing Process are not legally binding. Both participation in the Process and 
the ‘implementation’ of the Declarations and subsequent ministerial commu-
niqués are entirely voluntary; they are “political artefacts”7 that may be re-
garded as “public international soft law”.8 It should indeed also be underlined 
that the Bologna Process is formally separate from the EU and EU law. The 
European Commission is a “member” of Bologna alongside the participating 
counties, but the Process takes place outside the EU’s institutional and legal 
framework. As we shall see in Section iii, the UK has played an important 
Declaration, the Bologna Declaration carefully avoids the use of the word. In fact, the ques-
tion whether the envisaged Bologna project constituted ‘harmonisation’ is reported to have 
been a highly contentious issue that had to be resolved before the Declaration could be 
signed. There had already been discussion about the use of the term in the run- up to the con-
ference. Most of the participating countries deemed the type of standardisation entailed by 
harmonisation to be undesirable in the field of higher education. Although the French min-
ister Claude Allègre tried to convince his colleagues that ‘harmonisation’ as used in the text 
of the Declaration was not to mean ‘standardisation’ in its unwanted sense, the majority of 
participants preferred to stay on the safe side and leave out the term. See: Kirkwood- Tucker, 
T. (2004). Toward a European Model of Higher Education Processes, Problems, and Promises. 
European Education 36 (3), pp. 51– 69.
 6 1997 Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the 
European Region.
 7 Amaral A., and Magalhaes, A. (2004). Epidemiology and the Bologna Saga. Higher Education 
48 (1), pp. 79– 100, 84.
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role in ensuring that the Bologna Process would remain an intergovernmen-
tal, voluntary project, keeping the EU on the side- lines. But also a number 
of other EU Member States were (initially) eager to exclude the EU, perhaps 
as ‘retribution’ for the EU’s growing role in the area despite its initial lack of 
direct competence.9
I have argued elsewhere that the exclusion of the EU and the intergovern-
mental nature of the Bologna Process have led to a number of legitimacy prob-
lems, and that it would in fact have been better to adopt the Declaration as a 
binding measure within an EU context.10 In any event, the activities undertak-
en in the context of Bologna overlap to an important extent with EU policies 
and initiatives, and its objectives are closely connected to an EU corpus legis. 
The Commission is heavily involved by means of funding and steering, and 
characterizes its contribution to the Process as part of the Lisbon/ Europe 2020 
Strategy.11 The Bologna follow- up relies heavily on the EU presidency and the 
European Credit Transfer System (ects) has been transposed into the Bologna 
Process’ Bachelor- Master system. Furthermore, since 2015, the EU offers a Stu-
dent Loan Guarantee Facility, which provides partial guarantees to financial 
intermediaries in respect of loans granted to students undertaking a second- 
cycle degree, such as a Master’s degree, which is neither their country of resi-
dence nor the country in which they obtained their qualification granting ac-
cess to the Master’s programme.12 Once fully implemented,13 this EU measure 
is of course an important support for the system and the goals of the Bologna 
Process. All of this makes the exact status of the Bologna Process obscure and 
means that in spite of the intentions of the (original) Bologna actors, the ehea 
is deeply connected to the EU’s institutional and legal framework, even if it 
remains formally separate from it.
9  For extensive discussion, see: Garben, S. (2014). EU Higher Education Law, cit.
 10 Ibid; Garben, S. (2010). The Bologna Process: from a European law perspective. European 
Law Journal 16 (2), pp. 186– 210. .
 11 European Commission (2003). Realising the European Higher Education Area, 
Contribution of the European Commission to the Berlin Conference of European Higher 
Education Ministers on 18/ 19 Sept. 2003.
 12 Regulation (EU) No 1288/ 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2013 establishing “Erasmus+”: The Union programme for education, training, 
youth and sport and repealing Decisions No 1719/ 2006/ EC, No 1720/ 2006/ EC and No 1298/ 
2008/ EC, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 50– 73.
 13 Currently the scheme is being made available through banks and universities, with only 
limited coverage. See https:// ec.europa.eu/ programmes/ erasmus- plus/ opportunities/ 











2 The EU and Its Higher Education Law and Policy
As was just indicated, the EU features a range of laws and policies in the area 
of higher education, and this was already the case at the time of the Bologna 
Declaration’s genesis. This may be to the surprise of some, considering that the 
1957 Rome Treaty did not confer any specific powers for the development of a 
common educational policy. This absence however did not deter the European 
Court of Justice to expand its influence and to help establish a “Community 
law of education”,14 stating that “although educational and training policy is 
not as such included in the spheres which the Treaty has entrusted to the Com-
munity Institutions, it does not follow that the exercise of powers transferred 
to the Community is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to affect 
the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of education and 
training”.15 Moreover, there was not a complete lack of explicit competence in 
educational matters. Article 57 eec (now Article 53 tfeu) granted legislative 
powers for the mutual recognition of diplomas. Furthermore, the eec Treaty 
also provided for competence in vocational training. It is in fact on this pro-
vision that the EU’s initial education law was developed. In its consequential 
Gravier judgment, where the Court held that Member states cannot charge 
higher enrolment fees to non- national EU students, the Court interpreted 
vocational training to include an element of “general education”.16 Shortly af-
terwards, the Commission presented the Erasmus programme for student ex-
change17 solely under Article 128 EC (now Article 166 tfeu on vocational train-
ing),18 and in a subsequent case, the Court largely upheld the Commission’s 
 14 De Witte, B., ed.(1989). European Community Law of Education. Baden- Baden: Nomos.
 15 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 July 1974, case 9/ 74, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt 
München.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 February 1985, case 293/ 83, Gravier. Further developed 
in Court of Justice, judgment of 2 February 1988, case 24/ 86, Blaizot v. University of Liege 
clarifying that this could also include university education whenever it prepares students 
for an occupation.
 17 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision adopting erasmus, com (1985) 
756. Erasmus establishes a European University Network, encouraging universities by 
means of financial incentives to set up student and teacher exchange agreements. It gives 
out grants to the participating students; covering the cost of linguistic preparation for 
the studies abroad, travel expenditure and compensation for the higher cost of living 
in the host state. Erasmus is very much a success story, in terms of numbers, outcomes 
and perception. See European Commission (2007). Erasmus:  Success Stories:  Europe 
Creates Opportunities. Luxembourg:  Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities.
 18 Pépin, L.  (2007). The history of EU cooperation in the field of education and train-
ing: How lifelong learning became a strategic objective. European Journal of Education 42 
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wide interpretation of this provision so as to apply to university education.19 
Even if this discussion has been long superseded since the introduction of a 
specific legal basis for education in the Maastricht Treaty (the most recent in-
carnation of the programme, erasmus+,20 is based on both Article 165 and 
166 tfeu), this story remains interesting as it shows the dynamics behind the 
evolution of this area.
The Court’s case law on student mobility has developed since the seminal 
Gravier judgment, making clear that EU citizens have the right to higher edu-
cation in other EU Member States on the same terms as nationals, which does 
not only require equal treatment as regards access conditions and tuition 
fees, but in principle also as regards maintenance grants. In the Bidar case, 
the Court included student maintenance for the purposes of the application 
of the prohibition of discrimination as a matter of principle.21 Remarkably, 
the Court used the Citizenship Directive 2004/ 38,22 which provides in its re-
cital 21 that it should be left to the host Member State to decide whether it will 
grant maintenance assistance for studies, and in Article 24(2) that the host 
Member States “shall not be obliged to […] grant maintenance aid for studies” 
prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, as an argument that 
the grant of such aid actually falls within the scope of the Treaty.23 Contrary 
Witte, ed., European Community Law of Education, cit, p. 116; Shaw, J. (1992). Education and 
the law in the European Community. Journal of Law & Education 21 (3), pp. 415– 442, 420.
 19 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 May 1989, case 242/ 87, Commission v. Council (Erasmus).
 20 Regulation (EU) No 1288/ 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2013 establishing “Erasmus+”: the Union programme for education, training, 
youth and sport and repealing Decisions No 1719/ 2006/ EC, No 1720/ 2006/ EC and No 1298/ 
2008/ EC, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 50– 73.
 21 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C- 209/ 03, The Queen, on the application 
of Dany Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills.
 22 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 23 The Court stated:  “That development of Community law is confirmed by Article 24 of 
Directive 2004/ 38, which states in paragraph 1 that all Union citizens residing in the terri-
tory of another Member State on the basis of that directive are to enjoy equal treatment 
‘within the scope of the Treaty’. In that the Community legislature, in paragraph 2 of that 
article, defined the content of paragraph 1 in more detail, by providing that a Member 
State may in the case of persons other than workers, self- employed persons, persons who 
retain such status and members of their families restrict the grant of maintenance aid 
in the form of grants or loans in respect of students who have not acquired a right of 












to the expectations raised by Bidar that students may qualify for maintenance 
aid before obtaining the right of permanent residence after 5 years of legal 
residence, in the Förster case the Court allowed for an extensive derogation 
of this principle, so that under the current state of affairs only those students 
of foreign EU nationality are eligible that have spent 5 years in the host State 
before applying.24 As regards the exportability of maintenance grants and 
loans, the Court held in Morgan and Bucher that “where a Member State pro-
vides for a system of education or training grants which enables students to 
receive such grants if they pursue studies in another Member State, it must 
ensure that the detailed rules for the award of those grants do not create an 
unjustified restriction of the right to move and reside within the territory of 
the Member States”.25
This distinction between access conditions, comprising tuition fees, on 
the one hand, for which full equal treatment of mobile students is required, 
and on the other hand maintenance support for which equal treatment 
will only apply in exceptional cases, has an asymmetrical effect on Member 
States’ higher education systems. Where a Member States subsidizes and or-
ganizes higher education through free or low- tuition access, EU law requires 
them to extend this to mobile EU students. Where, on the other hand, it 
subsidizes and organizes higher education through maintenance grants and 
loans, it does not have to do so. This works to the disadvantage of Member 
States with a social model of higher education, as “EU law requires Member 
States which choose to devote significant public resources to maintaining a 
high quality further education system for the benefit of their own popula-
tions to subsidize, through the principle of equal access, in addition poten-
tially large numbers of foreign students”26 while more Member States with 
a more ‘liberal’ model with high tuition fees and support through mainte-
nance grants or loans have to pay significantly less to mobile students in 
comparison.
In addition to the provision on vocational training discussed above, the 
Rome Treaty featured another competence related to education:  Article 53 
accordance with Article 24(1), now falls within the scope of the Treaty”. See paragraph 43 
of the judgment.
 24 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 November 2008, case C- 158/ 07, Jacqueline Förster 
v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep.
 25 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 October 2007, joined cases C- 11/ 06 and C- 12/ 06, Rhiannon 
Morgan v. Bezirksregierung Köln (C- 11/ 06) and Iris Bucher v. Landrat des Kreises Düren (C- 
12/ 06), para. 28.
 26 Dougan, M.  (2005). Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques:  Who Covers the Costs of 
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tfeu on recognition of diplomas. Professional diploma recognition deals 
with the rules of Member States that make access to or pursuit of a regulated 
profession in their territory contingent on possession of professional qualifi-
cations.27 Article 53 tfeu provides an explicit legal basis for legislative action, 
approaching the issue from an internal market logic. Considering that cur-
rently around 800 professions are regulated by one or more Member States, 
the establishment of a common employment market would be fundamental-
ly impaired if Member States could carve out these professions by applying 
their different statutory regimes. This has allowed the EU to adopt a range 
of legal measures. The numerous directives on co- ordination of training and 
recognition of qualifications have had a direct impact on content of cours-
es.28 For instance, Directive 78/ 687 caused the entire dentistry curriculum of 
Italian universities to be recreated.29 The most important current measure 
is umbrella Directive 2005/ 36/ EC.30 It consolidated almost all the previous 
legislation, except for the specific directives on the provision of services and 
establishment of lawyers.31 The umbrella directive does not substantially im-
pact the higher education systems of the Member States in a direct way. It 
does not propose the harmonization of new professions, but simply applies 
a mutual recognition approach to the non- coordinated professions. Still, the 
mechanism of mutual recognition might have an effect on the national high-
er education systems, as it could put pressure on the systems that are less 
‘efficient’.
In contrast to professional recognition, academic recognition is said to be 
concerned with the academic status of obtained degrees. Academic recogni-
tion is often regarded to lie outside the scope of formal EU powers. Although 
it could be argued that this distinction is unfounded,32 no EU legislation 
 27 Schneider, H.  (1995). Die Anerkennung von Diplomen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. 
Antwerp: Maklu.
 28 Lonbay, J. (1989). Education and the law: The Community Context. European Law Review 
14 (6), pp. 363– 387, 368.
 29 Zilioli, C. (1989). The Recognition of Diplomas and its Impact on Educational Policies. In; 
B. de Witte, ed., European Community Law of Education, cit., 51.
 30 Directive 2005/ 36/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 
2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 22– 142.
 31 Council Directive 77/ 249/ EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by law-
yers of freedom to provide services, OJ L 78, 26.3.1977, p. 17– 18 and Directive 98/ 5/ EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the 
profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the 
qualification was obtained, OJ L 77, 14.3.1998, p. 36– 43.
 32 Garben, S.  (2011). On Recognition of Qualifications for Academic and Professional 














concerning the academic recognition of diplomas has been adopted. That is 
not to say that no European integration has taken place in this area. Firstly, 
the EU has adopted a number of supporting measures to facilitate academic 
recognition, such as the European Credit Transfer System for higher educa-
tion (ects)33 and for vocational training (ecvet),34 Europass,35 the European 
Qualifications Framework36 and the Diploma Supplement.37 Moreover, the 
case law of the Court has played an important role also here, as it has held that 
the refusal to recognize academic diplomas or titles from other Member States 
can constitute a restriction of the fundamental freedoms.38 Beyond the mobil-
ity of students and diploma holders, EU law features important mobility rights 
for other education actors. Teachers qualify as “workers” and can therefore rely 
on all the rights and benefits connected to Article 45 tfeu.39 Furthermore, 
the activities of private education institutions qualify as “services” under Ar-
ticle 56 tfeu.40 Similarly, private education institutions have the right to free 
establishment across the EU. Member States may therefore in principle not 
restrict privately funded higher education institutions from offering education 
 33 ects was developed by the Commission in the context of erasmus to enable students to 
take the credits obtained during their period of study abroad and use them within their 
home curriculum.
 34 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on 
the establishment of a European Credit system for Vocational Education and Training 
(ecvet), OJ C 155, 8.7.2009, p. 11– 18.
 35 Decision (EU) 2018/ 646 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 April 2018 
on a common framework for the provision of better services for skills and qualifications 
(Europass).
 36 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
the establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning, OJ C 
111, 6.5.2008, p. 1– 7. The eqf constitutes a European reference framework, consisting of 8 
levels, based on “learning outcomes”.
 37 The Diploma Supplement is a European administrative annex to diplomas, which has 
been elaborated jointly by a working group of the European Commission, Council of 
Europe and unesco.
 38 Court of Justice, judgment of 31 March 1993, case C- 19/ 92, Dieter Kraus v.  Land Baden- 
Württemberg. The non- recognition on equal terms of secondary school qualifications was 
considered a restriction of Arts. 18 and 21 tfeu on equal treatment of EU citizens, in 
Court of Justice, Judgments of 1 July 2004, 7 July 2005 and 13 April 2010 in cases C- 65/ 03, 
Commission v. Belgium, C- 147/ 03, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of 
Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2005:427 and Case C- 73/ 08, Nicolas Bressol and Others, Céline Chaverot 
and Others v. Gouvernement de la Communauté française.
 39 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 November 1989, case 379/ 87, Anita Groener v. Minister for 
Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee.
 40 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 September 2007, case C- 76/ 05, Herbert Schwarz, Marga 
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programmes and degrees in other Member States, and the diplomas they issue 
should in principle be recognized by that host Member State.41
Further relevant EU measures include the Student Residence Directives. Di-
rective 93/ 9642 granted students the right of residence in the Member State of 
study, but under the conditions of sufficient health insurance and sufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the host State’s social assistance 
schemes. This Directive was repealed by Directive 2004/ 3843 on the right of 
citizens to move and reside freely within EU territory. The Directive constitutes 
a consolidation and clarification of all the legislation on the right of entry and 
residence for Union citizens. As discussed above, it indicates specifically that 
host Member States are not required, prior to the acquisition of the permanent 
right of residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, including for vocation-
al training, in the form of grants or loans. Directive 2004/ 114 in turn concerns 
students from third countries. The rationale behind the Directive is to “pro-
mote Europe as a whole as a world centre of excellence for studies and voca-
tional training” by promoting the mobility of third- country nationals to the 
EU for the purpose of studies.44 The Directive distinguishes four categories of 
third- country nationals, namely students, school pupils, unpaid trainees and 
volunteers. The conditions for entry of students and pupils are that they have 
a valid travel document and, if minors, come with parental authorization, that 
they have sickness insurance and sufficient resources to cover their stay and 
that they have been accepted by a higher educational establishment or school.
A final important aspect of EU higher education is the European Research 
Area (era), for which the Lisbon Treaty introduced a legal basis in Article 
179(1) tfeu.45 According to the text of Article 179 feu, this area is characterized 
 41 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 November 2003, case C- 153/ 02, Valentina Neri v. European 
School of Economics.
 42 Council Directive 93/ 96/ EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, OJ 
L 317, 18.12.1993.
 43 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 44 Preamble (para. 14)  of Directive (EU) 2016/ 801 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third- country nationals 
for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes 
or educational projects and au pairing, OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 21– 57.
 45 The European Research Area was initiated by the Commission in 2000, com(2000) 6 













by increased mobility of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology, 
and increased “competitiveness” of the European research sector. This is to 
be achieved by collaboration among the various actors engaged in research, 
both private and public; through the use of the internal market freedoms; and 
through the definition of common standards, for which Article 182(5) tfeu 
provides a legal basis prescribing the ordinary legislative procedure. In 2010, 
the European Council indicated its intention to have “the European Research 
Area completed by 2014 to create a genuine single market for knowledge, re-
search and innovation”.46 That declaration also indicated mobility as a priority, 
noting that:  “[i] n particular, efforts should be made to improve the mobility 
and career prospects of researchers, the mobility of graduate students and the 
attractiveness of Europe for foreign researchers”.47 Researchers can, in prin-
ciple, qualify as “workers” in the sense of Article 45 tfeu when they perform 
services under direction in return for remuneration,48 but when they carry out 
their activities on the basis of a grant rather than a traditional salary, these 
conditions may not be met.49 Several further obstacles tend to hamper mobil-
ity: many vacancies are not (internationally) openly accessible, many jobs in 
this sector still require (at least some degree of) knowledge of the national lan-
guage; and social security provisions for researchers are highly heterogeneous 
and transferability of entitlements is troublesome.
Facing these challenges, the EU has adopted various policy measures. In 
2005, the European Commission adopted a European Charter for Research-
ers and a Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers.50 For the pur-
pose of open, transparent and merit- based recruitment, the EU created the 
EURAXESS Jobs Portal,51 the use of which is uneven but growing.52 In 2014, 
RESAVER was launched. This is a single European pension arrangement of-
fering a defined contribution plan, tailor- made for research organisations 
and their employees, to enable mobile and non- mobile employees to remain 
affiliated to the same pension vehicle when moving countries and changing 
 46 euco 2/ 1/ 11 rev of 8 March 2010.
 47 Ibid.
 48 See Court of Justice, judgment of 17 July 2008, case C- 94/ 07, Andrea Raccanelli v Max- 
Planck- Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV.
 49 Ibid.
 50 Commission Recommendation of 11 March 2005 on the European Charter for Researchers 
and on a Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers, OJ L 75, 22.3.2005, p. 67– 77.
 51 http:// ec.europa.eu/ euraxess/ .
 52 About 47 % of researcher job postings in 2014 with 7.8% compound annual growth rate 
in the period 2012– 2014 in the EU. European Commission (2016). European Research Area 
Progress Report 2016, swd (2017)21, available at:  http:// ec.europa.eu/ research/ era/ pdf/ 
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jobs.53 Furthermore, the European Research Council (erc), which was estab-
lished in its current form in 2007,54 has had significant success in ‘opening 
up’ research activities to competition at European level. As von Bogdandy 
notes: “[t] he success rate in obtaining funding from one of its programs is per-
haps the most visible instrument for an intra- European comparison regarding 
the attractiveness and capability of the research institutions of the member 
states”.55 Indeed, for many the most tangible element of the era is the funding 
for research it provides under Horizon 2020, which amounts to 8 billion euro.
The era and ehea have very different legal statuses from an EU law per-
spective. The era is firmly based in the Treaties and the EU’s institutional set-
ting, while as mentioned the ehea is a feature of “public international soft 
law”.56 Still, there is a “substantial degree of resemblance in terms of scope, 
governance and working methods, actors and activity types”.57 There is also a 
certain alignment in overall political orientation, as both aim to increase com-
petition and introduce market mechanisms in the higher education sector.58 
The fact that such sensitive decisions are taken through soft law processes, im-
plying a certain accountability deficit, has met with some criticism.59
iii The UK and European Higher Education Law and Policy
1 The UK and the Bologna Process
Whereas at the end of the last century, other European countries were strug-
gling with the faltering influence and standing of their once so glorious 
 53 See European Commission (2014). New pan- European pension fund to boost researcher 
mobility, available at http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ IP- 14- 1063_ en.htm and http:// 
www.resaver.eu.
 54 Commission Decision of 17 February 2015 amending Decision C(2013) 8915 establishing 
the European Research Council, OJ C 58, 18.2.2015, p. 3– 5.
 55 Von Bogdandy, A.  (2012). National legal scholarship in the European Legal Area  – 
A Manifesto. International Journal of Constitutional Law 10 (3), pp. 614– 626.
 56 Hackl, E. (2001). Towards a European Area of Higher Education, cit, p. 28.
 57 Van der Hijden, P. (2012). Mobility Key to the EHEA and ERA. In: Curaj et al, eds., European 
Higher Education at the Crossroads:  Between the Bologna Process and National Reforms. 
Dordrecht: Springer, p. 378.
 58 See Garben, S. (2010). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy: Commercialisation of 
Higher Education through the Back Door?. Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 
6 (6), pp. 209– 230.
 59 Ibid. See also Gideon, A.  (2015). The Position of Higher Education Institutions in a 
Changing European Context: An EU Law Perspective. Journal of Common Market Studies 


















universities, and accordingly with the decreasing attractiveness of their higher 
education systems,60 the only problem the UK had in attracting foreign stu-
dents was that there were too many applicants from all over the world eager 
to study at the UK’s universities, because of their world- class reputation and 
because of the opportunity for students to develop their English- language 
skills.61 Accordingly, “the UK’s strong position in European higher education 
raises questions about why it needs to be involved in the Bologna Process, what 
it has to gain, and why the UK should help other countries in the ehea to 
modernise if that is going to risk its competitive advantage”.62 For indeed, the 
model towards which convergence was directed in the Sorbonne and Bologna 
Declarations closely resembles the UK Bachelor- Master system, which could 
have meant that other countries would copy precisely the aspects of the UK’s 
higher- education system that are considered to be responsible for its success. 
That would risk diminishing the UK’s advantageous position, without any ad-
ditional benefits for the UK itself. Why indeed then, one could ask, is the UK 
one of the four founding members of the Bologna Process?
The initiative for the Bologna Declaration surely came from the French, Ital-
ian and German ministers more than from its fourth signatory, the UK junior 
minister Baroness Tessa Blackstone. The other three ministers already knew 
each other and had been discussing some of the issues already well before the 
Sorbonne event.63 Hoareau reports that only “once France, Germany and Ita-
ly had agreed on the principle of a reform of degrees establishing an under-
graduate degree of three years, and two postgraduate levels in two and eight 
years” they “contacted the British minister”.64 The three initiators were well 
aware that for the Declaration to have an optimum impact they needed the 
 60 See for extensive discussion Garben, S. (2014). EU Higher Education Law, cit.
 61 Furlong, P.  (2005). British Higher Education and the Bologna Process:  An Interim 
Assessment. Politics 25 (1), pp. 53– 61.
 62 House of Commons, Education and Skills Committee (2007). The Bologna Process, Fourth 
Report of Session 2006– 7, 6.
 63 The three ministers from France, Germany and Italy had “come to know and esteem one 
another in the context of a virtually unknown international organization, sometimes 
called the “G8 of research”, the largely informal grouping of the ministers for research in 
the key industrialized countries of the world established by the Carnegie Commission 
on Science, Technology and Government”. Tessa Blackstone, as a junior minister, was not 
in charge of research and had therefore not been a part of these conferences. Schriewer, 
J.  (2009). Rationalized Myths in European Higher Education:  The Construction and 
Diffusion of the Bologna Model. European Education 41 (2), pp. 31– 51.
 64 Hoareau, C.  (2009). Consequential Deliberative Governance? Analysing the Impact of 
Deliberation on Attitudinal and Policy Change in the European Higher Education Area. 
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UK onboard “in light of the political clout the UK has as one of the “larger” 
EU Member States”.65 Blackstone agreed to participate, probably because of 
the idea that the Bologna Process only proposed convergence towards the UK 
model. Indeed, Blackstone stated that signing the Sorbonne Declaration “was 
a riskier action”66 for the other three signatories than for her: “They were com-
mitting their own systems of higher education to much greater change than 
I. The Anglo- Saxon model that was proposed that day in May 1998 was essen-
tially the one that prevailed in the United Kingdom as well as North America. 
We in Britain had to make relatively few adaptations. In France, Germany and 
Italy more change was required following the Declaration”.67
Together with this idea that no reforms would be required, it was import-
ant for Blackstone that the project would be a strictly intergovernmental one, 
without any binding agreement, and for that reason she was keen to keep the 
EU and the European Commission out.
It is reported that when Blackstone returned from the Sorbonne meeting, 
she did face some “criticism for signing something so “European” as a declara-
tion on a common European Higher Education Area”.68 But contrary to what 
one might expect, it seems that there was no real controversy or even a heated 
public debate about the UK’s participation in (creating) the ehea. Blackstone’s 
justification for her signature, stressing that the agreement only implied that 
Britain’s system would be introduced elsewhere,69 was apparently convincing 
enough. The government, the higher education sector and the public were 
all more or less on the same side, because the UK government did not have 
an agenda to participate in the Bologna Process to push national reforms in 
the same sense many of the governments of the other participating countries 
had.70 In contrast to the governmental rhetoric in those other countries, UK 
officials were eager to water down the importance of the Declaration, stressing 
that no reforms would be necessary as the UK was the model country any-
way. Indeed, its higher education sector was not subjected to the massive and 
sometimes painful reorganizations that their colleagues on mainland Europe 
 65 Schriewer, J. (2009). Rationalized Myths in European Higher Education: The Construction 
and Diffusion of the Bologna Model, cit, p. 37.
 66 Blackstone T., Education and Training in the Europe of Knowledge, link no longer available.
 67 Ibid.
 68 Martens, K.  and Wolf, K.  (2009) Boomerangs and Trojan Horses:  The Unintended 
Consequences of Internationalizing Education Policy through in the EU and the OECD. 
In: Amaral et al, eds., European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and 
Research. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 81et seq.
 69 Ibid.














faced in the wake of Bologna. This might have contributed to the fact the UK 
reaction mainly consisted of “complacency, based on the view that much of 
this amounts to catch- up by other European countries”71 combined with a sort 
of indifference to Bologna’s ins and outs.
This is not to say that the UK was not actively involved in the Process from 
the beginning. Seminars and meetings were organized on a relatively frequent 
basis already a few years after the signing of the Declarations. The national 
Quality Assurance Agency launched a national framework for higher educa-
tion qualifications “with careful descriptions of bachelors and master’s degree 
qualifications” in 2000.72 In 2003, the UK Government ratified the Lisbon Rec-
ognition Convention, a key Bologna aim. A survey of UK higher education in-
stitutions by the Europe Unit in 2005 indicated considerable awareness and 
engagement with the Bologna Process among those institutions. However, it 
can be said that it was only in 2006, when the House of Commons Education 
and Skills Committee launched an inquiry focusing on Bologna that any kind 
of substantive debate really materialized. The inquiry was undertaken in the 
immediate run- up to the Bologna Process’ London Ministerial Summit of May 
2007 “in order to facilitate broad discussion of the UK position” “with the in-
tention of making a constructive contribution to the negotiations at the 2007 
Summit and beyond”.73 The Report thoroughly addressed the question why the 
UK should participate, because “as a European leader in higher education, the 
benefits of engagement in the Bologna Process might not be as immediately 
obvious for the UK as they are for other signatory countries in the ehea”.74 As 
a minimum case for membership, it was argued that in the rapidly developing 
global market for higher education, the UK could simply not afford not to be 
involved. “The modernization of European higher education would continue 
to take place regardless of UK involvement and could have implications for 
the recognition of UK courses and competitive position”.75 It would therefore 
be better to participate and attempt to influence and steer the Process from 
the inside.76 The Report made it clear that a sense of complacency had to be 
 71 Furlong, P.  (2005). British Higher Education and the Bologna Process:  An Interim 
Assessment, cit, p. 60.
 72 Cowen, R. (2008). The Bologna Process and Higher Education in England. In: Palomba, 
ed., Changing Universities in Europe and the ‘Bologna Process’. Comparative Education 
Studies, p. 58.
 73 House of Commons Education and Skills Committee (2007). The Bologna Process cit, p. 3.
 74 Ibid, p. 25.
 75 Ibid.
 76 In the words of a UK Minister: “The problem is that they [mainland Europe] will get on 
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avoided, and identified the pressure that the convergence process put on the 
UK’s higher education system. The competitive advantage in attracting over-
seas students, traditionally a particular focus of the UK, could be reduced if 
“comparability and compatibility would develop apace across the ehea with-
out efforts from the UK to keep up”.
Beyond the minimum case for membership, the Report identified some 
significant benefits for the UK in active Bologna participation. The Commit-
tee found government and the organizations representing higher education 
to agree about such advantages, supported by student organizations as well 
as university leaders and academic staff involved in implementing the Bolo-
gna principles and action lines in practice. Engagement in the Process could 
be economically beneficial, through increased employment and productivity. 
Furthermore, involvement could increase the competitiveness of the UK high-
er education sector through promoting the attractiveness and international 
reputation of the ehea at large. In addition, the Report pointed out that UK 
students could profit from increased mobility and employment opportunities. 
With regard to UK universities, active Bologna membership could guarantee 
an increased market for both EU and international students within the ehea, 
increased mobility of staff, sharing of best practice and expertise in a broad 
range of areas, and increased opportunities for research collaboration across 
the era. All these considerations led the Committee to conclude that there 
were not only significant dangers for the UK not to be actively involved in the 
Bologna Process, but that there were also some significant advantages to be 
gained from membership, with the Bologna action lines increasingly reflect-
ing the policy priorities in the UK. This settled the question of the desirability 
of the UK’s membership of the Bologna Process, almost ten years after it had 
helped create it.
2 The UK and EU Higher Education and Policy
In EU higher education law and policy, the UK equally occupies a privileged 
position. First and foremost, the UK and its higher education sector has been 
one of the main beneficiaries of the era. UK higher education institutions are 
highly successful in acquiring EU research funding, with the highest number 
exist, over time for some of our institutions, I think that could hit them competitively in 
that they have ended up in a situation where a system of comparability and compatibility 
is developed elsewhere in the broader Europe [and] we are not a part of it […] that is why 
I think the process is happening, we need to embrace it and we need to influence it in our 




of Horizon 2020 submissions obtaining the 2nd highest share of all funding, 
amounting to 15.2% of overall available funding (as well as benefitting indirect-
ly from funding allocated to their project partners from elsewhere in the EU).77 
It has been estimated that EU research funding generates more than 19,000 
jobs across the UK, £1.86 billion for the UK economy and contributes more 
than £1 billion to gdp, according to a report produced for Universities UK.78
As regards student mobility, as set out in Part ii.B above, EU law requires 
equal treatment in higher education as regards all access conditions, includ-
ing tuition fees, but allows a 5- year prior residence requirement to be applied 
for the purposes of maintenance support. While it is difficult to establish an 
accurate overall financial picture, it can be expected that EU law as it current-
ly stands thus plays out to the benefit of the UK system, which charges high 
tuition fees to all students (up to £9,250)79 and provides its main subsidies to 
individual students through maintenance grants and loans. Of course, EU law 
prevents the UK from charging higher tuition fees to foreign EU students than 
it charges national students and, considering the UK’s status as the biggest net- 
importer of students in the EU, this implies an opportunity cost. On the other 
hand, if the UK were in fact to charge higher tuition fees, it could be projected 
that fewer EU students would come. In any event, compared to Member States 
that do not charge any, or only low, tuition, the UK is required to pay less in 
regard to foreign students. Furthermore, UK students can, of course, benefit 
from other Member States’ more ‘generous’ education systems.
It may even be that the UK has a net financial benefit per foreign EU student. 
EU students will only be entitled to undergraduate tuition fee loans, to cover 
their ± £9000 yearly fees, which will have to be repaid. Only if they become 
permanent residents after 5 years of legal stay in the UK, can they apply for 
undergraduate maintenance support.80 As the loan is on ‘friendly conditions’ 
and not all is always paid back, this of course can still be estimated to come at 
 77 European Commission (2018). Horizon 2020 in Full Swing, Key Facts and Figures 2014 – 2016. 
Luxembourg : Publications Office of the European Union available at https:// ec.europa.
eu/ programmes/ horizon2020/ sites/ horizon2020/ files/ h2020_ threeyearson_ a4_ horizon-
tal_ 2018_ web.pdf.
 78 Kelly, U.  (2016). Economic Impact on the UK of EU Research Funding to UK Universities, 
available at:  https:// www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/ policy- and- analysis/ reports/ Documents/ 
2016/ economic- impact- of- eu- research- funding- in- uk- universities.pdf.
 79 The cost of studying at a university in the UK (2017). Times Higher Education, 
December 1, available at:  https:// www.timeshighereducation.com/ student/ advice/ cost-  
studying- university- uk.
 80 Students with 3 years prior residence, but not for the main purpose of receiving full- time 
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some cost to the UK taxpayer.81 However, the EU student also spends money 
in the UK on various living costs such as accommodation, food and general 
consumption, meaning that on balance this could be projected to break even 
for the UK economy as a whole. As to the financial position of the universities 
themselves, while some are claiming that a student costs a university £16.000 
a year,82 there is no transparency concerning the calculations on which these 
figures are based.83 It is possible that in the average cost of a student to the in-
stitution, universities calculate their various bursary and scholarship schemes 
which may in fact not always be accessible to EU students. This means that EU 
students may in certain cases be financing UK students at UK universities. In 
any event, all these calculations are of course apart from the less calculable 
but highly valuable knowledge the EU students bring to UK classrooms, the 
internationalization that adds to the overall competitiveness of the sector and 
other more intangible benefits to the UK economy and society at large.
If it is indeed considered that importing EU students provides the UK and 
its universities with significant benefits, it must thank the Court of Justice for 
its interpretation of EU law that made studying abroad so attractive even be-
fore the Bologna Process. Beyond access conditions and fees, it is the ‘outcome’ 
of studying that is of major interest to students. The leading case of Kraus84 
illustrates this well. The German student Dieter Kraus studied law in Germany 
and passed the first State examination in law in 1986. In 1988 he obtained the 
university degree of Master of Laws (LL.M) following postgraduate study at the 
University of Edinburgh in the UK. In 1989 Mr Kraus sent a copy of his LL.M 
degree certificate from the University of Edinburgh to the Ministry of Sciences 
and Arts of the Land Baden- Wuerttemberg, requesting confirmation that, hav-
ing done so, there was nothing further to prevent him from using his title in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The Ministry replied that his request could be 
allowed only if he made a formal application for the authorization prescribed 
 81 For the highly complex calculations that could be made in this regard, see: Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (2014). Estimating the Public Cost of Student Loans, available at: https:// 
www.ifs.org.uk/ comms/ r94.pdf.
 82 Garner, O. (2013). We Need Tuition Fees of Up to £16,000, Says Oxford Vice- Chancellor 
Professor Andrew Hamilton. The Independent, October 9, available at: https:// www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/ student/ news/ we- need- tuition- fees- of- up- to- 16000- says- oxford- vice- 
chancellor- professor- andrew- hamilton- 8867323.html.
 83 Oxford Teaching and the £16K Question – How Does the University Calculate the Real 
Cost of Undergraduate Education? Times Higher Education, available at:  https:// www.
timeshighereducation.com/ news/ oxford- teaching- and- the- 16k- question/ 2008179.article.











for the purpose by German law, using the appropriate form and attaching to it 
a certified copy of the diploma in question. Mr Kraus subsequently sent a cer-
tified copy of his Edinburgh degree, but refused to submit a formal application 
for authorization on the ground that the requirement for such an authoriza-
tion prior to the use of an academic title awarded in another Member State 
constituted an obstacle to the free movement of persons and also discrimina-
tion, both prohibited by EU law, since no such authorization was required for 
the use of a diploma awarded by a German establishment.
The Court of Justice considered that the freedom of movement for workers 
and freedom of establishment were hampered by a lack of academic diploma 
recognition, since the possession of an academic title constitutes “an advan-
tage for the purpose both of gaining entry to such a profession and of pros-
pering in it”, improving “its holder’s chances of appointment” and may lead to 
“higher remuneration or more rapid advancement or […] access to certain spe-
cific posts reserved to persons with particularly high qualifications”, and since 
“the possibility of using academic titles awarded abroad and supplementing 
national diplomas required for access to a profession greatly facilitates estab-
lishment as an independent practitioner and, in any event, the pursuit of a 
corresponding professional activity”.85 While Member States are allowed to 
restrict these freedoms in the interest of preventing abuse of academic titles, 
any authorization procedure must be intended solely to verify whether the 
postgraduate academic title obtained in another Member State was properly 
awarded, following a course of studies which was actually completed, in an 
establishment of higher education which was competent to award it.86 The 
procedure must be easy of access and should not be excessively expensive.87 
Any refusal of authorization must be capable of being subject to judicial pro-
ceedings in which its legality under EU law can be reviewed and that the per-
son concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken 
with respect to him.88 Finally, whilst the national authorities are entitled to 
prescribe penalties for non- compliance with the authorization procedure, the 
penalties imposed should not exceed what appears proportionate to the of-
fence committed.89 As this provides important guarantees to any mobile stu-
dent, this case law can be considered as instrumental to student mobility as 
the well- known Gravier doctrine.
 85 Paragraphs 18 – 23 of the judgment.
 86 Paragraph 38 of the judgment.
 87 Paragraph 39 of the judgment.
 88 Paragraph 40 of the judgment.
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Another leading diploma recognition case similarly shows how UK higher 
education institutions benefit from EU mobility rights, in an even more direct 
sense. Universities themselves can rely on the freedom to provide services and 
the freedom of establishment to offer for- profit education in other EU Mem-
ber States. This reportedly comprises 13% of the UK higher education’s sector’s 
“transnational education” activities, which are an important profit- yielding 
part of its higher education model.90 Ms Neri91 enrolled at Nottingham Trent 
University (“ntu”) with a view to acquiring a BA Honours degree in Interna-
tional Political Studies on completion of a four- year course of studies. Not-
tingham Trent University is a university subject to UK legislation included in 
the list of bodies authorised to award BA honours degrees having legal status. 
While Nottingham Trent University generally administers its courses of study 
at its establishment in the UK, where final degrees are awarded, it also provides 
for an ‘outsourced’ system in accordance with Article 216 of the Education 
Reform Act 1988. Under Article 216 of the Education Reform Act, the Secre-
tary of State approves a list of bodies who may provide any course which is in 
preparation for a degree to be granted by a recognised body and is approved 
by or on behalf of the recognised body, which includes the European School 
of Economics (ese). The ese is thus a Higher Education College authorised 
according to the UK educational system to organise and provide the univer-
sity courses of study approved by ntu. It is incorporated as a limited liability 
company, established in the UK with a number of secondary establishments 
in other Member States, having 12 branches in Italy. ese does not award its 
own degrees but for remuneration organises courses for the students enrolled 
with ntu in accordance with study plans validated by that university, which 
then awards a final degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours. The quality of 
the courses of study provided by ese is also subject to audit by the UK Quality 
Assurance Agency for Higher Education.
In view of the high financial cost attendant on residence in the UK for the 
entire duration of her studies, Ms Neri decided to attend university courses in 
Italy at ese. Having enrolled for the first year of the course of studies held by 
ese in Genoa, she learned from authoritative Italian sources that ese was not 
authorised to organise university- level courses and that recognition could not 
be granted to the university’s degrees, albeit legally recognised in the United 
 90 Boe, L., The Scale of UK Higher Education Transnational Education 2015– 16. Universities 
UK International available at: https:// www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/ International/ Documents/ 
The%20Scale%20of%20UK%20HE%20TNE%202015– 16.pdf.






Kingdom, if they had been obtained on the basis of periods of study completed 
in Italy. On this basis, Ms. Neri brought a case that was referred to the Court of 
Justice. The Court considered that the organisation for remuneration of uni-
versity courses is an economic activity falling within the chapter of the Treaty 
dealing with the right of establishment and that “for an institution like ese, 
which organises courses intended to enable its students to obtain degrees ca-
pable of facilitating their access to the employment market, the recognition 
of those degrees by the authorities of a Member State is of considerable im-
portance”.92 The Court held that it was clear that the Italian administrative 
practice, under which certain degrees awarded at the end of a university train-
ing course given by ese are not recognised in Italy, is likely to deter students 
from attending these courses and thus seriously hinder the pursuit by ese of 
its economic activity in that Member State. The Italian Government consid-
ered that restriction justified by the need to ensure high standards of univer-
sity education. It maintained that the Italian legal order did not accept agree-
ments such as the one between ese and Nottingham Trent University since it 
remains attached to a view of such education as a matter of public interest, 
expressing as it does the cultural and historical values of the State. According 
to the Italian Government, such an agreement on university education pre-
vents direct quality control of these private bodies by the competent authori-
ties both in the Member State of origin and the host Member State. The Court 
however held that “given that the Italian legal order appears to allow, pursuant 
to Article 8(1) of Law No 341/ 90, agreements between Italian universities and 
other Italian establishments of higher education which are comparable to the 
agreement entered into between ntu and ese” and since the non- recognition 
of degrees in question appeared to relate solely to degrees awarded to Italian 
nationals, the administrative practice did not appear suitable for attaining the 
objective of ensuring high standards of university education. Furthermore, the 
administrative practice was disproportionate, since it appeared “to preclude 
any examination by the national authorities and, consequently, any possibil-
ity of recognition of degrees awarded in circumstances like those in the main 
proceedings”.93 Thus, the upshot of the judgment is that while Member States 
may under circumstances limit the activities of for- profit higher education in-
stitutions on their territory, this is by way of exception to the internal market 
freedoms and therefore will have to comply with high standards of proportion-
ality. As the facts of this case also clearly show, these provisions of EU law, as 
 92 Paragraph 42 of the judgment.
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interpreted by the Court, are of particular benefit to the UK higher education 
system and its institutions.
iv The Implications of, and on, Brexit
The exact implications of ‘Brexit’, are of course difficult to predict, especially 
as everything hinges on the specific conditions of the (various?) agreement(s) 
that the UK and the EU may conclude, if any, as well as complex and vola-
tile political dynamics. Even in the case of a ‘hard Brexit’, the future may see 
subject- specific cooperation agreements, which could very well include the 
area of higher education, where non- EU Member States regularly participate 
in various EU policies.94 Then again, even the ‘softest’ of Brexits may have pro-
found implications for UK and European higher education, particularly if it 
were to in any way dilute mobility rights or re- organize research funding. These 
considerations thus limit the predictive effect of anything we may project or 
conclude in this chapter. It can nevertheless be insightful, and hopefully some-
how useful, to reflect on how the underlying dynamics in the area of higher 
education, as explored in the previous parts of this chapter may be affected 
by – and themselves affect – the UK’s secession from the Union. The previous 
analysis has exposed a number of relevant ‘stakes’ and ‘pressure points’ when 
it comes to European higher education and the UK’s position in it, which are 
likely to come to the fore in the Brexit negotiations and afterwards, in post- 
Brexit Europe, in respect of the area of higher education.
As regards the ehea, it can firstly be presumed that the UK will remain 
party to it post- Brexit, as participation to the Bologna Process is entirely inde-
pendent from EU membership. The Process is voluntary, so there is no reason 
to fear any loss of sovereignty, and in its post- Brexit isolation, this may par 
excellence be one of the remaining forums within which the UK can still seek 
to ‘lean in’ on international affairs. In this respect, it is interesting to recall the 
comments made by a UK Minister in relation to UK participation in Bologna:
The problem is that they [mainland Europe] will get on with it, they will 
continue with this process and, given the competitive pressures that ex-
ist, over time for some of our institutions, I  think that could hit them 
competitively in that they have ended up in a situation where a system of 
comparability and compatibility is developed elsewhere in the broader 





Europe [and] we are not a part of it […] that is why I think the process 
is happening, we need to embrace it and we need to influence it in our 
national interest.95
These remarks have some additional poignancy, as they can be read to be 
about EU membership in general as much as about Bologna participation. 
They clearly show the stakes on the side of the UK: how to maintain influence 
international decision- making and the capacity to pursue the national inter-
est, especially considering economic competitive forces, while being excluded 
from the most important decision- making forum?
As such, it would not be wholly unexpected for the UK to seek to actually 
increase the standing and broaden the material scope of the Bologna Process, 
possibly ‘pulling’ as much as it can away from the EU in this area, thereby 
hoping to represent its interests (particularly the interest of its higher educa-
tion sector, and the public purse) and achieve its policy objectives concern-
ing student mobility, diploma recognition and perhaps even research fund-
ing somehow within this purely intergovernmental project in which it can be 
expected to remain a full and influential member. Such would be a strategic 
course of action for the UK, considering that as we have seen in the previous 
sections, much of the Bologna Process depends, in reality, on EU law to give 
actual effect to it. It is EU law that grants hard and enforceable rights to in-
dividual students, teachers and higher education institutions, that make the 
(proclaimed virtues of the) ehea from a paper tiger into a tangible reality. It 
would thus be rational for the UK to try and pry as much of that away from 
the EU as possible, or in any event to try and reach comparable outcomes in 
the context of Bologna. Clearly, it remains to be seen whether it will have any 
success in this regard. As was reported in Part ii.1. above, the UK was able to 
exclude the EU from Bologna, particularly as it found support in this from 
a number of other (larger) EU Member States. On the other hand, smaller 
Member States were less keen on this intergovernmentalism, as it exposes 
them to the more traditional international power- play against which the 
EU is, in many ways, a bulwark.96 Especially these countries are not likely 
to agree to (further) exchange the EU- forum for education law and policy 
making for the Bologna one. And in the post- Brexit climate, other larger EU 
Member States may be much less favourable towards the UK, its economic 
 95 See House of Commons Education and Skills Committee (2007). The Bologna Process, 
cit, p. 25.
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interests, and thus any of its attempts to assert Bologna over the EU decision- 
making process.
Whether there will be any such overt clashes of course remains to be seen. 
Overall, it should be emphasized that the policy- discourse of Bologna and 
of EU higher education policy have been very much in line. Both have been 
championing an Anglo- Saxon ‘liberal’ model of higher education, in which 
education is conceptualized mainly in economic terms, as self- investment 
and market- driven, as opposed to the social model of higher education that 
sees it as a social entitlement for all citizens and a responsibility of the state.97 
Within the former model, one would tend to see more involvement of private 
and for- profit actors, deregulation, the establishment of quasi- markets and 
of public- private partnerships, and more generally an instrumental, labour 
market approach to higher education. The latter model instead tends to make 
state involvement central, will be focused on widening access to higher educa-
tion, and may emphasize the citizenship- role of education and the pursuit of 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Within the Bologna Process, the preference 
for the former, ‘liberal’ model can be seen in its emphasis on ‘employability’ of 
graduates, which is operationalized through its requirement that the BA de-
gree has ‘labour market value’ (whereas before, in most continental European 
countries, an MA equivalent was usually needed for such labour market recog-
nition), and, even more importantly in practice, through its quality assurance 
processes. In national accreditation procedures, which higher education insti-
tutions often need to follow to be authorized to award degrees under national 
(but often Bologna- inspired) law, the Bologna- ‘requirements’ on ‘employabil-
ity’ are given real teeth, and it is here that much of the influential ‘steer’ hap-
pens: universities are forced to show how their programmes (aim to) guarantee 
certain economic, labour market- outcomes, for otherwise they may jeopardize 
their very existence.
Within an EU context, analysis in Part iii.2. has shown how EU law tends 
to play out to the favour of a liberal model such as the UK’s, and that it puts a 
higher burden on more social models that tend to subsidize higher education 
through open and free (or low- tuition) access. Furthermore, in recent years 
one of the most important sources of EU involvement in higher education is 
through its yearly cycle of economic policy coordination: the European Semes-
ter, where education is explicitly considered as a factor of economic stability 
and growth. The Country Specific Recommendations (csr s) are predomi-
nantly concerned with the ‘cost- effectiveness’ and ‘employability’ of Member 
 97 See also Garben, S. (2010). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy, cit. 
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States’ education systems. For instance, Denmark has been told that “[c] ontin-
ued efforts are […] needed to improve the quality and cost- effectiveness of its 
education and training systems”,98 Estonia to “[l]ink training and education 
more effectively to the needs of the labour market”99 and Malta that it should 
“focus education outcomes more on labour market needs”.100 The csr s can be 
remarkably detailed and specific on the required reforms concerning various 
aspects of national education systems.101 For example, the Commission’s pro-
posed csr s in 2017 for Croatia states: “Since 2015, as part of the implementa-
tion of the education, science and technology strategy, a reform of the school 
curricula was launched to improve on content and teaching of transferable 
skills. After ambivalent stakeholder reactions, the curricular reform was re-
vised, and implementation has been significantly delayed. The process now 
needs to continue in line with the original objectives”.102 Furthermore, the 
csr s reflect a clear policy to increase the involvement of the private sector in 
higher education and to make the funding of higher education ‘competitive’. 
In this vein, for instance, Bulgaria has been given the recommendation that 
“frameworks fostering collaboration between universities and the private sec-
tor have to be further developed, and funding should be allocated in a competi-
tive, merit- based and transparent way”, and to “pursue the reform of higher ed-
ucation, in particular through better aligning outcomes to labour market needs 
and strengthening cooperation between education, research and business”,103 
 98 Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National Reform Programme 2013 of 
Denmark and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Denmark, 
2013– 2016, OJ C 217, 30.7.2013, p. 18– 20, para. 12.
 99 Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 2012 of 
Estonia and delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability Programme of Estonia, 2012– 15, 
OJ C 219, 24.7.2012, 25 – 27, para. 14.
 100 Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National Reform Programme 2011 of 
Malta and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability Programme of Malta 
2011– 2014, OJ C 215, 21.7.2011, p. 10– 12, point 3.
 101 This could be said to sit uncomfortably with the national autonomy clause in Article 
165(1) tfeu that EU action should fully respect the responsibility of the Member States 
for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems.
 102 European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 
National Reform Programme of Croatia and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 
Convergence Programme of Croatia, COM/ 2017/ 0510 final.
 103 Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 2012 
of Bulgaria and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of 
Bulgaria,2012– 15, para. 16, OJ C 219, 24.7.2012, 9 – 12, and Council Recommendation of 9 
July 2013 on the National Reform Programme 2013 of Bulgaria and delivering a Council 
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Estonia to “enhance cooperation between businesses and academia”,104 and 
Italy to address the “underperformance of the tertiary education system” inter 
alia by creating “a stronger link between universities’ performance and the al-
location of public funding”.105
All this means that the general direction of the discourse in the European-
isation of higher education, both in the context of the Bologna Process and 
the EU, is very much in line with the UK’s approach, and benefits its model of 
higher education and its economic stakes in that model. Brexit is unlikely, as 
such, to bring any fundamental changes in this regard.106 The extent to which 
the UK will be able to continue to directly benefit from this development of 
continental higher education into a market- model like its own, is however like-
ly to change fundamentally with Brexit. As the analysis in Part iii.2. showed, 
UK higher education institutions rely heavily on EU law to be able to offer ser-
vices in other Member States and to be able to import talented students (the 
financial picture of which is unclear but which may, under the high tuition 
fee system, bring direct economic benefits to the universities as well as many 
indirect beneficial effects), and – through EU research grants – for the overall 
funding of its higher education and research and development sector(s). In 
this regard, the UK stands to lose more from Brexit than the other EU Member 
States:  EU students, teachers, researchers and higher education institutions 
will still have access to 27 higher education systems, and they can continue to 
create a fully effective internal higher education and research area, as well as 
an internal market for higher education. In fact, now that following the UK’s 
 104 Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 2012 of 
Estonia and delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability Programme of Estonia, 2012– 15, 
cit., para. 14.
 105 Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 2012 of Italy 
and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Italy, 2012– 2015, OJ C 219, 
24.7.2012, 46 – 49, para. 16.
 106 It has, however, been noted that in the context of allocation of European research fund-
ing, there have been “tensions between countries favouring competitive research fund-
ing and countries preferring a less competitive and more egalitarian system”. Alongside 
the Netherlands and Denmark, the UK has been the most important supporter of the 
competitive model. Without the UK at the table, this may change, which is a matter of 
concern for some stakeholders in the Netherlands and Denmark. See Courtois, A. (2018). 
Reconfiguring the European higher education sector. University World News June 22, 
available at https:// www.universityworldnews.com/ post.php?story=20180621101812552 
and the full report Courtois A., ed. (2018). Higher education and Brexit: current European 
perspectives. Centre for Global Higher Education, available at:  https:// www.researchc-









lead, EU Member States’ higher education systems have become each other’s 
competitors, there is much to gain from the UK’s weakening role, and some 
other Member States are indeed gearing up to take over from the UK as ‘EU 
leader in Higher Education’. Higher education may turn into one of Brexit’s 
major spoils.
These projected consequences of Brexit of course may influence the Brexit- 
process and negotiations themselves. EU higher education law and policy, with 
all its current benefits for the UK, is thus an important bargaining chip for the 
EU, both within the negotiations and potentially as leverage for the UK’s com-
pliance with its obligations under any future relationship. As such, the UK’s 
current strength in higher education is one of its weak spots in the Brexit nego-
tiations. The two key issues in this regard are on the one hand research funding 
under Horizon 2020, of which the UK is one of the main beneficiaries, and on 
the other hand the internal market freedoms and mobility rights connected to 
EU citizenship that foster the economic activities of the UK higher education 
sector. While the former could arguably be negotiated between the EU and the 
UK on an ad hoc basis, the latter is entirely dependent on the position of the 
UK in the internal market and will have to be part of any ‘big’ agreement on 
the future relationship between the EU and the UK. The UK may seek to use 
the Bologna Process as a ‘back door’ to pursue its key interests in this regard, 
but the potential effectiveness thereof is doubtful. It does, however, seem to 
be its most rational course of action, as it will need to seek alternative forums 
to ‘win friends and influence people’ once it has excluded itself from the most 
important forum to do so.
v Conclusion
The UK higher education sector is estimated to generate £95 billion for the 
UK economy each year. It is difficult to calculate the precise direct and indi-
rect negative impact on that lucrative sector in case Brexit would mean that 
the UK would have to give up EU research funding, student/ staff (and knock- 
on) mobility as well as UK transnational education, but it is likely to be sig-
nificant. While the overall policy- direction of European higher education is 
likely to continue, also post- Brexit, to champion the marketization of higher 
education along the lines of the Anglo- Saxon, liberal model, ironically it can 
be expected that the UK as a non- member of that growing internal market of 
higher education and research will be able to benefit less and less from it. At 
the risk of oversimplification, it could be said that the UK has first been instru-
mental and influential in creating a lucrative continental market for higher 
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education, and now it has excluded itself from that market, as well as from its 
position of influence. While, of course, also EU citizens are disadvantaged by a 
limitation of their mobility rights vis- à- vis the UK, they are in a better position 
to shift the focus to any of the other 27 Member States, who remain stronger 
together.
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 chapter 14
The Right to Participate in the European Elections 




The present book is, in part, dedicated to the federal division of competences 
in citizenship matters and the impact of EU Citizenship rights on the vertical 
division of powers in the EU. I would like to address here, more particularly, the 
right to participate in European elections and how the recent case- law on the 
subject may impact the distribution of competences between the European 
Union and the Member States.
As F. Fabbrini notes, “The concept of citizenship has been, since its mod-
ern reinvention, connected to the idea of political rights”. 1 This also applies 
to the European Union. EU citizenship is far from being a complete trans-
national status allowing each EU citizen to participate in all the national, 
regional and local elections in the country where they reside, and therefore 
“stands in sharp contrast to the situation in the United States, where the Cit-
izenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants U.S. citizens the cit-
izenship of the state in which they reside”.2 However, when EU citizenship 
was officially3 created in 1992, it came, for the first time, with an incipient 
status activus.
 * Professor of Public Law, University of Bordeaux. The present chapter has been last updated 
on the 15th July 2019.
 1 Fabbrini, F. (2017). The Political Side of EU Citizenship in the Context of EU Federalism. In: Ko-
chenov, D., ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and Federalism. The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 271.
 2 Shaw, J. (2007). E.U. Citizenship and Political Rights in an Evolving European Union. Ford-
ham Law Review 75 (5), pp. 2549– 2578, 2549.
 3 Several authors argue that citizenship already existed in substance, if not in texts, before the 
Maastricht Treaty. See for example Olsen, E. (2008). The origins of European citizenship in 
the first two decades of European integration. Journal of European Public Policy 15 (1), pp. 40– 
57, 42; and Closa, C.  (1992). The concept of Union citizenship in the Treaty on European 
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The right to vote and to run for the European elections predates de facto the 
creation of Union Citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, since the Mem-
bers of EU European Parliament have been elected by direct universal suffrage 
since 1976.4 However, the 1976 Act does not use the language of rights (“Elections 
shall be by direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret”). By contrast, 
Art. 20(2) and 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) 
provide that citizens of the EU enjoy, among others, the right to vote and to stand 
as candidates in elections of the European Parliament and in municipal elec-
tions in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nation-
als of that State. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty constitutionalised the political 
rights of EU Citizens, which as such was a novelty. In any case, the right for EU 
Citizens to participate in the municipal elections of the Member State where 
they reside was undeniably something new in 1992. These new rights therefore 
constitute major improvements for the rights of Union citizens.5
In 2009, when the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union 
came into force, these two Citizenship political rights became fundamental 
rights, enshrined in Art. 39 and 40. There is however a difference between 
the right to participate in municipal elections and the right to participate in 
European elections. Interestingly enough, the Court found that Art. 39 of the 
Charter not only contains a right to national treatment as regards European 
elections (just like Art. 40 contains a right to national treatment as regards 
municipal elections) but also an enforceable right to participate in European 
elections (ii). Furthermore, this right has a broad scope of application vis- à- vis 
Member States, since it is applicable to national electoral legislation, including 
in purely internal situations (iii). All this combined has the potential of blur-
ring the distribution of powers between the European Union and the Member 
States in the field of election law (iv). Having explored these issues, I will then 
briefly offer a conclusion (v).
ii An Enforceable Right to Participate in European Elections
Art. 39 Charter contains not only, in its first paragraph, the right of EU citizens 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of the European Parliament in 
 4 1976 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal 
suffrage, annexed to the Decision 76/ 787/ ECSC, EEC, Euratom of the representatives of the 
Member States meeting in the council relating to the Act concerning the election of the rep-
resentatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage.












the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State – which is also enshrined in Art. 20(2), b) and Art. 22(2) 
tfeu – but also, in its second paragraph, the more general principle according 
to which members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct uni-
versal suffrage in a free and secret ballot, which mirrors Art. 14(3) teu and Art. 
1(3) of the 1976 Act concerning the election of the members of the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage.
The first paragraph is a “simple” right to national treatment. This is notably 
apparent from the wording of Art. 20(2), b) and Art. 22(2) tfeu and Art. 39(1) 
of the EU Charter which all state that every citizen of the Union has the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of the European Parliament in 
the Member State in which he or she resides, “under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State”. This interpretation is confirmed by the case- law of the 
Court, which said in Eman and Sevigner6 and Spain v. UK7 that Art. 19(2) of the 
Treaty on the European Communities (EC), now Art. 22(2) tfeu, was confined 
to applying the principle of non- discrimination on grounds of nationality to 
the right to vote and stand for European elections. In this respect, it is similar 
to the right to participate in municipal elections, enshrined in Art. 20(2), b) 
and 22(1) tfeu and Art. 40 Charter.
The national treatment aspect of the political rights of EU citizens is con-
sistent with the concept of citizenship and strongly connected with the re-
quirement of equality between citizens.8 It has a strong normative potential 
to justify the abolition of all the remaining discriminations, limitations and 
inconsistencies affecting the political rights of EU citizens residing in oth-
er Member States.9 However, it only means that EU citizens can be treated 
as badly as the nationals of their State of residence as regards the European 
elections. It does not grant EU citizens, including nationals, an active right to 
participate in these elections, nor does it guarantee any minimum standard 
of treatment.
Despite the major breakthrough that was the decision to elect members 
of the European parliament at universal suffrage in terms of democracy and 
 6 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 300/ 04, Eman and Sevigner, 
para. 53.
 7 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 145/ 04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 
para. 66.
 8 See for example Lardy, H. (1996). The Political Rights of Union Citizenship. European Public 
Law 2, pp. 611– 633, 622.
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citizenship, EU legal texts are, surprisingly, rather limited as regards both the 
existence of a proper individual right of EU citizens to participate in the Eu-
ropean elections and the standards applicable thereto. All they say is that 
the members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal 
suffrage (since 1976)10 and that the elections shall be “free and secret” (since 
2002).11 These conditions are now also part of EU primary Law, in Art. 14(3) 
tfeu and Art. 39(2) of the Charter, which both provide that the members of 
the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free 
and secret ballot.
It is clear that these provisions create a legal obligation, for member States, 
to organise European elections under the prescribed conditions. However, be-
fore the Delvigne ruling in 2015,12 it was not clear whether such vague provi-
sions could be seen as granting a real, enforceable right to individuals. In 2006, 
the Court of Justice still considered, in Eman and Sevigner, that the provisions 
of (then) Part Two of the Treaty on the European Communities relating to cit-
izenship of the EU did not confer on citizens of the EU an unconditional right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of the European Parliament.13 
It is true that the circumstances of this case were specific, since it was about 
the right to participate in European elections in the Dutch island of Aruba. 
Aruba is one the overseas countries and territories14 which, according to Art. 
198 et seq. tfeu are not territorially part of the European Union but are as-
sociated with it. Therefore, finding the existence of a right to participate in 
European elections would not have been very useful for this case since it could 
not have been assumed that this right was applicable in Aruba. However, the 
statement of the Court regarding the absence, in general, of an individual right 
to participate in European elections under EU law contrasts with the opinion 
of Advocate- General Tizzano in this case and in Spain v. UK. In his opinion, AG 
Tizzano clearly stated that he believed that EU citizens did have a right to vote 
in European elections under EU Law.15 By contrast, the existence of an individ-
ual right to vote, under EU Law, for citizens of the EU in European elections has 
 10 Art. 1 of the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct 
universal suffrage.
 11 Art. 1(2) of the Council Decision of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 amending the 
Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/ 787/ ECSC, eec, Euratom.
 12 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2015, case C- 650/ 13, Delvigne.
 13 Para. 52.
 14 See Annex ii to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.














been explicitly denied by certain national courts, notably the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom.16
It was only in Delvigne that the Court of Justice explicitly found that such 
a right existed under EU Law. The case was about a French national who had 
lost his civic rights due to his conviction for a serious crime with a 12- year pris-
on sentence. Now a free man, Mr Delvigne went to challenge the decision of 
the competent administrative body to remove him from the electoral roll of 
the municipality where he resided. The local court referred the matter to the 
Court of justice. It found that the fact that Mr Delvigne had been deprived 
of the right to vote under national legislation was a limitation of his right to 
participate in the European elections implicitly guaranteed by Art. 39(2) of the 
Charter. However, the Court also found that this limitation 1) was provided for 
by law, 2) respected the essence of the right to vote referred to in Art. 39(2) of 
the Charter and 3) was proportionate.
Despite the fact that the Court found, in this case, that there was no viola-
tion of EU Law, which has disappointed some commentators,17 this ruling is 
noteworthy for the statement that Art. 39(2) of the Charter “constitutes the 
expression in the Charter of the right of Union citizens to vote in elections of 
the European Parliament”, confirming J. Shaw’s analysis that “we have moved 
from the sole site of contestation of these rights being within and across the 
European political institutions and the Member States to a situation where 
courts are likely to be increasingly involved in deliberating about the scope 
and nature of those rights”.18
In this finding, the Court was probably inspired by the case- law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights on Art. 3 of the Protocol n° 1 to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. According to this provision, “The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, 
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature”. This wording seems not to result in 
individual rights and freedoms but solely obligations between Parties.19 In the 
 16 R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice & McGeoch (AP) v The Lord 
President of the Council and another (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63.
 17 Van Eijken, H. and Van Rossem, J. W. (2016). Prisoner Disenfranchisement and the Right 
to Vote in Elections to the European Parliament:  Universal Suffrage Key to Unlocking 
Political Citizenship? European Constitutional Law Review 12 (1), pp. 114– 132, 878.
 18 Shaw, J.  (2008). The Political Representation of Europe’s Citizens:  Developments. 
European Constitutional Law Review 4 (1), pp. 162– 186, 183– 184.
 19 See Harris, D.J., Bates, E., O’Boyle, M., Warbrick C., and Buckley, C.  (2009). Law of the 
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1970s, however, the European Commission of Human Rights began to interpret 
this provision as creating “certain individual rights, such as the right to vote and 
the right to stand for election”.20 The Court adopted the same view in Mathieu- 
Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987),21 and consistently considers since then 
that this provision enshrines an individual right to free elections, under the 
conditions laid down in this provision.
The Court of Justice also used the text called “explanations relating to the 
Charter”. This text was originally prepared under the authority of the Praesid-
ium of the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. According to the third subparagraph of Art. 6(1) teu and 
Art. 52(7) of the Charter, this text must be given due regard for interpreting the 
Charter. It is however unlikely that this reference was decisive, since the ex-
planations only state, in a very general way, that Art. 39(2) takes over the basic 
principles of the electoral system in a democratic State.
It has also been considered by commentators of the ruling22 that this in-
terpretation may have been prompted by a semantic change brought by the 
Lisbon Treaty. Whereas Art. 189 EC used to state that the European Parliament 
consisted of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
Community, Art. 10(2) and 14(2) teu now both say that the members of the 
European Parliament represent the citizens of the Union. This disintermedi-
ation between the citizens and the European Parliament has also been noted 
by Advocate- General Cruz- Villalon in his opinion on the case,23 and some au-
thors had already interpreted this change as implying a real right to vote and to 
run as a candidate for the European elections.24
Be that as it may, the (objective) principle according to which the members 
of the European Parliament must be elected by direct universal suffrage in a 
free and secret ballot has been turned into a (subjective) right of EU citizens to 
 20 European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 10 May 1979, no. 8612/ 79, Alliance des 
Belges v. Belgium.
 21 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 March 1987, no. 9267/ 81, Mathieu- Mohin 
and Clerfayt v. Belgium.
 22 Van Eijken, H. and Van Rossem, J. W. (2016). Prisoner Disenfranchisement and the Right 
to Vote in Elections to the European Parliament:  Universal Suffrage Key to Unlocking 
Political Citizenship? European Constitutional Law Review 12 (1), pp. 114– 132, 118; Coutts, 
S.  (2017). Delvigne:  A Multi- Levelled Political Citizenship. European Law Review 42, 
pp. 867– 881, 877.
 23 See para. 100 of his opinion.
 24 See House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution Written Evidence, Memorandum 













vote in European elections. It has also been given a broad scope of application 
vis- à- vis Member States.
iii The Broad Scope of Application of the Right to Participate in 
European Elections vis- à- vis Member States
The scope of the right to participate in European elections as regards Member 
States benefits from its dual nature. As a Citizenship right, it applies to Mem-
ber States even in situations were the link with EU Law is weak (iii.1). As a 
fundamental right, it can apply regardless of any cross- border element (iii.2).
iii.1 A Right Applicable to Member States
According to Art. 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions are addressed to the Mem-
ber States only when they are implementing European Union law. The Court 
has broadly interpreted this provision in the past, especially in Fransson25 in 
which the Court said that “since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter must (…) be complied with where national legislation falls within the 
scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that 
way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applica-
ble. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Charter”. However, in the same decision, the 
Court added that even such a broad interpretation has its limits:  “where, on 
the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the scope of European 
Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions 
of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such juris-
diction they are applicable every time EU Law is applicable”. Later judgments 
of the Court of Justice, for example Torralbo Marcos26 and Siragusa,27 demon-
strate that the Court can be quite strict when defining the limits of the material 
scope of the Charter as regards the Member States.
However, when it comes to the right to participate in European elections, 
the Court has proven to be quite bold about the scope of the Charter. In Delvi-
gne, the Court found the Charter applicable to the case despite the fact that the 
relevant French criminal legislation had clearly not been adopted in order to 
give effect to any specific EU provision. The situation can, mutatis mutandis, be 
 25 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C- 617/ 10, Åkerberg Fransson.
 26 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 2014, case C- 265/ 13, Torralbo Marcos.
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compared with the Siragusa case.28 In Siragusa, the Court refused to consider 
that an order requiring Mr Siragusa to dismantle work carried out in breach of 
a law protecting the cultural heritage and the landscape fell within the scope 
of EU Law. The Court admitted that there was a connection between such pro-
ceedings and EU Environmental Law since protecting the landscape – the aim 
of the national legislation in question – is an aspect of protecting the environ-
ment. Yet, the Court insisted (para 24) that “it should be borne in mind that the 
concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Art. 51 of the Charter, 
requires a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters covered 
being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the 
other”. Then the Court stated that
in order to determine whether national legislation involves the imple-
mentation of EU law for the purposes of Art. 51 of the Charter, some 
of the points to be determined are whether that legislation is intended 
to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and 
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even 
if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are 
specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it.
It could have therefore been argued in Delvigne that French criminal Law only 
indirectly affected the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in the Europe-
an elections. Furthermore, as that Court notices in §29 of Delvigne, “Art. 8 of 
the 1976 Act provides that, subject to the provisions of that act, the electoral 
procedure is to be governed in each Member State by its national provisions”, 
which could have broken the connection with EU Law. Let us also remember 
that in Spain v. United Kingdom,29 the Court stated that “the definition of the 
persons entitled to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament falls within the competence of each Member State”, allowing 
them to grant that right to certain persons who have close links to them, other 
than their own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in their territory. Yet, 
in Delvigne, the Court decided that the case fell within the scope of the Charter 
and, therefore, under its jurisdiction.
This solution, I believe, reveals the ambiguous nature of EU citizens’ rights 
as fundamental rights. The doctrine of fundamental rights in EC Law was 
developed by the Court of Justice in the 70s, following pressure by several 
 28 Siragusa, cit.






national constitutional courts (especially German and Italian), to protect in-
dividuals’ rights against the institutions of the (then) European Communities. 
These rights address mainly the institutions. Therefore, in the EU legal system, 
fundamental rights only apply to the States when they are acting as “agents” 
of the European Union. The Charter does not primarily address the Member 
States, it only binds them in an incidental manner – even though the Court 
adopted a broad view of the applicability of the Charter to the States in the 
Fransson judgment. As regards the Member States, the EU standards of Human 
Rights are functional, not federal.
This is not, and this has never been, the way EU citizens’ rights operate. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, they have been intentionally designed to be 
enjoyed by EU citizens in their relations with the Member States. Member 
States are therefore the primary addressees of the EU citizens’ rights, whether 
they are laid down in the Treaties or in the Charter. This is true for all of them, 
even the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European 
Parliament, since these elections are organised by the Member States. This 
right, and all the other rights of the EU citizens, have been designed primar-
ily to impose specific obligations on the Member States as regards these EU 
citizens.
It is worth mentioning that this reasoning does not apply to all the citizens’ 
rights in the EU Charter. The Title v of the EU Charter, “Citizens’ rights”, is quite 
misleading – at least in the English language.30 It gives the impression that it 
contains only EU citizens’ rights (i.e. rights reserved for EU citizens) whereas 
in fact it contains rights related to citizenship as a broad concept, i.e. rights 
of action for individuals and legal persons in their relation with the Europe-
an Union. It does contain EU citizens’ rights, reserved for EU citizens and pri-
marily addressed to the Member States. These rights are the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament (Art. 39); the 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections (Art. 40); the 
freedom of movement and of residence (Art. 45) and the right to diplomatic 
and consular protection (Art. 46). However, it also contains rights enjoyed not 
only by EU citizens but more broadly by every individual or legal person, some-
times on the condition that they reside or have a registered office in a Member 
State. These rights are the right to good administration (Art. 41); the right of 
access to documents (Art. 42); the right to refer to the European Ombudsman 
cases of maladministration (Art. 43)  and the right to petition the European 
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Parliament (Art. 44). Unlike EU citizens’ rights, these “non- EU- citizens- only 
rights” are explicitly addressed either to all the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union or to one of them (the European Ombudsman – Art. 43; 
the European Parliament – Art. 44). We could therefore say that in fact, these 
“non- EU- citizens- only rights” are less likely than any other right in the Charter 
to apply to Member States. The Court of Justice clearly said for example in 
Cicala31 and YS and M. and S.32 that the right to good administration protected 
under Art. 41 could not be used as such against a Member State – even though 
it also said in M. M.33 (see especially the ambiguous wording of para 84, “that 
provision is of general application”) and more clearly in H. N.34 that this article 
reflects a general principle of EU Law, which applies to Member States within 
the scope of EU Law. It is also hard to imagine how the right of access to doc-
uments of the Union, the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of 
maladministration or the right to petition the European Parliament could ap-
ply to Member States, except if somehow a national authority were to interfere 
with one of these rights being exercised.
Since it is in their essential nature to be applicable primarily to the Mem-
ber States, it is not surprising that the fundamental rights of the Citizens are 
more easily applicable to Member States than the other fundamental rights 
protected under EU Law. From a technical point of view, this broad applicabil-
ity is facilitated by the fact that the rights of the Citizens in the Charter mirror 
provisions contained in other sources of EU Law. For example, in Delvigne, the 
Court demonstrated the link between the situation in question and EU Law by 
saying that the French legislation must be considered as an implementation 
of Art. 14(3) of the teu (“The members of the European Parliament shall be 
elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret 
ballot”) and Art. 1(3) of the 1976 Act concerning the election of the members 
of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (“Elections shall be 
by direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret”). In short, the Court 
used the EU provisions which are the material source of the relevant provision 
of the Charter to declare the Charter applicable, making the limitation of the 
scope of application of the Charter to the Member States laid down in Art. 51(1) 
de facto almost irrelevant for these specific rights.
 31 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, case C- 482/ 10, Cicala, para. 28.
 32 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 July 2014, joined cases C- 141/ 12 and C- 372/ 12, YS and 
M. and S., para. 67.
 33 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 November 2012, case C- - 277/ 11, M. M.









iii.2 A Right Applicable in Purely Internal Situations
EU citizens’ rights (understood senso strictu as the rights enjoyed only, under 
EU Law, by the citizens of the European Union) usually require a “cross- border” 
situation in order to apply. The freedom of movement and of residence applies 
only, in principle, to EU citizens who have crossed or want to cross an internal 
border of the European Union. The diplomatic and consular protection only 
applies to EU citizens in their relations with Member States other than those 
of which they are nationals. The right to vote and to stand as a candidate at 
municipal elections is, in fact, a specific expression of the right to national 
treatment. Therefore, it only applies to non- national EU citizens.35 The same 
applies, in theory, to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at European 
elections.
In Spain v. United Kingdom,36 the Court stated at para 66 that Art. 19(2) EC 
(now Art. 22(2) tfeu), “implies that nationals of a Member State have the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in their own country”. However, this seems 
to be, at best, a mere passing reference. Furthermore, the broader context of 
this statement gives further indication that the Court may not have meant ex-
actly what it seems to have said. More precisely it said that Art. 19(2) EC, “like 
Article 19(1) EC relating to the right of Union citizens to vote and to stand as a 
candidate at municipal elections, implies that nationals of a Member State have 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their own country and requires 
the Member States to accord those rights to citizens of the Union residing in 
their territory”.37 The use of two different verbs (“implies” / “requires”) and the 
reference to the right to participate in municipal elections (a “mere” right to 
national treatment) seem to indicate that the existence of a right for Member 
States nationals to vote and to stand as a candidate in their own country is not 
a consequence of EU Law but merely a precondition for the exercise of the right 
to national treatment. Without such a pre- existing right to participate in Euro-
pean elections for nationals under national Law, the right to be treated like the 
nationals would make no sense. It does not necessarily mean that this right is 
by itself protected under EU Law.
In Eman and Sevinger, the European Court of Justice considered that a dif-
ference of treatment between nationals as regards the European elections fell 
within the scope of EU Law.38 The national law in question was a Dutch law 
 35 Court of justice, Order of 26 March 2009, case C- 535/ 08, Pignataro, para. 17.
 36 Spain v. United Kingdom, cit., para. 66.
 37 Emphasis added.
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disenfranchising Dutch nationals residing in the Dutch overseas territory of 
Aruba from EU Parliamentary elections, whereas Dutch nationals residing in a 
non- member country could still vote and stand as a candidate in elections to 
the European Parliament held in the Netherlands. In this case, the Court found 
that the Netherlands Government had not sufficiently demonstrated that the 
difference in treatment observed between Netherlands nationals resident in a 
non- member country and those resident in the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba 
was objectively justified as regards the principle of equal treatment. In short, 
the Court found a breach of equality between Dutch nationals, with no consid-
eration of free movement within the European Union. However, in this case, 
the infringed principle was not the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in European elections itself but the general principle of equality, as a general 
principle of EC Law.39 The Court only used the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in European elections in order to “link” the situation with EC Law, 
making the general principle of equality, as protected under EC Law, applica-
ble to the case. All in all, the right to participate in European elections seemed 
to be reserved to mobile citizens, or at least citizens who do not enjoy the na-
tionality of the Member State they live in.
It was not therefore before the Delvigne ruling in 2015, again, that the Court 
applied the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections itself to a 
purely internal situation. The main case, as mentioned before, was about a 
French national complaining that French legislation prevented him from par-
ticipating in the European elections in France. There was no border- crossing or 
multinational element whatsoever.
The application of EU citizens’ rights in a purely internal situation is not 
unprecedented. In Rottmann,40 the Court held that a Member State shall ob-
serve the principle of proportionality when deciding whether to withdraw its 
nationality from one of its nationals, especially when such a decision would 
deprive this citizen of his/ her EU citizenship. In Ruiz Zambrano,41 the Court 
held that a Member State could not deprive an EU citizen – even one of its own 
nationals – of “the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching 
to the status of European Union citizen”. In this case, Belgium could therefore 
not refuse a non- EU national who had dependent minor children, who were 
Belgians and therefore EU citizens, a right of residence in Belgium, nor refuse 
to grant a work permit to that non- EU national. In doing so, Belgium would 
 39 See at para. 57 et seq.
 40 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08, Rottmann.








have forced this non- EU national to leave the EU territory with his children, 
depriving them of “the genuine enjoyment of the substance” of the right to stay 
on the territory of any Member State.
However, these solutions are exceptional and apply only in extreme cir-
cumstances. In particular, the Court made it clear in its post- Ruiz Zambrano 
case- law that the Ruiz Zambrano solution could only apply exceptionally, in 
particular when the EU citizen whose third- country national family member 
is threatened with deportation is not a child.42 By contrast, it is rather striking 
that the right to participate in European elections can apply in a purely in-
ternal situation even where there is no extreme and particular circumstances 
“amounting to a de facto loss of one of the rights attaching to that status”.43
Could this reasoning apply to the other EU citizens’ electoral right, the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections? It would seem quite 
unlikely since, as mentioned above, this right is, in fact, a specific and rather 
limited44 expression of the right to national treatment with no direct univer-
sal suffrage clause, unlike Art. 39 of the Charter. However, the Ruiz Zambrano 
precedent could possibly open a door here. Let us imagine for example that, in 
a Member State, the restrictions to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in local elections are excessive but non- discriminatory (i.e. they apply also to 
national citizens). In such a case, the right to national treatment is irrelevant, 
because the issue is not about discrimination. However, would it be possible 
to say, in such a case, using the Ruiz Zambrano test, that EU citizens are de-
prived of “the genuine enjoyment of the substance” of the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate for municipal elections? Arguably, this is a far- fetched 
reasoning, and in any case, it could only apply in extreme circumstances, just 
like the Ruiz Zambrano solution. Moreover, in most cases, restrictions of the 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate would not only apply to municipal 
elections but to all elections – including the European elections. The situation 
could therefore be dealt with using the Delvigne precedent, without any need 
for a Ruiz Zambrano- like reasoning. However, in the (rather unlikely) case of 
 42 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 May 2018, case C- 82/ 16, K.A.  and others v.  Belgische 
Staat.
 43 Lenaerts, K. and Gutiérrez- Fons, J. A. (2017). Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism. The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 766.
 44 Exceptions to the right of national treatment are laid down in several provisions of the 
Council Directive 94/ 80/ EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for 
the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
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a restriction to local elections that would not apply to European elections, a 
Ruiz Zambrano- like reasoning could give more substance to the political status 
of the EU citizens, giving them not only a right to political inclusion in other 
Member States (limited to local and European elections) but also a minimum 
right to political participation in other Member States.
iv The Right to Participate in European Elections, a Potential 
Disruptor of the Distribution of Powers between the European 
Union and Member States
The disruption caused by the right to participate in European elections in the 
distribution of powers between the European Union and the Member States 
results from its existence and also from its legal potential, as could be devel-
oped by the Court of Justice in future cases.
iv.1 A New Citizenship Right?
According to Art. 25(2) tfeu, only the Council, acting unanimously in accor-
dance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to 
the rights listed in Article 20(2) tfeu, subject to the approval by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Incor-
porating new citizenship rights by means of judicial interpretation “would be 
in clear violation of Article 25 tfeu”.45 In doing so, the Court would therefore 
not only encroach on the horizontal allocation of powers between EU institu-
tions, trespassing the remit of the Council, but also on the vertical allocation 
of powers between the European Union and the Member States, who are to 
approve such an addition according to their respective constitutional require-
ments. Yet, it is clear that, in Delvigne, the Court created a new right, and that 
this right is reserved, under EU Law, to Union citizens.46
It could be considered that this right was implicitly protected in Art. 20(2), 
b) tfeu and, therefore, also in Art. 22(2) tfeu. If it was the case, the right to 
participate in European elections, as enshrined in Art. 20(2), b) and 22(2) tfeu, 
would therefore have always contained not only a right to national treatment 
but also an active, enforceable right to participate in European elections, unlike 
the right to participate in municipal elections, contains. However, this does not 
 45 Lenaerts K. and Gutiérrez- Fons J. A. (2017). Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears, 
op. cit., p. 780.








sit well with the finding of the Court in Eman and Sevigner47 and Spain v UK48 
that Art. 19(2) of the Treaty on the European Communities (EC), currently Art. 
22(2) tfeu, was confined to applying the principle of non- discrimination on 
grounds of nationality to that right to vote and stand for election.
Can we consider Delvigne to be an overruling of Eman and Sevigner and 
Spain v UK? Such an overruling could be justified by new legal circumstances 
that occurred since these previous rulings, namely the entry into force of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. One could argue that, 
by linking together, in the same article of the Charter, the right to national 
treatment and the requirement for direct universal suffrage in a free and secret 
ballot, the Member States of the European Union, as sovereign Masters of the 
Treaties, have implicitly amended the content of the former Art. 19(2) of the 
Treaty on the European Communities (now Art. 22(2) tfeu). In this respect, 
one must remember that, according to Art. 52(2) Charter, “rights recognised by 
this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised un-
der the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties”. If we con-
sider that this provision “links” the substance of the provisions of the Charter 
which have their source in the treaties with the provisions that they mirror, the 
incorporation of a new substance in a right laid down in the Charter may also 
affect the substance of the equivalent right in the treaties. In this interpreta-
tion, the Court has not created a new right in 2015. Instead, the Member States 
have implicitly amended the content of Art. 19(2) EC in 2009.
This is, however, a very far- fetched and acrobatic interpretation. It is diffi-
cult to construe Art. 52(2) Charter as a “two- way” interpretation link. Instead, 
it seems more plausible that the drafters of the Charter meant this provision 
as a “one- way” interpretation guideline, in order to prevent the substance of 
the Charter from going beyond the substance of the provisions of the treaties 
“cloned” in the Charter. One could argue that Art. 52(2) was designed precisely 
to prevent rulings like Delvigne. In any case, it requires a lot of legal imagi-
nation to consider that the Court has not tempered with the powers of the 
Member States by declaring the existence of an active, enforceable right to 
participate in European elections on the top of the existing right to national 
treatment as regards European elections.
Another possibility is that the right to participate in European elections al-
ready existed somewhere else in EU Law other than in Art. 20(2) tfeu. Art. 
 47 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2016, case C- 300/ 04, Eman and Sevigner, 
para. 53.
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20(2) does not list all the rights of EU citizens, as evidenced by the terms “in-
ter alia” and also by the fact that one of the rights of EU citizens, the collec-
tive right to invite the Commission to submit a proposal for a legal act (the 
so- called “citizens’ initiative”),49 is not mentioned in Art. 20(2). The right to 
participate in European elections could therefore be a new right added in Art. 
39(2) of the Charter. However, since Art. 39(2) mirrors Art. 14(3) teu and Art. 
1(3) of the 1976 Act, and since the Court explicitly says that Article 39(2) of the 
Charter “constitutes the expression in the Charter of the right of Union citizens 
to vote in elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Article 14(3) 
teu and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act”,50 it could be argued that the EU citizens’ 
right to participate in European elections is and always was located in these 
provisions. This interpretation would mean that the Court has not created 
a new right and therefore has not encroached upon the powers of the oth-
er institutions or of the Member States under Art. 25(2) tfeu. However, even 
though this interpretation is much less far- fetched than the previous one, it is 
still quite formalistic. It assumes that the Court has merely discovered a right 
that was always there, even though it is unlikely that this was the intention of 
the drafters of the treaties and, before that, of the 1976 Act. Furthermore, it is 
not perfectly consistent with Spain v UK and Eman and Sevinger, in which the 
Court did not interpret the 1976 Act in such a way.
Whichever interpretation we choose, it is therefore hard to construe the 
finding of the Court as not trespassing on the powers of the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Member States.
iv.2 A Potential Minimum EU Standard for National Election Law
By recognizing a real and enforceable right to vote in the European elections, 
Delvigne may have paved the way for the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to have a greater control over limitations of civic rights imposed on 
Union citizens – as long as these limitations also affect their right to participate 
in the European elections. Furthermore, the Court of Justice will probably, on 
the basis of the requirement that the elections be “free and secret”, be able to 
fully assess whether the Member States meet fundamental democratic stan-
dards, as laid down in the case- law of the European Court on Human rights, 
when organising the European elections – just as the European Court on Hu-
man Rights did itself in Matthews v United Kingdom.51 Since a lot of domestic 
 49 Art. 11(4) teu.
 50 Delvigne, cit., para. 44.










rules which apply to the European elections also apply to the other domestic 
elections, the Court could therefore assess large portions of the electoral leg-
islation of the Member States. The Court’s assessment could include, not only 
the reasonableness of the restrictions of the right to vote based on criminal 
conviction (as was the case in Delvigne), but also on other grounds, like mental 
health,52 and more broadly, the quality of the electoral regime, like the clari-
ty of the electoral legislation,53 the existence of an effective remedy for those 
who claim that they have been unlawfully deprived of their vote54 or the rules 
governing the access to the media and the neutrality of State- owned media.55 
Even though the Court does not mention it explicitly in Delvigne, it would be 
surprising if its review did not encompass, not only the right to vote, but also 
the right to run as a candidate in European elections, even though it must be 
kept in mind that the European Court of Human Rights “accepts that stricter 
requirements may be imposed on the eligibility to stand for election to parlia-
ment, as distinguished from voting eligibility”.56
It is true that the more recent case- law of the Court of Justice does not re-
ally show any willingness from the Court to go further in reviewing national 
election law. In particular, the order issued by the President of the General 
Court on the 1st July 2019 is a bit disappointing in this respect.57 In this case, 
the Catalan politicians Carles Puigdemont and Antoni Comín got elected in 
the European Parliamentary elections of 26 May 2019. However, they did not 
appear in person before the Spanish Central Electoral Commission to swear 
allegiance to the Spanish Constitution, as required by the Spanish legislation. 
Because of that, the Commission did not include their names in the list which 
was notified to the European Parliament on 17 June 2019. According to Article 
12 of the 1976 Act, for the purposes of verifying the credentials of its members, 
the Parliament is to take note of the results declared officially by the Member 
States. Therefore, the President of the European Parliament sent a letter to the 
applicants stating that their names were not on the list of elected members 
 52 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 20 May 2010, no.  38832/ 06, Alajos Kiss 
v. Hungary.
 53 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 March 2010, no.  78039/ 01, Grosaru 
v. Romania.
 54 Grosaru v. Romania, cit.
 55 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 19 June 2012, no. 29400/ 05, Communist 
Party of Russia and others v. Russia.
 56 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 19 October 2004, no. 17707/ 02, Melnitchenko 
v. Ukraine, para. 57.
 57 General Court, order of the 1st July 2019, case T-388/ 19 R, Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó 
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officially communicated to the European Parliament by the Spanish author-
ities. Consequently, and until further notice by the Spanish authorities, they 
cannot be treated as future Members of the European Parliament. Carles Puig-
demont and Antoni Comín lodged an application before the General Court 
seeking, in essence, annulment of several decisions of the European Parlia-
ment which they claim prevent the applicants from taking their seats in the 
European Parliament as elected members. They also brought an application 
for interim measures. It is this second application that was dismissed by the 
president of the General Court in the order, based on a literal interpretation 
of the 1976 Act, and not taking into account whether or not the Spanish legal 
requirement to appear in person before the Commission was compatible with 
the Union Citizens’ right to vote and to be elected at the European Parliament. 
However disappointing, this order is not the end of the story because a) the 
General Court still has to rule on the substance of the case in the main pro-
ceedings, b) there is a possibility of appeal against the order of the General 
Court before the Court of Justice and c) a legal action against the requirement 
to swear allegiance to the Spanish constitution is pending before Spanish 
courts, which may request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on 
the compatibility of Spanish electoral law with EU Law.58
If the Court can indeed decide on minimum standards applicable to na-
tional election laws (and this evolution has yet to be confirmed by the Court), 
this would affect the division of competences between the European Union 
and the Member States as regards electoral rules. So far, the definition of elec-
toral rules and standards falls mostly within the remit of Member States, with 
the exception of the minimal requirements imposed by EU secondary law 
regarding European elections. However, if the Court can indeed develop a 
body of case- law- based standards, this body could constitute the core of an 
incipient electoral regime common to all the Member States of the Europe-
an Union.
Another question that could arise is whether the right to participate in Eu-
ropean elections is an exclusive right of EU citizens. In Eman and Sevinger, the 
Court stated in para 74 that “while citizenship of the Union is destined to be 
the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who 
find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irre-
spective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provid-
ed for (...), that statement does not necessarily mean that the rights recognised 
 58 Van Elsuwege, P.  (2019). Empty Seats in the European Parliament:  What About EU 
Citizenship? VerfassungsBlog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ empty- seats- in- 




by the Treaty are limited to citizens of the Union”.59 This statement seems to 
explain the non- exclusive nature of citizenship rights by the fact that they are 
essentially rights to national treatment. The same conclusion can be drawn 
from para 76, in which the Court says that “while [Article 19(2) EC, now Art. 
22(2) tfeu] (…) requires the Member States to accord those rights to citizens 
of the Union residing in their territory, it does not follow that a Member State in 
a position such as that of the United Kingdom is prevented from granting the 
right to vote and to stand for election to certain persons who have a close link 
with it without however being nationals of that State or another Member State”.60 
The Court then went on to find that a Member State (in this case, the United 
Kingdom) could legally allow non- EU Citizens (in this case, Commonwealth 
citizens) to participate in the European elections. It seems that the Court found 
that since the right to participate in the European elections was a “mere” right 
to national treatment, it was not exclusively reserved for EU citizens as long as 
it benefitted at least to them. However, if there is indeed an active right to par-
ticipate in European elections, can it be inferred that this right is an exclusive 
right, aimed at creating a political European community? It is hard to tell, and 
it would be a considerable overturn of the previous case- law, but if such was 
the case, this limitation would encroach the power normally reserved to Mem-
ber States to determine the limits of their political franchise.
On a positive note, this could, to a certain extent, respond to the criticism 
that the fragmented electoral rights regime across the EU results in an uneven 
access to the franchise.61 It could also create a minimum level playing field 
applicable to both manifestations of democracy in the European Union mul-
tilevel system. According to Art. 10(2) tfeu, “Citizens are directly represented 
at Union level in the European Parliament” whereas “Member States are rep-
resented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and 
in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable 
either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens”. Setting some mini-
mum standards applicable to both European elections and national elections 
ensures a common fundamental grammar for these two “branches” of Europe-
an democracy, under the common supervision of the Court of Justice.
It is also consistent with the fact that being a functional democracy is a con-
dition for being a Member State of the European Union, under the so- called 
“Copenhagen criteria”. It is now well known, in particular as regards the “rule 
 59 Emphasis added.
 60 Emphasis added.
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of law backsliding”62 in several Member States,63 that the European Union is 
remarkably firm on candidate States complying with the standards of liberal 
democracy and the rule of law, while lacking the means to enforce these very 
same standards vis- à- vis Member States. Reviewing whether national legisla-
tions meet the basic standards of democracy may contribute to the resorption 
of this so- called “Copenhagen dilemma”,64 especially when illiberal govern-
ments meddle with electoral law in order to remain in power. As an example, 
the Court could review the various infringements to the ‘one person, one vote’ 
principle in Hungary, as well as the differences of treatment between different 
categories of citizens abroad depending on whether they are more or less likely 
to vote for the Prime Minister’s ruling party Fidesz.65
It is however likely that the standards discovered and enforced by the Court, 
as well as the intensity of its review on Member States’ electoral systems, will 
be limited, due to the obligation of the European Union to respect the nation-
al identities of the Member States, under Art. 4(2) teu. The concept of na-
tional identity, coined by the Maastricht Treaty and made more (but far from 
completely) precise by the Lisbon Treaty, includes each country’s fundamen-
tal political and constitutional structures, for example the status of the State 
as a Republic.66 It may therefore also include the electoral legislation, as it is 
strongly connected with each country’s fundamental constitutional and polit-
ical choices. Tension is therefore likely to arise between, on the one hand, the 
necessity to ensure the effectiveness of European representative democracy, 
which according to Art. 10(1) tfeu founds the functioning of the Union, and 
 62 Pech, L. and Scheppele K. L. (2017). Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU. 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 3– 47. See also the concept of “con-
stitutional capture” coined by J.- W. Müller about Hungary: Müller, J.- W. (2015). Should the 
EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States? European Law Journal 
21 (1), pp. 141– 160, 142.
 63 Poland, in particular, is currently the object of both a political procedure under Art. 7(1) 
teu and infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice due to various measures 
undertook by the current Polish Government with the apparent aim of curtailing the 
independence of the judiciary. On the 12th September 2018, the European Parliament has 
also activated the Art. 7(1) procedure against Hungary.
 64 As far as we can tell, this expression was coined by then Commissioner V.  Reding 
during a debate at the European Parliament concerning the situation in Romania on 
the 12th September 2012:  http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=- // 
EP// TEXT+CRE+20120912+ITEM- 011+DOC+XML+V0// EN.
 65 Majtényi, B., Nagy, A., and Kállai, P.  (2018). “Only Fidesz”  – Minority Electoral Law in 
Hungary. VerfassungsBlog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ onlyfidesz- electoral- 
law- in- hungary/ .












of Union citizens’ participation to the election of the European co- legislature 
and, on the other hand, the sovereignty of Member States. This could be, for 
example, an argument against the exclusive nature of the right to participate 
in European elections (i.e. the thesis according to which this right should be 
reserved to EU citizens), at least in countries where the extension of suffrage 
to non- EU citizens is a part of their constitutional identity. This is probably 
the case with the United Kingdom, since the Court stated in Spain v UK that 
it is “for reasons connected to its constitutional traditions”67 that the United 
Kingdom chose to grant the right to vote and to stand for election to Common-
wealth citizens.
One must also consider the fact that the Court can only review and decide 
on standards applicable to national election laws insofar as the laws in ques-
tion are applicable to European elections. A Member State could perfectly de-
velop electoral rules that are strictly specific to the European elections. These 
specific rules are likely to be limited, because it is not in the interest of the 
States to create complications in their electoral regimes. However, a State can 
for example decide that citizens have to be of a certain age to run as a candi-
date for European elections, and for European elections only. If the Court was 
to find this age excessive for example, this finding would not apply to other 
national elections. Member States could even be tempted to develop a body 
of law specific to the European elections in order to make sure that the review 
exercised by the Court, along with the standards it could develop, do not “con-
taminate” the rest of national electoral law. However, such a strategy would be 
likely to create major inconsistencies. Can we really imagine that a State would 
agree, for example, that persons with mental difficulties would be allowed to 
vote for the European elections but disenfranchised for every other election?
Certain questions in particular are likely to remain either beyond the reach 
of the Court or subject to self- restraint. This is typically the case of national 
rules concerning the disenfranchisement of nationals residing in other coun-
tries, notwithstanding the position of certain authors who consider these rules 
incompatible with EU citizens’ free movement rights.68 There are two possibil-
ities here. First, it may be that the nationals of a Member State imposing such 
disenfranchisement rules reside in another Member State. In this case, the cit-
izens in question might still be able to participate in the European elections in 
the host State, which means that even if their right to participate in elections 
 67 Para. 79.
 68 See Kochenov, D. (2009). Free Movement and Participation in the Parliamentary Elections 
in the Member State of Nationality: An Ignored Link? Maastricht Journal of European and 
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in their State of nationality is compromised, their right to participate in Europe-
an elections is not. Alternatively, the citizens in question may reside in a third 
country. Theoretically, in this case, the Court could review the national rules 
in question, since in this case the citizens are effectively barred from the pos-
sibility to participate in European elections. However, it is likely that the Court 
would apply self- restraint in this case, for several reasons. First, EU secondary 
legislation explicitly protects national discretion on this matter.69 Even though 
technically the right to participate in European elections prevails on second-
ary law, being enshrined in primary Law, this might deter the Court from go-
ing against the explicit will of the EU legislature. Secondly, even the European 
Court of Human Rights applies self- restraint on this question, as evidenced by 
its Shindler ruling concerning the 15- year rule in the United Kingdom.70 Surely, 
the Court of Justice is not bound by the interpretation of the European Court 
of Human Rights. It could be argued that the right to participate in European 
elections must be interpreted in its constitutional context, and notably in the 
light of the importance of representative democracy in the European Union as 
expressed in Art. 10(1) tfeu (“The functioning of the Union shall be founded 
on representative democracy”). However, on this issue, the national identity 
clause, mentioned above, could play a role in the EU context similar to the na-
tional margin of appreciation in the case- law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. One cannot completely rule out, however, the Court of Justice taking 
such a bold stance, should the question arise before it.
v Conclusion
Political rights are an essential aspect of citizenship. Yet, when it comes to EU 
citizenship, the main focus is usually on transnational (horizontal) rights, like 
free movement and equal treatment, rather than on political (vertical) rights. 
However, after a period of “expansion” of citizens’ transnational rights, during 
which the Court of Justice seemed to drift away from the “single- market- based” 
 69 Art. 1(2) of the Directive 93/ 109/ EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrange-
ments for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals: “Nothing in this Directive shall affect each Member State’s provisions 
concerning the right to vote or to stand as a candidate of its nationals who reside outside 
its electoral territory”.








citizenship, the Court, in recent cases like Dano71 and Alimanovic,72 seems to 
have taken a more restrictive stance, in particular as regards the access of EU 
citizens to social benefits in the host Member State.73 Could it be that, at the 
same time, political rights have taken an opposite trajectory and have been 
reinforced by the Court? The case- law on political rights is too scarce to draw 
such a definitive conclusion. However, it is striking that the Court has adopted 
a bold view in Delvigne by discovering in the Charter an enforceable right for 
EU citizens to participate in European elections. The Court did not go as far 
as some would have hoped since it did not find any violation of EU Law in the 
case at stake. However, as some commentators have observed, it is a “classical 
strategy for landmark decisions” to show “restraint with regard to the outcome 
of the case” while scoring “an important point as a matter of legal principle”.74 
Recognising an enforceable right to participate in European elections, applica-
ble to national law regardless of its connection with EU Law and of any cross- 
border element has a real potential to rock the boat. In particular, I have argued 
that, merely by its existence, this judicially- recognised right encroaches on the 
power, reserved by the Treaties to Member States (inter alia), to recognise new 
citizenship rights. Furthermore, this right could potentially expand into a se-
ries of basic democratic standards, applicable to national election rules insofar 
as they also apply to European elections, with the Court of Justice having the 
power to review whether national election rules comply with these standards. 
This potential still needs to be realised, and may be hindered by the Member 
States’ claim to sovereignty. This is however an interesting development, that 
deserves to be observed closely. Given the strong recognition of the democratic 
foundation of the European Union in the Lisbon Treaty, and despite the con-
sistently low turnout at the European elections, political rights could develop 
into another strong pillar for EU Citizenship, alongside transnational / free- 
movement rights.
 71 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 November 2014, case C- 333/ 13, Dano.
 72 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2015, case C- 67/ 14, Alimanovic.
 73 This phenomenon is one of the subjects of Kochenov, D., ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and 
Federalism. The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Thym, 
D., ed. (2017). Questioning EU Citizenship. Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and 
Solidarity in the EU. Camden: Hart Publishing.
 74 Van Eijken, H. and Van Rossem, J. W. (2016). Prisoner Disenfranchisement and the Right 
to Vote in Elections to the European Parliament:  Universal Suffrage Key to Unlocking 
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The European Citizens’ Initiative in Times of Brexit
Natassa Athanasiadou*
i Introduction
The European citizens’ Initiative is an instrument of participatory demo-
cracy1 introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 11(4) teu) and aiming to reinforce 
the influence of citizens over the legislative agenda of the EU.2 Pursuant to 
Art. 11(4) teu, not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a signifi-
cant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the Europe-
an Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropri-
ate proposal for a legal act of the Union. The right to participate in a European 
citizens’ initiative constitutes one of the specific forms of the general right 
of every EU citizen to participate in the democratic life of the Union (Art. 
10(3) teu).3 It enables the involvement of EU citizens in the decision- making 
process at the EU level, while requiring that they come together with citizens 
from other Member States and present a proposal not of national, but of Eu-
ropean interest. It thus introduces a new dimension of transnational partic-
ipatory democracy, alongside representative democracy on which the EU is 
founded,4 and adds another tool to the political arsenal of EU citizenship.5 
 * Assistant Professor of EU Law, Maastricht University.
 1 On participatory democracy and the scope of Art. 11 teu, see Mendes, J.  (2011). Participa-
tion and the role of law after Lisbon:  a legal view on article 11 TEU. Common Market Law 
Review 48 (6), pp. 1849– 1878; Cuesta Lopez, V. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on dem-
ocratic principles: A legal framework for participatory democracy. European Public Law 16(1), 
pp. 123– 138.
 2 Art. 11(4) teu echoes Art. I- 47(4) of the non- ratified Constitutional Treaty; see Sipala, 
F.  (2007). La vie démocratique de l’Union. In: G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte, eds., 
Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne, Brussels: Bruylant, p. 367; Dougan, M. (2011). 
What are we to make of the citizens’ initiative? Common Market Law Review 48 (6), pp. 1807– 
1848, 1808.
 3 See General Court, judgment of 10 May 2017, case T- 754/ 14, Efler v.  Commission, paras 24 
and 37.
 4 Art. 10(1) teu.
 5 See Art. 24 tfeu; General Court, judgment of 23 April 2018, case T- 561/ 14, One of Us v. Com-















The effective functioning of citizens’ initiatives could therefore strengthen 
the common identity of EU citizens and at the same time enhance the legit-
imacy of certain Commission proposals being initiated from citizens across 
the Union.
However, the impact of this instrument so far has been assessed as limited6 
and the European Commission has been criticised for depriving the European 
citizens’ initiative of its effectiveness due to its own institutional practice.7 On 
this point, it is important to underline that the Commission’s interpretation 
of the material scope of application of citizens’ initiatives has been confirmed 
in four out of six cases brought before the General Court.8 The Commission 
has lost only once in substance, in the “Stop ttip” case,9 and once for the 
procedural reason of lack of justification, in the “Minority SafePack” case.10 
It is the latter case, as it will be shown, that has influenced more the general 
 administrative practice, notably from a procedural point of view. Following 
this case- law and under pressure by the European Parliament,11 the Europe-
an Ombudsman12 and other stakeholders,13 the Commission has revisited its 
 6 See the second Commission report to the European Parliament and Council on the appli-
cation of Regulation (EU) No 211/ 2011, com(2018) 157 final, p. 2.
 7 See Salm, C. (2018). The added value of the ECI and its revision. European Parliament Re-
search Service, PE 615.666, 13 April 2018, p. 11 et seq.
 8 See General Court, judgment of 30 September 2015, case T- 450/ 12, Anagnostakis v. Com-
mission, which was confirmed by Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2017, case C- 
589/ 15 P, Anagnostakis v. Commission; General Court, judgment of 19 April 2016, case T- 44/ 
14, Constantini and others v. Commission; judgment of 5 April 2017, case T- 361/ 14, HB and 
others v. Commission, which was confirmed by Court of Justice, judgment of 8 February 
2018, case C- 336/ 17 P, HB and others v. Commission. In case Izsak and Dabis v. Commission, 
the General Court ruled in favour of the Commission at first instance (judgment of 10 
May 2015, case T- 529/ 13, Izsak and Dabis v. Commission), but its judgment was set aside 
following an appeal before the Court of Justice, because the General Court had errone-
ously placed the burden of proof on the applicants as to whether the subject matter of 
their initiative was falling within the Commission competences to propose a legal act of 
the Union (Court of Justice, judgment of 7 March 2019, case C- 420/ 16 P, Izsak and Dabis 
v. Commission, para. 72.) However, the Court of Justice confirmed in essence the Commis-
sion’s interpretation of the Treaties (ibid. paras 70– 71.).
 9 Efler v. Commission, cit.
 10 General Court, judgment of 3 February 2017, case T- 646/ 13, Minority SafePack 
v. Commission.
 11 European Parliament Resolution P8_ TA(2015)0382 of 28 October 2015 on the European 
Citizens’ Initiative.
 12 Own initiative report of the European Ombudsman of 4 March 2015, OI/ 9/ 2013/ TN.
 13 See for instance the opinion of the European Citizen Action Service (ecas), Revising the 
ECI:  How to make it fit for purpose, 20 April 2017, <www.euractiv.com/ section/ politics/ 
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application practice towards a more flexible approach.14 In addition, it initiat-
ed a new Regulation governing the European citizens’ initiative with a view to 
rendering this instrument more user- friendly and accessible to citizens.15
The timing of the Commission’s revisited administrative practice and the 
initiation of the new Regulation coincide with the trigger of a series of Brexit- 
related citizens’ initiatives. EU citizens from different Member States have 
brought forward initiatives aiming either to reverse Brexit or to secure the 
rights of EU- citizens whose country withdraws from the EU. EU citizens with 
the nationality of the United Kingdom (UK) were able to organise and partic-
ipate in European citizens’ initiatives until the withdrawal of the UK from the 
EU. After the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, namely on 1 Febru-
ary 2020,16 UK nationals lost, inter alia, this political right, since Art. 11(4) teu 
requires that participants of a European citizens’ initiative are nationals of a 
Member State. It is noted that the withdrawal agreement excludes the applica-
bility of the European citizens’ initiative during the transition period.17
Given the wide public interest that Brexit has generated and the fact that 
six European citizens’ initiatives have been Brexit- related, this group of ini-
tiatives (“Brexit- related initiatives”) constitutes a suitable case study in order 
to illustrate the evolution of the Commission’s administrative practice and 
assess it against general principles underpinning the functioning of EU insti-
tutions. It will be argued that the changed Commission’s approach towards 
more flexibility takes better account of the primary law right of EU citizens to 
participate in the democratic life of the EU. However, a closer look at the way 
the revisited approach works in practice reveals shortcomings which interfere 
with the right to good administration and the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations. These principles will serve as normative benchmarks 
when assessing the Commission’s practice.
Good administration is a general principle of EU law and a right en-
shrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Char-
ter), which guarantees that every person has their affairs handled impar-
tially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices 
 14 See the second Commission report com(2018) 157 final, cit., p. 2 on the non- legislative 
measures taken by the Commission.
 15 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European citizens’ initiative, com(2017) 482 final.
 16 See https:// ec.europa.eu/ info/ european- union- and- united- kingdom- forging- new- partnership/  
eu- uk- withdrawal- agreement_ en
 17 See Article 127(1) (b) of the Withdrawal Agreement.applicability in the United Kingdom 










and agencies of the Union.18 This right also generates an obligation of the 
administration to inform adequately all involved persons in an ongoing ad-
ministrative procedure.19 From a broader perspective, good administration 
is connected with good governance and requires that the administration 
conducts a transparent information policy and provides guidance and as-
sistance to the public.20
Legal certainty requires that legal rules and acts are clear and precise, 
and that legal relationships governed by Community law remain foresee-
able.21 While legal certainty refers to the clarity and foreseeability of the 
legal framework, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations 
concerns the ability to rely on the presumed legality of individual mea-
sures and on precise assurances provided by the competent administrative 
 organs.22
In the following sections, the role of the Commission as institutional me-
diator of European citizens’ initiatives will be assessed against these princi-
ples, which form the procedural guarantees for the effective exercise of this 
participatory right. The cycle of a European citizens’ initiative will be divided 
 18 See Court of Justice, judgment of 4 April 2017, case C- 337/ 15 P, Ombudsman v. Staelen, 
para. 34.
 19 See Art. 41, para. 1, let. b), of the Charter on the access to the file which encompasses 
a more general information obligation; on this obligation see Harlow, C. and Rawlings, 
R. (2014) Process and Procedure in EU Administration. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 88.
 20 On the elements of good governance see Art. 15 tfeu. On the connection between good 
administration and good governance see Hofmann, H., Rowe, G.  and Türk, A.  (2011). 
Administrative law and policy of the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 461; Harlow, 
C.  and Rawlings, R.  (2014). Process and Procedure in EU Administration. cit., p.  209. As 
example of the obligation of assistance and guidance to the public see Art. 1, para. 2, 
of Regulation (EC) No 1367/ 2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, 
p. 13– 19.
 21 See Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2005, case C- 199/ 03, Ireland v. Commission, 
para 69; judgment of 29 October 2009, case C- 29/ 08, SKF, para. 77; See also Tridimas, 
T.  (2006). The General Principles of EU Law. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, p.  242; 
Hofmann, H., Rowe, G. and Türk, A. (2011). Administrative law and policy of the EU, cit., 
p. 173.
 22 See inter alia Court of Justice, judgment of 16 June 1966, case 54/ 65, Châtillon v.  High 
Authority; judgment of 19 May 1983, case 289/ 81, Mavrides v.  Parliament; judgment 
of 20 March 1997, case C- 24/ 95, Land Rheinland- Pfalz v.  Alcan Deutschland. See also 
Sharpston, E.  (1990– 1991). European Community Law and the Doctrine of Legitimate 
Expectations: How Legitimate, and for Whom. Northwestern Journal of International Law 
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in two phases: the registration phase, in which the Commission applies the so- 
called admissibility test (section ii), and the post- registration phase, in which 
the collection of signatures takes place and the Commission pronounces on 
an eventually successful initiative (section iii). In the last section, the Brexit- 
related initiatives will be used as a case study illustrating the evolution of the 
Commission’s practice towards more flexibility and the shortcomings which 
still remain (section iv).
ii Revisiting the Admissibility Test
The right to put in place a European citizens’ initiative as enshrined in Art. 
11(4) teu was rendered concrete through Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011, which was adopted on 
the basis of Art. 24(1) tfeu and entered into force on 1 April 2012.23 Regulation 
(EU) 211/ 2011 was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2019/ 788 (“new Regulation”), 
which entered into force on 1 January 2020. Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011 remains 
in force for ongoing initiatives.24 Since this chapter discusses initiatives which 
were put place on the basis of Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011, reference is primarily 
made to this Regulation.
The procedure which citizens have to follow contains several steps: as a first 
step, the organisers of an initiative who must be EU citizens and residents of 
at least seven different Member States (Art. 3 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011) are 
required to apply for registration in the Commission’s online register by sub-
mitting information on the subject matter and the objectives of the proposed 
initiative (Art. 4 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). The Commission has two months 
to examine the proposed initiative and check whether certain admissibility 
conditions are fulfilled (Art. 4(2) Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). If the initiative is 
found admissible and is registered by the Commission, the signature collection 
process begins (Art. 5 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). The organisers must collect 
within 12 months at least one million signatures from at least one quarter of 
 23 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011 on the citizens’ initiative, OJ L 65, 11.3.2011, p. 1– 22. For critical remarks on Regulation 
211/ 2011, see Dougan, M.  (2011). What are we to make of the citizens’ initiative?, cit., 
p. 1807; Kaufmann, B. (2012). Transnational Babystep: The European citizens’ initiative. 
In:  Τ. Schiller and M.  Setala, eds., Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe; Procedures and conse-
quences of agenda- setting by citizens, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 229.
 24 See Art. 26– 27 Regulation (EU) 2019/ 788 of the European Parliament and the Council of 










Member States (Art. 7 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). Once all the conditions relat-
ing to the collection of signatures have been fulfilled and verified (Art. 8), the 
organisers may submit the initiative to the Commission for its consideration 
(Art. 9 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). The Commission publishes it and receives 
the organisers who can now explain their proposal in detail (Art. 10(1), let. a) 
and b), Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). In addition, a public hearing is organised 
at the European Parliament with the participation of other institutions, the 
Commission included (Art. 11 Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011). Finally, within three 
months following the submission, the Commission sets out in a communica-
tion its legal and political conclusions on the initiative, the action it intends to 
take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action (Art. 10(1), let. 
c), Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011).
From this brief outline of the procedure, it becomes apparent that the role 
of the Commission is crucial at two stages, at the very beginning, at the stage 
of the admissibility check, and at the very end, when the Commission decides 
which action it intends to take in order to give effect to a successful initiative 
(follow- up stage).
The admissibility test encompasses one positive procedural and three neg-
ative substantive conditions. The procedural condition requires that the or-
ganisers have formed a citizens’ committee of at least seven persons who are 
residents of at least seven different Member States (Art. 3 and 4(2), let. b), Reg-
ulation (EU) 211/ 2011). The substantive conditions concern the subject matter 
of the initiative and require that it is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vex-
atious (Art. 4(2) let. c), Regulation (EU) 211/ 2011), it is not manifestly contrary 
to the values of the Union as set out in Art. 2 teu (Art. 4(2), let. d), Regulation 
(EU) 211/ 2011) and, most importantly, as directly dictated by primary law, it 
does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal of a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing 
the Treaties.
This latter condition has proven to be the main hurdle for organisers to achieve 
formal registration of their initiative and it has generated a series of judgments 
of the General Court. Twenty eight initiatives25 have been refused registration 
so far because, according to the Commission’s justification, no legal basis in the 
Treaties could support a legal act of the Union on their subject matter, three 
of which were in the end (partially) registered following a Court judgment.26  
 25 Available at <www.ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ non- registered>.
 26 The Initiatives “Stop ttip”, “Minority SafePack” and “Cohesion policy for the equality of 
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Various stakeholders, including citizens’ organisations,27 academics,28 the Eu-
ropean Parliament29 and the European Ombudsman30 had urged the Commis-
sion, before the introduction of the new Regulation, to reconsider its practice by 
offering better guidance to organisers and applying the admissibility test in a less 
strict way, so as to increase the number of successful registrations.
In the following sub- sections, two landmark judgments, which bear also 
importance for initiatives in the context of the Brexit negotiations, will be 
analysed: firstly, the judgment in case “Minority SafePack”, which opened the 
way for partial registration of citizens’ initiatives (ii.1.); secondly, the judg-
ment in case “stop ttip”, which enabled the registration of initiatives aiming 
to influence ongoing negotiations of international agreements (ii.2.). These 
evolutions will be assessed against the right to participation and the general 
principles of good administration, legal certainty and protection of legitimate 
expectations.
ii.1 Possibility of Partial Registration
The main problem in the initial registration practice had been that the Com-
mission perceived an initiative as an inseparable package leading to either 
acceptance or rejection of the initiative as a whole, without assessing each 
of its different components.31 It seemed to apply a centre of gravity test on 
whether the essence of the initiative lied with the admissible or the non- 
admissible part and decide accordingly.32 This approach prevented initiators 
from understanding which of the elements of their proposal could possibly 
qualify for resubmission, in order to come back with a new admissible proj-
ect.33 The opportunity for the Commission to reconsider this practice was giv-
en with the judgment of the General Court in case “Minority SafePack”. With 
this judgment the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision refusing 
the registration of the initiative “Minority SafePack” on the formal ground of 
lack of justification, because the Commission did not specify which elements 
of the initiative where admissible and which were not (incomplete statement 
 27 See for instance the opinion of the European Citizen Action Service (ecas), cit.
 28 Organ, J.  (2014). Decommissioning direct democracy? European Constitutional Law 
Review 10 (3), pp. 422– 443; Karatzia, A. (2015). The European citizens’ initiative in prac-
tice: legal admissibility concerns. European Law Review 40 (4), pp. 251– 270.
 29 European Parliament Resolution (2015)0382, cit.
 30 Own initiative report of the European Ombudsman of 4 March 2015, OI/ 9/ 2013/ TN.
 31 See for the Commission’s interpretation Minority SafePack v. Commission, cit., para. 21.
 32 See for the Commission’s position Minority SafePack v. Commission, cit., para. 28.

















of reasons).34 The General Court left open the legal consequences of partial 
admissibility.35 Two different options seemed to be possible, namely that par-
tial admissibility leads to full rejection if the inadmissible content constitutes 
the essence of the initiative, or to partial registration if the content is indeed 
separable. As for the possibility of partial registration, it could also be argued 
that this should not be decided alone by the Commission, but that the latter 
should confer with the organisers whether they consent to partial registration.
The Commission’s practice following the judgment in case “Minority Safe-
Pack” shows that, from this point onwards, the Commission identifies the el-
ements of the initiative on which it could make a proposal for an act of the 
Union and accepts registration for these parts.36 This evolution is welcome and 
indeed enables the registration of more initiatives, while respecting the prin-
ciple of conferral of Union powers (Art. 5 teu). Partial registration also takes 
better account of the principle of legitimate expectations, since the registered 
initiative is cleared from its inadmissible parts and therefore both the organ-
isers and potential signatories have in this way an accurate picture of what 
they can achieve through their initiative.
However, the problem in the implementation of this practice is that the 
content of the initiative which is registered in the official Commission register 
(public website) is not adjusted to the Commission’s decision to accept only 
part of the initiative, but it continues to include the inadmissible parts.37 The 
webpage contains a disclaimer that the contents of the page are the sole re-
sponsibility of the organisers of the initiatives and they can in no way be taken 
to reflect the views of the Commission. However, this approach leads to the 
result that the official register does not provide a clear image of the admissi-
ble content of initiatives. This could have the negative effect of creating false 
expectations for those signatories who sign an initiative on the basis of the 
 34 Minority SafePack v.  Commission, cit., para. 29. For a detailed analysis, see Inglese, 
M.  (2018). Recent trends in European Citizens’ Initiatives:  The General Court case- law 
and the Commission’s practice. European Public Law 24 (2), p. 335.
 35 See Minority SafePack v.  Commission, cit., para. 29. This open outcome is in line with 
Article 266(1) tfeu which provides that the institution draws the consequences of the 
annulment of its act.
 36 See the Commission Decision C(2017) 2200 of 29 March 2017 on the partial registra-
tion of the initiative “Minority SafePack”, following the judgment in Minority SafePack 
v. Commission, cit.; see also the Commission Decision C(2017) 3382 of 16 May 2017 on the 
partial registration of the proposed citizens’ initiative entitled “Let us reduce the wage 
and economic differences that tear the EU apart!”.
 37 See for instance the description of the initiative “Minority SafePack” following its partial 
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content featured on the website without looking concretely into the Commis-
sion decision of registration.
This recent practice of partial registration is now crystallised in the new 
Regulation, which proposes a fully- fledged mechanism of exchange of views 
between the Commission and the organisers, when upon request of registra-
tion of an initiative the Commission considers that the whole or parts of the 
initiative manifestly fall(s) outside of the Commission’s powers, with a view to 
enabling at least partial registration of the initiative.38 This proposed mecha-
nism of interaction between the Commission and the organisers is of major 
importance, because it will allow organisers to know in advance the Com-
mission’s position on the admissibility of their initiative, so as to adjust the 
content accordingly in order to achieve successful registration. Currently, such 
exchanges of views and clarifications regarding the content of the proposal 
appear to happen for the first time before the General Court, when the organ-
isers challenge the non- registration of their initiative. This situation is an ob-
stacle to effective democratic participation and is not considered to be in line 
with the principle of good administration in the broad sense, which as out-
lined above,39 requires the provision of assistance and guidance to interested 
citizens. The importance of this principle in the context of European citizens’ 
initiatives has been already stressed by the Court.40 It is thus welcome that 
the new Regulation includes an administrative phase of exchange of views be-
tween the Commission and the organisers.
The new Regulation also provides that, when partial registration takes place, 
the organisers shall ensure that potential signatories are informed of the scope 
of the registration and of the fact that statements of support are collected only 
in relation to the scope of the registration of the initiative.41 This provision is 
also of major importance towards achieving transparency and clarity about 
the final admissible content of an initiative, since, as already mentioned, or-
ganisers have not been adjusting the information provided in the official Com-
mission register following a partial registration.
ii.2 Possibility of Influencing Ongoing Negotiations
A second important judgment, which bears significance also for initiatives in 
the context of Brexit, is the judgment in the case “stop ttip”. The organisers 
of the initiative “stop ttip” requested the Commission inter alia to withdraw 
 38 See Art. 6, para. 4, Regulation (EU) 2019/ 788.
 39 See section i.
 40 See Anagnostakis v. Commission, case C- 589/ 15 P, cit., para. 47.











its recommendation to the Council to authorise the opening of negotiations 
for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip).42 The Commis-
sion rejected the request for registration on the basis of two arguments.
First, the Commission supported the view that Art. 11(4) teu refers only 
to formal Commission proposals leading to the adoption of final acts of the 
Union producing legal effects vis- à- vis third parties; it thus excludes Commis-
sion recommendations which aim at the adoption of preparatory acts by an-
other institution producing effects only among the institutions, such as the 
Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations.43 This Council de-
cision adopted on the basis of Art. 218(3) teu was perceived by the Commis-
sion as a preparatory/ intermediate act; the final act of the procedure leading 
to the adoption of an international agreement would be the Council decision 
authorising the Commission to conclude the agreement.44
The second Commission’s argument was that “negative acts” may be the ob-
ject of citizens’ initiatives only if they seek to amend or repeal existing acts, 
because Art. 11(4) teu provides that initiatives should aim at the adoption of 
an act required for implementing the Treaties (emphasis added). For this reason, 
according to the Commission, it is not possible for citizens to reunite in order 
to stop the institutions from acting for the first time.45
The General Court, following an action for annulment by the organisers of 
the “stop ttip” initiative, ruled that citizens could also invite the Commission 
on the basis of Art. 11(4) teu to submit recommendations for any act of the 
Union, including acts which deploy legal effects only among institutions, since 
the provision of the Treaties does not contain any indication to the contrary.46 
This conclusion was reinforced by the argument that the Council decision au-
thorising the opening of negotiations constitutes a decision in the sense of Art. 
288 tfeu and thus an “act of the Union” in the meaning of Art. 11(4) teu.47 It is 
important to note that the General Court used the principle of democracy as a 
guiding principle when interpreting the legal framework, which is specifically 
pursued by the instrument of the European citizens’ initiative. This principle 
requires, according to the judgment, a broad interpretation of the term “legal 
act of the Union”, so as to enable citizens’ participation in all legal acts which 





 46 Efler v. Commission, cit., para. 35.
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seek to modify the legal order of the Union, such as the acts preparing the con-
clusion of an international agreement.48
It follows from this judgment that the General Court interpreted the term 
“proposal” for an act of the Union, as used in Art. 11(4) teu, in a “non- technical” 
way and beyond the limits of Art. 17(2) teu, thus including also Commission 
recommendations or possibly other acts, with which the Commission gives its 
opinion to another institution for the adoption of any legal act of the Union. 
This broad interpretation of the term “proposal” could also be based on the 
wording of Art. 11(4) teu which refers to “any appropriate proposal” by the 
Commission, leaving the specific instrument open. It is interesting to note that 
the wording of Regulation 211/ 2011 appears to be more restrictive in this sense 
referring to “a proposal” by the Commission and not “any appropriate propos-
al” as in primary law [emphasis added].
The General Court dismissed also the second argument of the Commission 
with the justification that the objective of participation in the democratic life 
of the Union pursued by the mechanism of the European citizens’ initiative 
manifestly includes the power to request the amendment or withdrawal of le-
gal acts, such as the Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations 
with a view to concluding an international agreement. Acts whose object it is 
to prevent the signing and conclusion of such an agreement produce, accord-
ing to the General Court, independent legal effects by preventing, as the case 
may be, an announced modification of European Union law.49 The General 
Court also noted, that, were the Commission’s opinion to be followed, the ab-
surdity would be that citizens would have to await the conclusion of an inter-
national agreement, so as to be able to invite the institutions to end it.50
This judgment bears significant importance, since it clarifies the material 
scope of the European citizens’ initiative. By using the principle of democracy 
as a normative benchmark, the Court interprets Art. 11(4) teu in the broad-
est possible way, with a view to enabling citizen involvement also in the area 
of ongoing negotiations. The straightforward interpretation of the term “legal 
act” as encompassing any legal act of the institutions strengthens not only par-
ticipatory democracy but also legal certainty, because it avoids classifying EU 
 48 Ibid., para. 37. The principle of democracy was used as interpretation guideline also in 
previous cases, see Anagnostakis v. Commission, case T- 450/ 12, cit., para. 26; Constantini 
and others v. Commission, cit., para. 73; Minority SafePack v. Commission, cit., para. 18.
 49 Efler v.  Commission, cit., para. 43. Following this judgment, the Commission registered 
the initiative “stop ttip” with Commission Decision C(2017) 4725 of 4 July 2017 on the 
proposed citizens’ initiative entitled “Stop ttip”.








legal acts in categories which would be difficult for potential organisers and 
citizens to follow.
iii Managing Expectations at the Post- Registration Stage
The organisers of an initiative, even after they have cleared the hurdle of ad-
missibility and have managed to gather the necessary number of signatures, 
have still no guarantee that the Commission will take action in line with their 
proposal. It is clear from the wording of Art. 11(4) teu (“inviting”) that the 
Commission enjoys discretion on whether to follow the proposal made by the 
citizens and which exact action to take (“any appropriate proposal”).51 This 
means that the instrument of citizens’ initiatives constitutes an agenda setting 
tool and not a way to formally initiate the adoption of a legal act.52 The right 
of initiative remains with the Commission. This interpretation according to 
which the Commission has no legal obligation to make a proposal following 
the invitation of a successful initiative was confirmed by the recent judgments 
in the case “One of Us”, both by the General Court and by the Grand Chamber 
of the Court of Justice upon appeal of the organisers.53 The choice made by 
the Treaty not to confer to an eci a formal right of initiative can be explained 
through the Commission’s role in the EU institutional balance.54 Pursuant to 
Art. 17 teu, the Commission is in charge – inter alia – of safeguarding the gen-
eral interest of the EU, ensuring respect of the Treaties (Art. 17(1) teu) and 
initiating the adoption of Union legal acts (Art. 17(2) teu). It follows from this 
last point that the Commission is also responsible for ensuring the coherence 
 51 Compare the wording of Art. 11(4) teu with Art. 225 tfeu on the equivalent right of the 
European Parliament and Art. 241 tfeu on the equivalent right of the Council, which 
both use the term “requests”. See the preparatory works of the Constitutional Treaty, 
during which the initial term “requests” was replaced with the term “invites” in Art. I- 
46 of the draft Constitutional Treaty on the European citizens’ initiatives, 12 June 2003, 
CONV 811/ 03, p. 5. On this, see also Hieber, T. (2014) Die Europäische Bürgerinitiative nach 
dem Vertrag von Lissabon. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 9.
 52 On this agenda- setting function, see Organ, J.  (2014). Decommissioning direct democ-
racy?, cit., p. 424.
 53 One of Us v.  Commission, cit., paras 111 and 122. The judgment of the General Court 
was confirmed by the Court of Justice, judgment of 19 December 2019, case C- 418/ 18 P, 
Puppinck and Others v. Commission (One of Us).
 54 On the “institutional balance” within the EU, see Court of Justice, judgment of 13 June 
1958, case 9/ 56, Meroni v. High Authority, p. 152; judgment of 14 April 2015, case C- 409/ 13, 
Council v. Commission, para. 64; Efler v. Commission, cit., para. 46; One of Us v. Commission, 
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of EU policies and actions55 on the basis of the Union’s annual and multian-
nual programming (Art. 17(1) teu).56 Thus, an initiative launched by citizens 
which contradicts a policy line, especially one based on existing legislation,57 
would provoke a public debate on the issue, but would not necessarily oblige 
the Commission to change its policy line.
Only five initiatives have so far collected the required one million signa-
tures.58 The Commission in its communications59 as a follow- up to these suc-
cessful initiatives committed itself to further strengthening and improving 
the existing legal framework in the relevant subject matter, but it has been 
reproached for not fulfilling (all) the objectives of the organisers and for not 
initiating any new legislation apart from amendments to existing provisions.60
The organisers of the initiative “One of Us” aiming to end the financing of 
activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in 
the areas of research, development aid and public health, have been the first to 
challenge the Commission’s Communication61 on its intended follow- up (non)
action before the General Court. The Commission argued before the Court that 
its communications on its intended action or non- action do not constitute 
 55 See Council v. Commission, cit., para. 87.
 56 On the Union’s annual and multiannual programming see Martenczuk, B. (2019). Art. 17 
EUV. In: E. Grabitz, M. Hilf and M. Nettesheim, eds., Das Recht der EU, Munich: C. H. Beck, 
para. 51.
 57 See the Commission’s argument in One of Us v. Commission, cit., para. 151.
 58 The initiative “Right2Water” on achieving universal access to water and sanitation and 
on exempting water supply and management from internal market rules; the initiative 
“Stop Vivisection” with the aim to phase out animal experiments for scientific purposes; 
the initiative “One of us” aiming to ban and end the financing of activities which presup-
pose the destruction of human embryos and the initiative “Ban glyphosate” aiming to ban 
glyphosate- based herbicides and improve the EU regulatory framework for evaluation of 
pesticides; lastly, the initiative “Minority SafePack”, which calls upon the EU to improve 
the protection of persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and strengthen 
cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union. All five initiatives can be found at <www.
ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ successful>.
 59 The Commission Communications can be found at <www.ec.europa.eu/ citizens- 
initiative/ public/ initiatives/ successful>.
 60 See Karatzia, A.  (2017). The European citizensʼ initiative and the EU institutional bal-
ance: on realism and the possibilities of affecting EU lawmaking. Common Market Law 
Review 54 (1), pp. 177– 208, 198; Bélier, S. (2014). Fulfilling the promise of the eci, learning 
from the Right2Water experience. In:  C. Berg and J.  Thomson, eds., An ECI that works! 
Learning from the first two years of the European citizens’ initiative, Germany: Alfter, p. 81. 
On the follow- up action of the Commission to the so far successful initiatives, see the 
second Commission report com(2018) 157 final, cit., p. 10 et seq.
















reviewable acts, because they do not produce legal effects capable of affecting 
the interests of the applicants by bringing about a distinct change in their le-
gal position.62 Contrary to the Commission’s contentions, the Court ruled that 
such communications are indeed reviewable, because they are the closure act 
of an administrative procedure, which the Commission is obliged to issue while 
respecting certain procedural guarantees, such as the obligation to state rea-
sons.63 The General Court allowed judicial review so as to control the respect 
of these procedural guarantees, while noting that such review is of a limited 
nature given the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Commission.64
Assessing the Commission’s follow- up practice to date against the princi-
ples of good administration, legal certainty and legitimate expectations, two 
lessons can be learnt, which might help managing expectations for future suc-
cessful initiatives and are relevant for Brexit- related initiatives.
iii.1 False Expectations in Case of Partially Inadmissible Initiatives
In the case of two successful initiatives, the Commission indicated in its Com-
munications to the organisers at the very late stage of follow- up that it could 
not take any action for part of the aims of the initiatives, since they were Mem-
ber State rather than EU competencies. More specifically, this concerned one 
of the aims of the initiative “Right2Water” to exempt water supply and man-
agement from privatisation65 and the part of the initiative “One of us” aiming 
to ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of 
human embryos for research purposes.66 The fact that these initiatives were 
fully registered despite containing certain inadmissible elements created false 
expectations for the organisers, the signatories as well as the general public that 
the Commission is competent to propose legislation in line with the initiatives. 
The Commission has been criticised for not fulfilling (all) the objectives of the 
organisers and for not initiating any new legislation in this regard,67although 
 62 One of Us v. Commission, cit., para. 69.
 63 One of Us v. Commission, cit., paras 77 et seq.
 64 One of Us v. Commission, cit., paras 169– 170.
 65 See Commission Communication com(2014) 177 of 19 March 2014 on the European 
Citizens’ Initiative “Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a 
commodity!”.
 66 See Commission Communication com(2014) 355.
 67 See the reaction of the “Right2Water” citizens’ committee at <http:// www.right-
2water.eu/ news/ press- release- commission- lacks- ambition- replying- first- european- 
citizens%E2%80%99- initiative>. See among the academic commentators Karatzia, 
A.  (2017). The European citizensʼ initiative and the EU institutional balance, cit., 198; 
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the real problem was the creation of false expectations from the outset. This 
example illustrates the importance of clearing the admissibility of the main 
aims of an initiative at the registration phase. Otherwise, the early admissibil-
ity check loses its rationale. The recent Commission practice of clearing the 
inadmissible parts through partial registration, as explained above, is expected 
to bring more clarity to the organisers and potential signatories of what they 
can reasonably expect as the outcome of their initiative.
iii.2 Difficulty of Influencing Ongoing Procedures
Another situation which can create frustration and disappointment for organ-
isers is where they aim to influence ongoing procedures, such as the negotia-
tion or signature of international agreements. In the case of the initiative “stop 
ttip”, the organisers invited the Commission to recommend to the Council to 
repeal the negotiating mandate for the ttip and not to conclude the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta). The request for registration 
was made in July 2014, whereas in August 2014 the negotiations for ceta were 
already concluded and the negotiating mandate for ttip had already been ap-
proved by the Council one year before the request for registration.68
Even assuming that there was the political will to repeal the negotiating 
mandate for ttip, it is legally unclear whether the Commission has the power 
to return to the Council with a new recommendation after the Council has 
already approved the negotiating mandate. More precisely, Art. 293(2) tfeu 
provides that the Commission can amend its proposals as long as the Coun-
cil has not acted. The same was held by the Court of Justice as regards the 
Commission’s right to withdraw its proposals under certain conditions.69 The 
Commission must respect this requirement also when it amends or withdraws 
a proposal following the invitation of a citizens’ initiative, meaning that the 
withdrawal or amendment must take place before the Council has acted, since 
the Treaty provision does not contain any exceptions. Here, the question arises 
whether the same limitation should apply also when citizens invite the Com-
mission to amend or withdraw its recommendation after the Council has al-
ready acted. In case this limitation of Art. 293(2) tfeu is to be applied mutatis 
mutandis also in the context of Art. 218(3) tfeu, it is highly doubtful that the 
discretion and control: Reflections on the institutional position of the Commission within 
the European citizens’ initiative process. European Law Journal 23 (3– 4), pp. 250– 271, 261; 
Inglese, M. (2018). Recent trends in European Citizens’ Initiatives, cit., p. 358.
 68 On the facts, see Efler v. Commission, cit., para. 1.
 69 Council v. Commission, cit. On this judgment, see Ritleng, D. (2016) Does the European 







Commission can come back with a new recommendation advising the oppo-
site course of action to that it recommended previously.
The judgment of the General Court does not deal with these aspects at all, 
stating in a rather minimal way that the citizens’ initiative “stop ttip” is “far 
from amounting to an interference in an ongoing legislative procedure”.70 It 
can be derived from this that the General Court assessed in abstracto whether 
the Commission has a general competence in the subject matter of the initia-
tive without taking into account in concreto whether it would be able to submit 
any appropriate proposal on this matter in terms of timing. The aspect of tim-
ing is of particular importance bearing in mind that the organisers also need 
time for the collection of signatures (a maximum of one year).71
The case of “stop ttip” shows that the lengthy procedure of a European cit-
izens’ initiative does not seem to be best suited for quick reactions from citizens 
with a view to blocking ongoing procedures. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine 
that a citizens’ initiative could successfully block the ongoing procedure in re-
lation to the conclusion of an international agreement, since the gathering of 
signatures has no suspensive effect on the actions of the institutions.
In sum, the Commission has in recent years been urged to become more 
open and flexible when interpreting the admissibility of eci s. This is a wel-
come development, but it raises a set of new challenges to protect the legiti-
mate expectations of organisers and signatories as to the real potential of their 
initiatives. We can therefore observe a tension between a generous admissibil-
ity control with a view to enhancing participation and the need to adequately 
inform the public of what can be actually and pragmatically achieved at the 
end of the process. The difficulty of solving this tension by striking the right 
balance is evident also in the case of Brexit- related initiatives. It will be shown 
that Brexit- related initiatives have benefitted from the Commission’s more 
open approach when applying the admissibility test as it has developed after 
the aforementioned judgments in cases “Minority SafePack” and “stop ttip”, 
but that no measures have been taken in order to manage the expectations of 
the citizens involved.
iv Brexit- Related Initiatives as a Case Study
Brexit- related initiatives which have requested registration from the European 
Commission can be divided into two categories: first, initiatives aiming directly 
 70 Efler v. Commission, cit., para. 47.
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or indirectly at reversing the decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU, and, 
second, initiatives aiming at securing the rights of citizens whose countries 
withdraw from the EU. The Commission has applied a strict admissibility test 
to the first category stressing the sovereign power of the UK regarding the 
withdrawal decision, while it has shown considerable openness and flexibility 
vis- à- vis the second category.
iv.1 Towards a More Flexible Admissibility Test
The category of initiatives aiming directly or indirectly at reversing the deci-
sion of the UK to withdraw from the EU consists of the initiatives “stop Brexit” 
and “British friends- stay with us in EU”. The main aim of the initiative “stop 
Brexit” is that the UK stays in the European Union, without any further spec-
ification.72 As regards the second initiative in this category, “British friends- 
stay with us in EU”, its main aim is to “create a platform which would enable 
all European citizens to take part in this initiative and to reach a majority of 
British citizens (including those which live in the EU who were effectively dis-
enfranchised in the original referendum) thereby giving to all British citizens 
an opportunity to voice their opinion”.73
The Commission rejected registration of both initiatives with the argument 
that there is no legal basis in the Treaties which would allow for the adoption of 
a legal act of the Union in order to prevent a Member State from withdrawing 
from the Union, since the withdrawal decision is a sovereign decision of Mem-
ber States according to their own constitutional requirements pursuant to Art. 
50(1) teu.74 This argumentation appears to be self- evident for the initiative 
“stop Brexit”. However, the answer as regards the admissibility of the initia-
tive “British friends- stay with us in EU” does not seem to be straight- forward. 
This initiative does not request that the Commission adopts an act in order to 
prevent the withdrawal of the UK, but merely the creation of a platform which 
will unite EU citizens against the Brexit outcome. The exact mission of this 
platform is not entirely clear; however, the initiative seems to request facilita-
tion in order to unify the voices of British citizens against Brexit. It thus seems 
to invite the Commission not to adopt a legal act, but to proceed to a “material 
act”, the creation of a platform.
 72 Available at <http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ non- registered/ 
details/ 3511>.
 73 Available at <http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ non- registered/ 
details/ 4061>.










The instrument of the European citizens’ initiative should aim, according to 
Art. 11(4) teu, at the adoption of legal acts. The Commission’s previous prac-
tice shows that the Commission does not exclude taking also measures other 
than the adoption of legal acts, such as the organisation of conferences, in or-
der to fulfil the aims of an initiative.75 However, such measures seem to be of 
a supplementary or preparatory nature vis- à- vis the adoption of a legal act. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that an initiative which aims exclusively at a 
“material” or “simple” act, such as the creation of a platform, and not of a legal 
act of the Union, falls outside the scope of the Art. 11(4) teu. Even though the 
outcome is the same, the Commission’s justification of the rejection of the ini-
tiative does not seem to be reflecting the real content of the initiative, leaving 
the organisers without any sufficient explanation. The situation of unclarity as 
to the material scope of a European citizens’ initiative hampers legal certainty. 
The Commission missed the opportunity to clarify whether Art. 11(4) teu fully 
excludes “material acts” or allows them only complementary, in conjunction 
with legal acts. This question apparently continues to remain perplexing for 
citizens.
The second category of initiatives, aiming at securing the rights of citizens 
whose countries withdraw from the EU, comprises four initiatives. All four ini-
tiatives managed to pass the hurdle of admissibility. The first initiative, regis-
tered as “European Free Movement Instrument” (known also as the “Choose 
Freedom initiative”), aimed at giving UK nationals EU passports in the form 
of a unified laissez- passer document,76 similar to the laissez- passer document 
currently issued for EU officials and other staff members of the EU.77 Accord-
ing to the Commission’s press communication, the College of Commission-
ers decided to register this initiative, concluding that a legal act of the Union 
with the content of this initiative could indeed be adopted under the current 
Treaties.78 The justification of this positive decision is indeed not evident, es-
pecially if it is taken into account that the legal basis of issuance of the current 
laissez- passer documents is Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities 
of the European Union, which aims to facilitate the functioning of the EU in-
stitutions, by conferring inter alia certain rights to their staff members. It is 
thus left unanswered under which basis a legal act of the Union conferring EU 
 75 See C(2015) 3773 of 3 June 2015 on the European Citizens’ Initiative “Stop Vivisection”.
 76 Available at <http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ obsolete/ details/ 
2017/ 000001>.
 77 See Council Regulation (EU) No 1417/ 2013 of 17 December 2013 laying down the form of 
the laissez- passer issued by the European Union, OJ L 353, 28.12.2013, p. 26– 39.
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passports to non- EU citizens who are not employees of the institutions could 
be adopted.
This decision is diametrically opposed to the previous Commission prac-
tice, during which the Commission was examining in a very thorough and 
detailed way the possible legal bases for an initiative, without taking positive 
registration decisions in abstract terms, i.e. without having concretely identi-
fied at least one legal basis which could support the aim of the initiative.79 Fur-
thermore, it is the first time that the press communication refers to a decision 
of the “College of Commissioners”80 and that the decision is signed on behalf 
of the College by the first Vice- President F. Timmermans, while all the previ-
ous decisions concerning the registration of European citizens’ initiatives were 
signed by the Commission’s Secretary General. This new practice of signature 
by the competent Vice- President has continued for all subsequent registration 
decisions to date, demonstrating a clear intention of the Commission to retain 
control of the admissibility practice at the highest level and to show to the 
public that it highly values the instrument of the European citizens’ initiative. 
This change of practice is explicitly mentioned in the second Commission re-
port to the European Parliament and Council on the application of Regulation 
211/ 2011.81
It is not surprising that this both procedural and substantive change of prac-
tice began after the hearings in cases “Minority SafePack” and “stop ttip” and 
shortly before the General Court delivered its judgments in these cases, annul-
ling the Commission decisions not to register the initiatives at stake. For all 
these reasons, the positive decision of the Commission registering the “Euro-
pean Free Movement Instrument” initiative seems to mark a new era as regards 
the Commission’s practice when assessing the admissibility of initiatives.
This new approach, showing considerable openness when assessing wheth-
er the Treaties contain a legal basis which could support the object of the ini-
tiative, was confirmed also in three subsequent initiatives related to Brexit and 
citizens’ rights. With the initiative “EU- citizenship for Europeans:  United in 
Diversity in Spite of jus soli and jus sanguinis” (informally known as “Flock 
Brexit”), the organisers aimed at separating EU citizenship and nationality.82 
In a similar vein, the aim of the initiative “Retaining European Citizenship” 
 79 See also the facts mentioned in Constantini and others v.  Commission, cit., para. 54, as 
regards the Commission’s detailed assessment of possible legal bases.
 80 Brussels, 21 December 2016, IP/ 16/ 4436.
 81 Second Commission report com(2018) 157 final, cit., p. 5.











was to “retain the rights of EU citizenship for all those who have already ex-
ercised their freedom of movement prior to the departure of a Member State 
leaving the Union, and for those nationals of a departing State who wish to 
retain their status as citizens of the Union”.83 Similar to both these initiatives, 
the last initiative “Permanent European Union Citizenship” invites the Com-
mission to assure all EU citizens that, once attained, the fundamental status of 
EU citizenship is permanent and their rights acquired.84
All three initiatives aim(ed) in essence at the adoption of an act of the 
Union which would enable EU citizens whose countries withdraw from the 
Union to retain their rights and status of EU citizen. In all three cases, the Com-
mission responded in its registration decisions that it cannot propose an act of 
the Union aiming at granting the citizenship of the Union to persons who do 
not hold the nationality of a Member State. However, it accepted registration 
of the initiatives based on the understanding that they aim at ensuring that fol-
lowing the withdrawal of a Member State its citizens continue to benefit from 
similar rights compared to EU citizens.85 This means that although the subject 
matter of all three initiatives, as initially submitted by the organisers falls out-
side the powers of the Commission under the current Treaties, the Commis-
sion “re- qualified” their subject matter in a way that would allow acceptance 
for registration and collection of signatures. Requalification seems to go a step 
further than partial registration, since the Commission does not merely “clear” 
an initiative from its inadmissible elements, but it adjusts the subject in a way 
that could fall within its competences.
iv.2 Shortcomings at the Post- Registration Stage
This openness and cooperative spirit demonstrates a clear change of the Com-
mission’s practice and enables a more effective use of the instrument. Howev-
er, the Commission has not so far ensured in cases of such “re- qualification” of 
content or in cases of partial registration that the information on an initiative 
 83 Available at <http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ obsolete/ details/ 
2017/ 000005>.
 84 Available at <http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ public/ initiatives/ open/ details/ 
2018/ 000003>.
 85 See Commission Decision C(2017) 2001 of 22 March 2017 on the proposed citizens’ initia-
tive entitled “EU Citizenship for Europeans: United in Diversity in Spite of jus soli and jus 
sanguinis”; Commission Decision C(2017) 2002 of 22 March 2017 on the proposed citizens’ 
initiative entitled “Retaining European Citizenship” and Commission Decision C(2018) 
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made available to potential signatories and the public corresponds to the exact 
scope of the registration by the Commission.
The Commission made an attempt to guide organisers towards gathering 
signatures on the basis of the “requalified” content of the initiative. More 
specifically, in its positive decision to register the initiative “EU Citizenship 
for Europeans” the Commission indicated that “statements of support may 
be collected, based on the understanding that it aims at a proposal for a le-
gal act of the Union that would ensure that, following the withdrawal of a 
Member State from the EU the citizens of that country can continue to ben-
efit from similar rights to those which they enjoyed whilst that country was a 
Member State”.86 However, the Commission did not use an equivalent caveat 
when accepting registration of the similar initiatives “Retaining European Cit-
izenship” and “Permanent European Union Citizenship”. This means that the 
registration of these two initiatives was unconditional and only in the recitals 
of the registration decisions the Commission mentioned this clarification of 
scope, although the need for a conditional registration is evident for these 
initiatives as well.
Furthermore, in all cases, the title and main aims of the initiatives, as 
displayed in the official Commission register and on the webpages where 
electronic signatures could/ can be gathered, have not been adjusted to the 
Commission’s “requalification” and feature(d) the initial inadmissible aim to 
decouple EU citizenship from nationality. As aforementioned, the webpage of 
the official register contains a disclaimer that the content of the page of the 
register dedicated to each initiative is the sole responsibility of the organisers 
of the initiatives. However, this approach leads to the result that the official 
register does not provide a clear image of the admissible content of initiatives.
Given this problematic situation, it is welcome, as mentioned above, that 
the new Regulation provides that, when partial registration takes place, the 
organisers shall ensure that potential signatories are informed of the scope of 
the registration and of the fact that statements of support are collected only 
in relation to the scope of the registration of the initiative.87 The obligation of 
organisers to accurately inform potential signatories should also apply, when 
the Commission “requalifies” an initiative, so as to shape it in a way that falls 
within its powers.
Apart from the organisers, the Commission should also ensure that all in-
formation appearing on its official register corresponds to the exact scope 
 86 See Commission Decision C(2017) 2001.






of the registered initiative in accordance with the principle of good admin-
istration. As outlined above,88 this principle requires that the Commission 
provides adequate information and assistance to those involved in an ad-
ministrative procedure. The different stages of a European citizens’ initiative 
constitute altogether an administrative procedure, which ends with a Com-
munication of the Commission in case of collection of the necessary number 
of signatures.89 It is true that the collection of signatures takes place without 
the Commission’s intervention. However, the Commission should ensure that 
this collection is carried out in a transparent way and on the basis of accu-
rate information. Otherwise, even the mere validity of signatures which were 
collected on the basis of inaccurate or wrong information can be called into 
question.
None of the Brexit- related initiatives managed to gather sufficient popular 
support in any Member State in order to reach the required one million sig-
natures and be able to request from the Commission a possible follow- up ac-
tion in line with their aims.90 They gained certain popularity in essence only 
in the UK and did not manage to create a transnational movement, which 
constitutes the added value of the eci.91 Different reasons can be evoked 
in order to justify this failure, such as the limited network of the organisers, 
the fragmentation of signatures among similar initiatives or even the lack of 
interest of other EU citizens to mobilise for the sake of securing the rights 
of UK nationals. An important reason, connected with the subject matter of 
this contribution, could also be the non- adjustment of the titles and main 
objectives of the registered Brexit- related initiatives so as to be in line with 
the current Treaties. It is possible that the discrepancy between the current 
Treaties, which make EU citizenship conditional upon holding the nationali-
ty of a Member State, and the initiatives’ objectives, which aim at decoupling 
EU citizenship from the nationality of a Member State, have caused loss of 
credibility of these initiatives.
In order to restore trust in the instrument and to present to the general pub-
lic a realistic picture of the potential of an initiative, the need for reinforced 
mechanisms of cooperation among the Commission and the initiatives’ organ-
isers are critical.
 88 See section i.
 89 One of Us v. Commission, cit., para. 76.
 90 See the archived initiatives with insufficient support at http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- 
initiative/ public/ initiatives/ obsolete/ conditions_ not_ fulfilled.
 91 On the strengthening of trans- European society as an added value element of the eci, see 
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iv Conclusion
The instrument of the European citizens’ initiative, as a tool of participatory 
democracy and EU citizenship, has the potential to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the political agenda and strengthen the active participation of EU citizens. The 
European Commission had been criticised for depriving the European citizens’ 
initiative of its effectiveness due to its own institutional practice, particularly 
regarding the application of a strict admissibility test and the lack of adequate 
guidance to organisers. The Commission’s practice following the judgment in 
case “Minority SafePack” shows that, from this point onwards, the Commission 
identifies the elements of the initiative on the basis of which it could make a 
proposal for an act of the Union and accepts registration for these parts. This 
adaptation of the Commission’s practice is welcome and indeed enables the 
registration of more initiatives, while respecting the principle of conferral of 
Union powers. Partial registration also better takes into account the principle 
of legitimate expectations, since the registered initiative is cleared from its in-
admissible parts and therefore both the organisers and potential signatories 
have this way an accurate picture of what they can achieve through their ini-
tiative.
The effective use of the instrument of citizens’ initiatives depends also on 
a clear understanding of citizens as to its material scope of application. The 
judgment in case “stop ttip” has contributed to enhancing legal clarity in this 
respect. However, the Commission, through its reasoning when accepting or 
rejecting initiatives, can further reinforce legal certainty, by explaining clearly 
to citizens what types of acts may fall within the material scope of an initiative. 
As the analysis of the admissibility of the initiative “British friends- stay with 
us in EU”, which aimed at creating a discussion platform for Brexit, has shown, 
it remains unclear whether material acts could be the (principal) object of an 
initiative.
Brexit- related initiatives aiming at securing the rights of UK citizens have 
benefitted from the Commission’s more open approach when assessing the 
admissibility of initiatives. When treating these initiatives, the Commission 
went even a step further than partial registration and showed a more proactive 
stance:  it did not merely “clear” an initiative from its inadmissible elements, 
but it adjusted, i.e. requalified, the subject in a way that could fall within its 
competences.
However, the problem in the concrete implementation of this new approach 
is that the content of the initiative which was registered in the official Commis-
sion register (public website) was not adjusted to the Commission’s decision, 
which had only accepted part of the initiative or which “requalified” the object, 
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but continued to include the inadmissible parts. This could have the negative 
effect of creating false expectations for the signatories of the initiative, who 
will sign the initiative on the basis of the content featured on the website with-
out looking concretely into the Commission decision of registration.
The impact of this instrument in the context of the Brexit negotiations can 
be assessed as limited. None of the Brexit- related initiatives have managed to 
gather sufficient popular support in order to reach the required one million 
signatures and be able to request from the Commission a possible follow- up 
action in line with their aims. A  possible reason for this outcome could be 
the lack of credibility of these initiatives, whose titles and main objectives, 
as presented throughout the signature collection process, were at odds with 
the current Treaties as regards the relationship between EU citizenship and 
nationality of a Member State. The Commission should therefore guide the 
future organisers of an initiative as to how to adjust its title and content in 
accordance with the registration decision. Such obligations of assistance and 
cooperation derive from the principle of good administration understood 
in a broad sense through the lens of good governance. The evolution of the 
Commission’s role from a mere respondent to a facilitator or even supporter 
of citizens’ initiatives could potentially enhance the institutional role of this 
instrument. The initiation of six Brexit- related initiatives clearly demonstrates 
that, in a pressing situation for citizens’ rights, the European citizens’ initiative 
constitutes an important tool for EU citizens to raise their voices together. It 
remains to be seen whether these voices will gain greater force in the future.
∵
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The “Sale” of Conditional Citizenship: the Cyprus 
Investment Programme under the Lens of EU Law
Sofya Kudryashova*
i Introduction
The rise of investment migration has become subject to intense study world-
wide. These schemes are characterised as an ‘exchange of national member-
ship rights for immigrants’ financial and human capital’ and have been intro-
duced worldwide with great success, especially in North and Latin America.1 
Despite facing criticism,2 the increasing popularity of investment migration 
 * Corporate Administrator at phc Tsangarides llc. I would like to express my gratitude to Pro-
fessor Dimitry Kochenov for his guidance and encouragement throughout the entire process 
of writing this article. All views expressed herein are personal.
 1 Gramlen, A., Kutarna, C.  and Monk, A.  H. B.  (2016). Re- thinking Immigrant Investment 
Funds. Investment Migration Working Papers No. 2016/ 1; Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship 
by Investment (Amendment) Act (2016) published in the Official Gazette, Vol 36; Dominica 
Economic Citizenship Program, available at http:// www.dominicacitizenshipbyinvestment.
com; Barzey, U.  P. (2015). 4 Caribbean Citizenship By Investment Programs, available on 
https:// www.caribbeanandco.com/ 4- caribbean- citizenship- by- investment- programs; Valen-
cia, M. (2017). Passports for cash: Citizens of Anywhere, available at https:// www.1843mag-
azine.com/ features/ citizens- of- anywhere; Krakat, M. B. (2018). Genuine Links beyond State 
and Market Control: The Sale of Citizenship by Investment in International and Suprana-
tional Legal Perspective. Bond Law Review 30.
 2 Schachar, A. (2018). Dangerous Liaisons: Money and Citizenship, in Bauböck, R. (ed), Debat-
ing Transformations of National Citizenship. Springer, Cham, pp. 11– 12; Barbulescu, R. (2018). 
Global mobility corridors for the ultra- rich. The neoliberal transformation of citizenship, in 
Bauböck, R. (ed), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship. Springer, Cham, pp. 29; 
Scherrer, A.  and Thirion, E.  (2018). Citizenship by Investment (cbi) and Residency by In-
vestment (rbi) schemes in the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service (PE 627.128), 
pp. 20– 25; Cooper, H. (2016). mep s Slam Cypriot Citizenship- For- Sale Scheme. https:// www.
politico.eu/ article/ meps- slam- cypriot- citizenship- for- sale- scheme- schengen- area/ ; Mavelli, 
L.  (2018). Citizenship for Sale and the Neoliberal Political Economy of Belonging. Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, pp. 1, 4– 5; Parker, O. (2016). Commercializing Citizenship in Crisis 
EU:  The Case of Immigrant Investor Programmes. Journal of Common Market Studies 55, 
pp. 234– 345, 338– 340; Klirides, S. (2017). Σχέδια προσέλκυσης επενδυτών μέσω της αγοράς γης 
οδηγούν σε τεχνητή αύξηση των τιμών των ακινήτων και συνεπώς σε δημιουργία υπεραξίας (Plans 
to attract investors through the land market lead to artificially rising property prices and the 










schemes has reached the EU, with Austria, Malta and the Republic of Cyprus 
(hereinafter ‘Cyprus’ or ‘Republic’) being the leading Member States grant-
ing national and therefore EU citizenship to third- country nationals in ex-
change for financial contribution to their economies.3 Cyprus, a member of 
the Union since 2004, introduced its Investment Programme in 2013, which 
has changed over the years and the newest amendments were imposed as of 
15th of May 2019.4 As the Programme is proving successful in attracting for-
eign investors,5 the importance of examining the potential legal issues orig-
inating from the criteria imposed on applicants and their aftermath under 
EU law is indisputable to ensure its legality. The strict territorial link to the 
institution of citizenship6 as an attribute of state sovereignty7 has been loos-
ened through the formation of polities beyond the state, with the emergence 
of the EU and the institution of Union citizenship8 as prime examples. The 
criteria imposed on applicants are to a certain extent similar to those of oth-
er investment migration programmes, a topic elaborated in the first section 
of this article. However, two elements of the Programme are open to ques-
tion: first, applicants must retain residential property permanently in the Re-
public to preserve their citizenship status and second, non- compliance with 
 3 Surak, K.  (2016). Global Citizenship 2.0:  The Growth of Citizenship by Investment Pro-
grammes. imc- rp 2016/ 3, pp.  16– 17, 21, 24– 25; Baaren, L.  and Li, H.  (2018). Wealth Influx, 
Wealth Exodus: Investment Migration from China to Portugal. imc- rp 2018/ 1, pp. 2– 3; Dz-
ankic, J. (2012). The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in Comparative Per-
spective. eui Working Papers rscas 2012/ 14, pp. 11– 13; Parker (n 2), pp. 335.
 4 Extract from the minutes of the Ministerial Council Meeting Dated 13/ 2/ 2019, The Cyprus 
Investment Programme, Decision Number 86.879, available on http:// www.cm.gov.cy/ 
cm/ cm.nsf/ All/ B374F161F3F53A07C22583F300273513/ $file/ 86%20879.pdf?Open Element; 
Cyprus Investment Programme on the basis of subsection (2)  of section 111A of the Civil 
Registry Laws of 2002– 2019’ available on http:// www.moi.gov.cy/ moi/ moi.nsf/ all/ A54823EF-
D5AA75DDC22583FE00224C1F/ $file/ CYPRUS%20INVESTEMENT%20PROGRAMME_ 
15.5.2019.pdf?openelement.
 5 Farolfi, S., Harding, L.  and Orphanides, S.  (2018). EU Citizenship for sale as Russian 
oligarch buys Cypriot passport, available on https:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 
2018/ mar/ 02/ eu- citizenship- for- sale- as- russian- oligarch- oleg- deripaska- buys- cypriot- 
passport; Leptos, P.  (2018). Σχέδιο πολιτογράφησης μέσω επένδυσης:  Σημαντικά τα οφέλη 
για την οικονομία (Scheme for naturalisation through investment: significant benefits for 
the economy), available on https:// inbusinessnews.reporter.com.cy/ opinions/ article/ 
183434/ schedio- politogafisis- meso- ependysis- simantika- ta- ofeli- ga- tin- oikonomia.
 6 Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University 
Press, pp. 23– 26.
 7 Kochenov, D. (2009). Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Re-
lationship between Status and Rights. Columbia Journal of European Law 15, pp. 178.
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the criterion mentioned results in the retroactive revocation of their Cypriot 
and EU citizenship.
This article analyses the legal implications of the acquisition of EU citi-
zenship through the Cyprus Investment Programme in light of EU law, par-
ticularly on the free movement of capital and citizenship. Accordingly, by 
focusing on the abovementioned aspects, two principal questions will be 
addressed:
 1. Does the requirement to permanently own residential property in Cy-
prus result in a violation of the free movement of capital under EU law?
 2. Does the possibility of revocation of Cypriot nationality for non- compli-
ance with the abovementioned requirement violate the principles estab-
lished in EU citizenship case law?
To answer the first question, section two will focus on the origins of the free-
dom of movement of capital and on the constraints imposed on it by the Pro-
gramme’s requirements. Following a close examination of the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘cjeu’ or ‘the Court’), the under-
lying presumption that economic objectives cannot justify restrictions on cap-
ital movements9 will aid in the assessment of the legality of the Programme. 
The following section examines the second question; throughout its evolution 
in the case law of the cjeu and the work of legal scholars, Union citizenship 
has acquired a unique status which is not a mere extension of the Member 
States’ nationalities.10 The applicability of Union law in matters of citizenship 
was established in Micheletti,11 and the material scope of Union citizenship 
was further expanded in Rottmann12 and Ruiz Zambrano.13 The evaluation of 
the legality of the Cyprus Investment Programme in light of EU citizenship 
case law will show that Cyprus cannot take measures which will undermine 
the rights attached to EU citizenship, nor should it place its citizens under a 
legal regime, which would not allow the future prospect of exercising the said 
 9 Court of Justice, judgment of 4 June 2002, case C- 367/ 98, Commission v Portuguese Repub-
lic, para 52.
 10 Szpunar, M.  and Blas López, M.  E. (2017). Some Reflections on Member State 
Nationality:  A Prerequisite of EU Citizenship and an Obstacle to Its Enjoyment, in 
Kochenov, D.  (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism:  The Role of Rights. Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 111– 112.
 11 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July1992, case C- 369/ 90 Mario Vicente Micheletti and others 
v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria.
 12 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, case C- 135/ 08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat 
Bayern.
 13 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office 











rights.14 In this regard, the status and the rights of the family members of the 
investor will also be taken into consideration and the Rottmann criteria will 
be applied by analogy to the Cyprus Investment Programme. Its examination 
in light of the abovementioned will lead to conclusions suggesting an urgent 
need to amend the Programme in order to comply with Union law.
ii The Unique Case of the Cyprus Investment Programme
Before going through the specific attributes of the Investment Programme in-
troduced in Cyprus, it is important to set out the geopolitical conditions of the 
island in order to understand its relationship with the Union and the context 
in which the Programme will be analysed.
Following the Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the unrecognised 
declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(hereafter ‘the trnc’) in 1983,15 Cypriot membership of the EU was achieved 
in 2004, but the application of the acquis communitaire is suspended in the 
northern part of the island’s territory.16 The status of the trnc is a unique case 
in the EU, very different to that enjoyed in the outermost regions17 or overseas 
territories18 of its other Member States, as the suspension of the acquis there is 
 14 Kochenov, D.  (2011). A  Real European Citizenship:  A New Jurisdiction Test:  A Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European Law 
14, pp. 94, 96.
 15 Ker- Lindsay, J. (2011). The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University 
Press, pp. 5– 6.
 16 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic 
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded – Protocol No 10 on Cyprus [2003] OJ L 236, 23.9.2003.
 17 In Outermost Regions (9) EU law applies according to Article 355 (1) tfeu, under condi-
tions laid down by the Council in Regulations 1447/ 2001, 1448/ 2001, 1449/ 2001, 1450/ 2001, 
1451/ 2001, [2001] OJ L198/ 1 and Regulations 1452/ 2001, 1453/ 2001, 1454/ 2001, [2001] OJ L 
198, 21.07.2001. See Skoutaris, N. (2017). Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland 
and Northern Ireland Remain in the EU and/ or the Single Market? Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 300; For more information on the status of Outermost 
Regions see Omarjee, I. (2011). Specific Measures for the Outermost Regions after the Entry 
into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in Kochenov, D. (ed) EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost 
Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis. Wolters 
Kluwer, Leiden, pp. 121– 136.
 18 These are territories where the applicability of EU law is governed by Part 4 of the tfeu 
and their corresponding association agreements. See Skoutaris, N.  (2017). Territorial 
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a consequence of a military intervention.19 It has been acknowledged that the 
area is under the effective control of Turkey20 and as a consequence, a special 
regime has been established for the Turkish- Cypriot community residing in 
the north of the island. Although, the status of Union citizenship of Turkish 
Cypriots and the rights it entails are uncontested, they remain in ‘hiberna-
tion’21 as long as they reside in the trnc, because the protection of their rights 
there falls under the jurisdiction of Turkey.22 To provide certain guarantees for 
the enjoyment of EU rights for such citizens, the Union adopted the Green 
Line Regulation on the administration of the rules concerning the crossing of 
the line dividing the island.23 It is worth mentioning that the Green Line does 
not constitute a border in the EU;24 it authorises Cyprus to impose checks on 
the crossing of persons, goods and services that originate or have as their des-
tination the trnc.25 Due to this state of affairs, the Investment Programme 
discussed in this article is enforced only in the southern part of the territory 
of Cyprus, as that is the only area of the island where the Cypriot government 
exercises effective control and where EU law is applied in its entirety.
or the Single Market? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 301– 302. For 
more information on the status of the Overseas Territories see Clegg, P. (2013). European 
Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games:  The EU Overseas Countries and 
Territories. The Round Table, pp. 492– 494; Tryfonidou, A. (2010). The Free Movement of 
Goods, the Overseas Countries and Territories, and the EU’s Outermost Regions: Some 
Problematic Aspects. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 37, pp.  317– 338; Kochenov, 
D. (2011). EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and 
Territories, Territories Sui Generis. Wolters Kluwer, Leiden, pp. 47– 50.
 19 Skoutaris, N. (2011). The Cyprus Issue: The Four Freedoms in a Member State Under Siege. 
Oxford University Press, pp. 52– 54.
 20 Art. 1, Protocol 10 on Cyprus (n 16); Skoutaris, N. (2005). Differentiation in European Union 
Citizenship l aw: The Cyprus Problem, in Inglis, K. and Ott, A. (eds), The Constitution for 
Europe and an Enlarging Union: Union in Diversity? Europa Law Publishing, pp. 172– 173; 
European Court of Human Rights, decision of 23 March 1995, no 15318/ 89, Titina Loizidou 
v Turkey, para 56.
 21 Skoutaris (n 19), pp. 65.
 22 Skoutaris (n 19), pp. 55– 56.
 23 Council Regulation (EC) 866/ 2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 Protocol 
10 to the Act of Accession, ‘Green Line Regulation’ [2014] OJ L 206; Skoutaris (n 20), 
pp. 171– 172.
 24 Council Regulation (EC) 866/ 2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 Protocol 
10 to the Act of Accession, ‘Green Line Regulation’ [2014] OJ L 206, 9.6.2004, recital 7; 
Laulhé- Shaelou, S. (2010) The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration. 
Brill, pp. 270.
 25 Council Regulation (EC) 866/ 2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 Protocol 
10 to the Act of Accession, ‘Green Line Regulation’ [2014] OJ L 206, 9.6.2004, titles ii– iv; 
















The Investment Programme has been variously amended since its adoption 
in 2013 by the Cypriot Council of Ministers, before culminating in its current 
version in May 2019.26 According to this Programme, any third- country na-
tional can acquire Cypriot and therefore EU citizenship if they meet certain 
economic criteria such as investment in real estate, land development and in-
frastructure projects, the purchase or establishment or participation in Cypri-
ot companies or businesses, or investment in alternative investment funds or 
financial assets in Cypriot companies or organisations. The investment funds 
must be at least eur 2 million and must be retained in the Republic for a period 
of at least 5 years from the date of naturalisation.27 The latest amendment to 
the Programme this year introduced an additional economic criterion for ap-
plicants: donation of eur 75.000 to the Research and Innovation Foundation 
and eur 75.000 the Cyprus Land Development Corporation for the financing 
of housing schemes for affordable housing in the Republic.
Further obligations are imposed on the applicants, incorporated in the 
terms and conditions of the Programme. These include due diligence checks, 
the possession of a residence permit in Cyprus, a declaration of having no 
other applications for citizenship rejected in other EU Member States and 
most importantly with respect to this article, residential property which 
the applicant must retain ownership of. Residence permits are granted to 
third- country nationals already living in the Republic in accordance with 
Regulation 1030/ 2002,28 but for the purposes of acquiring Cypriot national-
ity through investment, an immigration permit is granted to applicants on 
the basis of Regulation 6(2) of the national Aliens and Immigration Law.29 
The criteria for the acquisition of an immigration permit are included in sec-
tions A and B of the Investment Programme, in addition to requirements for 
a number of financial guarantees such as secure annual income and property 
title deeds.30 According to the Programme, if naturalisation is declined or 
revoked, the immigration permit obtained for the purposes of naturalisa-
tion will also be nullified.31 The due diligence checks have also been recently 
 26 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4).
 27 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4).
 28 Council Regulation (EC) of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform format for residence per-
mits for third- country nationals [2002] OJ L 157, 15.6.2002.
 29 2nd Revision of the Criteria for Granting an Immigration Permit within the Scope of 
the Expedited Procedure to Applicants who are Third- Country Nationals and Invest 
in Cyprus [2016], available at http:// www.moi.gov.cy/ moi/ CRMD/ crmd.nsf/ All/ 
6E845849175A310DC2257F7D0030F4FE?OpenDocument.
 30 Ibid, Section 2.
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enhanced, with the creation of an independent governmental body that will 
examine applicants’ admissibility in the future. All applicants must possess 
a recent clean criminal record, should not hold the status of politically ex-
posed persons and should not be included in the list of persons whose assets 
have been frozen within the EU as a result of sanctions, in accordance with 
Directive 2014/ 42/ EU,32 or had any sanctions imposed by third countries and 
international organisations, as all of the abovementioned will render their 
application inadmissible.33
As for the purchase of permanent residential property, it should be worth 
at least eur 500,000 (plus vat) and must be retained in the Republic per-
manently.34 It is also noted that if the applicant is investing in housing units, 
which have already been used for the purpose of naturalizing under this Pro-
gramme, the investment amount rises to eur 2.5 million, which also includes 
the eur 500.000 housing unit. The indefinite ownership of a residence in Cy-
prus is a crucial requirement for both admissibility and for the retention of 
citizenship. The Programme clearly states that where periodic checks discover 
that any criterion or term and condition ceased to be complied with, natural-
isation will be revoked. This is in accordance with Article 54(4) of the General 
Principles of the Administrative Law of Cyprus, which permits the revocation 
of any administrative decision in situations where the factual circumstances 
constituting the basis of the decision or which constituted the conditions for 
the issuance of that decision have changed.35 In practice, resale of the property 
is allowed only when it is followed by the purchase of other residential proper-
ty in the Republic for the applicant’s personal use.
This Programme provides the possibility of investing in Cyprus, however 
obliges applicants to lock part of their investment within its borders, and as 
a result, obtain Union citizenship, the status of which is enduringly upon the 
ongoing ownership of one housing unit. These two issues are crucial when ex-
amining the Programme in light of the right to the free movement of capital 
and EU citizenship law respectively, both of which will be analysed in the fol-
lowing sections.
 32 Directive 2014/ 42/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on 
the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European 
Union [2014] OJ L 127, 29.4.2014.
 33 Council of Ministers Meeting of 25.7.2019, Evaluation of applications for the assign-
ment of Cypriot citizenship to non- Cypriots/ Cypriots on the basis of Cyprus Investment 
Programme by high risk applicants/ applicants, available in Greek at http:// www.cm.gov.
cy/ cm/ cm.nsf/ index_ 19/ index_ 19?OpenForm.
 34 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4), pp. 3– 4.










iii Restrictions on Free Movement of Capital
iii.1 Capital Movement, Its Restrictions and Justifications
The internal market of the Union is an area without internal frontiers, which 
ensures the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.36 Article 63 
tfeu sets out the prohibition on all restrictions on capital movement between 
the Member States and between the Union and third countries. The lack of 
an exact definition of capital movement in the Treaties led to the adoption 
of Directive 88/ 361/ EEC which provides an explanatory Nomenclature in its 
first Annex.37 The list provided for in the annex is not exhaustive, but offers an 
adequate explanation of the types of capital movement available.38 Relevant 
to this article are the definitions of Direct Investment and Investment in Real 
Estate, the meanings of which are provided in the explanatory notes.39 Direct 
investment includes investments by all kinds of natural or commercial under-
takings, which enable the establishment of lasting and direct links between 
the undertaking and the entrepreneur to which the capital is made available, 
in order to carry on an economic activity. Investment in real estate is the pur-
chase of buildings and land for personal use.40 These are wide definitions and 
must be interpreted accordingly.
The cjeu was called upon to provide guidance to the Member States in 
numerous cases regarding the nature of restrictions prohibited by Article 63 
tfeu. The Court insists on a broad interpretation of the freedom and its pos-
sible restrictions,41 since the proper functioning of the internal market relies 
on free capital movement in combination with the free movement of persons, 
goods and services.42 The first identified restriction to the free movement of 
 36 Art. 26 (2) tfeu.
 37 Council Directive 88/ 361/ EEC of 24 July 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the 
Treaty [1988] OJ L 178, 8.7.88, art. 1, para. 1, Annex i; Usher, J. A. (2007). The Evolution of 
Free Movement of Capital. Fordham International Law Journal 31, pp. 1537– 1538.
 38 Ibid, pp.  1537– 1538; Baber, G.  (2014). The Free Movement of Capital and Financial 
Services: An Exposition? Cambridge Scholars, pp. 26.
 39 Council Directive 88/ 361/ EEC of 24 July 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the 
Treaty [1988] OJ L178/ 5, explanatory notes.
 40 Ibid.
 41 Horsley, T. (2012). The Concept of an Obstacle to Intra- EU Capital Movement in EU Law, in 
Nic Shuibhne, N. and Gormley, L.W. (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays 
in Memory of John A. Usher. Oxford University Press, pp. 163– 164.
 42 Hindelang, S.  (2009). The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment:  The 
Scope of Protection in EU law. Oxford Scholarship Online. pp.  128; Andenæs, M., Gütt, 
T.  and Pannier, M.  (2005). Free Movement of Capital and National Company Law. 

















The “Sale” of Conditional Citizenship 421
capital was discrimination between domestic and cross- border movement and 
between two cross- border movements.43 However, to extend the protective na-
ture of the freedom, the Court has broadened its scope so that it goes beyond 
the notion of non- discrimination. In Commission v France, it ruled that the 
prohibition of restrictions of capital movement ‘goes beyond the mere elimi-
nation of unequal treatment’44 and has reaffirmed the non- hindrance test45 in 
Commission v Portuguese Republic, where it established that a regulation which 
restricts the possibility for foreign investors to acquire shares in certain Portu-
guese undertakings is:
[…] capable of impeding capital movements and dissuading individuals 
in other Member States from investing.46
Such a regulation may render the free movement of capital illusory and there-
fore violate Article 63 tfeu. Other examples of the application of the non- 
hindrance test include a requirement for prior authorisation for the acquisi-
tion of a plot of land in order to demonstrate that the planned acquisition will 
not be used to establish a secondary residence in Konle,47 and a requirement 
for the security of a mortgage debt, payable in the currency of another Mem-
ber State, to be registered in the national currency in Trummer and Mayer.48
Derogations to the free movement of capital are allowed if they fall under 
the reasons listed in Article 65 tfeu; otherwise, they must be justified on the 
basis of overriding public interests and objective reasons on grounds of public 
policy and public security within the meaning of the case law of the cjeu.49 In 
principle, it is up to the Member States to ‘decide on the degree of protection 
under which they wish to afford to such legitimate interests’, but they must do 
so within the limits of EU law, particularly by complying with the principle of 
 43 Hindelang (n 42), pp. 130– 131.
 44 Court of Justice, judgment of 4 June 2002, case C- 483/ 99 Commission v France, paras 40– 41.
 45 de Luca, A.  (2012). New Developments on the Scope of the EU Common Commercial 
Policy Under the Lisbon Treaty, in Sauvant, K. P. (ed), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law and Policy. Oxford University Press, pp. 189– 191; Horsley (n 41), pp. 164.
 46 Court of Justice, judgement of 4 June 2002, case C- 367/ 98 Commission v Portuguese 
Republic, paras 9– 12, 44– 45.
 47 Court of Justice, judgment of 1 June 1999, case C- 302/ 97 Klaus Konle v Republik Österreich, 
para 39.
 48 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 March 1999, case C- 222/ 97 Manfred Trummer and Peter 
Mayer, para 28.
 49 C- 302/ 97 Konle para 40; Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, case C- 271/ 09 















proportionality.50 The Court established in its case law on the free movement 
of goods51 and services52 that economic grounds cannot serve as a justifica-
tion for derogations from the Member States’ obligations.53 As the scope of 
the Treaty provisions on the four fundamental freedoms has expanded and 
the Gebhard formula54 has been applied consistently in case law relating not 
just to the freedom of establishment,55 the prohibition of using pure economic 
justifications extends also to measures restricting the free movement of cap-
ital.56 Accordingly, limitations on capital movements cannot be justified by 
the financial interests of Member States,57 such as strengthening the structure 
of the market58 or primary budgetary objectives.59 One issue remains, how-
ever, which is the difficulty of obtaining a precise definition of what consti-
tutes strictly economic interests.60 As a result, the Court sometimes adopts an 
‘avoidance strategy’,61 where it disregards the possible economic justifications 
of a measure and is satisfied by argumentation based on the general interest of 
the Member States.62
Understanding the basic principles which govern the freedom of capital 
movement in the context of this article is paramount to reviewing the legal-
ity of the Cyprus Investment Programme adequately. Even though the free-
dom acquired a wide definition, the Court’s methods in assessing measures 
 50 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 September 2006, Joined Cases C- 282/ 04 and C- 283/ 04 
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands, paras 32– 33.
 51 C- 265/ 95 Commission v France, para 62.
 52 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 1997, case C- 398/ 95 SETTG, para 23.
 53 C- 367/ 98 Commission v Portuguese Republic, para 52.
 54 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 November 1995, case C- 55/ 94 Reinhard Gebhard v 
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, para 37.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 July 2002, case C- 294/ 00 Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für 
Naturheilverfaharen GmbH v. K Gräbner, para 39; Court of Justice, judgment of 17 October 
2002, case C- 79/ 01 Payroll Data Services (Italy) et al, para 28; Spaventa, E. (2004). From 
Gebhard to Carpenter:  Towards a (non- ) Economic European Constitution. Common 
Market Law Review 41, pp. 749– 750.
 56 Spaventa (n 55), pp. 751; Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects 
Concerning Intra- EU Investment [1997] C220/ 15, point 9.
 57 Horsley (n 41), pp. 167.
 58 C- 367/ 98 Commission v Portuguese Republic, para 52.
 59 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 February 1984, case 238/ 82 Duphar BV and others v The 
Netherlands State, para 23.
 60 Snell, J.  (2016). Economic Justification and the Role of the State, in Koutrakos, P., Nic 
Shuibhne, N. and Syrpis, P. (eds), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law. Hart Publishing, 
pp. 16– 17.
 61 Ibid.
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breaching Article 63 tfeu have now become uniform and systematic. Member 
States may not limit the ability or dissuade their citizens from liquidating or 
reallocating their investments without a legitimate reason. Most importantly, 
this reasoning should not be purely economic, despite the difficulty which ex-
ists in identifying wholly economic justifications.
iii.2 Application of These Principles to the Cypriot Case
The Cyprus Investment Programme requires applicants to invest in private 
immovable property, part of which must be retained in the Republic indef-
initely. This particular condition amounts to a de facto barrier to the right 
of free movement of capital in the form of real estate investments. Cypriots 
naturalised under this Programme are prevented from exercising their right 
to move their investment freely, without any restrictions, limitations or unfair 
repercussions, such as the threat of revocation of their citizenship status. In 
this context, one cannot disregard the right to property, included in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (‘echr’),63 the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union64 as well as the Cyprus Constitution.65 The right 
to own and dispose of lawfully acquired possessions is an intrinsic element in 
all three articles and while limitations may be imposed, they must be made in 
the name of public interest and be regulated by law. As the focus of this section 
is the right to free movement of capital, an analysis of the restriction imposed 
by the duty to retain property permanently and its possible justifications will 
proceed.
Firstly, I argue that the Programme lacks any guarantee for the equal treat-
ment of domestic and cross- border capital movements. Those naturalised 
through this Programme are able to move their investment only within the 
borders of Cyprus (apart from the trnc where the government does not ex-
ercise effective control); relocation of the investment to other Member States 
or sale of the property without the immediate purchase of a replacement will 
result in the revocation of citizenship. Such a requirement is not imposed on 
other Cypriots.66 Secondly, the obligation to retain ownership of residential 
property in the Republic forever – regardless the fact that it is part of the in-
vestment used for naturalisation – can be argued to constitute a violation of 
Article 63 tfeu, if it is considered in light of the non- hindrance test applied 
 63 Art. 1, Protocol 1 echr.
 64 Art. 17 (1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] C364/ 1.
 65 Art. 23, Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus 1960.










in Commission v Belgium67 and Commission v Portuguese Republic,68 where the 
Court stated that Article 63 tfeu is breached, if a measure has a deterrent or 
discouraging effect on individuals seeking to invest abroad. A similar conclu-
sion can be drawn by looking at the judgment in Verkooijen where the appli-
cant was restricted from investing in companies outside the Netherlands69 as 
a result of a measure that did not grant tax exemptions to individuals who re-
ceive dividends on shares in foreign companies.70 Such a restriction, according 
to the Court, dissuades individuals from investing their capital in other Mem-
ber States,71 a ruling that can be applied by analogy to the duty to retain own-
ership of residential property used for investment in exchange for citizenship. 
Allowing Member States to impose restrictions as such, creates the illusion of 
the freedom of movement of capital and problems with legal certainty and the 
uniform application of Union law arise.
Furthermore, by providing Union citizenship, the Programme makes it 
more attractive for third- country nationals to lock their investment in the Re-
public, which may gradually lead to the obstruction of free movement of cap-
ital to other Member States. Liberalisation of cross- border capital movement 
within the EU is an intrinsic feature of the internal market and it is essential for 
the attainment of the socioeconomic objectives of the Union.72 Obstruction of 
the possibility of making the best use of this freedom affects the individuals 
whose Union rights are violated, but ultimately, it has detrimental effects on 
the economic prosperity of other Member States, which the Union aims to 
guarantee.73 Despite the fact that the legal requirements for the acquisition 
 67 The case concerned a Belgian Royal Decree which prohibited Belgian residents from 
obtaining loans issued by German banks above the fixed rate. In its evaluation of the 
measure, the Court established that limitations on acquiring loans from other Member 
States, as well as making investments abroad, constitute violations of Article 63 tfeu; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 26 September 2000, case C- 478/ 98 Commission v Kingdom 
of Belgium, paras 3, 18.
 68 C- 367/ 98 Commission v Portuguese Republic, paras 44– 45.
 69 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 June 2000, case C- 35/ 98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v 
B.G.M. Verkooijen, paras 34– 35.
 70 C- 35/ 98 Verkooijen, paras 6– 11; Note that in this case it was established that the receipt 
of dividends from companies in other Member States is an ‘indissociable from a capital 
movement’ (para 29).
 71 C- 35/ 98 Verkooijen, para 34.
 72 Art. 3(1) teu; Hindelang (n 42), pp.  10– 11; European Commission, National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, ‘Capital Market Liberalisation’ (summary) Single Market 
Review Series [1996].
 73 For an extensive analysis of the socioeconomic benefits of the free movement of capital 
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of EU Citizenship through investment in Cyprus do not take the form of ex-
change authorization or affect the general possibility of investment abroad, 
they could constitute an obstacle to the broadest possible liberalisation of the 
capital movement markets in the EU, as was established in the Brugnoni case.74
That said, the possible justifications which could validate the implementa-
tion of restrictive measures in the Republic and the derogation from its obliga-
tions towards the Union must be examined. The Programme was adopted to 
overcome the economic challenges after the 2012 financial crisis and to attract 
foreign investment by encouraging natural persons with high incomes to estab-
lish themselves in the Republic.75 These are the only explicit objectives found 
in the government’s website and public statements, which I would argue can 
be considered purely economic motives. The consequences have been indeed 
positive: increased tax revenue and increased investment in real estate, tourism 
and development.76 Economic prosperity surely resonates with the interest of 
those individuals who can profit from the clear deficiencies of this Programme, 
which disadvantages others with respect to Union law. The Cypriot government 
aims to boost its economy through this Programme and the restriction imposed 
on applicants would fall under the justification of establishing and maintaining 
lasting economic links between the investors naturalising and the Republic.
However, justifying such an obvious restriction on capital movement on the 
basis of achieving economic prosperity would be rather difficult before the 
Court. As mentioned in the preceding passage, the Court is reluctant to allow 
justification of a restriction on strictly economic grounds.77 Another approach 
would be to consider the principle of the general interest of the state as an 
overriding justification. In Decker78 and Kohl,79 the justification used to restrict 
 74 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 June 1986, case C- 157/ 85 Brugnoni and Ruffinengo v Cassa 
di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia, para 22.
 75 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4); Antoniou, G.  (2017). Limits on passports to 
investors, available at http:// www.philenews.com/ eidiseis/ politiki/ article/ 436466/ 
orio- sta- diabatiria- se- ependytes.
 76 Maurides, M.  (2017). Η πώληση διαβατηρίων είναι εργαλείο ανάπτυξης (Passport sell-
ing is a development tool), available at http:// www.sigmalive.com/ simerini/ analiseis/ 
457175/ i- polisi- diavatirion- einai- ergaleio- anaptyksis; Polykarpou, A.  (2017). Ρώσοι και 
Άραβες επενδυτές κατέκλυσαν την Κύπρο (Russian and Arab investors flooded Cyprus), 
available at https:// www.offsite.com.cy/ articles/ eidiseis/ oikonomia/ 217274- rosoi- kai- 
araves- ependytes- kateklysan- tin- kypro- poia- einai- ta; Hadjioannou, B. (2019). €6.6b from 
citizenship scheme: breakdown of investments, available at https:// in- cyprus.com/ e6- 6b- 
from- citizenship- scheme- breakdown- of- investments/ .
 77 Snell (n 60).
 78 C- 120/ 95 Decker, para 39.













the free movement of goods and services respectively was to secure the finan-
cial balance of the social security systems. The Court found that neither re-
striction had any significant effect on the social security system of the Member 
States in question and then proceeded in examining alternative justifications, 
by ruling on the general interest of a state, as opposed to focusing on purely 
economic justifications.80 I believe that a similar outcome would result from 
such an approach during the examination of the conformity of the Cyprus Pro-
gramme with Article 63 tfeu. Alternatively, the Court would find the justifica-
tions used by the Cyprus government as strictly economic. Either way, requir-
ing individuals to retain their investment in Cyprus indefinitely raises serious 
concerns in view of the right to move capital freely within the Union: such a 
limitation constitutes a violation of the Republic’s obligations under the Trea-
ties and surviving the judicial scrutiny of the Court can be difficult.
iv Citizenship of the EU
iv.1 Investment Migration Schemes in the EU and the Evolving Nature of 
Union Citizenship
Examining investment migration schemes in the framework of the EU legal 
order can be challenging, considering the unconventional character EU citi-
zenship acquired. It was recognised as the intended future fundamental status 
of Member States’ nationals in 199281 and ever since, made the complicated re-
lationship between the supranational EU and national legal orders even more 
profound. Prima facie, agreeing with Jo Shaw, there is no legal basis for EU- level 
opposition to investment migration programmes,82 because of the derivative 
nature of Union citizenship.83 Nevertheless, different nationality laws have al-
ways raised concerns within the Union, as the result of granting the unifying 
EU citizenship status to third- country nationals would be the availability of 
EU rights such as freedom of movement, which ultimately affects all Member 
States.84 In 2014 the European Parliament, while underlining its own lack of 
 80 C- 120/ 95 Decker, paras 40– 41; C- 158/ 96 Kohll, paras 42– 43.
 81 Art. 8, Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/ 1; Court of Justice, judgment of 20 
September 2001, case C- 184/ 99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies- 
Louvain- la- Neuve, para 31; Court of Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99 
Baumbast and R, para 82.
 82 Shaw, J.  (2018). Citizenship for Sale:  Could and Should the EU Intervene? in Bauböck, 
R. (ed) Debating Transformations of National Citizenship. Springer, Cham 2018, pp. 63– 64.
 83 Art. 20 tfeu.
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legal competences over this matter,85 adopted a Resolution on EU Citizenship 
for sale in response to the Maltese Individual Investors Programme (hereafter 
the ‘iip’), where it expressed its concerns at the development of investment 
migration in the EU and requested the Commission to examine their legality.86
Attention must also be paid to the principle of recognition of other Mem-
ber State nationalities, regardless of their mode of acquisition, developed in 
Micheletti.87 Accordingly, Member States have to respect the EU citizenship 
status of nationals from other Member States as well as the nationality of their 
own citizens.88 This line of reasoning was previously indicated in Auer, where 
the Court ruled that:
There is no provision of the Treaty which […] makes it possible to treat 
nationals of a Member State differently according to the time at which or 
the manner in which they acquired the nationality of that State [.] 89
This is crucial to the development of investment migration and the concerns 
raised by Member States that such practices affect the entire Union. According 
to Auer and Micheletti, the mode of naturalisation is irrelevant to the validity 
and recognition of the EU citizenship status of an individual by other Mem-
ber States and any distinction between groups of nationals of Member States 
made in this regard shall be deemed unacceptable.90 The cjeu’s approach to 
the recognition of Member States’ nationalities makes investment migration 
schemes perfectly legitimate:  ‘investment Cypriots’ – just as the ‘investment 
Maltese’ – are full- fledged citizens of the EU. In addition, the argument pro-
posed by the AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann,91 that mass naturalisations of 
third- country nationals could contradict the principle of sincere cooperation92 
 85 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale, 2013/ 
2995(rsp), recital 7.
 86 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale, 2013/ 
2995(rsp), recitals 1, 3; Surak (n 3), pp.  25; ‘Malta Citizenship by Investment Program’ 
available at http:// www.maltaimmigration.com.
 87 C- 369/ 90 Micheletti, para 10; Kochenov (n 7), pp. 182.
 88 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.- U. (1993). Case C- 369/ 90 Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v 
Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, Judgment of 7 July 1992. Common Market Review 
30, pp. 628.
 89 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 February 1979, case C- 136/ 78 Ministere Public v. Auer, para 
28 (emphasis added).
 90 Art. 5(2), European Convention on Nationality (1997) ets 166; de Groot, D.A.J.G. (2018), 
Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens, European Papers 3, pp. 1105.
 91 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann.


















if not performed in consultation with other Member States,93 seems inapplica-
ble to the case of investment schemes, given that the number of naturalisations 
through investment in the EU remain low, especially compared with analogous 
situations, such as the large numbers of Latin Americans naturalised as Ital-
ians.94 Even if these numbers were to grow in the future, we must consider that 
third- country nationals naturalising in any Member State through investment 
migration schemes are individuals of high net worth who would not impose an 
‘unreasonable burden’ on the social welfare systems of Member States if they 
were to decide to use their free movement rights according to the Citizenship 
Directive.95 These individuals contribute to the functioning of the internal 
market and the objectives of European economic integration, making them 
valuable citizens in light of EU’s unfortunate internal market logic.96
The rights attached to the status of EU citizenship were initially manifest-
ed in activity within the internal market through the free movement rights,97 
which explains the Court’s insistence on the requirement for cross border 
movement to ascertain the applicability of Union law in citizenship cases.98 
 93 C- 135/ 08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I- 01449, Opinion of AG Poiares 
Maduro, para 30.
 94 Kochenov, D.  (2018). Citizenship for Real:  Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price, in 
Bauböck, R.  (ed), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship. Springer, Cham, 
pp. 54; Tintori, G. (2011). The Transnational Political Practices of “Latin American Italians” 
IOM 49, pp.172– 173; Surak (n 3), pp. 6.
 95 Art. 7(1)(b), Council Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member [2004] OJ L 158 30.4.2004; Heindlmaier, A. and Blauberger, M. (2017). Enter 
at your own risk:  free movement of EU citizens in practice. West European Politics 40, 
pp. 1200– 1201; Thym, D. (2015). The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and 
Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens. Common Market Law Review 52, 
pp. 20.
 96 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator, in 
Kochenov D. (ed) EU Citizenship and Federalism: the Role of Rights. Cambridge University 
Press, pp.  36– 39; Kochenov, D.  (2019). Interlegality  – Citizenship  – Intercitizenship, 
Forthcoming in Palombella, G.and Klabbers J.  (eds), The Challenge of Interlegality. 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 70.
 97 Kostakopolou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional 
Change. The Modern Law Review 68, pp.  238– 239; Yanasmayan, Z.  (2009). European 
Citizenship:  A Tool for Integration, in Carrera, S., Groenendijk, K.  and Guild, E.  (eds), 
Illiberal Liberal States:  Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Routledge, 
pp.  68; Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned Citizenship  – Understanding Union Citizenship 
through its Scope, in Kochenov, D. (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 206– 207.
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The cross- border rationale continues to exist but is now broadened by the 
inclusion of potential cross- border movement and with added emphasis on 
individual rights through the expansion of the material and personal scope of 
Union citizenship through the case law of the cjeu.99
Rottmann100 is of utmost importance in this respect. The Court for the 
first time provided a clarification of the principle ‘due regard to Communi-
ty law’, established in Micheletti.101 Essentially, the ruling resulted in limiting 
the Member States’ discretion in measures revolving around the grant and re-
vocation of nationality by introducing the principle of proportionality to the 
decisions taken by national authorities:102 this led to the reassessment of the 
interdependent relationship between national and EU citizenship.103 Despite 
AG Poiares Maduro’s suggestion that a cross- border element is a prerequisite 
to trigger EU law, the Court’s approach to this case was different.104 According-
ly, a situation in which an individual is faced with a decision withdrawing their 
naturalisation falls ‘by reason of its nature and its consequences within the 
ambit of EU law’.105 The Court’s departure from the traditional requirement of 
cross- border movement indicates a shift of emphasis to the protection of the 
individual, who is placed in a situation where they lose the status conferred by 
 99 Ibid, pp. 1612, 1613– 1614; Kochenov (14), pp. 59– 60.
 100 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann.
 101 In Micheletti the Court mentioned the principle ‘due regard to community law’ but it 
was perceived as obiter dictum of the ruling; de Groot, G.- R. (2004), Towards a European 
Nationality Law, ejcl, 8; Jessurun d’Oliveira (n 88), pp. 634.
 102 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann, para 55. For more information on the principle of proportionality see 
Rochel, J. (2019). Working in Tandem: Proportionality and Procedural Guarantees in EU 
Immigration Law, German L.J. 20.
 103 Mann, D.- J.  and Purnhagen, K.  P. (2011). The Nature of Union Citizenship between 
Autonomy and Dependency on (Member) State Citizenship – A Comparative Analysis 
of the Rottmann Ruling, or:  How to Avoid a European Dred Scott Decision. Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 29, pp. 491– 493; Shaw, J. (2018). Deprivation of Citizenship: Is 
There an Issue of EU Law? in Bauböck, R.  (ed) Debating Transformations of National 
Citizenship. Springer, Cham, pp. 236– 238.
 104 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, paras 10, 14, 23; 
Kochenov, D. (2010). Case C- 135/ 08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010, not yet reported. Common Market Law Review 
47, pp. 1832– 1833; Kostakopoulou, D. (2012). The European Court of Justice, Member State 
Autonomy and European Citizenship:  Conjunctions and Disjunctions, in Micklitz, H.- 
W. and de Witte, B. (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member 
States. Intersentia, pp. 198– 199.
 105 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann, para 42; van Eijken, H.  (2010). European Citizenship and the 
Competence of Member States to Grant and to Withdraw the Nationality of their 
















Article 20 tfeu and the rights attached thereof.106 By bringing Dr Rottmann’s 
case within the scope of EU law, the Court effectively expanded the ratione 
materiae of EU citizenship.107 As a result, the need to exercise free movement 
rights is no longer the paramount requirement for the ecj to intervene; based 
on Rottmann, the status of being a Union citizen and the rights associated with 
it became sufficient foundation to engage and determine any violations of EU 
law, which reaffirms its fundamental status, established in Grzelczyk.108
Another critical case which builds on the Rottmann line of reasoning is Ruiz 
Zambrano.109 This case dealt with the decision of the Belgian authorities to 
deprive the residency and working rights of Mr Ruiz Zambrano, a Colombi-
an national and parent of two children born in Belgium.110 The ecj insisted 
on the applicability of the case under EU law, despite the absence of cross- 
border movement, because Mr Zambrano’s children were Union citizens 
and would be deprived of ‘the genuine enjoyment of the substance of [their] 
rights’111 if forced to move outside the territory of the Union.112 Unfortunately, 
in following cases the Court adopted a more restrictive approach to situations 
which potentially deprive individuals of the substance of their Union citi-
zenship rights,113 by qualifying the ruling in Ruiz Zambrano as an exceptional 
 106 Kochenov (n 14), pp. 58– 61; C- 135/ 08 Rottmann, para 42; Garner, O. (2018). The Existential 
Crisis of Citizenship of the European Union: The Argument for an Autonomous Status. 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 20, pp. 126.
 107 Kochenov (n 14), pp. 64 and 67– 69.
 108 Cambien, N.  (2011). Case C- 135/ 08 Janko Rottmann v.  Freistaat Bayern. Columbia 
Journal of European Law 17, pp. 383– 384; Bauböck, R. and Paskalev, V. (2014). Cutting 
Genuine Links: A Normative Analysis of Citizenship Deprivation, Geo. Immigr. L.J. 30 
(47), pp.  99 and 102; Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.- U. (2018). Once again:  Plural nationality. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 25, pp. 37; Jessurun d’Oliveira in 
this volume.
 109 C- 34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano.
 110 C- 34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano, paras 14– 16, 43– 44.
 111 C- 34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano, paras 40– 44; Lansbergen, A.  and Miller, N.  (2011). Court of 
Justice of the European Union European Citizenship Rights in Internal Situations:  An 
Ambiguous Revolution? Decision of 8 March 2011, Case C- 34/ 09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v Office national de l’emploi (onem). European Constitutional Law Review 7, pp. 291.
 112 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2012). (Some of) The Kids Are All Right. Common Market Law Review 49, 
pp. 350– 352; Hailbronner K. and Thym, D. (2011). Case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 
of 8 March 2011, not yet reported. Common Market Law Review 48, 1255– 1257.
 113 C- 434/ 09 McCarthy, paras 46– 47; Court of Justice, judgment of 29 September 2011, case 
C- 256/ 11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, paras 40, 74; Spaventa, 
E. (2017). Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship through its Scope, in 
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case.114 In the recent case of Tjebbes,115despite the effort to follow the princi-
ples established in previous case law on EU citizenship, the Court ruled that a 
measure revoking Dutch and EU citizenship of Dutch nationals, who possess 
another nationality and who resided outside the Union for more than ten con-
secutive years, without renewing their passport within that period, is compat-
ible with EU law as long as the proportionality test is performed by the nation-
al authorities and courts.116 The vagueness and the passing manner by which 
the principles of EU citizenship have been applied by the Court, resulted in a 
missed opportunity to clarify and strengthen the already established princi-
ples on EU citizenship.117 Notwithstanding that, the formula of ‘substance of 
rights’ established in Ruiz Zambrano, though uncertain, remains promising118 
and is regarded as a stepping stone on the way to shaping the material scope 
of Union law by defending the future ability of individuals to enjoy their EU 
rights.119
The judgments in Micheletti, Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano pave the way 
towards a better understanding of the relationship between national and 
Union citizenship.120 With the expansion of the scope of EU citizenship ratio-
ne materiae, the requirement of cross- border movement is proven illogical121 
in a ‘Union without borders’ and contrary to the spirit of European integra-
tion.122 In the current context, three conclusions can be drawn which will pro-
vide guidance in the assessment of the Cyprus Programme. Firstly, Member 
State nationality must be recognised and respected by all Member States (in-
cluding the Member State issuing the nationality),123 regardless the mode of 
 114 C- 256/ 11 Dereci, para 55; Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2015). Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:  The 
Challenging Legal Shape of Union Citizenship. Common Market Review 52, 901– 902; 
Skrbic, A. (2019) Mobile Individualism: The Subjectivity of EU Citizenship, Neth. J. Legal. 
Phil. 48, pp. 25– 26.
 115 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17 M.G. Tjebbes and Others v 
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.
 116 C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes, paras 39– 40.
 117 Kochenov, D. (2019), The Tjebbes Fail, European Papers 4, 326.
 118 Sánchez, S. I. (2014). Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A 
Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison? European Law Journal 20, pp. 474.
 119 Kochenov, D.  (2013). The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years 
of Academic Debate:  Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon? International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 63, pp. 101.
 120 Kochenov (n 14), pp.  86; Krūma, K.  (2015). EU Citizenship, Nationality and Migrant 
Status: An ongoing Challenge. Brill Nijhoff, pp. 124.
 121 Kochenov (n 14) pp. 92– 93.
 122 Kochenov, D. (2010). Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal. Jean 






















naturalisation. Secondly, even though the derivative nature of EU citizenship 
is uncontested, the need to preserve its unique status and protect the individ-
uals’ rights requires limitations on Member State competences in matters of 
citizenship, particularly when EU rights are undermined by a measure adopt-
ed at the national level. Thirdly, Member States should not impose restrictive 
conditions on their own citizens, the effects of which would be to render the 
future prospect of exercising their Union rights impossible.
iv.2 The Cyprus Investment Programme: Revocation of Union 
Citizenship, Discrimination, Family Members and the Right to Leave
The adoption of investment migration schemes in Member States is not un-
common and, as has been established in the previous passage, does not nec-
essarily violate Union law. However, the Cyprus Investment Programme is 
significantly different due to the requirement imposed on investors to retain 
ownership of residential property in the Republic for an unlimited period. This 
condition can cause future complications, as it places individuals who decide 
to sell their invested property or to relocate beyond the island’s territory in a 
situation where their Cypriot nationality and EU citizenship will be revoked.124 
The conditional nature of the citizenship acquired through investment125 
prompts several issues when viewed in the light of EU citizenship law: the abil-
ity of Cyprus to revoke citizenship upon the exercise of rights granted by EU 
law and the consequences such measures would have on the investor’s family.
The revocation of citizenship based on non- compliance with the condi-
tions of the Cyprus Programme must be closely analysed, mainly in light of 
 124 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4) 1.
 125 ‘Conditional Citizenship’ is not merely a Cypriot invention; the UK adopted a similar 
approach and according to the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, depri-
vation of citizenship constitutes a valid measure that can be taken by the Secretary of 
State of the Home Department in an attempt to “fight terrorists ‘disguised’ as UK citi-
zens”. The difference between the UK and Cyprus is that firstly, the conditionality of the 
British citizenship applies to all citizens, regardless whether they acquired their nation-
ality by birth or through registration and naturalisation and secondly, this conditionality 
is activated when a citizen engages in terrorist activity; thus the deprivation is seen as a 
form of a punitive measure to protect national security. In Cyprus on the contrary, the 
conditional nature applies only to investor Cypriots who exercise their right to the free 
movement of capital by re- investing outside the Republic’s territory. See Mantu, S. (2010). 
‘Terrorist’ citizens and the human right to nationality. Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies 26, pp. 32– 33; Lavi, S. (2010). Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the 
United Kingdom, United States, and Israel. New Criminal Law Review:  An International 
and Interdisciplinary Journal 13, pp.  409– 411; Joppke, J.  (2015). Terror and the Loss of 
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Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano. In Rottmann the Court concluded that Member 
States must take decisions on the revocation of nationality having due regard 
to Community law, and proceeded to delegate the proportionality test to the 
German court.126 On the one hand, empowering national courts with the ap-
plication of the principle of proportionality could undermine the principle of 
legal certainty for individuals and threaten the uniform application of Union 
law.127 On the other hand, it can be considered as an efficient method of al-
lowing cooperation between the national courts of the Member States and the 
cjeu, once the latter establishes its jurisdiction and the potential breach of the 
substance of EU citizenship rights.128 In Rottmann the national courts found 
that the revocation of Dr Rottmann’s citizenship was proportionate because of 
his criminal history and the fact that it did not breach any international or EU 
law requirements.129
Notwithstanding the discretion Member States enjoy in nationality mat-
ters, measures regarding the withdrawal of nationality must be legitimate 
in light of EU law.130 When comparing the argumentation and the outcome 
of Rottmann to the Cyprus case, fundamental differences must be pointed 
out. To begin with, the decision of an individual to exercise their Union 
rights and relocate their investment outside the territory of a Member State 
cannot be compared to the situation in Rottmann, where the applicant was 
found guilty of obtaining German nationality by deception.131 Consequent-
ly, the revocation of nationality was considered legitimate in the name of 
protecting the solidarity between all the citizens of Germany. In the Cyprus 
case nationality is withdrawn as a consequence of the decision from Cy-
priots naturalised through investment to move their capital away from the 
territory of Cyprus, relying on Articles 26 and 36 tfeu. The revocation of 
Cypriot nationality for non- compliance with the condition to permanently 
 126 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann, paras 58– 59.
 127 In Rottmann, before delegating the competence to the German court, the ecj included 
some suggestions on how to assess proportionality which made the outcome of the 
German ruling more predictable, see C- 135/ 08 Rottmann [2010], para 56; van Eijken, 
H.  (2010). European Citizenship and the Competence of Member States to Grant and 
to Withdraw the Nationality of their Nationals. Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law 27, pp. 69; van der Mei, A. P. (2018). EU Citizenship and Loss of Member 
State Nationality. European Papers 3, pp. 1323.
 128 Kochenov, D.  and Plender, R.  (2012). EU Citizenship:  From an Incipient Form to an 
Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text. European Law Review 37, pp. 386 
and 392– 393.
 129 Kochenov (n 14), pp. 78.
 130 C- 135/ 08 Rottmann, para 51; Shaw (n 103), p. 235.














own property in Cyprus is a restriction of the EU right to free movement of 
capital and the possibility of this measure being justified is very unlikely, as 
was established in the previous section on capital movement. The measure 
also restricts the applicants’ right leave the territory of Cyprus and establish 
themselves in other Member States. Łazowski argues that the right to exit 
is a condition sine qua non to the right to move and reside freely within the 
Union,132 as it is implied in Article 21 tfeu. The right to exit is also estab-
lished in Article 4 of the Citizenship Directive133 and was affirmed by the 
Court in Jipa and subsequent cases, in which individuals were prevented 
from leaving their Member State of nationality.134 This right is compromised 
by the Investment Programme as it practically ties the applicants to the 
Republic, making the exercise of the right to move freely to other Member 
States unappealing. Even if this does not amount to a direct restriction to the 
right to leave, it is nonetheless incompatible with the objective to eliminate 
any obstacles to free movement within the EU, a prerequisite to the func-
tioning of the internal market.135
Adopting a naturalisation programme on the basis of limiting the exer-
cise of rights accorded by EU law is contrary to the spirit of the Treaties 
as it interferes with the goal of gradual integration even if, paradoxically, 
the Cyprus Investment Programme presents it under a pretext of enhancing 
economic integration. Based on the judgment in Lounes136 it is ‘contrary to 
the underlying logic of gradual integration that informs Article 21(1) tfeu 
 132 Łazowski, A. (2015). Darling you are Not Going Anywhere: The Right to Exit and Restriction 
in EU Law. European Law Review 47, pp. 888.
 133 Art. 4, Council Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
[2004] OJ L 158 30.4.2004.
 134 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 July 2008, case C- 33/ 07 Ministerul Administratiei si 
Internelor – Directia Generala de Pasapoarte Bucuresti v Jipa, para 18; This line of reason-
ing continued in subsequent judgments, see Court of Justice, judgment of 17 November 
2011, case C- 430/ 10 Gaydarov v Direktor na Glavna Direktsia Ohranitelna Politsia pri 
Ministerstvo na Vatreshnite Raboti and Court of Justice, judgment of 17 November 2011, 
case C- 434/ 10 Aladzhov v Zamestnik Direktor na Stolichna Direktsia na Vatreshnite Raboti 
kam Ministerstvo na Vatreshnite Raboti.
 135 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08 Blaise Baheten Metock and 
Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, para 68; de Groot, G.- R. and Steling, 
A. (2011). The Consequences of the Rottmann Judgment on Member States Autonomy – 
The Court’s Avant- Gardism in Nationality Matters, in Shaw, J.  (ed), Has the European 
Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in National Law? EUI RSCAS 2011/ 62.
 136 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C- 165/ 16 Toufik Lounes v Secretary of 
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to hold that such citizens, who have acquired rights under that provision as 
a result of having exercised their freedom of movement, must forego those 
rights’.137
Through the case law on citizenship, the Court established itself as the fi-
nal arbitrator and protector of EU citizens through the activation of EU law 
when national measures result to the loss of the rights attached to the status 
of Union citizenship138 and as a result, decision- making and the adoption of 
policies such as the Cyprus Investment Programme no longer fall under the 
sovereignty umbrella. Potential violations of the substance of Union citizen-
ship can be manifested through restrictions to the exercise of one of the fun-
damental rights of the Treaties139 and are amplified when a Member State’s 
naturalisation process leads to the granting of Union citizenship status which 
is absurdly conditioned by a limitation of the rights it is associated with. The 
priority to enact measures which would result in relative economic prosperity 
should not overshadow the arbitrary effects of such measures on individuals’ 
rights. The interests of other Member States must also not be ignored: using 
a measure such as the withdrawal of nationality if individuals decide to exer-
cise their right to the free movement of capital is burdensome to say the least 
and contrary to the aim of achieving a functioning internal market within the 
EU.140 Based on these findings, one must conclude that a measure withdrawing 
the naturalisation of an EU citizen on the basis of exercising their right to the 
free movement of capital alongside their right to exit, cannot be considered 
legitimate.
In addition to the effects on the main investor, family members are also 
greatly affected by this Investment Programme. Citizenship is granted initial-
ly to the main investor and subsequently can be acquired by their parents, 
spouse or partner and by their financially dependent adult children,141 while 
their minor children naturalise in accordance with Article 110(3) Civil Registry 
 137 C- 165/ 16 Lounes, para 58; de Groot (n 135), pp. 1104; Shaw, J. (2018). EU citizenship: still a 
fundamental status? European University Institute (rscas 2018/ 14), pp. 7.
 138 Lenaerts, K.  (2012). Civis Europaeus Sum:  From the Cross- border Link to the Status 
of Citizen of the Union, in Rosas, A., Wahl, N., Lindh, L.  and Cardonnel, P.  (eds) 
Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh. Oxford Hart 
Publishing, pp. 141– 142.
 139 de Groot, G.- R. (2004). Towards a European Nationality Law. EJCL 8.
 140 Art. 26 tfeu; Hindelang (n 42), pp. 10– 11.
 141 ‘Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4) 1. For clarification, adult dependent children of the 
applicants are considered students under the age of 28 and children with severe physical 












Law.142 However, there is no mention of the circumstances under which the 
family members lose their nationality. The extent of their dependency on the 
investor’s citizenship is unclear and their legal status is questionable if the cit-
izenship of the former is revoked because of future non- compliance with the 
conditions of the Programme. Relying on the Citizenship Directive143 would 
only be possible if the family moves to another Member State and satisfied the 
criteria of Articles 7(1) and 14(2).144 The predicament here is that, if the fam-
ily wished to exercise the right to relocate within the Union by relying on the 
Directive, it is very likely that the residential property forming part of their in-
vestment would be sold in Cyprus and at most, be reinvested in another Mem-
ber State. This case, based on the wording of the Programme, would lead to the 
revocation of at least the main investor’s citizenship, and most likely that of 
all family Members except for minor children naturalised under the ordinary 
national naturalisation procedures noted above. Therefore, the possibility to 
acquire or retain residency rights and invoke the right to family reunification 
becomes ambiguous, as the beneficiaries of the Directive remain Union citi-
zens and their family members.145
The Programme also fails to detail the effects of the loss of the Union cit-
izenship of the main investor and their family on future generations. If the 
nationality of both parents is revoked in accordance with the Programme, 
their children, born in Cyprus and therefore Cypriot citizens iure soli, would 
be forced to leave the territory of the Union and thus be deprived of the sub-
stance of their Union rights analogously to the situation in Ruiz Zambrano.146 
One of the questions submitted to the Court in Tjebbes,147 was whether it 
is in conformity of EU law to have minors lose their citizenship status as a 
 142 Art. 110(3) Civil Registry Law 114(I)/ 2002 provides that minor children of a citizen of the 
Republic may acquire Cypriot nationality upon a request made to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.
 143 Article 6 and 7, Council Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member [2004] OJ L 158 30.4.2004.
 144 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C- 424/ 10 and C- 425/ 
10 Tomasz Ziolkowski and Barbara Szeja and Others v Land Berlin, paras 40– 41; Jesse, 
M. (2012). Joined Cases C- 424/ 10, Tomasz Ziolkowski v. Land Berlin, and C- 425/ 10, Barbara 
Szeja, Maria- Magdalena Szeja, Marlon Szeja v.  Land Berlin, Judgment of the Court of 
Justice (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 201. Common Market Law Review 49, pp. 2008.
 145 Art. 3, Council Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
[2004] OJ L 158 30.4.2004; de Groot (n 90), pp. 1092– 1093; C- 165/ 16 Lounes, para 35.
 146 C- 34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano, paras 40– 44.
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consequence of the deprivation of the nationality of their parent. In his opin-
ion, AG Mengozzi considered that the principle of uniform nationality within 
the same family should not be burdensome on the substantive rights and in-
terests of minors, which must be recognised as being independent from those 
of their parents.148 On the other side, the Court ruled that as long as the de-
cision withdrawing the nationality of a minor is seen in light of Article 24 of 
the Charter, such a decision can be legitimate.149 Having regard that a minor 
loses their citizenship as a consequence of the deprivation of their parent’s 
citizenship, the only logical assumption to an illegitimate decision to revoke 
the nationality of the parent is that the child is losing their nationality illegiti-
mately as well.150 Depriving the status of Union citizenship of minors born in 
a Member State on the basis of an unjustified revocation of the nationality of 
their parents seems highly inappropriate and any justification based on eco-
nomic grounds or the discretion accorded to Member States to govern their 
nationality laws would contradict the approach taken and the aims pursued 
by the Court in Ruiz Zambrano.
Non- compliance with the requirement of retaining the invested residential 
property in the Republic will result in the withdrawal of the investor’s Cypri-
ot and EU citizenship and have a knock- on effect on their family members. 
The ambiguity of the Programme permits the strict interpretation of its pro-
visions, which leads to the following conclusions: the investor and their fam-
ily members acquire a very peculiar Union citizenship, the validity of which 
depends on limiting the rights accorded to all EU citizens and the revocation 
of which exposes the entire family to a regime with which fails to provide for 
legal  remedies.
We must consider whether alternative, more appropriate measures could be 
taken to integrate newly naturalised investors and at the same time achieve the 
goal of economic prosperity and development. The main difference between 
the Cyprus Investment Programme and other investment migration schemes 
is the conditional character of the citizenship granted to investors, since the 
requirement of withholding the residential property has no time limitation151 
and non- compliance results in the revocation of their nationality.152 Imposing 
a reasonable time limit on the ownership of the residential property would 
 148 C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi paras 122– 125.
 149 C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes, para 47.
 150 Bauböck and Paskalev (n 108), pp. 83– 85.
 151 Cyprus Investment Programme (n 4), pp. 3– 4.












not raise concerns in the domain of the free movement of capital.153 The abso-
lute prohibition from selling the residential property used as an investment for 
the purposes of naturalisation in the Republic contradicts the very essence of 
investment, which is conditioned on the prospect of future liquidity.154 More-
over, the programme needs to become more specific on the manner in which 
citizenship is revoked and provide for a possibility of reviewing such a decision 
in a procedure that aims to protect the fundamental rights of those affected, 
having due regard to Union law.
It might be a tough task to balance the economic benefits of a measure, 
which has indeed succeeded in generating eur 4.8 billion in investment as 
of March 2018,155 with its adverse effects on individuals, while taking into ac-
count the established case law focusing on the deprivation of EU citizenship. 
It is my view, that the nature of the citizenship granted to investors and the 
limitations imposed on them demonstrates an unreasonable violation of the 
substance of Union citizenship, as established by the cjeu’s jurisprudence.156 
With the evolution of a ‘new logic of citizenship’,157 the importance of Union 
law and principles shall not be underestimated by national authorities when 
exercising their competences in matters of naturalisation.
v Conclusions
The legal analysis of the Cyprus Investment Programme in light of EU law on 
the free movement of capital and citizenship has proven that there is an imme-
diate need for amendments and improvements, which will not only guarantee 
compliance with Union rules but also advance the benefits for the economy of 
Cyprus and possibly secure its continuation in the future.
With regards to the question whether the Programme imposes restrictions 
to the free movement of capital, the case law of the ecj demonstrates that, in-
asmuch as economic objectives cannot justify derogations from the obligation 
 153 Limitations to the free movement of capital are allowed for a certain periods of time, 
according to art. 3(4) and 6 of Council Directive 88/ 361/ EEC of 24 July 1988 for the imple-
mentation of Article 67 of the Treaty [1988] OJ L 178/ 5.
 154 ubs. (2017). The Liquidity of Real Estate Investments: Investor Challenges During the Real 
Estate Cycle. White Paper, pp. 5.
 155 Farolfi, S., Harding, L. and Orphanides, S. (2018). EU Citizenship for sale as Russian oli-
garch buys Cypriot passport, available at https:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2018/ mar/ 
02/ eu- citizenship- for- sale- as- russian- oligarch- oleg- deripaska- buys- cypriot- passport.
 156 C- 34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano, paras 40– 44.
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to prohibit measures that would result in a restriction to the freedom guaran-
teed in Article 26 tfeu, advancing the national economy through a stream 
of foreign investment, part of which must be kept indefinitely in Cyprus, vi-
olates Article 63 tfeu. Therefore, the Programme must be reformed and the 
requirement to maintain residential property in the Republic indefinitely must 
be altered with the introduction of time limitations. The overall wording of 
the Programme should also be more precise, offering individuals all the legal 
remedies needed in case their citizenship is revoked.
As for the question of the possible violations of EU citizenship law, this 
article finds that the requirements of the Cyprus Investment Programme are 
dubious to say the least. The liberalisation of Union citizenship from its tra-
ditional establishment in the Treaties through the case law of the cjeu has 
played a detrimental role in the decisions Member States can take in matters 
regarding the grant and revocation of nationality. The judgments of Rottmann, 
Ruiz Zambrano and Lounes guided the process of the evaluation of the Cyprus 
Programme and accordingly, the revocation of Cypriot nationality and EU cit-
izenship as a result of non- compliance with the condition to retain part of the 
investment in the Republic forever is illegitimate and unjustifiable, as it leads 
to the revocation of Union citizenship based on the exercise of the rights it 
grants access to and leaves the investor’s entire family unprotected and with 
no other alternative but to leave the territory of the Union.
Naturalisation should be a transparent and just process, regardless of the 
financial status of individuals. As a Member of the EU, Cyprus is under an ob-
ligation to follow Union principles such as sincere cooperation and loyalty and 
is required to eliminate any unjustified obstacles to the free movement of cap-
ital. Current and future legislators and other public authorities adopting mea-
sures on matters of naturalisation and citizenship in general should remember 
that serving national economic interests should not restrict fundamental EU 
rights. The increasing significance of the supranational character of Union cit-
izenship proves that compliance is not a mere formalistic obligation imposed 
on the Member States: the objectives of the Union158 must be internalised and 
prioritised in every national policy of the Member States. Effective coopera-
tion between national and EU authorities is the best way to adequately shape 
and preserve the essence of EU citizenship and define the extent to which EU 
institutions can intervene in the sovereign powers of the Member States. The 
Cyprus Investment Programme is just one example of the discrepancies that 
emanate from the uncertainty and disparity in the ecj’s case law. Be that as 
 158 Art 3 teu. 
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it may, the Court is not solely to blame for the troubled development of EU 
citizenship; national authorities which continue to disregard the supranation-
al character of the Union are also accountable for the current state of affairs. 
Instead of contemplating methods to profit from systemic inadequacies, both 
legal orders must work together to prioritise individual rights, the protection 
of which both are pledged to guarantee.
© A.P. van der Mei, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004433076_018
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According to Article 20 tfeu, “[E] very person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”.1 The wording of the provision 
thus suggests a notably simple relationship between EU citizenship and Mem-
ber State nationality: to be an EU citizen one must be a Member State national. 
Third country nationals cannot acquire EU citizenship. Loss of nationality im-
plies automatic loss of this privileged status. When a Member State withdraws 
from the EU its nationals become third country nationals.2
From the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu), 
however, it follows that the relationship between EU and national citizenship 
is not as clear and straightforward as the Treaty text suggests. To be sure, the 
cjeu has never recognised, and not even suggested, any exceptions to the rule 
that EU citizenship is reserved for Member State nationals. Rather, in the well- 
known Rottmann ruling,3 it confirmed the exclusive link between EU citizen-
ship and national citizenship. What the cjeu did say in this ruling – and this 
is what complicates the relationship between the two citizenships  – is that 
Member States must, before taking a decision withdrawing “their” nationali-
ty, consider the consequences of such a decision for the person concerned as 
regards the loss of the rights he/ she enjoys as an EU citizen. Loss of EU citizen-
ship or the rights attached to it may preclude the lawful application of national 
rules on deprivation of national citizenship.
 * Professor of European Social law, Maastricht Centre for European Law. The author thanks 
Dr. Hoai- Thu Nguyen for her valuable comments on an earlier draft of this contribution. The 
usual disclaimer applies.
 1 See also the almost identically worded Article 9 teu.
 2 The same holds true when a region or comparable entity secedes from a Member State and 
becomes a new independent State. See further Marrero González, G. (2017). Civis Europaeus 
Sum? Consequences with Regard to Nationality law and EU Citizenship Status of the Indepen-
dence of a Devolved Part of an EU Member State. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers.












This is not just a theoretical matter. In recent years, questions concerning 
the loss of Member State nationality and the implications for EU citizenship 
have emerged, and increasingly so, in various contexts.4 A first one concerns 
the fight against terrorism. Various Member States have adopted laws making 
it possible or easier to deprive convicted or suspected terrorists of their nation-
ality. As commentators have observed,5 not only international law and echr 
law but also EU law, including the norms on EU citizenship, may restrict Mem-
ber States law and policies on nationality deprivation. Further, in response 
to increased migration and the proliferation of multiple citizenship, various 
States have enacted laws aimed at singular citizenship. Acquisition of the na-
tionality of a third State may result in loss of a Member State nationality and, 
thus, EU citizenship. In Tjebbes6 the cjeu was given the opportunity to specify 
its holdings in Rottmann and to determine its significance for situations involv-
ing national fights against multiple citizenship.
And finally, there is of course Brexit. The UK’s decision to withdraw from 
the EU has triggered numerous questions concerning the rights and interests 
of UK nationals. Early 2018, an Amsterdam court, in the ‘Brexpats’ case,7 an-
nounced its intention to ask the cjeu whether a hard Brexit indeed implies 
that UK nationals will become ‘ordinary’ third country nationals. In the end 
the preliminary question was not referred to Luxembourg, but Brexit and the 
Brexpats case do trigger interesting questions on the status and rights of na-
tionals of former EU Member States and, more generally, the link between EU 
and national citizenship.
1 Deprivation of Member State Nationality
For a proper understanding of Tjebbes and the questions that arose in the case, 
let us first recall the lessons from Rottmann.
 4 For a comprehensive overview of Member States’ rules and policies on loss of nationality and 
its implications for EU citizenship see Carrera Nunez, S. and de Groot, G- R. (2015). European 
Citizenship at the Crossroads – The Role of the European Union on Loss and Acquisition of Na-
tionality. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers. For theoretical reflections on loss of nationality 
and its significance for EU citizenship see Bauböck, R. and Peskalev, V. (2015). Citizenship 
Deprivation  – A  Normative Analysis. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No.82, 
available at www.ceps.eu.
 5 See e.g. Cloots, E. (2017). The Legal Limits of Citizenship Deprivation as a Counterterror Strat-
egy. European Public Law 23 (1), pp. 57– 92.
 6 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes and Others.
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First, while Member States are competent in nationality matters, they must 
exercise their powers with due regard for EU law.8
Second, decisions depriving a person of his or her nationality are subject to 
review under EU law whenever loss of EU citizenship or the rights attached to 
it are at stake. It is not necessary that the person concerned has exercised free 
movement rights.9
Third, Member States are entitled to protect the special relationship of soli-
darity and good faith, as well as the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form 
the bedrock of the bond of nationality.10
Fourth, when deciding on possibly withdrawing a nationality, Member 
States must observe principles of EU law, including the principles of propor-
tionality,11 legitimate expectations and equality.12
Fifth, as regards proportionality, the cjeu demands from Member States to 
balance national interests, such as combatting the acquisition of their nation-
ality by deception or fraud, against the implications of a possible withdrawal 
of nationality for the person concerned.13
Sixth, if proportionality is respected, Member States are entitled to with-
draw nationality, which, if the person concerned does not hold the nationality 
of any other Member State, in turn implies the loss of EU citizenship.
In Tjebbes the Court was asked to clarify Rottmann in a case which con-
cerned Dutch nationality law. The relevant rules stipulated that Dutch nation-
ality is lost, by operation of law, if the person concerned also possesses a ‘for-
eign’ nationality, and has lived outside the EU for an uninterrupted period of 
ten years. In addition, according to the Dutch nationality rules, where a parent 
loses Dutch nationality on grounds of having lived in a third country for ten 
years, his or her minor children are deprived of Dutch nationality too, unless 
they would become stateless. Are these rules, so the Court was asked in Tjeb-
bes, compatible with the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship?
 Adults
Unlike the German rule at stake in Rottmann, the Dutch rule under consider-
ation did not seek to combat wrong or fraudulent acquisition of nationality. 
 8 Rottmann, cit., paras. 39– 41 and 45.
 9 Ibid., para. 42.
 10 Ibid., para. 51.
 11 Ibid., para. 55.
 12 de Groot, G- R.  and Wautelet, P.  (2014). Reflections on Quasi- Loss of Nationality in 
Comparative, International and European Perspective. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security 
in Europe, No. 66, pp. 27 et seq.














Rather, the goal was to fight multi- citizenship and to ensure that nationals have 
and retain a genuine link with the Netherlands. Following its Advocate Gener-
al,14 the Court accepted the aim of the Dutch legislature as a legally sound one:
it is legitimate for a Member State to take the view that nationality is the 
expression of a genuine link between it and its nationals, and therefore 
to prescribe that the absence, or the loss, of any such genuine link entails 
the loss of nationality.15
In that regard, a criterion such as laid down in Dutch legislation of residence 
outside national territory for a given period may be regarded as an indication 
that there is no such link.16 The legitimacy of this, so the Court observed, is 
supported by international law. For example, the European Convention on per-
mits State parties to withdraw nationality in case of a lack of a genuine link 
between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad, provided it 
concerns persons with double or multiple nationality, who do not run the risk 
of becoming stateless.17
A Member State, in principle, thus may prescribe for reasons of public inter-
est that its nationality is lost in case of long- term residence abroad, even if this 
were to imply of loss of EU citizenship. The more difficult question, however, 
concerned proportionality. Tjebbes involved a national provision that with-
draws nationality by operation of law. It should be noted that it is plain that 
the Dutch legislature did not blindly pursue the above- stated ‘genuine link- 
aim’. It also had an eye on the interests of the persons concerned. The Dutch 
 14 Opinion of 12 July 2018, Tjebbes, cit., paras. 51– 59.
 15 Tjebbes and Others, cit., para. 35.
 16 Ibid., para. 36.
 17 Art.7(1), sub e of the Convention. Even though the Court did not stress the point, it is 
worth highlighting out that the Dutch provision under consideration withdraws Dutch 
nationality in the event of ten years habitual residence outside not only the Netherlands 
but also outside the EU. The latter would seem to be crucial. If long- term habitual resi-
dence in another EU Member State could be regarded as evidence of a lack of a genuine 
link with the Netherlands, Dutch nationals (who also possess the nationality of a third 
country) could lose EU citizenship for having exercised the right to freedom of move-
ment that they enjoy in that capacity. Exercising EU citizenship rights could therefore 
lead to a loss of EU citizenship. This, of course, does not and cannot hold true. De Groot, 
G- R. (2004). Towards a European Nationality Law. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8 
(3), 8. Member States may impose long- term residence requirements as key elements for 
establishing a genuine link between them and their nationals, but, in principle, EU law 
and EU citizenship demand that they recognize periods of residence in another Member 
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legislature chose a quite long period of absence from the EU of ten years. It also 
showed flexibility:  the ten- year absence rule does not apply to persons who, 
during this period, have lived in the Netherlands for a year or who have been 
issued a passport or identity card. Moreover, the rule only applies to persons 
who hold another nationality; the rule does not and cannot lead to stateless-
ness. Further, and as already highlighted, the Dutch legislature showed due re-
spect for EU law, and EU citizenship in particular, by not considering residence 
in another Member State as residence abroad for purposes of the ten- year rule. 
Finally, loss of Dutch nationality was not final and irreversible; Dutch nationals 
could retain it under preferential conditions.
So, the Dutch legislature did apply a proportionality test. The question that 
arose, however, was whether this suffices for compatibility with EU law or 
whether proportionality demands that all relevant factors and circumstances 
are taken into account in each individual case where nationality may be with-
drawn. Rottmann concerned a decision in an individual case. Did the ruling 
in this case imply that the balancing act that proportionality entails must be 
performed by national authorities and/ or courts in each individual case or is 
there room for regulatory balancing?
In the view of AG Mengozzi, a national provision may comply with the pro-
portionality requirement, even if it is general or regulatory in nature. In support 
of this opinion the AG referred to the ruling in Delvigne,18 in which the Court ac-
cepted that a national provision according to which persons convicted of a crime 
were deprived of their right to vote, also in European Parliament elections, could 
pass the proportionality test. In the view of the AG, one cannot deduce from the 
ruling in Rottmann a requirement that proportionality must be considered in 
each and every case by any administrative authority or court. This would even be 
at odds with the division of competences between the European Union and the 
Member States. It is for the Member States to govern the conditions for acquisi-
tion and loss of their nationality, and national legislatures are in principle free 
to establish which criteria are determinative for the genuine link between them 
and their nationals. If the EU principle of proportionality would require each 
national court in each case to consider all factors and circumstances, including 
those that the legislature has deliberately not chosen, determining the genuine 
link, it would intervene too deeply in the national domain of nationality law.
The Court did not follow its Advocate General on this point. It held that:
the loss of the nationality of a Member State by operation of law would 
be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality if the relevant 
 18 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2015, case C- 650/ 13, Delvigne. 
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national rules did not permit at any time an individual examination of 
the consequences of that loss for the persons concerned from the point 
of view of EU law.19
It follows that
the competent national authorities and courts must be in a position to 
examine the consequences of the loss of nationality and, where appro-
priate, to have the person concerned recover his or her nationality ex 
tunc’.20
That examination, so the Court explained,
requires an individual assessment of the situation of the person con-
cerned and that of his or her family in order to determine whether the 
consequences of losing the nationality of the Member State concerned, 
when it entails the loss of his or her citizenship of the Union, might 
(..),disproportionately affect the normal development of his or her family 
and professional life from the point of view of EU law.21
As part of that examination national authorities and courts must ensure 
that the loss of nationality is consistent with the fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the right to re-
spect for family life in particular.22 Circumstances that might be relevant in 
applying the proportionality test include difficulties in travelling Member 
States in order to retain genuine and regular links with members of his or 
her family, or to pursue professional activities, and the fact that the person 
concerned might not have been able to renounce the nationality of a third 
country.23
The Court’s conclusion is notable yet understandable. Case law on the 
Citizenship Directive24 or the European Arrest Warrant25 demonstrate that 
a proportionality assessment may very well be carried out by the (European) 
 19 Tjebbes and Others, cit., para. 41.
 20 Ibid., para. 42.
 21 Ibid., para. 44.
 22 Ibid., para. 45.
 23 Ibid.
 24 E.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2015, case C- 67/ 14, Alimanovic.
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legislature without there being a need for an additional proportionality as-
sessment by executive authorities in each individual case.26 Further, one 
may agree with AG Mengozzi that an obligation under EU law for national 
authorities and courts to check in every single case whether the legislature 
has sufficiently considered and balanced all factors relevant for the required 
genuine link is perhaps hard to compare with the duty imposed by Article 
4(2) teu on the EU to respect national identities, of which “the composition 
of the national body politic is clearly an essential element”.27 At the same 
time, one certainly may have sympathy for the Court’s requirement of an 
individual proportionality test. The application of a rule according to which 
a Member State nationality is lost may have very diverse implications for 
the right to enter or return to the European Union, a factor to which the 
Court appears to attach specific importance. For example, for a person who 
after loss of the nationality of a given Member State still holds US nation-
ality it will be much easier than for someone who only possesses Iranian 
 nationality.28
ii.2 Minor Children
When it comes to the rules applicable to minor children, even greater doubts 
existed as regards the compatibility with EU law. Under these rules, Dutch chil-
dren lose their nationality if the father or the mother loses Dutch nationality 
on the ground of having lived outside the EU for ten years or more. This holds 
true even if the child has lived during that period in the Netherlands or the EU. 
Dutch nationality is not lost if this would result in the minor child becoming 
stateless.
The Dutch legislature had justified this rule by emphasizing the unity 
of nationality within the family. The Court accepted this by holding that it 
is legitimate for “a Member State to wish to protect the unity of national-
ity within the same family”.29 The Court added that the lack of a genuine 
link between parents (who have lived abroad for more than 10  years) and 
a Member State like the Netherlands can be understood, in principle, as a 
lack of a genuine link between the child and that same Member State.30 
 26 Compare the contribution by Elise Muir in this Volume.
 27 Opinion in Tjebbes. cit., para. 107, referring to Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann, 
cit., para. 25.
 28 See e.g. de Groot, G- R. (2019). Beschouwingen over Tjebbes. Tijdschrift voor Asiel- & 
Migrantenrecht 10 (5), pp. 196– 203, 200– 201.














However, also as regards children an individual assessment is needed of the 
consequences of the loss of nationality. In carrying out such an assessment, 
national authorities and courts must consider the development of a child’s 
family and (future) professional life and, as Article 24(2) of the EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights requires, the child’s best interest must be the prima-
ry consideration.31
The Court’s ruling is, in as far as children is concerned, a bit puzzling. As 
such it may not truly surprise that the Court accepts promoting the unity of 
nationality within one and the same family as a ground for justification as this 
indeed is an internationally recognized as a permissible tool for combating 
multiple nationality.32 However, it is not apparent why or how this principle of 
unity of nationality serves the interests of a child in cases on loss of nationali-
ty. How can depriving children of their nationality can actually promote their 
interests? Leaving aside issues concerning military service, one would rath-
er think that only rights to retain or acquire nationality can serve children’s 
interests. It is hard to see how the fact that a child possesses an additional 
nationality to the one that he/ she shares with the parent disadvantages him/ 
her.33 Arguably, the interests of the child call for the promotion rather than the 
reduction of multiple citizenship.
Further, the Court accepted the argument of the Dutch Government that in 
case a parent loses his/ her nationality because he/ she no longer has an effec-
tive link with the Netherlands, it is reasonable to presume that also the minor 
children no longer have such a link. As such this presumption may make sense 
but not in all situations, for example in situations in which children do not live 
with their parent(s). Fortunately, the individual assessment and consideration 
of proportionality that the Court requires, may help to ensure here ‘fair’ out-
comes in the sense that national authorities or courts may have to reach the 
 31 Ibid., para. 47. Compare also UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 3 (1): “In all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare insti-
tutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.”
 32 See e.g. Second Protocol to the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple 
Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, European 
Treaties Series No.149.
 33 The “only conceivable disadvantage is if at a latter point in life she is suspected of terror-
ism – in such cases the availability of a second citizenship may expose her to depriva-
tion, while potential statelessness may protect her from losing her preferred citizenship. 
However, the probability that same person is exposed to potential derivative loss as a 
child and threatened with deprivation on security grounds as an adult seems extremely 
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conclusion that, unlike their parents, children cannot lose their nationality as 
this would affect their rights as EU citizens.
In his Opinion, the AG also criticized the Dutch rules concerned because 
they would disregard to the autonomous nature of EU citizenship. EU citi-
zenship is not reserved for adults, and minors are not second- class EU citi-
zens. Children’s EU citizenship cannot be regarded as being derived from their 
parents’ possession of that same status but must be regarded as an autono-
mous status. Therefore, so the AG argued, children ought to have the same 
procedural and substantive rights in relation to the possible loss of nationality 
and, thus, EU citizenship. In the case at hand, this was not the case inter alia 
because, under the Dutch nationality rules, only adults could break the unin-
terrupted period of ten years of living abroad by applying for e.g. a passport, 
and, by doing so, thereby retain both their nationality and EU citizenship. On 
this point, one does not necessarily have to agree with the AG. It may very well 
be true that that EU citizenship has evolved to become an autonomous status 
which in itself may be a source of rights, and of course, these rights can be 
enjoyed by all EU citizens regardless of their age. Yet, from the fact that EU law 
itself may determine the scope and meaning of EU citizenship rights it does 
not necessarily follow that it is also exclusively up to EU law to decide on who 
possesses EU citizenship. We will return to the issue in the following sections, 
but the fact is that Article 20 tfeu makes the possession of EU citizenship di-
rectly and exclusively conditional upon Member State nationality. It is not for 
the EU but for the Member States to determine who possesses ‘their’ nation-
ality. If children’s nationality derives under national law from their parents’ 
nationality, the same holds true for EU citizenship. Both for parents and chil-
dren, EU citizenship is derivative in nature. Therefore, from the autonomous 
nature of EU citizenship it arguably does not (necessarily) follow that children 
ought to have the same procedural and substantive rights as adults under na-
tional law to obtain or retain Member State nationality and, by extension, EU 
citizenship.
2 Member State Withdrawal from the Union
The Rottmann case law concerned national decisions withdrawing a Member 
State nationality and its implications for EU citizenship and the rights linked 
to that status. That case law thus is not directly applicable to situations in 
which a Member State nationality is lost because the Member State concerned 
decides to withdraw from the Union. Yet, can the logic underpinning the case 
law be extended to withdrawal situations?
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Early 2018 an Amsterdam district court answered this question in the affir-
mative.34 The court was faced with a case initiated by UK nationals living in 
the Netherlands, who claimed that the Dutch State and/ or the city of Amster-
dam had to take measures so as to ensure that they could continue to enjoy 
EU citizenship rights after Brexit. Referring to AG Poiares Maduro’s opinion in 
Rottmann,35 the Amsterdam court observed that EU citizenship now consti-
tutes an own autonomous source of rights and that decisions implying loss of 
Member State nationality must be proportional. The court opined that it can 
reasonably be doubted that loss of national citizenship implies loss of EU cit-
izenship and stated its intention to refer the following preliminary questions 
to the Court of Justice:
First, does the withdrawal of the UK from the EU automatically lead to the 
loss of EU citizenship of [UK] nationals and, thus, to the elimination of rights 
and freedoms deriving from EU citizenship, if and in so far as the EU and the 
UK do not agree otherwise in the exit- negotiations?
Second, if Brexit does imply loss of EU citizenship, should conditions or re-
strictions be imposed on the maintenance of the rights and freedoms to be 
derived from EU citizenship? In the end, however, the questions were not re-
ferred to Luxembourg.36
It is not clear on what grounds the Amsterdam court based its suggestion 
that UK nationals might keep EU citizenship after Brexit. It may very well be 
that EU citizenship has evolved to become a fundamental status that may con-
stitute an autonomous source of EU rights, and that Article 20 tfeu “precludes 
 34 Rechtbank Amsterdam, C/ 13/ 640244 / KG ZA 17– 1327, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:605. See also 
Garner, O. (2018). Does Member State Withdrawal from the European Union Extinguish 
EU Citizenship? European Law Blog, available at: http:// europeanlawblog.eu/ 2018/ 02/ 19/ 
does- member- state- withdrawal- from- the- european- union- extinguish- eu- citizenship- 
c13640244- kg- za- 17- 1327- rechtbank- amsterdam- the- amsterdam- case.
 35 Ibid., para. 5.20.
 36 The Amsterdam court had not yet taken the decision to refer the question to the Court of 
Justice. It had invited the parties in the proceedings to appeal its interlocutory decision 
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals recognized that a decision to refer 
preliminary questions cannot be made subject to an appeal (Court of Justice, judgment 
of 16 December 2008, case C- 210/ 06, Cartesio), but held that it nonetheless had jurisdic-
tion because parties could appeal the interlocutory decision also on grounds other than 
the decision to refer preliminary questions. The Court of Appeals shared the view that 
doubts indeed exist as regards the view that Brexit implies loss of EU citizenship, but it 
concluded that the British applicants’ claims were too vague. Regardless of the possible 
answers of the Court of Justice to the suggested preliminary question, applicants had not 
adequately indicated what concrete measures they demanded to be taken by the State 
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national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance”37 of EU citizenship rights. From that, 
however, no conclusion can be drawn about a possible retention of EU citi-
zenship itself after a Member State has left the EU. One could perhaps seek to 
interpret Article 20 tfeu to imply that Member States – via their nationality 
laws – can only decide on the grant but not on the withdrawal of EU citizen-
ship, but there is not much, if anything, in the text or drafting history to sup-
port this reading.38 Further, it is hard to understand why or how the Court’s 
line of reasoning in Rottmann can be extended to situations in which a Mem-
ber State national loses his/ her nationality as a result of the decision of his/ 
her Member State to step out of the Union. Should, because of Rottmann, a 
Member State observe proportionality when taking a decision under Article 
50 teu? A decision to withdraw nationality in individual cases and a decision 
to withdraw as an entire State from the European Union are not in any serious 
manner comparable. The entire reasoning of the Court was clearly geared to-
wards the specific individual situation in which Mr. Rottmann found himself. 
It simply does not make much sense to draw conclusions from this reasoning 
for the entirely different situation of Brexit, in which millions of citizens could 
lose EU citizenship as a result of a collective decision adopted in accordance 
with their own democratic rules.
Article 20 tfeu makes it patently clear that EU citizenship is derivative in 
nature. Neither in Rottmann nor in any other ruling did the Court cut through 
EU citizenship’s exclusive and absolute link with Member State nationality. 
From existing case law one arguably can only draw one logical conclusion: for 
UK nationals, Brexit implies loss of EU citizenship.
Of course, (some) UK nationals might have hoped for an activist Court that 
would be willing to change its position.39 There are no sound reasons, however, 
why the Court would or should have done so. The contrary rather holds true. 
If the Court would have accept that nationals of former Member States could 
retain EU citizenship, it would have acted contrary to the wishes of the drafters 
of the Treaty.
First, in Maastricht the drafters made it patently clear that it is not the 
Union but the Member States who, through their nationality laws, decide on 
 37 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 43.
 38 Compare Dawson, M.  and Augenstein, D.  (2016). After Brexit:  Time for a Further 
Decoupling of European and National Citizenship. Verfassungsblog, available at https:// 
verfassungsblog.de/ brexit- decoupling- european- national- citizenship.
 39 Compare Shaw, J. (2018). EU Citizenship: Still a Fundamental Status? EUI Working Paper 








who holds EU citizenship. Second, in Lisbon, by including Article 50 in the teu 
and by thus ordering the EU to negotiate and conclude an agreement govern-
ing the arrangements for withdrawal with the exiting Member State, the draft-
ers of the Treaty made it clear that a possible retention of EU citizenship and 
of the rights linked to it falls within the tasks of the political EU institutions, 
not of the Court. The entire structure of Article 50 teu implies that it is up to 
Member States to withdraw from the Union in whichever manner they wish; 
EU law does not impose any limitations as to the reasons for the withdrawal, 
the manner in which this decision is taken, or the extent to which that Mem-
ber State takes into consideration the interests of its own nationals. If a Mem-
ber State decides to withdraw from the EU, and thus to deprive their nationals 
of EU citizenship, it is perfectly entitled to do this. The EU, including its highest 
court, cannot alter this.
3 Associate EU Citizenship
Thus, under the Treaties, it essentially falls to the EU political institutions 
rather than the Court to prevent a situation in which UK nationals would lose 
EU citizenship status and/ or rights as a consequence of Brexit. As regards the 
possibilities and options available, politicians,40 non- governmental organisa-
tions41 as well as academics have expressed their views.42 The most interesting 
ones among the suggested proposals were those calling for the introduction of 
an associate EU citizenship. The original idea, if I am correct, stemmed from 
the mind of the European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator, Guy Verhofstadt. 
In December 2016, Verhofstadt suggested a form of EU ‘associate citizenship’ 
status that would allow individuals to “keep free movement to live and work 
across the EU, as well as a vote in European Parliament elections”. mep col-
league Goerens supported the idea and added that “[f] ollowing the reciprocal 
 40 These include mep s Goerens and Verhofstadt. See further Miller, V.  (2018) Brexit and 
European Citizenship, House of Commons  – Briefing paper 8365, and Austin- Greenall, 
A. and Lipinska, S. (2017). Brexit and Loss of EU Citizenship: Cases, Options, Perceptions, 
Citizen Brexit Observatory.
 41 See e.g. the various European citizens’ initiatives Permanent European Union Citizenship, 
Retaining European Citizenship and EU Citizenship for Europeans:  United in Diversity in 
Spite of jus soli and jus sanguinis, available on http:// ec.europa.eu/ citizens- initiative/ pub-
lic/ welcome. See further the contribution by Natassa Athanasiadou in this Special Issue.
 42 See Kostakopoulou, D.  (2018). Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post- Brexit and the 
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principle of ‘no taxation without representation’, these associate citizens 
should pay an annual membership fee directly into the EU budget.”43 The EP 
itself was also sympathetic to the idea and proposed that the EU- 27 would ex-
amine how to mitigate the loss of EU rights by UK nationals by introducing 
such status, provided that full respect is given to the principles of reciprocity, 
equity, symmetry and non- discrimination.44
The idea of an associate EU citizenship has proven to be controversial, with 
some indeed advocating it45 and others (strongly) opposing it.46 Discussions 
on this status are not always easy to understand, partly because it is not truly 
clear what associate European citizenship would actually entail. To be sure, 
associate European citizenship would differ from EU citizenship itself. Those 
who favour it do not seem to call for a retention of the status established by 
Article 20 tfeu but rather for the creation of a new status. Further, it would be 
a status to be granted or offered to nationals of former Member States and not, 
for example, to third country nationals who have acquired long- term residence 
status. Third, in terms of substance, the new status would encompass the most 
important EU citizenship rights: free movement rights (presumably including 
equal treatment) and active voting rights in European Parliament elections.
Numerous aspects, however, still remain unclear. For example, will/ would 
paying a fee into the EU budget be a requirement, as mep Goerens suggested? 
The issue certainly is relevant for the legitimacy of Associate citizenship and 
reminds us of the ‘citizenship- by- investment’ of Malta, and a few other Mem-
ber States.47 The Maltese programme has proven quite controversial inter alia 
because of a free rider problem. By buying Maltese citizenship, a country with 
which they may have no genuine link, third country nationals could acquire 
EU citizenship and, subsequently, move to other Member States, which other-
wise would never have admitted them. This free rider problem would not exist 
 43 Goerens, C. (2016). European Citizenship, Blog, available at https:// www.charlesgoerens.
eu/ blog- charles/ eu- citizenship.
 44 European Parliament, Draft Motion for a Resolution to to wind up the debate on negotia-
tions with the United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from 
the European Union, 29 March 2017, B8- 0000/ 2017.
 45 For an overview see Austin- Greenall, A.  and Lipinska, S.  (2017). Brexit and Loss of EU 
Citizenship, cit.
 46 Kochenov, D.  (2018). Misguided ‘Associate EU Citizenship’  – Talk as a Denial of EU 
Values. Verfassungsblog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ misguided- associate- eu- 
citizenship- talk- as- a- denial- of- eu- values/ , and Van den Brink, M. and Kochenov, D. (2019). 
Against Associate EU Citizenship. Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (6), pp. 1366– 1382.
 47 Carrera, S. (2014). The Price of EU Citizenship – The Maltese Citizenship- for- Sale Affair 
and the Principle of Sincere Cooperation in Nationality Matters. Maastricht Journal of 











if one were to introduce associate citizenship at EU level. Yet, is it desirable to 
ask a price for a citizenship- like status, to commercialise it? Will it be a new 
status based on a genuine link that its holders have with the EU or one of its 
Member States, or will associate EU citizenship be a tradable good?
A next question that then arises is who would be the beneficiaries of this 
new associated citizenship? Concretely in the case of Brexit: would only the 
Brits who have moved to another Member State and have lived there for a giv-
en period of time be given the right or option to become associate EU citizens, 
or also those who have never done so and find themselves in ‘purely internal 
British situation’? The answer to this question is relevant because it triggers 
the subsequent question of what the actual aim of associate citizenship would 
be: is it just a means to ensure the continuation of rights for nationals of exit-
ing Member States living in other EU Member States, or does it have an own 
intrinsic or more deeply motivated aim? If the former is the case, why would 
UK nationals who have never settled across the Channel still need to have a 
right to vote for the EP? Those who wish to include EP election rights for this 
category of UK nationals must have something else or more in mind. Yet, what 
exactly? Even though the term ‘associate citizenship’ is used, is it not that this 
is meant as a covert way to make sure that Brits, and potential other future ex- 
Member State nationals, can nonetheless retain EU citizenship?
It is of course perfectly possible that advocates of associate European citi-
zenship themselves do not exactly know what they are proposing or what the 
implications of their proposal might be. As noble as their motives may be, if 
these advocates have more in mind than merely freezing the legal status of 
UK nationals living in ‘Europe’, one must be cautious. Critical questions must 
be addressed. If this envisaged status is meant as a status separate from EU 
citizenship, yet encompassing the same or very similar rights as the latter, does 
it not undermine EU citizenship? Even if it were established that the EU can 
formally confer all rights that it offers to its own citizens to third country na-
tionals, does the very existence of EU citizenship not command restrictions? 
Further, and recalling what has previously been said about Article 50 teu, why 
is there at all a need for the EU to consider introducing a new status to the ben-
efit of people who have collectively, and fully in accordance with their own in-
ternal constitutional norms and procedures, decided to step out of the Union 
and decided to give up their EU citizenship? Apparently, the majority who vot-
ed in favour of Brexit did not consider EU citizenship important enough. And 
whatever others may think of this choice, the choice to leave the EU made was 
entirely legally. Those who voted to remain simply have to accept that they, as 
a result of UK constitutional rules, lost the battle and, with that, EU citizenship 
and all rights flowing from this status. In fact, by offering one- sidedly associate 
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citizenship to those UK nationals who wish to remain part of the European 
integration project, the EU is meddling in the internal affairs of a former Mem-
ber State in which it arguably should not meddle.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, why would the EU at all consider 
unilaterally offering a new status to British (or other former EU) citizens with-
out there being any reciprocal status or legal protection for EU citizens living 
in the UK (or any other exiting Member State)? The number of EU citizens in 
the UK far exceeds the number of UK nationals living in ‘Europe’. As noble as 
it may be to show legal and political compassion with UK nationals in EU- 27 
Member States, the EU’s main commitment does not, or at least should not, lie 
with them but rather with EU citizens living in the UK. The EU should not give 
in to the pressure of all those who – often quite annoyingly – place so much 
emphasis on the negative implications of Brexit for UK nationals living in the 
EU without giving equal (if any at all) attention to the rights and interests of 
EU citizens residing in the UK. Reciprocity is a must. Without it, introducing 
associate European citizenship is an idea that is doomed to be rejected by EU 
citizens.
4 Final Remarks
There is no denying that the drafters of the European Treaties have decided to 
reserve EU citizenship for nationals of EU Member States. The Court of Justice 
has never cut through the exclusive link between Member State nationality 
and EU citizenship. As the legal situation stand at present, the Court is well 
advised not to alter its position just because of ‘Brexit’. If it were to do so, it 
would likely be faced with accusations of undue judicial activism that may not 
be easy to dismiss.
Of course, one fully understands the frustrations of all those UK nationals 
who live in ‘Europe’ and may lose the rights attached to EU citizenship, or all 
those British citizens who voted for ‘Bremain’. And, yes, one understands the 
calls made by them, or on their behalf, for cutting through the umbilical cord 
between EU and national citizenship. Yet, this is not a task for the Court, but 
rather a task for ‘politics’ and, more concretely, for the parties that have to ne-
gotiate the exit agreement under Article 50 teu. One may dislike the idea that 
individuals are subject to political negotiations and thus deals,48 but that is 
essentially what the Treaty prescribes. Given their political, day- to- day nature 





one can only be satisfied that the Brexit- negotiators have limited themselves 
to a freezing of the rights of mobile EU citizens and have not burned their fin-
gers on more fundamental questions concerning the scope and nature of EU 
citizenship. For an answer on those questions we, as European citizens, need 
to take more time to reflect.
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From Union Citizen to Third- Country National: 
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Brexit, including over three years of uncertainty leading up to Brexit on 31 Jan-
uary 2019, has had a profound effect on the lives of the approximately 3 mil-
lion EU citizens living in the UK and 1.2 million UK nationals1 living in the EU 
Member States. For both groups of citizens, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
means their rights under EU law are withdrawn while they are exercising them. 
This is an unprecedented situation and a major development in the history of 
Union citizenship (“EU citizenship”).
Brexit for UK nationals means they become third- country nationals and 
collectively lose their EU citizenship. This chapter focusses on the specific po-
sition of UK nationals (referred to interchangeably as either UK nationals or 
Britons) who live and/ or work in the EU(and who do not have the nationality 
of another Member State and thereby lose EU citizenship). What happens in 
legal terms to these former EU citizens still living in the EU?
The transformation of Britons into non- EU citizens in fact takes place in 
two stages: in a first stage, from 1 February 2020 when the UK ceases to be a 
Member State, all UK nationals lose the political rights of EU citizenship (see 
further below).2 The Withdrawal Agreement allows however other rights of 
EU citizenship to be retained during the transition period:  all UK nationals 
 * Legal Officer, DG GROW, European Commission. Affiliated Member, Institute of European 
Law, KU Leuven. The information and views set out in this chapter are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Commission.
 1 For a discussion of the size of the UK population in the EU, see, Benton, M. (2017). Safe or 
Sorry: Prospects for Britons in the EU after Brexit. Migration Policy Institute 2017, 6– 11.
 2 These rights are excepted from the effect of the transition period by Article 127(1)(b) of 










continue to enjoy the rights of free movement and residence in other Member 
States during this time. In the second stage, at the end of the transition (in 
principle 31 December 2020), these rights will end.3 The provisions of Part Two 
of the Withdrawal Agreement then kick in fully to protect only those citizens 
and their family members within its scope.4 As this contribution will set out, 
only certain rights are however protected by the Agreement.
The chapter is divided into four parts. First, it reminds the reader of the con-
cept of EU citizenship and its associated rights: what exactly do UK nationals 
lose? Second, it considers the Withdrawal Agreement:  what has the process 
been; what is its scope; what rights does it protect for UK nationals living and/ 
or working in the EU? Third, the preparations made by the EUunder the No- 
Deal scenario for the sudden default of UK citizens to third- country national 
status are put under the lens. The fourth section reflects more broadly on the 
withdrawal of EU citizenship: who has the duty to protect the citizens whose 
EU citizenship is being withdrawn; what rights must be protected; and what 
should the process look like?
The specific rights that may eventually be given to UK nationals residing 
and/ or working in the EU under a new UK- EU relationship are, at the time 
of writing, unknown.5 This issue is not therefore discussed. The position of 
non- mobile UK nationals, who remain in the UK, is out of scope of this con-
tribution too.
1 EU Citizenship – the Concept – the Rights – Its Evolution
The Maastricht Treaty established both the European Union and the concept 
of EU citizenship. EU citizenship was part of the creation of a “People’s Eu-
rope”:- showing to citizens that the nascent Union offered more than merely 
the possibility to participate in the (single) market.6 In addition, a new label, 
“Union citizen” or “EU citizen” was invented that went beyond the “privileged 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 
C 384I, 12.11.2019, p. 1– 184 (hereinafter, “the Withdrawal Agreement”).
 3 Article 132(1) provides that the transition period may before 1 July 2020 be extended for up to 
1 or 2 years.
 4 Article 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
 5 An outline of what is foreseen as regards movement of citizens can be found in Part ix “Mo-
bility” of the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship be-
tween the European Union and the United Kingdom, OJ C 384, 12.11.19, p. 178.
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foreigner” status that nationals from Member States had hitherto enjoyed in 
a host Member State.7 The Union citizen was defined as every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State and a set of citizenship rights was laid down 
by the new Treaty.
The core element of EU citizenship, when introduced, was in fact an already 
known set of rights:  the right to move and reside within the territory of all 
Member States. What was new was that such rights were conferred by prima-
ry law on all Union citizens (although subject to limitations and conditions), 
regardless of economic activity. There were also political rights, which in part 
restated what already existed pre- Maastricht: the right for EU citizens to vote 
and stand in European Parliament elections, including while residing in anoth-
er Member State; a new right to vote and stand in local elections in the Member 
State of residence; and the right to petition the European Parliament, another 
already- existing right. To this group of political rights, the Lisbon Treaty later 
added the right to launch a European Citizen’s initiative – a right intended to 
promote EU citizens’ participation in the democratic life of the Union.8 EU cit-
izens were also (by the Maastricht Treaty) conferred with the right to consular 
protection by any Member State when unrepresented in a third country out-
side of the EU. In addition, institutional rights, aimed at reinforcing relations 
with EU institutions, were listed: the right to apply to the European Ombuds-
man; to which the Amsterdam Treaty added the right to correspond with the 
EU institutions in one’s own language.
While not formally part of the list of EU citizenship rights, the guarantee of 
non- discrimination on grounds of Member State nationality is a fundamental, 
constitutional aspect of EU citizenship.9
At the time of introduction of EU citizenship, many writers demonstrated 
scepticism towards the concept. Everson underlined the difficulty of creating 
a bond of citizenship and allegiance between an individual and a transna-
tional group of states. While EU citizenship was a “progressive concept” and 
could be a “dynamic notion”, Everson doubted whether what was essentially 
still a market or consumer status could do this.10 Jessurun d’Oliveira consid-
ered the concept as largely symbolic, lacking coherence and with little new 
 7 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1994). Citizenship: Its meaning, Its Potential. In: Dehousse, ed., 
European After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? Munich: CH Beck, p. 127.
 8 Recital 1 of Regulation (EU) 2019/ 788 on the European Citizens’ Initiative, OJ L 130, 
17.5.2019, p. 55.
 9 Muir, E. (2018). EU equality law: the first fundamental rights policy of the EU. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, p. 36.
 10 Everson, M. (1995). The Legacy of the Market Citizen. In: Shaw and More, eds., New Legal 










content. Moreover, due to its link to the nationality of a Member State, EU 
citizenship created a demarcation line between those who “belonged” and 
those who did not. In his view it would have been both more cohesive and 
more rational in policy terms to forge EU citizenship for resident aliens as 
well.11
Since its introduction, EU citizenship has evolved considerably. Its definition 
was amended by the Amsterdam Treaty to underline that it complements and 
does not replace national citizenship. It is reinforced by a section on “Citizens’ 
rights” in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. It is supported by a 
body of secondary legislation,12 which in various ways shapes its content and 
direction. The Court of Justice has contributed to the development of EU citi-
zenship through its judgments: in its heyday the Court established that EU citi-
zenship was “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States”;13 more recently, reacting to a political environment hostile to mobile 
EU citizens accessing social welfare, the Court reined in the equal treatment 
rights of EU citizenship.14 Public opinion surveys show that EU citizenship is a 
concept that the European public embraces.15 Through the eci and other civil 
society initiatives, EU citizenship provides a framework for European action 
not just from the top down but also from the bottom up.16 It has become a prod-
uct not only of a process of polity- building beyond the state, but also of a move 
away from a predominantly state- centred conception of citizenship.17
 11 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (1994), cit., p. 147.
 12 Most notably, Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State, OJ L 158, 
30.4.2004, p. 77; Directive 94/ 80/ EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
municipal elections, OJ L 368, 31.12.1994, p. 38; Directive 93/ 109 on the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals European Parliament 
elections OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34; Directive (EU) 2015/ 637 on the coordination and coop-
eration measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union 
in third countries and repealing Decision 95/ 553/ EC, OJ L 106, 24.4.2015, p. 1.
 13 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk, para. 31.
 14 Martinsen, D.S. and others. (2018). ECJ judges read the morning papers. Explaining the 
turnaround of European citizenship jurisprudence. Journal of European Public Policy 25 
(10), pp. 1422– 1441.
 15 Standard Eurobarometer 91 (published in August 2019)  showed that in all 28 Member 
States, more than half of respondents felt that they were citizens of the EU. Across the EU, 
73% felt this way.
 16 Venables, T.  (2016). The UK Referendum on Membership of the EU:  One Choice Hides 
Another – to Keep or Give up European Citizenship. ecit Foundation.
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The personal scope of EU citizenship remains however firmly linked to na-
tionality of a Member State.18 Concern about the loss of rights Brexit entails 
has triggered a massive wave of applications from UK citizens for other Mem-
ber State nationalities in order to conserve their EU citizenship.19 UK nation-
als in the Netherlands initiated litigation – judged premature by the nation-
al appeal court – to challenge the loss of EU citizenship.20 The mep, Charles 
Goerens, put forward the possibility of creating associate EU citizenship for 
nationals of a former Member State;21 a European Citizens’ Initiative (“eci”) 
was launched to ask for the creation of “Permanent EU Citizenship”;22 and a 
citizens’ lobby group suggested a “Green Card” as a way to maintain free move-
ment rights after Brexit for both EU citizens and UK nationals with permanent 
residence rights.23 In April 2020 a direct action challenging the removal of EU 
citizenship rights upon the UK’s departure from the EU was lodged before the 
General Court of the EU.24 Brexit has paradoxically brought the concept of EU 
citizenship alive!25
Yet, despite the attempts by UK nationals to find a way to retain EU citi-
zenship, the Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK made clear there 
was no panacea for the loss of EU citizenship pursuant to Brexit. Article 50(3) 
teu is the mechanism by which EU citizenship is removed. It provides that 
the Treaties shall cease to apply to the State, which has notified its withdrawal 
from the EU under the terms of Article 50 teu. Thus, when the Withdrawal 
Agreement takes effect, the UK ceases to be a Member State and persons with 
UK nationality thereby no longer fulfill the condition in Article 20 tfeu to 
have EU citizenship – “nationality of a Member State”. In this way the rights of 
 18 Kostakopoulou, D.  (2014). European Union citizenship and Member State nation-
ality:  rethinking the link? In:  Konopacki, ed., Europe in the time of crisis. Łódź/ 
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, p. 71.
 19 House of Commons Library Briefing, Brexit and European Citizenship, 6 July 2018, p. 35.
 20 De Staat der Nederlanden & de Gemeente Amsterdam v Brexpats Hear Our Voice, 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 20 June 2018, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:2009.
 21 European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2016). Amendments to draft 
report on “Possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set- up of the 
European Union”. 9 November 2016.
 22 Available at https:// www.eucitizen2017.org.
 23 “European Green Card proposed as solution”, available at https:// neweuropeans.net/ arti-
cle/ 2628/ european- green- card- proposed- solution.
 24 Available at https:// www.thelondoneconomic.com/ politics/ exclusive- uk- campaigners- 
file- case- to- prove- withdrawal- agreement- cannot- remove- eu- citizenship/ 27/ 04/ 
 25 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H.U. (2018). Brexit, Nationality and Union Citizenship: bottom up. EUI 


















EU citizenship listed in Article 20(2) tfeu previously enjoyed by UK nationals 
simply fall away. Other key rights for individuals in the EU Treaties, which de-
pend on having nationality of a Member State, such as the rights of work and 
establishment in another Member State and the right to provide cross- border 
services, are also lost by virtue of the effect of Article 50 teu.
2 Loss of EU Citizenship and the Withdrawal Agreement
From the outset of the discussions concerning Brexit, the EU and the UK gov-
ernment stated their commitment to protecting the rights of citizens affected 
by Brexit – both EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU. The protec-
tion of citizens’ rights was one of the central planks of the Withdrawal Agree-
ment. A position paper published by the European Commission’s Taskforce 50 
on 12 June 2017 set out its objective as follows:
..to protect the rights of EU27 citizens, UK nationals and their family 
members who … have enjoyed rights relating to free movement under 
Union law, as well as rights which are in the process of being obtained 
and the rights the enjoyment of which will intervene at a later date[for 
example pensions rights].26
The paper set out essential principles for the start of the withdrawal negotia-
tions with the UK, stating that, among others, the following principle should 
apply:
the same level of protection as set out in Union law at the date of with-
drawal of EU27 citizens in the UK and of UK nationals in EU27 including 
the right to acquire permanent residence after a continuous period of 
5 years of legal residence …
As the negotiations commenced and a joint EU- UK position was agreed in the 
December 2017 Joint Report,27 the commitment of the earlier position paper 
 26 European Commission (2017). TaskForce50 Position Paper on “Essential Principles on 
Citizens’ Rights”, 12 June 2017.
 27 Joint Report of the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 teu on the 
United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union, TF50 (2017) 19  – 
Commission to EU 27. 8 December 2017, available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ commission/ 
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narrowed: the aim became “protecting the effective exercise of rights derived 
from EU law and based on past life choices”. As the discussion below will show, 
the new focus on “past life choices”, in the case of UK nationals in the EU, be-
came a limitation.
Laffan describes the key strengths of the Union in the withdrawal negoti-
ations as the way it framed the Brexit negotiations and the method it devel-
oped: a so- called “Brexit toolkit”.28 In the context of citizens’ rights, “protection 
of past life choices” and reciprocal protection were central framing principles. 
Important elements of the citizens’ rights toolkit were transparency (publica-
tion of key draft texts), regular meetings with the Member States and consul-
tation with the key interest groups on both sides. The interest group, the3mi-
llion, was consulted on the position of EU citizens in the UK.29 The umbrella 
organisation, British in Europe, was consulted on the interests of UK nationals 
living in the EU.30 Both interest groups were formed in the context of Brexit, 
precisely for these reasons.31 This process of consultation was conveyed on so-
cial media with photos of the Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, meeting with 
both the3million and with British in Europe.
3 Key Elements of the Withdrawal Agreement as Regards 
Citizens’ Rights
This process of draft texts, discussions and consultations led to Part Two of 
the Withdrawal Agreement  – concerning citizens’ rights. Compared to the 
list of EU citizenship rights above, the Agreement focusses on a limited num-
ber of rights:  residence; the exercise of an economic activity as a worker or 
 28 Laffan, B. (2019). How the EU27 came to be. Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (S1), 
pp. 13– 27, 16– 18.
 29 The3million is the largest campaign organisation for EU citizens in the UK, formed after 
the 2016 EU referendum. It is not party affiliated and does not take a position on whether 
the UK should leave or remain in the EU. It works with MPs and organisations across 
the political spectrum on the specific issue of protecting EU citizens’ rights. Available at 
https:// www.the3million.org.uk/ about- us.
 30 The coalition group, British in Europe, was created in early 2017 to allow for better coor-
dination between British citizenship groups across Europe in the Brexit negotiations. It 
is made up of 10 groups, representing a membership of around 35 000 Brits, working 
together to stand up for the rights of UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK. 
Available at https:// britishineurope.org/ who- we- are/ .












self- employed person (including frontier workers); social security coordina-
tion; and certain acquired rights, including recognition of professional qual-
ifications (including qualifications in the process of being recognised). The 
expectation of acquiring permanent residence in the host country after legal 
residence for a continuous period of 5 years is also protected.32 The Agreement 
makes clear that persons within its scope will enjoy life- long protection, for as 
long as they continue to meet the necessary conditions.33
4 Personal Scope and Lawful Residence
The defining feature of Part Two of the Agreement is its personal scope. This is 
what decides if you are protected by the Agreement or not. For Britons in the 
EU, personal scope is defined (except as regards social security where a differ-
ent scope is necessary) by Article 10, as applying to,
– “UK nationals who exercised their right to reside in a Member State in accor-
dance with Union law before the end of the transition period and continue to 
reside there thereafter”; and
– “UK nationals who exercised their right as frontier workers34 in one or more 
Member States in accordance with Union law before the end of the transition 
period and continue to do so thereafter”.
The same approach to scope applies also to EU citizens in the UK. The scope 
is generous to the extent that it catches citizens who move to live in either the 
UK or in an EU state during the transition period. However, for both groups of 
citizens, only in the circumstances where a person can demonstrate a right of 
residence as defined by Union law (or meets the definition of frontier worker 
in the Agreement), are they protected.35
The EU legal acquis on having a “right of residence” is a dense and compli-
cated patchwork of legislation and Court of Justice case- law. Most Member 
States no longer require EU citizens to have residence documents (known as 
registration certificates) and many citizens may not know if they have a le-
gal right of residence. The existence of the right is assessed based on compli-
ance with certain conditions. As citizens’ and their family members’ factual 
situations evolve (e.g. in work or not, length of time unemployed, divorced, in 
 32 Article 15 of the Agreement.
 33 Article 39 of the Agreement.
 34 The term, “frontier worker” covers both employed and self- employed persons: see Article 
9(b) of the Agreement.
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partnership or married, claiming benefits or not), they may cease, sometimes 
temporarily, to meet those conditions. Member State administrators find the 
law complex and are generally encouraged to take a strict approach to the de-
termination of such rights.36 Member State authorities regularly challenge the 
right to reside of workers by asking the question whether the work was genu-
ine and effective37; for the self- employed,38 Member State authorities apply a 
range of national criteria to recognise this status; and for non- active persons 
(for example, the retired), the lack of guidance on the meaning of “comprehen-
sive sickness insurance”39 and the requirement for sufficient resources40 give 
Member State authorities various possibilities to find that residence was not 
“in accordance with Union law”. Indeed, research on Britons in France mapped 
the case of Britons who, concerned about their status after the Brexit vote, ap-
plied for registration documents to confirm their right of residence, but ended 
up being served with papers asking them to leave France.41
The Joint Report from the negotiators in December 2017 already made 
clear there would be a pre- condition of legal residence in the Agreement. 
The3million, British in Europe and academic commentators expressed con-
siderable concern on this matter.42 The draft Withdrawal Agreement pub-
lished in February 2018 maintained the condition, but softened its application 
with procedural provisions, requiring, for example: the application form to be 
 36 O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Diversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale 
of the UK. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 201– 241.
 37 O’Brien, C. (2016). Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free 
Movement Rights. Common Market Law Review 53 (4), pp. 937– 978, 953– 964; feantsa 
(2019). The working poor and EU free movement:  the notion of “worker” in the context of 
low- wage and low- hour employment, available at https:// www.feantsa.org/ en/ report/ 2019/ 
05/ 22/ the- working- poor- and- eu- free- movement- the- notion- of- worker- in- the- context- of- low- 
wage- and- low- hour- employment.
 38 Guidance in EU law on who is self- employed is provided by Court of Justice, judgment of 
27 June 1996, case C- 107/ 94, Asscher, para. 26; and judgment of 30 November 1995, case 
C- 55/ 94, Gebhard, paras. 24– 25.
 39 Although see Case C- 535/ 19, pending before the Court of Justice.
 40 Recent case- law from the Court of Justice gives Member States a basis to find persons, 
who claim “social benefits”, do not comply with the requirement for sufficient resources 
and hence have no right to reside: Court of Justice, judgment of 19 September 2013, case 
C- 140/ 12, Brey; judgment of 11 November 2014, case C- 333/ 13, Dano.
 41 Benson, M.  (2019). “Focus:  Brexit and Rethinking the British in Europe”. Discover 
Society 65 Focus. See also, European Citizen Action Service (ecas). UK and EU citizens 
still struggle to obtain residence documents in France, available at https:// ecas.org/ 
uk- and- eu- citizens- still- struggle- to- obtain- residence- documents- in- france.
 42 British in Europe and the3million (2018a). Securing citizens’ rights:  Considerations for 















“user- friendly”; that the competent authorities should “help the applicant to 
prove their eligibility”;43 and underlining that the host state cannot require 
documents that “go beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to 
provide evidence”.44
Less restrictive approaches to scope and to residence were indeed possi-
ble.45 Smismans suggests part of the reason behind the requirement for a right 
of residence may have been the fear of undermining the method of Directive 
2004/ 38/ EC (“the Free Movement Directive”), the central plank of EU law on 
the right of residence.46 Laffan, in her discussion of the overall EU approach, 
provides the rationale for this:  one of the key strategies in the negotiations 
was to ensure adherence to, and preserve, the fundamental principles of the 
Union.47 Smismans argues, nonetheless, that simply copying the criteria for 
legal residence from the Free Movement Directive underestimates the chal-
lenges of applying these criteria in a very different context.48
5 The Requirement to Apply for Residence Status under the 
Agreement
During the Brexit negotiations, the United Kingdom made clear its intention 
to require EU citizens residing in the UK to apply for a status referred to as “set-
tled status” in order to have rights in the UK under the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Following the framing principle of reciprocity, this meant that the EU Member 
States would have to require Britons in the EU to apply also for a new residence 
status. Adoption of this approach was controversial as it ran contrary to the 
usual “declaratory” approach in EU law, under which residence rights flow di-
rectly from EU law, regardless of whether the holder is in possession of a valid 
 43 Article 18(1)(o) of the Agreement.
 44 Article 18(1)(n) of the Agreement.
 45 See for example the concept of habitual residence in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/ 
2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/ 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, OJ L 284, 30.10.2009, p. 1, or the concept of normal 
residence in Council Directive 83/ 182/ EEC of 28 March 1983 on tax exemptions within the 
Community for certain means of transport temporarily imported into one Member State 
from another, OJ L 105, 23.4.1983, p. 59.
 46 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, cit.; Smismans, S.  (2018). Brexit and EU27 citizens’ rights:  a pro-
posal for a Protocol. EUlawanalysis Blog, available at https:// eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/ 
2018/ 06/ brexit- and- eu27- citizens- rights.html.
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residence document.49 Moreover, it implied a potential administrative burden 
for EU Member States with large numbers of British residents.
In the end, the UK’s requirement that EU citizens apply for “settled status” 
was accepted. Article 18(1) of the Agreement reflects this and allows the UK 
and the EU Member States to choose whether they will require EU citizens, UK 
nationals and their family members to apply for a new residence status or not. 
The principles of reciprocity, uniformity and indeed the declaratory nature of 
EU rights were therefore compromised on this point.
The UK started to implement its system of “settled status” in March 2019, 
well in advance of Brexit taking place. For Britons in the EU, Article 18(1) of the 
Withdrawal Agreement means there is no uniform EU approach to confirming 
their status in their country of residence under the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Each EU Member State decides whether to institute a “constitutive” registra-
tion system (similar to UK “settled status”), or whether to adopt the “declara-
tory” approach that legal residence on its territory is sufficient to be protected 
by the Agreement.50 At the time of writing this (April 2020), little informa-
tion and no official published list is available:51 Italy has indicated it intends to 
apply the “declaratory approach”, under which UK nationals and their family 
members must simply register their status. Austria, France and Greece, on the 
other hand, have indicated the adoption of a “constitutive” approach, requir-
ing Britons to re- apply for a new residence status.52
The inclusion of an application procedure in the Agreement continues 
to cause controversy, particularly in the UK where this is the confirmed ap-
proach.53 The overall implication is that, if a person does not make an ap-
plication within the required deadline, she loses her right to reside legally 
in the host state.54 Particular groups have been identified as at risk: elderly 
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 April 1976, case C- 48/ 75, Royer; judgment of 21 July 2011, 
case C- 325/ 09, Dias, paras. 48– 49.
 50 In the latter case, Article 18(4) of the Agreement provides for UK nationals to receive a 
residence document, which may be in a digital form, that evidences their status under the 
Agreement.
 51 See Benton, M. & Ahad, A. (2019), A. On the Brink: Prospects for UK Nationals in the EU- 27 
after a No- Deal Brexit. mpi Europe Policy Brief No.14, pp. 4– 6.
 52 British in Europe (2020). Newsletter, 15 April 2020.
 53 The Commission’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, wrote in December 2019 to the 
UK government to express concern about the deadline imposed for applications to be 
received. Brussels Uneasy over EU Citizens’ rights after Brexit. Financial Times, January 
8, 2020.
 54 Smismans, S (2019). This is how to stop Brexit causing a new Windrush Scandal for 
EU citizens. Free Movement Blog, available at https:// www.freemovement.org.uk/ 














people; people without digital literacy; and children, who need their par-
ents or guardians to apply on their behalf.55 Taken together with the need to 
prove compliance with the conditions for a right of residence under EU law, 
there is effectively a double burden on the applicant. Decades of residence, 
of work and real links to the country56 are potentially at risk.57 In response 
to these concerns, the negotiators inserted a provision in the Agreement 
that requires both the UK and the EU Member State authorities to assess 
all the circumstances in the case of applicants who do not apply within the 
deadline. The authorities are required to allow the application, if there are 
reasonable grounds for the failure to meet the deadline.58 There is also a re-
quirement for the UK and the EU to carry out awareness- raising campaigns 
through national and local media.59 The UK government announced in sum-
mer 2019 funding for organisations to help UK nationals with the applica-
tion process.60
In addition, for applicants who already hold a permanent residence doc-
ument issued either under EU or under national law, the procedure is light-
er: they have a right to exchange this for the new residence document, although 
must still confirm their “ongoing residence” and undergo checks to verify their 
identity and criminality and security checks.61 Citizens who have a permanent 
residence document, may however not know that a second application un-
der the Withdrawal Agreement is necessary and information to this group of 
Britons in the EU – where some Member States will require applications and 
others not – will be particularly important.62
 55 Sumption, M. and Kone, Z. (2018). Unsettled Status? Which EU Citizens are at Risk of Failing 
to Secure their Rights after Brexit? Oxford: Migration Observatory.
 56 See for example the case of a Portuguese woman, who had worked in a range of jobs 
(building, looking after the elderly, caring for children) and lived in the UK for 20 years, 
but whose application status under the Withdrawal Agreement (settled status) was 
refused, “Tearful woman pleads to stay in UK on live TV”, The Guardian, Friday 30 
August 2019.
 57 O’Brien, C. (2019) Settled Status scheme for EU citizens risks being next Windrush. The 
Times, April 4, 2019.
 58 Article 18(1)(d) of the Agreement.
 59 Article 37 of the Agreement; For example, in autumn 2019 the UK Government advertised 
on social media to invite UK nationals living abroad to “citizens outreach” meetings in 
their member state of residence.
 60 Available at https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ news/ 3- million- grant- to- help- uk- nationals- in-  
eu- for- brexit.
 61 Article 18(1)(h) of the Agreement.
 62 Seeking Settled Status and Permanent Residency. The UK in a Changing Europe, available 
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6 Family Members
Part Two of the Agreement protects also the residence and rights to work of 
family members of UK nationals in the EU and EU citizens in the UK.63 As 
in the case of primary right- holders, family members must show they resided 
in the host state in accordance with Union law. Both “direct” family members 
within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Free Movement Directive and “ex-
tended” family members, including partners in a durable relationship, whose 
entry and residence have been facilitated under Article 3(2) of the Free Move-
ment Directive, are protected. Provision is also made for a right of residence for 
children born, or legally adopted, after the end of the transition period.
No protection is, however, provided for the right of UK nationals to return to 
the UK accompanied by their non- UK family members, referred to in shorthand 
as the Surinder Singh right.64 The extensive case- law on which the right is based 
involves EU citizens enforcing EU law – Article 45, Article 49 or Article 21 tfeu – 
against their home state on the basis that they are returning after having exercised 
Treaty free movement rights.65 This means that the UK will – post- Brexit – be en-
titled to apply its domestic immigration rules to the family members of Britons 
returning from the EU, potentially causing difficulties for the family to return to 
the UK. The UK Government however announced that Britons returning to the 
UK from the EU would, based on UK law, be permitted to bring their family mem-
bers – where the relation began before Brexit – until 29 March 2022.66
7 Loss of Market Citizenship
The principal rights not protected by the Agreement for Britons in the UK 
are their EU rights to earn a living through employment or self- employment 
in another Member State, provide cross- border services (“market citizenship 
rights”) and move freely across EU borders.67 An early draft of the Withdrawal 
 63 Article 10(1)(e) of the Agreement.
 64 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 370/ 90, R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
and Surinder Singh.
 65 C- 370/ 90 Singh, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 291/ 05, Eind, 
paras. 35– 38; judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 456/ 12, O. and B., paras. 50– 51; judgment 
of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, Banger, paras. 32– 34.
 66 Available at https:// www.gov.uk/ guidance/ advice- for- british- nationals- travelling- and- 
living- in- europe.
 67 Although UK nationals resident in the Schengen Area will benefit, as do other third- 














Agreement contained an Article 32 – “scope of rights” – which set this out ex-
plicitly, but it was deleted in the final published agreement.68
Instead the Agreement is limited to protecting “past life choices”. This fram-
ing principle is legally translated via Articles 9(c) and (d), which define the 
“host state” and “state of work”. The result is that a Briton’s right to work in the 
EU either as an employed person or self- employed person is protected, where 
this right is being exercised in the host state at the end of the transition period or, 
if the person is a frontier worker (either employed or self- employed) and pur-
sues an economic activity as a frontier worker in a Member State before the end of 
the transition period and continues to do so thereafter.69 So, for example, a fron-
tier worker with UK nationality, living in Belgium and working in France, will 
have her residence in Belgium and right to work in France protected. However, 
the option under EU law to take on a new job in another Member State is not 
protected.70 Similarly, for example, self- employed UK nationals established in 
Austria at the end of the transition will be protected as regards their work in 
Austria, but will not under the Withdrawal Agreement have the possibility to 
change their operations and establish in Italy.
The provision of cross- border services is, moreover, not covered in any way. 
UK nationals, who before or at the point of Brexit earn their living by providing 
their services in various Member States – IT engineers or freelance interpreters 
for  example – are not protected. In today’s labour market and gig economy, this 
is a striking restriction. The removal of such rights and the possibility under EU 
law to change country of work or establishment has been little publicised to 
Britons who are potentially affected.71 Pending any agreement on the UK- EU 
within any 180- day period: Article 6(1) Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EU) 2016/ 399 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 77, 
23.3.2016, p. 1).
 68 Article 32 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, 28 February 2018 provided:  “In respect 
of United Kingdom nationals and their family members, the rights provided for by this 
Part shall not include further free movement to the territory of another Member State, 
the right of establishment in the territory of another Member State, or the right to pro-
vide services on the territory of another Member State or to persons established in other 
Member States”, TF50 (2018) 33 – Commission to EU27.
 69 See Articles 24 and 25, read in conjunction with Article 9(c) and (d), of the Agreement.
 70 In contrast, the right to change to work in Belgium would seem to exist as, based on 
Article 17 of the Agreement, both EU citizens and UK nationals are entitled to “change 
status” in the host state: therefore in the example given, the UK national who resides (as 
a non- active person) in Belgium could change her status to a worker. Article 17 would 
appear to permit her to enter the Belgian labour market at a later stage.
 71 One exception is “The beautiful dream destroyed: Britons in EU on no- deal Brexit”, The 
Guardian, 7 September 2019, available at https:// www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2019/ 
sep/ 07/ britons- in- eu- no- deal- brexit. The UK Government in autumn 2019 started adver-
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future relationship, Britons who regularly cross borders providing services as 
the way of making their living will, where they can, establish as a legal person 
under the legislation of a Member State or find other solutions based on na-
tional law. .
8 Loss of Political and Institutional Rights of EU Citizenship
As already mentioned above, the political rights of EU citizenship are lost by 
UK nationals immediately after the UK leaves the EU. These are the rights to 
vote and stand in European Parliament elections, to vote and stand in local 
elections and to launch and participate in a European Citizens’ Initiative. 
These rights are explicitly exempted from the transition and there are no pro-
visions under the Withdrawal Agreement, for example, to protect the position 
of a British councillor sitting on a local council in Spain. These matters are left 
to national law to deal with.
In this regard, Spain and the UK signed a bilateral agreement enabling Span-
iards in the UK and UK nationals resident in Spain to maintain their rights to 
vote and stand in local elections once the UK leaves the EU.72 The bilateral 
agreement also allows UK citizens residing in Spain to vote in European Parlia-
ment elections – this reflects the fact that it is for Member States to decide the 
electoral franchise for the European Parliament.73 Bilateral agreements on vot-
ing rights have also been made by the UK with Luxembourg74 and Portugal.75 
In addition, the UK agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ireland that 
affirms a range of existing reciprocal rights between the two countries, includ-
ing the right for their citizens to vote in both local and general elections.76
Other rights of EU citizenship listed in Article 20(2)(c) and (d) tfeu (con-
sular protection, right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the 
European Ombudsman), while protected during the transition, are not covered 
by the Withdrawal Agreement. UK nationals resident in the EU nonetheless 
retain post- Brexit rights to petition the European Parliament and to apply to 
 72 Spain and UK guarantee citizens’ voting rights after Brexit, Financial Times, January 
21, 2019.
 73 Case C- 145/ 04 Spain v United Kingdom, ECLI: EU:C:2006:543 at paras. 77– 78.
 74 Available at https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ news/ treaty- on- voting- rights- signed- with-  
luxembourg.
 75 Available at https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ news/ voting- rights- treaty- secured- with-  
portugal.
 76 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland concerning the 












the Ombudsman based on Articles 227 and 228 tfeu, which extend the remit 
of these procedures to “any natural or legal person residing or having its regis-
tered office in a Member State”. The right to petition the European Parliament 
could indeed be an important means for Britons in the EU to obtain assistance 
with enforcing their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. Unlike in the UK, 
where an independent authority will (from the end of the transition period) 
monitor the implementation and application of the rights of EU citizens under 
the Agreement,77 there is no specific mechanism foreseen by the Withdrawal 
Agreement to assist UK nationals enforce their rights in the EU.78
9 Equal Treatment
The right to be protected from discrimination on grounds of nationality will 
be an important right all- round post- Brexit. For persons within the scope of 
the Withdrawal Agreement the right to equal treatment regardless of Member 
State nationality is conserved in a number of ways. There is a general provi-
sion of non- discrimination in Article 12 of the Agreement, which mirrors the 
wording of Article 18 tfeu. Its scope is limited to the citizens’ rights part of the 
Agreement. Since, however, the coverage of citizens’ rights is limited, so the 
scope of this equal treatment right seems also limited.
There is also in Chapter 1 of Title ii a guarantee of equal treatment which 
mirrors Article 24 of the Free Movement Directive. This gives persons with 
permanent residence status full equal treatment rights in matters such as so-
cial assistance or student study grants. However, persons with lesser residence 
rights are subject to the standard exceptions of the Directive (no entitlement 
to social assistance, maintenance aid etc). For workers, the equal treatment 
provisions of Regulation 492/ 2011 on the free movement of workers are repro-
duced.79 As regards establishment, the Chapter on professional qualifications 
sets out that the recognition of professional qualifications (based on specified 
EU instruments and where this has taken place or been initiated before the 
end of the transition period) shall maintain its effects, including the right to 
 77 Article 159 of the Agreement.
 78 Rights protected by the Withdrawal Agreement should be enforceable in national courts 
in the Member States, with the possibility to make preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice. A specialised committee on citizens’ rights is also foreseen in Article 165(1)(a) of 
the Agreement, but its role as regards implementation and application of UK nationals’ 
rights in the Member States is not specified.
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pursue a profession under the same conditions as nationals of the state con-
cerned.80
10 Social Security Coordination
Space does not permit a detailed consideration of the social security coordi-
nation provisions in Title iii of Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement. The 
personal scope of this Title is much wider than the residence title. It covers 
persons who have been subject to the social security legislation of either the 
UK or the EU. This scope is aimed at protecting past contributions, as well as 
persons still in cross- border situations.
One of the key concerns for many Britons in the EU related to continuing 
access to healthcare in their state of residence. The Withdrawal Agreement 
provides that the EU social security coordination rules will continue to apply 
to persons within its scope.81 Among other things, this means that the princi-
ple of equal treatment, which includes equal conditions of access to health-
care with nationals, will still apply.82 In addition, the S1 Portable Document 
system will continue, subject to the proviso that the citizens “continue with-
out interruption” to be in a UK- EU cross- border situation.83 In the course of 
2020 the European Commission is expected to agree with the Member States 
a “Guidance Document” on the citizens’ rights provisions in the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Such guidance could, among other issues, clarify how the term, 
“continue without interruption”, should be implemented.
11 Loss of EU Citizenship and Preparations for No- Deal by the EU
For a significant time leading up to Brexit, there was uncertainty as to whether 
the UK would leave the EU on the basis of the Withdrawal Agreement or not. The 
 80 Articles 27– 29 of the Agreement.
 81 Article 30 of the Agreement.
 82 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/ 2004 concerning the coordination of social security 
systems, OJ L 200, 7.6.2004, p. 1.; see also Article 24(1)€ of the Agreement which gives the 
same social advantages to workers and their families.
 83 Article 30(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement. The S1 allows persons, (for example) insured 
in the UK (pensioners, frontier workers, posted workers and some other categories of per-
sons who work in more than one Member State) to register with the healthcare authority 
in their host state and receive treatment as if they were insured in that country  – see 












European Commission therefore embarked on a process of No- Deal planning, the 
so- called “Brexit Preparedness” work. Just as the withdrawal negotiations under-
lined the capacity of the EU “to disaggregate complex problems and forge shared 
understandings across the member states”,84 so too did this contingency planning.
The protection of citizens’ rights was a plank of the Brexit Preparedness pro-
cess and the citizens’ lobby groups, the3million and British in Europe, were 
consulted additionally as part of this. However, despite repeated requests by 
the3million and British in Europe for special protection of citizens’ rights in 
the case of No- Deal (for example, by concluding a limited agreement based on 
Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement or part thereof),85 the EU maintained 
there could be no “mini- deal” on citizens’ rights. A regulation to put in place 
limited contingency arrangements for the EU social security coordination 
rules was however adopted as part of the Brexit Preparedness process.86
Had the UK left the EU without an agreement, then UK nationals would 
have transformed overnight from EU citizens who enjoyed entry rights, resi-
dence rights, market freedoms and free movement rights into third- country 
immigrants needing residence and work permits and, in the worst- case sce-
nario, entry visas. The “Brexit Preparedness” planning by the Commission 
therefore encouraged Member States to formulate in advance of the first Brexit 
deadline of 29 March 2019 their contingency plans for dealing with this loss of 
EU citizenship by UK nationals.
The EU, as part of its common immigration policy, has of course legal mi-
gration rules for third- country nationals entering and living in the EU. These 
EU norms sit however alongside national rules. If the EU has not acted, then 
it is national law that applies. Moreover, there is variable geometry in this 
area: Denmark does not participate in the EU’s common immigration policy; 
and Ireland only sometimes (if it chooses to opt in). Without a Withdrawal 
Agreement or other specific EU rules on how to deal with this unique situation 
of collective loss of EU citizenship on their territory, it would therefore be na-
tional competence that would apply. A key feature of the Brexit Preparedness 
planning was therefore to coordinate the 27 different legal regimes to which 
UK nationals would be subject.
 84 Laffan, B. (2019), cit., p. 16.
 85 British in Europe and the3million (2018). The last mile on citizens’ rights, available at https:// 
britishineurope.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2018/ 09/ Joint- position- paper- the3million- and- 
British- in- Europe.pdf.
 86 Regulation (EU) 2019/ 500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 March 
2019 establishing contingency measures in the field of social security coordination fol-
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12 Application of the Long- Term Residence Directive
One aspect of this planning was the provision of guidance to the Member States 
on the application of the Long- Term Residence Directive (“the ltr Directive”), 
a core instrument within the EU common immigration policy aimed at giving 
security of residence and a set of uniform rights to third- country nationals re-
siding in EU Member States.87 In early discussions on No- Deal and residence, 
it had been widely assumed that Britons with EU permanent residence rights 
(for which 5 years of legal residence are required)88 could simply fall back on 
the rights given (again after 5 years of legal residence) by the ltr Directive. 
However, when examined in detail, the ltr Directive allows Member States to 
define legal residence under their national law (albeit within the limits of EU 
law).89 Thus, residence in accordance with the Free Movement Directive could 
not automatically equate with legal residence for third- country nationals un-
der national law. In addition, the ltr directive allows Member States to attach 
additional conditions to long term resident status, for example, compliance 
with integration conditions.90
The European Commission acknowledged the difficulties on this question 
in its Communication of 13 November 2018 on Contingency Planning and 
urged Member States to take “a generous approach to the rights of UK citizens 
who are already resident in their territory” and to treat periods of legal resi-
dence of UK citizens in an EU Member State before the withdrawal of the UK 
as periods of legal residence in a Member State in accordance with the ltr 
Directive.91
13 Publication of Member State No- Deal Planning for Loss of EU 
Citizenship
Beyond this guidance, the Commission coordinated meetings with the Mem-
ber States and encouraged them to adopt No- deal legislation and publish in-
formation on UK citizens’ rights. The Commission itself published an evolving 
 87 OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, p. 44.
 88 Article 16 of the Free Movement Directive.
 89 European Commission (2011). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
to the Council on the application of Directive 2003/ 109/ EC concerning the status of third- 
country nationals who are long- term residents. com (2011) 585 final, p. 2.
 90 Article 5(2) of the long- term residents’ Directive.
 91 European Commission (2018). Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 














overview of Member States’ national No- Deal preparations on citizens’ rights 
on its Brexit- preparedness website.92 The website underlined that national 
authorities of the Member States remained the first point of contact for UK 
nationals as regards No- Deal and links to relevant national websites were also 
provided. Nonetheless, the information presented by most Member States was 
clearly based on a standard text, although a variation of approaches among 
them was still noticeable.
The last published overview of these contingency arrangements (17 Octo-
ber 2019) showed that most Member States proposed a “transitional” or “grace 
period” in case of No- Deal, varying between 6 months to 3 years, to allow UK 
nationals time to adjust to their new status and apply for a residence status un-
der national law. During this period, some countries proposed a specific tem-
porary permit. Most countries proposed that UK nationals could keep during 
this period “most of their rights as EU citizens” in their host country, including 
the right to reside, work, look for a job or study. Family members, provided 
the relationship predated the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, also retained 
their rights.
After the end of the national transitional or grace period, the 27 Member 
States’ approaches varied however:
 (1) Some Member States took the approach that UK nationals were no dif-
ferent from any other third- country nationals and were required to apply 
for a residence permit under the general immigration regime for third- 
country nationals (eg. Czech Republic, France, Germany);
 (2) Others were less clear and either said nothing or referred to the need to 
apply for a new residence permit, according to the law that would be ap-
plicable at that time (eg. Belgium, Spain; Sweden);
 (3) Some referred to UK nationals keeping their residence rights and “most 
of their rights” indefinitely (eg. Italy, Malta);
 (4) Some Member States referred to laws that made specific provision for 
UK citizens to keep their residence rights on more favourable terms (eg. 
Lithuania), or to UK nationals and their family members preserving their 
status (Estonia);
 (5) Most Member States set out that UK nationals with documents certifying 
permanent residence would qualify for long- term resident status without 
any further conditions (but not Ireland or Denmark);
 (6) Others referred to conditions for granting permanent residence under 
national law (Slovakia; Finland).
 92 Available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ info/ brexit/ brexit- preparedness/ citizens- rights_ en. 
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Many countries made clear that the arrangements offered for UK nationals 
were contingent on reciprocal treatment granted in a No- Deal situation to 
their own citizens living in the UK.93
In sum, the approach taken to the loss of EU citizenship pursuant to No- 
deal covered a wide spectrum, with some Member States apparently prepared 
to recognise for UK nationals living in the EU a special status as former EU 
citizens and others not.
14 Reflections on the Collective Loss of EU Citizenship
14.1 What Rights to Protect?
A key question not addressed so far is what rights and interests should be pro-
tected when a Member State withdraws from the Union? What guidance is 
there in either EU law or in international law on protection of citizens’ rights 
in this situation?
The Treaty itself  – beyond the bare bones of Article 50 teu  – does not 
address what should happen to citizens’ rights when a Member State with-
draws.94 It is therefore a matter of interpretation how EU law should apply 
in such circumstances. Kostakopoulou, writing following the outcome of the 
historic UK vote to leave the EU, draws from the essence of EU citizenship a 
duty on the Union to protect its citizens in the situation where a Member State 
decides to withdraw. She proposes the idea of an “EU protected citizen status”, 
which could apply both to EU citizens in the UK and to UK nationals in the EU. 
This would allow all EU citizens affected by Brexit to continue to be subject to 
the same conditions relating to their residence, employment and family reuni-
fication as previously.95 Garner underscores the need for reciprocal protection 
of rights and suggests an “ex- EU citizenship” regime for UK nationals living in 
the EU: “a Member State could operate as a legal guardian of an ex- EU citizen”, 
complying with the Member State’s obligation under Article 47 of the Charter 
 93 British in Europe (2019). Written evidence submitted by British in Europe to the House of 
Commons Committee for Exiting the European Union, NEG0038.
 94 Eeckhout and Frantziou point out that, at the Constitutional Convention that led to the 
Lisbon Treaty and the drafting of Article 50 teu, some delegates proposed amendments 
that safeguarded existing rights, but these were not adopted: Eeckhout, P. and Frantziou, 
E.(2017). Brexit and Article 50: A Constitutionalist Reading. Common Market Law Review 
54 (3), pp. 695– 733, 718. I am grateful to Nathan Cambien for this point.
 95 Kostakopoulou, D.  (2018). Scala Civium:  Citizenship Templates Post- Brexit and the 
European Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens. Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (4), 










of Fundamental Rights to provide individuals with effective judicial protec-
tion. He also emphasises the possible role of the principle of “protection of le-
gitimate expectations”.96 Cambien refers to the “effet utile” of the EU right: by 
suddenly taking the right away, it could be argued that this compromises the 
effet utile of the right which happened in tempore non suspecto.97
There has also been debate on the impact of international law on the with-
drawal of EU citizenship. Authors of a study for the European Parliament’s 
Constitutional Affairs Committee took the view that residence rights and 
rights linked to the exercise of single market freedoms could not be consid-
ered “acquired rights”, that is, rights protected against changes in law, under 
international law.98 The authors underlined at the same time the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 8 concerning the right 
to respect for private and family life and one’s home; and Article 1 of Protocol 1 
concerning the right to property. They recommended therefore the conclusion 
of an agreement founded on reciprocity and non- discrimination that achieved 
for affected citizens “as close as possible enjoyment … of the rights that Eu-
ropean citizens have possessed until now”, including “freedom of movement 
and residence, the so- called four freedoms, and equal access to public ser-
vices and social protection, as well as the right to vote in municipal elections 
in the country of permanent residence”.99 A  study undertaken for Jill Evans 
mep took a different view on the application of international law but made 
similar recommendations. The authors argued that the objectives of legal cer-
tainty and non- retroactivity of Article 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties required that individual rights created in the execution of 
a treaty continue past its end.100 They concluded therefore that the rights of 
EU citizenship, where they were being exercised, could not be taken away and 
proposed that the Withdrawal Agreement should protect a form of “Continuity 
 96 Garner, Oliver. (2016). After Brexit:  Protecting European citizens and citizenship from 
fragmentation. EUI Working Papers Law 2016/ 22, pp. 16– 18; Note the principle of protec-
tion of legitimate expectations is a general principle of EU law: see for example, Court of 
Justice, judgment of 28 April 1988, case 120/ 86, Mulder.
 97 See Cambien, N.  (2020). Residence Rights for EU Citizens and their Family 
Members: Navigating the New Normal, in this volume, section iv.2.
 98 Fernandez Tomas A., and Lopez Garrido D. (2017). Study for the AFCO Committee: The 
Impact and consequences of Brexit on acquired rights of EU citizens living in the UK and 
British citizens living in the EU- 27.
 99 Ibid, p. 60.
 100 Roeben, V., Snell, J., Minnerop P., Telles, P., and Bush K. (2017). The Feasibility of Associate 
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Union Citizenship”, or indeed go further and create a new status of “Associate 
Union citizenship”.
The idea of associate citizenship was also put forward by Charles Goerens 
mep, who proposed, with a view to the future UK- EU relationship, associate 
EU citizenship for nationals of former Member States, “who feel and wish to 
be part of the European Project”.101 The idea provoked however a counter- 
reaction. Van der Mei suggested that such a new status, existing in parallel to 
full EU citizenship, could undermine EU citizenship.102 Van den Brink and Ko-
chenov also objected to offering a form of EU citizenship to people who no 
longer had nationality of a Member State. The starting position for the nego-
tiations, they argued, must be to accept that EU citizenship is terminated for 
nationals of a withdrawing state.103
In this author’s view, the debate about associate or continuing EU citizen-
ship is a distraction. It’s not the label that matters. Rather, the core issue is 
protecting people whose rights are withdrawn while they are exercising them 
or who are discriminated against on grounds of their nationality as a result of 
the withdrawal process. In this regard, it seems the key rights – both for Britons 
in the EU and for EU citizens in the UK – necessitating protection are:  resi-
dence; residence of family members; family reunification; legitimate expecta-
tions; property; the right to earn a living; equality and non- discrimination on 
grounds of nationality; and legal redress in respect of all these rights.
15 The Process of Loss of EU Citizenship
The process of loss of EU citizenship also merits discussion. For those citizens 
affected, Brexit has been and remains a drawn- out process of uncertainty: will 
rights be withdrawn; if they are, what new rights (if any) will be given in their 
place; where is information available; is an application for a new residence 
status necessary; what procedure should be followed; what documents are 
needed to prove legal entitlement to continue residing in their home: will the 
 101 European Citizens’ Action Service (ecas). Interview  – Charles Goerens:  We should 
never say no to Associate Citizenship. December 21, 2017, available at https:// ecas.org/ 
charles- goerens- brexit- interview.
 102 Van der Mei, A.  (2018). Brexit and Citizenship ii: Associate EU Citizenship, Maastricht 
University Law Blog, available at https:// www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ blog/ 2018/ 10/ 
brexit- and- citizenship- ii- associate- eu- citizenship.
 103 Van den Brink, M., and Kochenov, D. (2019). Against Associate EU Citizenship. Journal of 









application be accepted?104 All these questions arise for both EU citizens in 
the UK and Britons in the EU. In addition, the split process between withdraw-
al, on the one hand, and the negotiation of the new UK- EU relationship, on the 
other, means an extended period for citizens affected by Brexit of not knowing 
what its impact on their lives will be.105
There is also the question of who exercises the duty of care for EU citizens 
affected by the departure of a Member State. In the Brexit negotiations the EU 
was clear throughout that securing the interests of EU citizens in the UK was 
its priority. Clearly it never took responsibility for the interests of the UK,106 
nor for Britons in the EU. The UK government, focussing on the rights of EU-
citizens in the UK, took however decisions, the reciprocal effect of which were 
not in the interests of Britons in the EU. The involvement of a neutral arbiter 
in the exit negotiations may arguably have obtained better results all round for 
the over 5 million citizens concerned.
What role did the European Parliament play? Via its Brexit Steering Group, 
it followed and gave input into the negotiations on citizens’ rights. In its res-
olution of January 2020, the Parliament flagged a range of concerns on the 
implementation and monitoring of the citizens’ rights part of the Agreement. 
The resolution called on the 27 Member StatesEU to provide legal certainty for 
UK nationals and included a commitment that the Parliament would monitor 
closely how they implement the possibility to require UK nationals living on 
their territory to apply for a new residence status.107
16 Conclusions
Brexit has underlined that EU citizenship remains a highly contingent status, 
reliant on nationality of a Member State. The nationals of a departing state 
 104 A survey of 3,044 people by Europe Street News underlined the anxiety and information gap 
felt by mobile EU citizens as a result of Brexit, European Street News (2019). Brexit, the EU 
and You, available at https:// europestreet.news/ brexit- the- eu- and- you- lack- of- information- 
protection- and- political- representation- revealed- in- europe- street- news- survey.
 105 Examples of the effects of this uncertainty are set out in the following article: https:// 
www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2019/ nov/ 15/ job- hunting- britons- in- eu- say- brexit- is- 
taking- its- toll.
 106 Laffan, B. (2019), cit., pp. 21– 22.
 107 Resolution on implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the 
Withdrawal Agreement adopted 15 January 2020, P9_ TA- PROV(2020)0006:  see points 
14– 16; see also the response of the European Parliament on Citizens’ Rights and the 
Withdrawal Agreement in: European Parliament (2018). Resolution of 14 March 2018 on 
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living on the territory of the EU become once more “resident aliens” albeit, 
thanks to the Withdrawal Agreement, resident aliens with a special status. The 
hard default to third- country national status, which some Member States fa-
voured in the context of No- deal preparations, is avoided. The Union has, to 
use Kostakopoulou’s terminology,108 exercised its duty to protect.
Whether the protection given by the Agreement is optimal is a different 
question. For both EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU, obtaining 
the protection of the Agreement will be difficult due to the highly conditional 
nature of the right of legal residence in EU law and the generally restrictive 
approach national adminstrations take to recognising it. Moreover, the option 
given to both the UK and the EU Member States to require an application for 
protected status compounds the difficulties in obtaining the protection of 
the Agreement. Excellent information campaigns combined with dedicated 
advice and problem- solving services for affected citizens will all be vital for 
ensuring correct application and maximising the protection of the Agreement.
The Agreement does not protect all rights. The refusal by the EU in partic-
ular to protect the right of Britons living in the EU to free movement to oth-
er Member States and associated market citizenship rights in the Withdrawal 
Agreement was a key strategic move. It is a bitter blow for Britons living in 
the EU to lose these rights. While the creation of EU citizenship was intend-
ed to move beyond market citizenship, Brexit underlines that market citizen-
ship – the right of individuals to move within the single market to earn a living 
through employment, self- employment and providing cross- border services – 
remains indeed a fundamental aspect of EU citizenship.
Finally, process is important. The uncertainty of over three years about loss 
of rights and status has been harrowing for those affected. While there may be 
reluctance to plan for the possibility that another Member State could leave 
the Union, it might make sense to strengthen the “unfinished institution”109 of 
EU citizenship for the future. As the planning for a Conference on the Future 
of Europe with involvement of citizens commences,110 perhaps one of the top-
ics to be addressed at this Conference should be the process of collective loss 
of EU citizenship?
 108 Kostakopolou, D. (2018), cit.
 109 Kostakopoulou, D. (2014), cit., p. 71.
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Free Movement of Persons in the EU v. in the eea: 




When the European Economic Area (eea) Agreement1 was concluded in the 
early 1990s, it reflected, in the fields covered, the state of the law of the then 
Community law. This also applied in the field of the free movement of persons. 
Since then, both eea and EU law in this field have developed further, though 
with certain marked differences. Most notably, in the Union the Treaty revision 
of Maastricht led to the introduction of Union citizenship on the Treaty level. 
Subsequently, Directive 2004/ 382 was adopted as a further development of the 
law on former free movement, on the one hand, and as a Union citizenship 
instrument, on the other hand. This double nature of the Directive and the fact 
that there is no concept corresponding to Union citizenship in the eea Agree-
ment led to certain challenges within the eea, when faced with the demand of 
the EU that the Directive should be incorporated into eea law. In fact, it was 
difficult to convince some of the eea/ European Free Trade Association (efta) 
States to agree to such incorporation. When eventually it was incorporated, 
this was done with certain reservations.
Today, it can be stated that the eea and the EU rules are identical with 
respect to the market access rights of economic agents (e.g. the right of 
migrant workers to be employed in another contracting State without 
 * Professor of European Union Law, Europa Institutes of the Universities of Basel (Switzer-
land) and Leiden (The Netherlands).
 1 European Economic Area Agreement of 2 May 1992. For a consolidated version of the 
Agreement that incorporates subsequent changes, see http:// www.efta.int/ Legal- Text/ EEA- 
Agreement- 1327.
 2 Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and repealing Direc-
tives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 
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discrimination on grounds of nationality and without restrictions). In con-
trast, it is debated whether and to what extent the incorporation of Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 into the eea legal system is limited for those purposes. Doubts 
have arisen notably in the context of recent case law of the efta Court 
(which deals with eea law matters arising in the three eea/ efta States 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) in the context of travel and residence 
rights and of family reunification.
This issue forms the subject matter of the present contribution, which ex-
plores the differences in the legal regime on the free movement of persons in 
the EU as compared to the eea. The contribution begins with a brief descrip-
tion of the legal framework of the incorporation of Directive 2004/ 38 into eea 
law (section ii.). In its main part, it then turns to the efta Court’s case law on 
the possible limits of that incorporation (section iii.) and, more generally, on 
the meaning of the Directive in the eea context (section iv.). A final part will 
summarise the findings and ask what they mean in other contexts, including 
notably that of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the EU (“Brexit”) (section v.).
ii The Incorporation of Directive 2004/ 38 into eea Law: Legal 
Framework
Through the eea Agreement, the participating efta States3 associate them-
selves to EU law in a number of important areas, the core of which is the 
Union’s internal market law. With respect to persons, this included from the 
beginning not only the (then Community) rules on the free movement of 
persons and services, but also the movement and residence rights for the 
 3 This includes all efta States except Switzerland. Whilst the Swiss Government wanted the 
country to join and participated very actively in the negotiation of the eea Agreement, a 
popular vote held in 1991 yielded a negative result with respect to membership; see Nell, P.G. 
(2012). Suisse- Communauté Européenne. Au coeur des négotiations sur l’Espace économique 
européen. Paris: Economica. Following the vote, Switzerland continued on its previous path 
of concluding sectoral agreements with the Communities and the Union; for a brief intro-
duction in the English language, see Oesch, M. (2018). Switzerland and the European Union. 
General Framework. Bilateral Agreements. Autonomous Adaptation. Zurich/ St.Gallen and 
Baden- Baden: Dike/ Nomos. For more details, e.g. Oesch M. (2015). Europarecht. Band I Grun-
dlagen, Institutionen, Verhältnis Schweiz- EU, Berne: Stämpfli; Cottier T., Diebold, N., Kölliker, 
I., Liechti- McKee, R., Oesch, M., Paysova, T. and Wüger, D. (2014). Die Rechtsbeziehungen der 
Schweiz und der Europäischen Union. Berne: Stämpfli, and Tobler, C. and Beglinger, J. (2013). 










economically non- active under what was then Directives 90/ 364,4 90/ 3655 
and 93/ 96.6 In this as in other fields, Community law developed further follow-
ing the signing of the eea Agreement. For this situation, the eea Agreement 
envisages a dynamic system of updating the eea acquis:  if new EU law falls 
within a field covered by the eea Agreement, the eea Joint Committee will 
decide on its incorporation into eea law. Should this decision not be taken, the 
consequence may be that the relevant part of the eea Agreement is suspended 
(Article 102 eea).7
This mechanism also came into play with regard to Directive 2004/ 38,8 
which was incorporated into Annex v to the eea Agreement, concerning the 
free movement for workers, and into Annex viii, concerning freedom of estab-
lishment, by Decision of the eea Joint Committee 158/ 2007 (“Joint Committee 
Decision” or “jcd”).9 For these purposes, the Directive’s geographic scope had 
to be broadened (namely to include the eea/ efta States) and its wording had 
to be adapted (e.g. to be read as referring, for the purposes of eea law, not to 
“Union citizens” but rather to “national(s) of [EU] Member States and efta 
States”, Article 1(1)(c) jcd). In addition, there was the problem that the concept 
of EU citizenship does not apply in the eea/ efta States. For that reason, the 
eea/ efta States were not enthusiastic about incorporation. However, the EU 
refused an approach whereby the provisions of the Directive that are linked 
to EU citizenship would have been excluded from incorporation into eea law. 
Instead, the parties agreed to a compromise under which the full text of the 
Directive was incorporated, though with certain limits regarding their inter-
pretation and application.
 4 Council Directive 90/ 364/ EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, 
p. 26– 27 (no longer in force).
 5 Council Directive 90/ 365/ EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and 
self- employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, p. 28– 
29 (no longer in force).
 6 Council Directive 93/ 96/ EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, OJ L 
317, 18.12.1993, p. 59– 60 (no longer in force).
 7 For the incorporation procedure, see e.g. Baur G. (2015). Decision- Making Procedure and Im-
plementing of New Law, as well as Suspension of Parts of the EEA Agreement: Disputes About 
Incorporation, Consequences of Failure to Reach Agreement and Safeguard Measures. Both 
in: Baudenbacher C., ed., The Handbook of EEA Law. Cham: Springer, pp. 45– 67 and pp. 69– 
83, respectively.
 8 See already Tobler, C.  (2013). Bikers Are(n’t) Welcome. (Jan Anfinn Wahl ./ . The Icelandic 
State, efta Court, judgment of 22 July 2013, E- 15/ 12). European Law Reporter, pp. 246– 255, 250 
et seq.
 9 eea Joint Committee, Decision No 158/ 2007 of 7 December 2007 amending Annex v (Free 
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First, the jdc circumscribes the fields where the incorporation takes effect. 
According to Articles 1 and 2 jcd, the Directive “shall apply, as appropriate, 
in the fields covered by this Annex”, i.e. the free movement for workers under 
Annex v and that of freedom of establishment under Annex viii. However, 
it should be noted that these Annexes concern not only the legal position of 
migrant workers and the self- employed, respectively, with the nationality of 
an eea State, but also that of their family members as defined in the Direc-
tive. Further, Annex viii also touches upon services and includes rules on the 
movement and residence of non- economic agents. Overall, this means that not 
only in the framework of EU law but also in that of eea law, Directive 2004/ 38 
applies to the movement of natural persons in a rather broad sense (workers, 
the self- employed, service providers and recipients, and non- economically ac-
tive persons under certain conditions), though according to the jcd only “as 
appropriate”. As will be seen infra (section iv.), the efta Court appears to have 
given a surprising meaning to this latter term.
Second, the Contracting Parties noted in the preamble to the jcd that the 
concept of Union citizenship is not included in, and immigration policy is not 
part of, the eea Agreement. This is elaborated on in a Joint Declaration. With 
reference to EU citizenship, it states:
The concept of Union Citizenship as introduced by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht […] has no equivalent in the eea Agreement. The incorporation of 
Directive 2004/ 38/ EC into the eea Agreement shall be without prejudice 
to the evaluation of the eea relevance of future EU legislation as well as 
future case law of the European Court of Justice based on the concept of 
Union Citizenship. The eea Agreement does not provide a legal basis for 
political rights of eea nationals.
Burke et al.10 note that, as a result of its incorporation into eea law, the Direc-
tive 2004/ 38 now applies in two divergent legal contexts (namely EU law and 
eea law). For practical purposes, the challenge lies in the fact that when the 
eea Joint Committee limited the application of the Directive to the (broad) 
scope of the two annexes as just described and at the same time stated that EU 
citizenship and immigration policy are not part of eea law, it consciously left 
 10 Burke, C., Ísberg Hannesson, Ó. and Bangsund, K. (2017). Chapter 12: Schrödinger’s Cake? 
Territorial Truths for Post- Brexit Britain. In: M. Kuijer and W. Werner, eds., Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 2016: The Changing Nature of Territoriality in International 





it to the courts to decide through interpretation what this means in concrete 
terms. In other words, the letter of eea law is not clear on this matter.
The following part deals with case law on Directive 2004/ 38 in the eea con-
text and on the meaning of the reservation in the jcd with respect to Union 
citizenship, in the latter context more specifically on the meaning of the sec-
ond sentence in the above quote from the Joint Declaration (“The incorpora-
tion of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC into the eea Agreement shall be without preju-
dice to the evaluation of the eea relevance of future EU legislation as well as 
future case law of the European Court of Justice based on the concept of Union 
Citizenship.”). At the time of writing, there is no case law yet of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (cjeu) on either the incorporation of Directive 
2004/ 38 into the eea legal acquis or on the meaning of the Directive in this 
specific context.11 In contrast, there are a number of efta Court judgments 
on Directive 2004/ 38 in the eea context. Of these, only one addresses the sub-
stantive meaning of the reservation with respect to Union citizenship, namely 
Wahl,12 and then only in an obiter dictum.
iii The Meaning of the Reservation according to the efta Court’s 
Obiter Dictum in Wahl
The Wahl case concerned the limitations to the right of entry and residence 
of persons with the nationality of an eea State under Article 27 of Directive 
2004/ 38. The efta Court held that the above- mentioned reservation cannot 
be relevant in this context. In the present writer’s opinion, that is correct, as 
the case concerned a provision on limitations to free movement that simply 
codified cjeu case law on the previous derogation rules, both of which had 
already been part of eea law before the incorporation of Directive 2004/ 38 
and neither of which relates specifically to Union citizenship. In fact, Wahl is 
 11 In the EU law context, this could notably be an action for annulment under Art. 263 tfeu 
of the decision of the EU to agree to the incorporation of the jcd (compare, in a different 
context, cjeu, judgment of 27 February 2014, Case C- 656/ 11 UK v Council) or a preliminary 
ruling under Art. 267 tfeu on an eea matter arising in the territory of an EU Member 
State. In the latter context, an example of a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the 
cjeu would be an Icelandic national who faces problems when wishing to exercise eea 
free movement rights in Spain (or in any other EU Member State). Conversely, where an 
eea matter arises on the territory of an eea/ efta State, it falls within the jurisdiction of 
the national courts of that state and of the efta Court.
 12 efta Court, judgment of 9 December 2013, Case E- 15/ 12 Jan Anfinn Wahl v The Icelandic 
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simply a successor to the European Economic Community (eec) free move-
ment for workers case of Van Duyn.13
Even so, the efta Court addressed the incorporation of the Directive into 
eea law and the meaning of the reservation as follows (Wahl, para. 74 et seq.):
The Directive was incorporated into the eea Agreement by the adoption 
of Joint Committee Decision No 158/ 2007 (“the Decision”). According to 
the Decision, the concept of ‘Union Citizenship’ and immigration policy 
are not included in the Agreement. That is further stipulated in the ac-
companying Joint Declaration by the Contracting Parties (“the Declara-
tion”). However, these exclusions have no material impact on the present 
case. Nevertheless, the impact of the exclusions must be assessed on a 
case- by- case basis and may vary accordingly. In this regard, it must be 
noted that, as is apparent from Article 1(a) and recital 3 in its preamble, 
the Directive aims in particular to strengthen the right of free movement 
and residence of eea nationals […]. To this end, it lays down the con-
ditions governing the exercise of the right of free movement and resi-
dence within the territory of the eea. The impact of the exclusion of the 
concept of citizenship has to be determined, in particular, in cases con-
cerning Article 24 of the Directive which essentially deals with the equal 
treatment of family members who are not nationals of a Member State 
and who have the right of residence or permanent residence. […].
In the present writer’s analysis of the Wahl judgment, the efta Court’s state-
ments with regard to Article 24 in the eea context might be the point where 
the Polydor principle enters eea law.14 According to this principle, provisions 
of agreements concluded by the EU with non- Member States are not automati-
cally to be interpreted in the same manner, even if they are very similar or even 
identical; rather, relevant differences in the context may lead to a different inter-
pretation. Weiss & Kaupa15 observe more generally that free movement rights 
under eea law may have to be interpreted differently from EU law if the legal 
or factual situation differs. In the present context, this might mean that cer-
tain provisions of Directive 2004/ 38, including in particular Article 24, though 
 13 cjeu, judgment of 4 December 1974, Case 41/ 74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. See on this point Tobler, C. (2013). Bikers Are(n’t) Welcome, cit., 249 
et seq.
 14 Tobler, C. (2013). Bikers Are(n’t) Welcome, cit., p. 252.









formally part of both EU law and eea law, might not have the same relevance 
or meaning in the two legal orders. Indeed, it could even mean that the incor-
poration of Directive 2004/ 38 into eea law implies certain substantive carve- 
outs, an approach that could be useful also in other contexts of the EU’s external 
relations, including notably the EU- Swiss Agreement on the free movement of 
persons.16 This has, however, not been confirmed through case law so far.
Other commentators on the efta Court’s Wahl decision were more critical. 
Fredriksen & Franklin17 thought that the efta Court’s reference to “in partic-
ular, Art. 24 of the Directive”, to the exclusion of other aspects, meant that the 
wind was already seemingly snatched out of the Joint Declaration’s sails. In 
this context, it is interesting to note the Norwegian Government’s argument 
before the efta Court that Directive 2004/ 38 has a more limited scope under 
eea law than under EU law, due to the fact that Union citizenship is not part 
of the former. However, the following parts of this contribution will show that 
that is not the gist of subsequent case law of the efta Court. Whilst the ex-
pectation that identical provisions might not have the same meaning under 
EU and eea law has been confirmed, this is in a rather different manner than 
expected by the present writer in her annotation of the Wahl judgment. In-
deed, the result of more recent efta Court case law appears to be, not that of 
limiting the meaning of Directive 2004/ 38 under eea law but, on the contrary, 
of broadening it beyond that applicable under EU law, based on a rather par-
ticular understanding of homogeneity.
iv Other efta Court Case Law on Directive 2004/ 38 in the eea Context
None of these other decisions applies the reservation, and none elaborates on 
its meaning. On the contrary: several commentators are of the opinion that, in 
 16 Tobler, C. (2013). Bikers Are(n’t) Welcome, cit., p. 253. More specifically, this would mean 
that certain matters, in the context of EU law, are clearly linked to Union citizenship, 
though formally part of the Directive also in the eea context, would in fact not be part of 
eea law, e.g. the right to equal treatment of the economically non- active with respect to 
social assistance (see also infra, footnote 25). Similarly, Fredriksen and Franklin thought 
that where the cjeu bases its decisions on these Union citizenship provisions or gives 
a “citizenship reading” of worker’s rights under EU law, the same direct methods will 
not be possible under eea law. As an example, they mention job- seekers’ rights to equal 
treatment under Art. 45 tfeu; Fredriksen, H.H. and Franklin, C.N.K. (2015). Of pragma-
tism and principles: The eea Agreement 20 years on. Common Market Law Review 52(3), 
pp. 629– 684, 640.
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terms of their substantive finding, certain of these decisions are, in fact, based 
on elements of Union citizenship, thereby going beyond the limits of eea law. 
It is submitted that at least one of these decisions is unproblematic, whilst two 
further decisions indeed raise a number of questions.18
iv.1 Unproblematic in the Present Writer’s Opinion: Clauder
Clauder19 was the first efta Court decision on Directive 2004/ 38 in the eea 
context, handed down shortly before Wahl, without elaborating on the res-
ervation in the Joint Declaration with respect to Union citizenship. The case 
concerns the right of permanent residence of family members of eea nation-
als under Article 16 of the Directive. Mr Clauder, a German national living 
as a pensioner in Liechtenstein, drew old age pensions from Germany and 
Liechtenstein and supplementary social welfare benefits in Liechtenstein. 
Mr Clauder’s wife, a German national, lived in Germany at the time of their 
marriage. The Liechtenstein authorities based their refusal of family reuni-
fication on the argument that Mr Clauder could not prove that he had suffi-
cient financial resources for himself and his wife without having recourse to 
social welfare benefits. The case led to a request for an advisory opinion to the 
efta Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the efta States on the 
Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (esa/ Court 
Agreement).20
It should be noted that even though Article 16 of the Directive mentions 
the right to permanent residence for family members in para. 2 (a fact that 
is sometimes overlooked in comments on the Clauder decision), this relates 
specifically and exclusively to “family members who are not nationals of a 
Member State”. These are given a right to permanent residence if they have 
legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State for a contin-
uous period of five years. In contrast, no mention is made of family members 
whose nationality is of a Member State, as was the case with Ms Clauder. It is 
therefore not clear from the wording of the Directive whether such persons, 
too, must fulfill the residence condition (which Ms Clauder did not), possibly 
 18 One of the more recent decisions of the efta Court is not discussed below because, 
although it refers to Directive 2004/ 38, the facts of the case appear not to be covered by 
that Directive; efta Court, judgment of 13 November 2019, Case E- 2/ 19 D and E, https:// 
eftacourt.int/ download/ 2- 19- judgment/ ?wpdmdl=6340.
 19 efta Court, judgment of 8 April 2013, Case E- 4/ 11 Arnulf Clauder, [2011] efta Court 
Reports, 216.
 20 1994 Agreement between the efta States on the Establishment of a Surveillance 









combined with the condition of sufficient means and comprehensive health 
insurance.
According to the efta Court, there are no such conditions for EU nationals 
and there is a right to immediate permanent residence, even where the family 
member will be claiming social welfare benefits. As Franklin21 notes, the efta 
Court made no direct reference to cjeu citizenship case law. The respective 
reservation is not mentioned in the judgment, and the jcd appears only in 
the part where the efta Court describes the eea legal context (Clauder, para. 
5). According to Wennerås,22 the Court “dodged the issue”, relying instead on 
elements such as the right to protection of family life and the strengthening of 
free movement rights (Clauder, para. 33 et seq.).
Opinions with respect to the acceptability of the efta Court’s approach dif-
fer. According to Fløistad,23 the efta Court in Clauder took an innovative step 
towards free movement rights for economically inactive citizens in the eea 
Agreement, in fact comparable to the cjeu citizenship case law in the EU legal 
order. Similarly, Jay24 writes about an active, pro- integrationist stance of the 
efta Court and suggests that in Clauder the Court has essentially assimilated 
nationality of an eea/ efta State with EU citizenship for the purposes of free 
movement and residence. In Jay’s view, no other conclusion is tenable if the 
homogeneity of the internal market is to be maintained in a manner which 
secures fair and effective legal rights, though this can be seen to come at the 
cost of legal certainty. Still in the same vein, Einarsson25 considers the Court’s 
(implicit) view that the eea adaptations (i.e. with respect to the scope and the 
interpretation of the law) have no impact on the interpretation of the Direc-
tive well founded, as otherwise there would be very major deviations from the 
very wording of these adaptations.
 21 Franklin, C.N.K. (2017). Square Pegs and Round Holes:  The Free Movement of Persons 
Under EEA Law. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19, pp. 165– 186, p. 177.
 22 Wennerås, P. (2018). Article 6 Homogeneity. In: F. Arnesen, H.H. Fredriksen, H.P. Graver, 
O. Mestad, and C. Vedder, eds., Agreement on the European Economic Area: EEA Agreement. 
A commentary. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp. 209– 248, para. 15.
 23 Fløistad, F. (2018). Article 28 Free movement of workers. In: F. Arnesen, F., H.H. Fredriksen, 
H.H., H.P. Graver, H.P., O. Mestad, O. and C. Vedder C., eds., Agreement on the European 
Economic Area, cit., pp. 369– 385, para.15.
 24 Jay, M.A. (2012). Homogeneity, the free movement of persons and integration without 
membership:  mission impossible?. Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 8, 
pp. 77– 116, 87 et seq.
 25 Einarsson, Ó.J. (2018). Article 31 Freedom of establishment, in Wennerås, P. (2018). Article 
6 Homogeneity. In:  F. Arnesen, F., H.H. Fredriksen, H.H., H.P. Graver, H.P., O.  Mestad, 
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In contrast, the authors writing for the law firm Simonsen Vogt Wiig AS26 
opine that, according to the wording of the Directive, family members who 
do not fulfil the requirements for permanent residence pursuant to Article 16, 
para. 2, of the directive may only be granted a right of residence pursuant to 
Article 7, para. 1, letter c, in conjunction with Article 7, para. 1, letter b, of the 
Directive. In effect, this means that according to this view Article 16, para. 2, is 
relevant also for family members with the nationality of an EU Member State.
In the present writer’s view, the legal situation in Clauder is special in that 
the efta Court was faced with the gap in Article 16 of Directive 2004/ 38 with 
respect to family members with an EU nationality. It was, moreover, a gap that 
had not yet been filled by the cjeu in its case law. There was, therefore, no 
previous cjeu case law which the efta Court could or should have taken in 
account. Rather, the situation was one of “first go” for the efta Court, which 
gave it the chance to shape the interpretation of eea law, at least for the time 
being (i.e. awaiting what the cjeu would make of it once it would have the 
issue before it).
Did the efta Court fill the gap by using Union citizenship elements derived 
from cjeu case law on Union citizenship dating from after 7 December 2007, 
contrary to the reservation in the Joint Declaration? It is submitted that is not 
the case: Where the efta Court, in the relevant parts of the judgment, relies 
on cjeu case law, it does so with respect to the basic right to family unifica-
tion. Did the Court otherwise rely on Union citizenship, outside the limits of 
the reservation? It is true that under EU law, entitlement to social assistance 
for the economically non- active as such is historically linked to Union citizen-
ship (i.e. it has developed through cjeu Union citizenship case law).27 Insofar, 
one may argue that the fact that Directive 2004/ 38 does not maintain these 
conditions, for the economically non- active, in the context of the newly cre-
ated status of permanent residence is a consequence of Union citizenship, 
rather than a “mere” further development of the free movement aspects of 
previous law. However, that cannot be relevant under the Union citizenship 
reservation, which only relates to the evaluation of the eea relevance of future 
 26 Advokatfirmaet Simonsen Vogt Wiig AS (2016). Legal study on Norwayʼs obligations under 
the EU Citizenship Directive 2004/ 38/ EC, available at https:// www.udi.no/ globalassets/ 
global/ forskning- fou_ i/ annet/ norways- obligations- eu- citizenship- directive.pdf, p. 123.
 27 On this issue e.g. Tobler, C.  (2015). Auswirkungen einer Übernahme der 
Unionsbürgerrichtlinie für die Schweiz  – Sozialhilfe nach bilateralem Recht 
als Anwendungsfall des Polydor- Prinzips. In:  A. Epiney, and T.  Gordzielik, eds., 
Personenfreizügigkeit und Zugang zu staatlichen Leistungen / Libre circulation des per-






EU legislation as well as future cjeu case law based on the concept of Union 
 Citizenship.
More generally, it should be noted that Mr Clauder’s personal right to re-
side in Liechtenstein, in spite of the fact that he was in receipt of social wel-
fare assistance, was not in dispute. Rather, the case exclusively concerned 
the right to family reunification and in this vein Ms Clauder’s residence 
rights.
Overall, the present writer’s conclusion is that Clauder is in no way problem-
atic, but rather represents a sensible approach to filling the gap in Article 16 of 
the Directive 2004/ 38. After all, in a situation where the Directive clearly states 
certain conditions for third country family members only, it is quite legitimate 
to assume that the legislator did not wish the same conditions to apply to EU 
nationals, and it would be unreasonable to assume that EU family members 
would not enjoy permanent residence at all.
iv.2 From Clauder to Gunarsson and Jabbi: a Very Particular 
Understanding of Homogeneity
Compared to Clauder, the situation in the subsequent cases of Gunnarsson28 
and Jabbi29 was different, as the efta Court in its judgment ruled on the mean-
ing of the provisions of Directive 2004/ 38 in contexts that had already been 
addressed by the cjeu in its case law. Accordingly, the efta Court was bound 
by the homogeneity principle under Article 6 eea.
According to this principle, the provisions of the eea Agreement, in so far 
as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of EU law shall be 
interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the cjeu given prior 
to the date of signature of the eea Agreement. However, the efta Court has 
held generally that it does not consider this limitation in terms of time – i.e. 
relevance only of cjeu judgments given prior to the date of signature of the 
eea Agreement – useful. Rather, in the interest of the effectiveness of eea law, 
the efta Court goes beyond this date and also takes into account subsequent 
case law.30
 28 efta Court, judgment of 27 June 2014, Case E- 26/ 13 The Icelandic State and Atli 
Gunnarsson, [2014] efta Court Reports 254.
 29 efta Court, judgment of 26 July 2017, Case E- 28/ 15 Yankuba Jabbi v The Norwegian 
Government, [2016] efta Court Reports 573.
 30 For example, efta Court, judgment of 5 April 2013, Case E- 2/ 06 EFTA Surveillance 
Authority v Norway. In this case, commonly referred to as the Norwegian Waterfalls case, 
[2007] efta Court Reports 164, the efta Court stated (para. 59): “The principle of homo-
geneity enshrined in the eea Agreement leads to a presumption that provisions framed 
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In academic writing, it has been noted that homogeneity does not have to 
be slavish but can be creative.31 As was already indicated, both Gunnarsson 
and Jabbi reflect a very particular type of creative homogeneity, where the 
efta Court consciously interprets eea law differently from EU law, in order to 
achieve the same level of protection for eea citizens as for EU citizens. Before 
these decisions were handed down, a hint of this approach could, perhaps, be 
found in an article by the former President of the efta Court, Carl Bauden-
bacher, entitled “The goal of homogeneous interpretation of the law in the Eu-
ropean Economic Area. Two courts and two separate legal orders, but law that 
is essentially identical in substance”.32
In the following sections, the facts and issues of the Gunnarsson and Jab-
bi cases are described and the efta Court’s judgments in these cases are dis-
cussed, again, in view of the reservation with respect to Union citizenship.
iv.3 Gunnarsson and Jabbi: Facts and Issues
According to Fredriksen & Franklin,33 the Gunnarsson case represented the 
litmus test of the efta Court’s approach with respect to the reservation in the 
above- mentioned Joint Declaration (more specifically: of the second sentence 
of the above quote). The case involved an Icelandic couple who had lived in 
Denmark for a certain time. Their income, which was taxed in Iceland, consist-
ed of various pensions and benefits, including, among others, an employment- 
related pension of Mr Gunnarsson. He claimed that, for the purposes of 
taxation in Iceland, he should be allowed to use his wife’s unused personal 
tax credit in respect of his income for the time during which he resided in 
Denmark. This was denied to him because, under the law in force at the time 
(which was subsequently amended), the transfer of a personal tax credit was 
only possible between taxpayers with unlimited tax liability in Iceland (essen-
tially resident taxpayers) or where both spouses were in receipt of an Icelandic 
pension. None of this applied in the case at hand. Mr Gunnarsson demanded 
repayment of the income tax that he considered to have paid in excess. When 
refused, he brought an action to the relevant District Court. Both he and the 
Icelandic State appealed against this court’s decision, whereupon the Icelandic 
 31 E.g. Timmermans, C.  (2006). Creative Homogeneity. In:  M. Johansson, N.  Wahl, and 
U. Bernitz, eds., Liber amicorum in Honour of Sven Norberg: A European for all Seasons, 
Brussels: Bruylant, 471– 484.
 32 Baudenbacher, C.  (2008). The goal of homogeneous interpretation of the law in the 
European Economic Area. Two courts and two separate legal orders, but law that is essen-
tially identical in substance. The European Legal Forum 1- 2008, I- 22– 31.









Supreme Court turned to the efta Court for an advisory opinion. The Supreme 
Court’s questions related to the applicability of Article 28 eea and/ or Article 7 
of Directive 2004/ 38 in circumstances as that at hand. In addition, the nation-
al court asked whether it is of any significance that the eea Agreement does 
not contain a provision corresponding to Article 21 tfeu, on the free right to 
movement of Union citizens.
Before the efta Court, Iceland, Norway and efta Surveillance Authority 
(esa) argued that Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 does not impose obligations 
on the home State and therefore cannot be applicable in case like Gunnarsson. 
Rather, in EU law – and only there – such obligations follow from Article 21 
tfeu. Alternatively, Norway argued that if Article 7 of the Directive should 
entail rights in relation to the home State, it follows from the jcd that only eco-
nomically active persons are included. In contrast, the European Commission 
was of the opinion that Mr Gunnarsson could rely on Article 7 of the Directive 
in order to claim equal treatment with residents of Iceland in relation to the 
pooling of personal tax credits with his spouse, based on the argument that the 
rights of free movement and residence envisaged by this provision would be 
set at nought if the home State could obstruct persons wishing to avail them-
selves of them.
The Jabbi case concerned the question of whether “Article 7(1)(b), cf. Arti-
cle 7(2), of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC confer derived rights of residence to a third 
country national family member of an eea national who, upon returning from 
another eea State, is residing in the eea State in which the eea national is a 
citizen” (Jabbi, para. 26). Mr Jabbi had married his Norwegian wife when she 
lived in Spain as an economically inactive person. From there they later re-
turned to Norway. When Mr Jabbi’s application for residence in that country 
was refused, he went to court which turned to the efta Court for help with the 
interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38.
Before the efta Court, the esa argued that the scope of free movement 
rights granted to efta nationals should be the same as for EU nationals; fur-
ther, that the lack of a citizenship concept in the eea Agreement means that 
the Directive should be accorded a more important role in the eea context 
and that its scope must therefore be broadened on the basis of the principle 
of effectiveness. The European Commission, interestingly, criticised previous 
cjeu case law (mentioned further below) and argued that it should not apply 
in the present context.
iv.4 The efta Court’s Decision in Gunnarsson
In Gunnarsson, the Court mentions both the jcd and the accompanying 
Joint Declaration, acknowledging that “the incorporation of Directive 2004/ 
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38 cannot introduce rights in to the eea Agreement based on the concept of 
Union Citizenship”. However, it then adds that “individuals cannot be deprived 
of rights that they have already acquired under the eea Agreement before the 
introduction of Union Citizenship in the EU” (Gunnarsson, para. 80). This has 
to be seen against the background of the secondary law on movement and resi-
dence that applied before the incorporation of Directive 2004/ 38 into eea law. 
In fact, the efta Court found that due to temporal aspects of the Gunnarsson 
case, both the former Directive 90/ 365 and the subsequent Directive 2004/ 38 
were applicable. Noting that Directive 90/ 365 – in contrast to Directive 2004/ 
38 – does not explicitly mention a right of exit, the efta Court points out that 
taking up residence in another state presupposes a move from the eea State 
of origin. From this, it concludes that Article 1 of Directive 90/ 365 on the right 
of residence must be understood as also prohibiting the home State from hin-
dering the person concerned from moving to another eea State (Gunnarsson, 
para. 77).
In the present writer’s opinion, so far, the judgment is easy to follow and 
logical, if understood literally as relating to the right of exit by crossing the 
national border. What follows is perhaps more surprising. Pointing out that 
the substance of Article 1 of Directive 90/ 365 has been maintained in Article 
7, para. 1, letter b, of Directive 2004/ 38, the Court finds that there is nothing to 
suggest that the latter provision must be interpreted more narrowly than the 
former with regard to a right to move within the eea from the home State. 
On the contrary, according to recital 3 of its preamble, Directive 2004/ 38 aims 
in particular to strengthen the right of free movement and residence. Against 
this background, the efta Court concludes that “Article 1(1) of Directive 90/ 
365 and Article 7, para. 1, letter b, of Directive 2004/ 38 must be interpreted 
such that they confer on a pensioner who receives a pension due to a former 
employment relationship, but who has not carried out any economic activity 
in another eea State during his working life, not only a right of residence in 
relation to the host eea State, but also a right to move freely from the home 
eea State. The latter right prohibits the home State from hindering such a per-
son from moving to another eea State. A less favourable treatment of persons 
exercising the right to move than those who remain resident amounts to such 
a hindrance. Furthermore, a spouse of such a pensioner has similar derived 
rights, cf. Article 1(2) of Directive 90/ 365 and Article 7(1)(d) of Directive 2004/ 
38, respectively.” (Gunnarsson, para. 82).
The Court then elaborates on the meaning of the principle of equal treat-
ment with respect to eea direct tax law, thereby relying on cjeu case law on 
EU direct tax law (Gunnarsson, para. 84 et seq.). With respect to justification, 
the Court states that less favourable treatment of a pensioner and his wife who 
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have exercised the right to move freely within the eea is not compatible with 
Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 90/ 365 and Article 7(1)(b) and (d) of Directive 
2004/ 38, where the pension received by the pensioner constitutes all or near-
ly all of that person’s income, unless objectively justified. However, the efta 
Court refuses to consider the arguments by Iceland based on the grounds of 
fiscal cohesion and the effectiveness of fiscal supervision (both arguments that 
often appear in tax cases), pointing out that such grounds are permitted nei-
ther under Directive 90/ 365 nor under Directive 2004/ 38.
In the analysis of Wennerås,34 the Court swept everything aside that it had 
said in Wahl in relation to the reservation in the Joint Declaration in relation to 
Union citizenship, resulting in an interpretation of eea law that, on the level 
of secondary law, covers a field of law falling outside the Main Part of the eea 
Agreement itself. Conversely, in the present writer’s analysis, the reservation 
played no real role in the efta Court’s decision. It is, however, true that the 
Court’s approach is very particular in other respects.
With respect to the reservation, the decisive question is, again, whether 
the efta Court relied on Union citizenship case law of the cjeu that dates 
from after 7 December 2007. That is not the case. Whilst several authors com-
ment generally on the influence of Union citizenship on the outcome of the 
efta Court’s judgment, they do not address the time issue. Thus, Burke & 
Hannesson35 note that without the cjeu case law on citizenship in EU, “it is 
doubtful that the efta Court would have required this level of protection”. 
Similarly, Arnesen et al.36 argue that in Gunnarsson (as well as in the subse-
quent case of Jabbi) the efta Court opted for an interpretation of provisions 
of Directive 2004/ 38 at odds with cjeu case law in order to “remedy” the 
lack of eea Treaty provisions mirroring Articles 20 et seq. tfeu. The present 
writer joins these commentators in arguing that even though formally not in 
contradiction with the Joint Declaration, the efta Court’s approach is prob-
lematic in a context where the Court uses this approach in order to interpret 
eea secondary law differently from the relevant secondary EU law, thereby 
manifestly going beyond both the wording of this law and the relevant cjeu 
case law.
 34 Wennerås, P. (2018). Article 6 Homogeneity, cit., para. 15.
 35 Burke, C., and Hannesson, Ó.Í. (2015). Citizenship by the backdoor? Gunnarsson. Common 
Market Law Review 52(4), pp. 1111– 1133, 1127.
 36 The editors (2018). Introduction. The efta States, the eea and the different views on 
the legal integration of Europe. In: F. Arnesen, F., H.H. Fredriksen, H.H., H.P. Graver, H.P., 
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As was already indicated above, the present writer considers the efta Court’s 
statements about an implied right of exit as such under Directive 90/ 365 con-
vincing. At that time, the secondary law relating to movement and residence of 
economically active persons contained explicit provisions on the right of exit (of 
the Member State of origin) and of entry (into the host Member State; e.g. Arts. 
2 and 3 of Directive 68/ 360).37 In contrast, the Directives on persons who were 
not economically active only mentioned the right of residence. It is logical that 
this implies both a right of exit and a right of entry. However, the efta Court dis-
regards the fact that under the Directives that were explicit on this matter, these 
rights concerned specifically and exclusively the right to cross the border and its 
technicalities (“simply on production of a valid identity card or passport”). The 
same is true for Directive 2004/ 38. In the relevant provisions, there was, and is, no 
link to equal treatment and freedom of restrictions in other respects.
Moreover, when the cjeu began to develop its case law on measures that could 
deter Union citizens from making use of their free movement rights, this was in 
the context of market access rights for the economically active under the Treaty 
(e.g. Singh,38 Bosmann,39 Kranemann).40 Similarly, when the Court subsequently 
extended this approach to Union citizenship by introducing a prohibition of re-
striction, it again linked it to the substance of the right to free movement as stated 
in the Treaty (e.g. De Cuyper,41 Rüffler).42 It should also be noted that Article 24 of 
Directive 2004/ 38 adds to this a right to equal treatment only in respect to further 
matters, excluding those already covered under other Union law.43
 37 Council Directive 68/ 360/ EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on move-
ment and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their fam-
ilies, OJ English Special Edition Series i Chapter 1968(ii), p. 485.
 38 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, Case C- 370/ 90, The Queen v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal et Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department.
 39 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 1995, Case C- 415/ 93, Union royale belge des 
sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean- Marc Bosman.
 40 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 March 2005, Case C- 109/ 04, Karl Robert Kranemann v 
Land Nordrhein- Westfalen.
 41 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 July 2006, Case C- 406/ 04, Gérald De Cuyper v Office 
national de l’emploi.
 42 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 April 2009, Case C- 544/ 07, Uwe Rüffler v Dyrektor Izby 
Skarbowej we Wrocławiu Ośrodek Zamiejscowy w Wałbrzychu.
 43 Art. 24(1) of the Directive states: “Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly pro-
vided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this 
Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the 
nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right 
shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who 














There is, therefore, a difference between the right to cross the border as a 
purely technical issue, on the one hand, and the right not be discouraged from 
making use of a free movement right in a more general sense. Importantly, 
these different rights are regulated on different levels, and this is where EU law 
and eea differ, since the latter in respect to persons who are not economically 
active includes only one of the two levels, namely that of secondary law.
The efta Court is aware of this gap but considers it irrelevant (Gunnarsson, 
para. 81):
Nor can it be decisive that, in the EU pillar, the [cjeu] has based the right 
of an economically inactive person to move from his home State directly 
on the Treaty provision on Union Citizenship, now Article 21 tfeu, in-
stead of on Article 1 of Directive 90/ 365 or Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 
38. As the [cjeu] was called upon to rule on the matter only after a right 
to move and reside freely was expressly introduced in primary law, there 
was no need to interpret secondary law in that regard […].
As is stated by some commentators, this is not convincing, not least because 
of the different nature of the regulation on the two levels. In their careful and 
extensive annotation of the Gunnarsson judgment, Burke & Hannesson44 note 
that, up to the point of justification, the efta Court interprets the Directives 
in conformity with a component of the eea Agreement’s free movement 
provisions, namely the prohibition of discriminations and restrictions in the 
context of market access (it should be added: rather than movement and resi-
dence in a technical sense). The authors consider it rather artificial to do so in 
the context of a situation falling outside the material scope of these very same 
free movement provisions (namely because under EU law, it falls under Union 
citizenship provisions which do not exist under eea law). The authors also 
argue – again, convincingly in the present writer’s opinion – that it is difficult 
to reconcile the efta Court’s use of the exhaustive list of derogations under 
the Directives with the cjeu and efta Court case law on restrictions, where 
the category of objective justification is open. Against that background, Burke 
& Hannesson criticise the efta Court’s “complete absence of a convincing and 
explicit methodology”, including also the fact that this Court relied on select-
ed cjeu case law only, to the exclusion of other, more recent case law.45 This 
 44 Burke, C., and Hannesson, Ó.Í. (2015). Citizenship by the backdoor? Gunnarsson, cit., 
p. 1125 et seq.
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latter point relates notably to O. and B.,46 which had been handed down before 
Gunnarsson (and which the European Commission criticised before the efta 
Court). In O. and B., the cjeu held that it follows from a literal, systematic and 
teleological interpretation of Directive 2004/ 38 that it does not cover situa-
tions of a Union citizen returning to the Member State of nationality, or their 
family members. Instead, the Court found Article 21 tfeu to be applicable (in 
which context Directive 2004/ 38 applies by analogy).47
Overall, Burke & Hannesson48 note that as a result of the efta Court’s de-
cision in Gunnarsson, there is now a significant cleavage between the EU and 
the eea regime in relation to the interpretation of an identical norm. At the 
same time, the authors note that had the efta Court transposed cjeu case 
law, efta nationals would not have been afforded equal protection in their 
home states on the basis of eea law when compared to their counterparts in 
EU Member States relying on EU law. From that perspective, the authors con-
sider that the conclusion in Gunnarsson would seem justified, even though 
based on “a rather stretched teleology”.
It is submitted that here lies the key to the efta Court’s approach: rather 
than opting for a homogeneous interpretation of Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 
38 in the sense of following the interpretation in the relevant cjeu case law, 
the efta Court consciously deviates from that interpretation in order to arrive, 
not at the same interpretation, but rather, through different interpretation, at 
the same overall level of protection under EU law and under eea. The fact that 
this is the Court’s guiding star in interpreting Directive 2004/ 38 becomes evi-
dent in the next judgment, in the case of Jabbi, through explicit statements to 
that effect.
iv.5 The efta Court’s Decision in Jabbi
Having been criticised for disregarding the O. and B. decision of the cjeu in 
Gunnarsson, the efta Court in Jabbi sets out to explain why that judgment 
could not affect its approach. The efta Court begins by acknowledging that 
under EU law, the right to return of economically non- active citizens together 
with their family members is based on Article 21 tfeu, and that the cjeu had 
 46 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, Case C- 456/ 12 O. v Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v B.
 47 More recently, see also Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, Case C- 673/ 16, Relu 
Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor 
Interne.










explicitly rejected the application of Directive 2004/ 38. The efta Court con-
tinues in the following manner (Jabbi, para. 66 and 68):
Consequently, an unequal level of protection of the right to free move-
ment of persons within the eea could ensue. However, if the Court en-
sures the same level of protection in the eea, it must explain why the 
[cjeu’s] statement in O. and B. regarding the Directive cannot decide the 
matter. […] The case at hand must be distinguished from O.  and B. to 
the extent that that judgment is based on Union citizenship. Therefore, 
it must be examined if homogeneity in the eea can be achieved based 
on an authority included in the eea Agreement. Such an examination 
must be based on the eea Agreement, legal acts incorporated into it and 
case law.
Having set out its path in this manner and having, further, drawn attention to 
the preamble of the eea Agreement, according to which a uniform interpreta-
tion and application of the eea Agreement shall be achieved in full deference 
to the independence of the courts (Jabbi, para. 70), the efta Court recalls its 
finding in Gunnarsson, namely that Article 7, para. 1, letter b, of Directive 2004/ 
38 confers on an eea national the right to move freely from the home eea 
State and to take up residence in another eea State, that an eea State may 
not deter its nationals from moving to another eea State in the exercise of the 
freedom of movement under eea law, including in relation to family members 
covered by the Directive (Jabbi, para. 75).
Referring to Singh and Eind,49 the efta Court further recalls that the right 
to return is protected under EU law. In the latter, in particular, the cjeu recog-
nises that an EU migrant worker may rely on EU law upon returning as an eco-
nomically inactive person to his home State with a family member from a third 
country, provided he previously exercised his EU rights. According to the efta 
Court, this reasoning is equally relevant when the person returning is not a for-
mer migrant worker, but rather an economically inactive person who has exer-
cised the right to free movement under Article 7, para. 1, letter b, of the Direc-
tive. The efta Court therefore concludes that, “[w] hen a eea national makes 
use of his right to free movement, he may not be deterred from exercising that 
right by an obstacle to the entry and residence of a spouse in the eea nation-
al’s home State. Accordingly, when an eea national who has availed himself 
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2007, Case C- 291/ 05 Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v R. N. G. Eind.
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of the right to free movement returns to his home State, eea law requires that 
his spouse is granted a derived right of residence in that State” (Jabbi, para. 77).
From the perspective of the reservation in the Joint Declaration, again, the 
question should be asked whether the efta Court relied on cjeu case law on 
Union citizenship dating from after 7 December 2007. First, it may be noted 
that, contrary to the suggestion of the European Commission, the efta Court 
did not refer to McCarthy ii,50 handed down in 2014 and recommended by the 
European Commission as a benchmark. However, this is perhaps understand-
able in view of the fact that that case concerned an entirely different provi-
sion of the Directive, namely Article 35, on measures to refuse, terminate or 
withdraw any right conferred by the Directive in the case of abuse of rights or 
fraud, such as marriages of convenience. The Court did, however, rely on Eind, 
a decision that dates from 10 December 2007. But is it a citizenship case? As 
stated above, the case involved a former migrant worker who wanted to return 
home without being economically active there. The cjeu notes that “the right 
of the migrant worker to return and reside in the Member State of which he 
is a national, after being gainfully employed in another Member State, is con-
ferred by Community law, to the extent necessary to ensure the useful effect of 
the right to free movement for workers under Article 39 EC and the provisions 
adopted to give effect to that right, such as those laid down in Regulation No 
1612/ 68”, adding that “that interpretation is substantiated by the introduction 
of the status of citizen of the Union, which is intended to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States” (Eind, para. 10). In other words, it 
may be argued that the real basis of the Court’s reasoning in that case remains 
the free movement for workers, which is a particular aspect of the economic 
side of Union citizenship. If so, it must be concluded that the Court respected 
the limits of the reservation.
Again, academic comments on Jabbi do not focus on the temporal aspect 
of (alleged) Union citizenship case law of the cjeu that the efta Court relies 
on in Jabbi. They rather tend to discuss the efta Court’s particular approach 
to the homogeneity principle under eea law. They note that in interpreting 
Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, the efta Court chose a different approach than 
the cjeu did in the case of O. and B., formally distinguishing the case before 
it from that precedent but in fact openly departing from it. Thus, according to 
Wennerås,51 the efta Court held that Directive 2004/ 38 “could be applied by 
analogy and gave the applicant the same rights as the [cjeu] had said could 
 50 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2014, Case C- 202/ 13 The Queen, on the applica-
tion of Sean Ambrose McCarthy and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department.






only be derived from the concept of Union citizenship in Article 21 tfeu. The 
judgment speaks volumes about how the efta Court perceives the principle 
of homogeneity and the objectives of the eea Agreement.” Following Falch,52 
Jabbi suggests that the efta Court will do much to preserve homogeneity 
with EU law in its interpretation and application of eea law, even in situa-
tions where the parallel in EU law has been interpreted and applied in light 
of provisions not made part of the Agreement (i.e. Union citizenship provi-
sions). Franklin53 notes that “[t] he efta Court’s point seems to be that if one 
of the aims of the Citizenship Directive was to strengthen pre- existing rights 
of free movement, then one cannot rely on the introduction of Citizenship to 
do away with such pre- existing rights in an eea context. Even if the concept 
of Citizenship cannot be used to enhance the pre- existing rights which ap-
plied under eea law, it should certainly not be used as an argument to limit 
rights which were intended to survive. The creative technique opted for by 
the efta Court will therefore presumably be capable of ensuring homoge-
neity between eea and EU law in most cases, notwithstanding the contrary 
impression one might otherwise get from (and perhaps the intention behind) 
the Joint Declaration.”
A final example, Arnesen & Fredriksen54 argue that “[t] he controversial as-
pect of Jabbi lies in the fact that the efta Court found its break with the case 
law of the [cjeu] to be supported by the homogeneity principle (as opposed to 
representing a deviation from it) and, as a result, advocated a more extensive 
reading of the Citizenship Directive in the eea law context than in the EU law 
context.”
In this context, again, much depends on the meaning of the homogeneity 
principle. If homogeneity is understood as requiring, in principle, the same 
interpretation of a given provision under eea law as under EU law, then the 
efta Court clearly strayed from it. However, quite clearly, the efta Court in 
the present context does not aim at this type of homogeneity, but rather at 
homogeneity in view of the same result or the same level of protection. Wen-
nerås55 argues that, “[u] nderneath it all lays, it would seem, a conviction that 
 52 Falch, I. (2018). Article 4 Non- discrimination on grounds of nationality. In: F. Arnesen, F., 
H.H. Fredriksen, H.H., H.P. Graver, H.P., O. Mestad, O. and C. Vedder C., eds., Agreement on 
the European Economic Area, cit., pp. 196– 208, para. 20.
 53 Franklin, C.N.K. (2017). Square Pegs and Round Holes, cit., p. 183.
 54 Arnesen, F.  and Fredriksen, H.H. (2018). Preamble. In F.  Arnesen, F., H.H. Fredriksen, 
H.H., H.P. Graver, H.P., O. Mestad, O. and C. Vedder C., eds., Agreement on the European 
Economic Area, cit., pp. 150– 179, footnote 100.
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the Contracting Parties wants eea law to provide the same results as EU law 
and that it is for the efta Court to carry out this task.” Following the termi-
nology of Baudenbacher and Fredriksen, Burke & Hannesson56 in the context 
of Gunnarsson refer to “effect- related homogeneity”, stating that this decision 
represents the first occasion on which the efta Court interpreted eea law to 
entail more extensive rights than what follows from a settled interpretation of 
an identical norm of EU law by the cjeu.
Franklin57 opines that, “as a result of the efta Court’s Opinions in both 
Gunnarsson and Jabbi, it seems as though all rights – both autonomous and 
derived  – contained in eea rules pre- dating yet furthered in the Citizen-
ship Directive will continue to enjoy the same protection under eea law 
today and will continue to be interpreted in conformity with EU develop-
ments. It would seem as though almost any case in which the Court of Jus-
tice  bases its findings on the Citizenship rules of the Treaty, and where as-
pects of the rights in question find at least some resonance in the provisions 
of the  Directive, might therefore be capable of being followed – by way of 
analogy.”
The present writer would submit that the efta Court’s approach could be 
seen to reflect a new, reversed version of the Polydor principle: different con-
texts of the same provision must lead to different interpretations, where that 
is necessary in order to achieve the same overall result in terms of the level of 
peoples’ protection. It remains to be seen whether this approach will be con-
firmed in future decisions such as Campbell58 and Norway v L.59
v Findings with Respect to the Reservation and Relevance in Other 
Contexts, Including Notably Brexit
To return to the reservation in the Joint Declaration with respect to Union 
citizenship, Pirker60 quite rightly called it “in practice hardly ever relevant”. 
 56 Burke, C., and Hannesson, Ó.Í. (2015). Citizenship by the backdoor? Gunnarsson, cit., 
p. 1117 et seq.
 57 Franklin, C.N.K. (2017). Square Pegs and Round Holes, cit., p. 183.
 58 efta Court, Case E- 4/ 19 Melissa Colleen Campbell v The Norwegian Government, pending 
at the the time of review of the proofs for the present text.
 59 efta Court, Case E- 2/ 20 The Norwegian Government v L, pending at the the time of review 
of the proofs for the present text.
 60 Pirker, P. (2018). Switzerland and the EEA. In: F. Arnesen, F., H.H. Fredriksen, H.H., H.P. 
Graver, H.P., O. Mestad, O. and C. Vedder C., eds., Agreement on the European Economic 












According to Jay,61 this raises the question of how accurate it is to say that cit-
izenship rights do not form part of the eea Agreement, given that the efta 
Court has essentially assimilated nationality of an eea/ efta State with EU 
citizenship for the purposes of free movement and residence.
However, it remains to be seen whether the reservation would have any 
meaning in the context of Article 24 of Directive 2004/ 38, as indicated by the 
efta Court in Clauder. It also remains to be seen what the cjeu will make of 
the efta Court’s approach should it be faced with an eea case on Directive 
2004/ 38 in similar circumstances as those of Clauder, Gunnarsson and Jab-
bi. Will it follow the efta Court’s interpretation, or will it go in a different 
direction, adhering to its own, previous EU case law, also in the overall dif-
ferent context of the eea? Or will it follow a middle path, opting for an eea- 
specific interpretation that is different from that by the efta Court? In this 
context, it will be remembered that the European Commission had urged 
the efta Court to depart from O. and B., apparently aiming at the judicial 
dialogue between the two Courts and possibly hoping that an interpreta-
tion by the efta Court along the lines suggested by it would, subsequently, 
lead the cjeu to take the same approach when dealing with Directive 2004/ 
38 in the eea context. As Baudenbacher62 notes, the cjeu has shown itself 
willing to enter into a dialogue with the efta Court and in some instance 
even to reconsider and to adjust its case law in the light of the efta Court’s 
jurisprudence.
Finally, there is the question of what all of this could mean in other con-
texts, i.e. in the legal relations of the EU with other non- Member States.63 In 
this respect, different legal regimes must be distinguished. For example, under 
the Ankara Agreement between the EU and Turkey,64 Directive 2004/ 38 is not 
part of the common legal acquis. At the same time, it is established cjeu case 
law that “the principles enshrined in the Treaty articles relating to freedom 
of movement for workers must be extended, as far as possible, to Turkish na-
tionals who enjoy rights under the eec- Turkey Association”, and that the law 
 61 Jay, M.A. (2012). Homogeneity, the free movement of persons and integration without 
membership: mission impossible?, cit., p. 88.
 62 Baudenbacher, C.  (2008). The goal of homogeneous interpretation of the law in the 
European Economic Area, cit., p. I- 24 et seq.
 63 See Tobler, C. (2016). One of Many Challenges After ‚Brexit’. The Institutional Framework 
of an Alternative Agreement  – Lessons from Switzerland and Elsewhere? Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, 575– 594.
 64 Agreement of 1963 establishing an Association between the European Community and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Turkey, of the other part, OJ 1973 
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of the Ankara Agreement must be interpreted by analogy with EU Treaty and 
secondary law (e.g. Ziebell,65 para. 58). Against that background, the applicant 
in the case of Ziebell argued that Article 28 of Directive 2004/ 38, which estab-
lishes a system of protection against expulsion measures which is based on 
the degree of integration of the person in question in the host Member State, 
should apply also in the context of the agreement. The cjeu disagreed, stating 
that it is “the very concept of citizenship [which] justifies the recognition, for 
Union citizens alone, of guarantees which are considerably strengthened in 
respect of expulsion, such as those provided for in Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 
2004/ 38” (Ziebell, para. 73).
Another example relates to the EU- Swiss agreement on the free movement 
of persons (fmp).66 In terms of movement, residence and family reunifica-
tion, this agreement is based on secondary EU law that predates Directive 
2004/ 38. Whilst the EU desired the incorporation of that Directive into the 
acquis of the agreement, the Swiss Government resisted. So far, this has been 
possible because the agreement does not provide for a system of dynamic 
updating in line with the evolving EU law on which the agreement is based. 
However, the fmp is part of a package of market access agreements for which 
the EU has demanded the introduction of a new institutional system, includ-
ing, among others, a dynamic system of updating. Whilst Switzerland agreed 
to enter into negotiations on a renewed institutional system for the relevant 
agreements as well as for any future market access agreements, the Federal 
Government has aimed at leaving the incorporation of Directive 2004/ 38 out 
of the scope of the negotiations. In this respect, it has not been successful 
so far:  The draft text for an Institutional Agreement resulting from the ne-
gotiations as they stood at the end of November 201867 does not contain any 
limiting provisions with regard to Directive 2004/ 38. In fact, the draft text 
does not mention the Directive at all, with the consequence that it falls in 
principle under the new dynamic updating mechanism. It would then be up 
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 December 2011, Case C- 371/ 08, Nural Ziebell v.  Land 
Baden- Württemberg.
 66 Agreement of 21 June 1999 between the European Community and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, 
OJ 2002 L 114/ 6 (as amended).
 67 Accord facilitant les relations bilaterales entre l’Union européenne et la Confédération 
Suisse dans les parties du marché intérieur auxquelles la Suisse participle, original 
French draft text of 23 November 2018, available at https:// www.eda.admin.ch/ dam/ 
dea/ fr/ documents/ abkommen/ Acccord- inst- Projet- de- texte_ fr.pdf. See generally e.g. 








to the contracting parties to agree within the framework of the updating pro-
cedure whether Directive 2004/ 38 should be incorporated into bilateral law 
as a whole or only in part.68
Much earlier, after the efta Court’s decision in the case of Wahl had been 
handed down, the present writer suggested that, given the Court’s statements 
about the limits of the incorporation of the Directive into the eea Agreement, 
a limited incorporation of the Directive could also be useful for Switzerland, 
namely incorporation of the Directive minus its Union citizenship elements.69 
However, the efta Court’s subsequent case law, as discussed in this contribu-
tion, has shown that for such a carve- out to be effective, it would be wise to 
frame it in much more explicit terms.
This, then, would also be the lesson in the context of Brexit in the – though 
at present admittedly unlikely – event that the UK and the EU, following the 
former’s withdrawal from the Union, should agree on a future legal relation-
ship including some form of free movement of persons based on EU rules. 
Again, should the UK wish for a carve- out of specific Union citizenship ele-
ments, it would have to insist on a specific and unambiguous regulation of 
the matter.
Alternatively, should the UK decide to (re- )join the eea – though also un-
likely at the time of writing – then it would find that free movement of persons 
under eea is to a very large extent the same as under EU law, in spite of the 
absence of Union citizenship under eea law. Indeed, the only clearly estab-
lished difference is the presence, in the eea Agreement only, of a permanent 
safeguard clause. Article 112 eea provides:
 1. If serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a secto-
rial or regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Contracting Party 
may unilaterally take appropriate measures under the conditions and 
procedures laid down in Article 113.
December 2018, Ambühl, M. and Scherer, D.S. (2019). Zum Entwurf des Institutionellen 
Abkommens. Jusletter 4 February 2019, and Tobler, C.  and Beglinger, J.  (2020). Tobler/ 
Beglinger- Brevier zum Institutionellen Abkommen Schweiz- EU. Online publication, avail-
able via www.brevier.eur- charts.eu.
 68 On this issue, see in particular Epiney, A.  and Affolter, S.  (2019). Das Institutionelle 
Abkommen und die Unionsbürgerrichtlinie. Jusletter 11 March 2019; also Tobler and 
Beglinger. Tobler/ Beglinger- Brevier, cit., as of question 44.
 69 Tobler, C. (2013). Bikers Are(n’t) Welcome, cit., p. 254; subsequently also Tobler, C. (2015). 
Auswirkungen einer Übernahme der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie für die Schweiz – Sozialhilfe 
nach bilateralem Recht als Anwendungsfall des Polydor- Prinzips. In:  A. Epiney, A.  and 
T. Gordzielik, T., eds., Personenfreizügigkeit und Zugang zu staatlichen Leistungen / Libre 
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 2. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope 
and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situ-
ation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the 
functioning of this Agreement.
 3. The safeguard measures shall apply with regard to all Contracting 
 Parties.
This eea law clause – which has been used only once it its history, namely by 
Liechtenstein before it secured a special deal under the eea that limits its obli-
gation to let other eea nationals settle on its territory – 70 gives a certain leeway 
to the contracting States which is not available under EU law, if only in special 
circumstances. It is obvious that this is far from letting the States control the 
movement of persons based on their own, unilateral decision, as has been the 
aim of the recent UK governments for the time post- Brexit. In fact, to be com-
pletely “free” of EU law- related ramifications to the movement of persons, both 
on the substantive and on the institutional level, requires a common regime 
that makes no use whatsoever of substantive EU law concepts. Only in that 
case, will no issues of parallel interpretation arise.
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 chapter 20
The Free Movement of Persons in the Eurasian 
Economic Union – between Civis Eurasiaticus and 
Homo Oeconomicus
Benedikt Pirker and Kirill Entin*
i Introduction
Few commentators would suggest that the Eurasian Economic Union (eaeu) is 
in any way a European Union (EU) “in the making”. Nonetheless, as a regional 
integration project, the eaeu faces many challenges similar to those faced by the 
EU, and much can be learned from an informed comparison of the two organ-
isations. The present chapter examines the state of the right to free movement 
of persons in the Eurasian Economic Union. No formal eaeu citizenship exists 
which would be comparable to EU citizenship, and an examination of the exist-
ing legal framework reveals a rather limited conception of the “Civis Eurasiati-
cus”.1 Yet the case law of the Eurasian Economic Union Court (eaeu Court) and 
the interpretative leeway of certain provisions of eaeu law leave space to reflect 
on potential future developments. Additionally, some inspiration may come from 
the citizenship provisions of the Russia- Belarus Union state legal framework.
ii The eaeu and the Free Movement of Persons
Before we outline the context of free movement in detail it is useful to give a brief 
overview of the eaeu. The eaeu, active since 2015, was founded by Belarus, the 
 * University of Fribourg (Switzerland) and Legal Research and Analysis Department, Court 
of the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus), respectively. Dr Entin contributed to this article 
in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the 
official position of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union. The authors wish to thank 
Ekaterina Diyachenko, Dimitry Kochenov and Giovanni Piccirilli for their very useful com-
ments and suggestions, as well as Sabine Cotting for editorial assistance.
 1 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 9 December 1992, case C- 168/ 91, Konstan-
tinidis v Stadt Altensteig and Landratsamt Calw, para 46. See also Lenaerts, K. (2012). “Civis 
Europaeus sum”: from the cross- border link to the status of citizen of the Union. In: Cardon-
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Russian Federation and Kazakhstan and joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.2 In 
terms of institutions, it is far less supranational than the EU. There is a strict hierar-
chy of institutions from top to bottom: the Supreme Council formed by the heads 
of eaeu Member States, the Intergovernmental Council formed by the heads 
of national governments and the Eurasian Economic Commission (eecomm). 
The latter consists of a Council formed by the deputy prime ministers and the 
eecomm Board composed of ten members nominated as ministers by the Mem-
ber States, who, however, act independently from the latter as non- political quasi- 
commissioners. While the eecomm board can indeed be considered a suprana-
tional regulatory body, its decisions are all subject to being cancelled or amended 
by the Council.3 There is no parliamentary assembly at eaeu level.
The eaeu Court, in turn, has a rather limited set of judicial remedies at 
its disposal compared to the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu).4 
Even though the eaeu Court has given as much effect as possible to the rele-
vant provisions, we cannot overlook the fact that the legal framework offers no 
real preliminary reference procedure for national courts and, moreover, there 
is no possibility for the eecomm to bring Member States in front of the eaeu 
Court if they are not in compliance with eaeu law.5 The eecomm and Mem-
ber States can, however, ask the Court for a “clarification” of any provision of 
eaeu law. Although the advisory opinions of the Court are not formally bind-
ing, the eecomm and Member States tend to comply with them and this in-
strument has been repeatedly used by both the eecomm and Member States 
as a soft substitute for a real sanction in case of a failure to fulfil obligations. 
 2 On eaeu Law development, see, e.g., Dragneva, R., and De Kort, J. (2007). The Legal Regime 
for Free Trade in the Commonwealth of Independent States. International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 56 (2), pp. 233– 266, 266; Cooper, J. (2013). The development of Eurasian economic 
integration. In: Dragneva and Wolczuk, eds., Eurasian Economic Integration – Law, Policy and 
Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Kembayev, Z. (2016). Regional Integration in Eurasia: The 
Legal and Political Framework. Review of Central and East European Law 41 (2), pp. 157– 194.
 3 See for a concise overview Yeliseyeu, A. (2019). The Eurasian Economic Union: Expectations, 
Challenges and Achievements. German Marshall Fund Policy Paper (10), pp. 1– 22, 3– 4.
 4 For an overview of the competence of the Court see Diyachenko, E. and Entin, K. (2017) The 
Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives. Russian Law Journal 5 
(2), pp. 53– 74. For a detailed analysis of the Statute of the Court provisions see Дьяченко, 
E., Энтин, К. (2017) Компетенция Суда ЕАЭС:  мифы и реальность. Международное 
правосудие 3 (23), pp. 76– 95.
 5 See in detail Entin, K.  and Pirker, B.  (2018). The early case law of the Eurasian Economic 
Union Court: On the road to Luxembourg? Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 25 (3), pp. 266– 287; Kembayev, Z. (2016). The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: An 
Adequate Body for Facilitating Eurasian Integration? Review of Central and East Europe-
an Law 41 (3– 4), pp.  342– 367; Исполинов, А. (2016). Статут Суда ЕАЭС как отражение 
опасений и сомнений государств- членов Евразийского экономического союза. Право. 










The Professional Athletes case6 is a perfect example here as it originated from 
a complaint to the eecomm by the Ministry for International Economic In-
tegration and Reform of Armenia over a perceived violation of the rights of 
Armenian basketball players as workers in sports clubs of the Russian Feder-
ation. In its inquiry, the eecomm discovered that the Russian Federation had 
indeed put in place quantitative limits on participation in sports competitions 
based on players’ nationality, differentiating between Russian nationals and 
nationals of other Member States. The eecomm adopted a decision7 prompt-
ing Member States to comply with their obligations under Article 97(2) eaeu 
Treaty by ensuring equal possibilities for athletes from other Member States 
to work in sports organisations. The Russian Federation, however, made no 
move to comply with the eecomm’s decision. It argued that the case did not 
fall under Article 97(2) as the measures were not protectionist (this would be 
prevented under the Treaty) but rather were part of a policy to promote better 
conditions for the training of athletes. In response, the eecomm sought a clar-
ification of the relevant Treaty provision from the Court. On 7 December 2018, 
the eaeu Court handed down a remarkable advisory opinion that not only 
qualified measures taken by the Russian Federation as restrictions falling un-
der Article 97(2) eaeu Treaty, but also tackled a number of important issues, 
such as the horizontal effect of a fundamental freedom, the direct effect and 
primacy of eaeu Treaty norms, as well as the powers of the eecomm.
Substantive law includes numerous provisions on free movement covering 
the free movement of goods8 and services, the freedom of establishment as 
well as the activities of the self- employed.9 This chapter focuses on the aspect, 
which has thus far received most attention, namely freedom of movement for 
workers. Our aim is to determine to what extent there is an eaeu citizen, and 
if the latter is a “mere” market citizen10 or more.
6  Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 2/ 
5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.2. Cf. Pirker, 
B. and Entin, K. (2019). Bosman’s Second Life? The Eurasian Economic Union Court and 
the Free Movement of Professional Athletes. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 46 (2), 
pp. 129– 148, 148; Энтин К. и Дьяченко Е. (2019) Обзор практики Суда Евразийского 
экономического союза в 2018 году. Международное правосудие 1 (29), pp. 3– 22.
7  Decision n° 47 of 11 May 2017.
8  Art. 28, 29 eaeu Treaty.
9  Art. 65– 69 eaeu Treaty and Protocol No. 16.
 10 On the notion see e.g. Everson, M.  (1995). The Legacy of the Market Citizen. In:  Shaw 
and More, eds., New Legal Dynamics of European Union. Oxford:  Clarendon Press; 
Wollenschläger, F.  (2007). Grundfreiheit ohne Markt:  Die Herausbildung der 
Unionsbürgerschaft im unionsrechtlichen Freizügigkeitsregime. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck; 
Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship. Common Market Law 
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iii The Notion of Workers and Their Rights in eaeu Law – Come in, 
Let’s Get to Work …
A number of factors influence the effectiveness of free movement provisions. 
For the present purpose, we will take into account first the goals of eaeu in-
tegration and the effects of eaeu law in the context where it most matters, 
namely in Member States’ legal orders. We then turn to the status of workers 
and the rights connected to this status, as well as the effects of, and exceptions 
to, the relevant fundamental freedom of eaeu law. In the first part of this ar-
ticle we focus deliberately on the aspects of the law most favourable to free 
movement.
1 The Goals of eaeu Integration and the eaeu Citizen
At first glance, the objectives of the eaeu Treaty seem to aim mostly at estab-
lishing a single market and inter- state cooperation. Article 4 of the eaeu Treaty 
sets down a number of main objectives for the Union. The provision outlines as 
its goals the creation of a common market for goods, services, capital and labour 
within the Union (point 2) as well as the comprehensive modernisation, coop-
eration and competitiveness of national economies within the global economy 
(point 3). As the first point, in contrast, the document lists the creation of con-
ditions to encourage sustainable economic development in Member States in 
order to improve the living standards of their populations. In theory at least, 
there is no obstacle to adopting a broad reading of the living standards of Mem-
ber States’ populations, and also fostering more opportunities in life for indi-
viduals, which could stretch to more extensive rights to free movement. None-
theless, the improvement of living standards is framed as a goal to be achieved 
through the tool of sustainable economic development, which emphasizes the 
need for (sustainable) economic components of the project.
Still, even if some elements of the preamble to the eaeu Treaty also point at 
a strong role for Member States11 and for economic cooperation,12 there are also 
parts that focus on the position of individuals and how the eaeu can further 
this position. Recital 2 requires “unconditional” respect for the supremacy of 
constitutional rights and freedoms of “man and national”, while recital 3 aims to 
strengthen solidarity and cooperation between the “peoples” of Member States’.
EU citizenship in the context of European economic and social integration. In: Oliveira 
Pais, ed., EU Citizenship  – Challenges and Opportunities. Porto:  Universidade Catolica 
Editora.
 11 See recital 2 on the sovereign equality of states or recital 4 on Eurasian economic integra-
tion serving the national interests of the parties.







There is thus a justification for developing a reading of provisions of eaeu 
law in light of these objectives, giving weight to the protection of the legal po-
sition of individuals not only for economic purposes, but also for their own 
sake as “man and national”, as phrased in the Treaty. The eaeu Court has been 
initially reticent towards this idea, using Article 4 of the eaeu Treaty only to 
advance the idea of the common market through teleological interpretation.13 
However, in a recent advisory opinion regarding pensions for eaeu civil ser-
vant,14 the Court showed its willingness to assume some of the functions of a 
constitutional court. Referring to the provisions stated in the preamble on the 
“unconditional respect” for the constitutional rights and freedoms of a “man 
and national”, the court interpreted that provision as follows: “the level of such 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Union shall not be lower than that en-
sured in the Member States”. This is reminiscent of the early case law of the ecj 
in Stauder15 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft16 and could thus have a sig-
nificant effect on the free movement of workers. The position of the Court here 
illustrates its willingness to draw inspiration from the national constitutions in 
the absence of an eaeu catalogue of fundamental rights, thus creating a sort 
of a general principle of eaeu law. The phrasing used by the Court also sug-
gests that instead of a minimal standard or common denominator, the Court 
will be willing to adopt the highest standard of protection that exists among 
Member States.
2 The Effects of eaeu Law
Although the Treaty itself provides no such clear indication, through its case 
law the eaeu Court has established far- reaching effects of eaeu law in the do-
mestic legal orders of Member States.17 First, the eaeu Court has determined 
 13 See, e.g. in the context of competition law, Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advi-
sory opinion of 4 April 2017, case CE- 2- 1/ 1- 17- BK, Ministry of Justice of Belarus (Vertical 
Agreements case), part iv para. 2(5).
 14 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 20 December 2018, case СЕ- 2- 
2/ 7- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Pensions case), section iii, para. 3.1. Summary 
in English available at http:// courteurasian.org/ page- 26491.
 15 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 November 1969, case 29/ 69, Stauder v.  Stadt Ulm. Cf. 
Douglas- Scott, S. (2018). The European Union and Fundamental Rights. In: Schütze and 
Tridimas, eds., Oxford Principles of European Union Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
409– 410.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 December 1970, case 11/ 70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft.
 17 For an overview of the main characteristics of eaeu law see Дьяченко Е. и Энтин К. (2018) 
Свойства права Евразийского экономического союза сквозь призму практики Суда 
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that eaeu law can have direct effect. It did so by simply stating in the Vertical 
Agreements Case18 that the provisions of Article 76 containing general rules 
of competition “had direct effect and shall be applied directly” before setting 
up the criteria for direct effect in its Opinion on Professional Athletes stating 
that, where a norm conferred rights on individuals, was sufficiently precise 
and unconditional and did not require implementation, it possessed direct “ef-
fect and applicability”.19 It thereby overruled sceptical voices in the doctrine. 
These commentators had argued that the Court was not strong enough as an 
institution to develop the principle of direct effect and “introduce it to regular 
practice”20 or that the lack of a preliminary reference procedure – and the cor-
responding lack of cooperation between the eaeu Court and national courts – 
would hamper any effective implementation of a direct effect doctrine.21
Second, after some early reticence22 the eaeu Court embraced primacy 
in its Advisory Opinion on Downsizing, holding that national legislation could 
only apply to labour relations within the limits of eaeu law within the lat-
ter’s scope, and that the point of departure was the primacy of Treaty rules.23 
However, the exact reasons for these statements on primacy were not clear. In 
the Opinion on Professional Athletes, the Court cited a question asked by the 
eecomm to directly address national courts and emphasized that in cases of 
conflict with national law, it was their duty to be guided by the provisions of 
eaeu law.24 Consequently, and based on the experience of EU law, one can 
probably legitimately assume that such primacy implies certain obligations for 
national courts regarding eaeu law, e.g. that courts have to interpret national 
 18 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 4 April 2017, case CE- 2- 1/ 1- 17- 
BK, Ministry of Justice of Belarus (Vertical Agreements case), part IV para. 2(1).
 19 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.2.
 20 Kalinichenko, P. (2017). A Principle of Direct Effect: The Eurasian Economic Union’s Court 
Pushes for More Integration. Verfassungsblog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de.
 21 Rosano, A. (2018). Wrong Way to Direct Effect?: Case Note on the Advisory Opinion of the 
Court of the Eurasian Economic Union Delivered on 4 April 2017 at the Request of the 
Republic of Belarus. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 45 (2), pp. 211– 220, 218.
 22 See the avoidance of an answer in Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, judgments 
of 28 December 2015, 3 March 2016, cases CE- 1– 2/ 2- 15- KC and CE- 1– 2/ 2– 15/ AP, Tarasik 
K.P. v. Eurasian Economic Commission and a rather implicit formula used in Court of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, judgment of 21 February 2015, case CE- 1- 1/ 1- 16- BK, Russian 
Federation v. Republic of Belarus, para. 7(4).
 23 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 12 September 2017, case CE- 
2- 2/ 1- 17- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission, para. 4(7).
 24 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
















law as much as possible in conformity with eaeu law but where this is not pos-
sible, they have to set its rules aside.25 These elements are necessary if we wish 
to understand that, independent of the scope of a worker’s status and rights 
under eaeu law, eaeu law holds powerful legal effects which can render these 
norms effective also within the national legal orders of the Member States.26
3 The Definition of a Worker
One key difference which stands out when comparing the provisions of the 
eaeu Treaty with those of tfeu is an abundance of definitions. It should be 
noted here that the authors of the EU Treaties deliberately refrained from giv-
ing definitions of notions such as “quantitative restrictions and measures hav-
ing equivalent effect” or “workers”, thus leaving it to the cjeu to fill the gaps. 
In contrast, the drafters of the eaeu Treaty preferred to avoid surprises and 
agreed on a set of definitions. In addition to a main list in Article 2 eaeu, each 
of the chapters and even each of the protocols have its own list of definitions. 
This approach can be partly explained by the legislative tradition of the eaeu 
Member States.27 Even more importantly, however, the eaeu Treaty can be 
seen as a codification of a number of existing treaties in the framework of the 
customs union and the single economic area.
According to Article 96(5) eaeu, to qualify as a worker under eaeu law a 
person must be “a national of a Member State lawfully residing and lawfully 
engaged in labour activities in the state of employment, of which he or she is 
not a national and where he or she does not permanently reside”.28 Thus, un-
der eaeu law, to be a worker means exercising a labour activity, i.e. an activity 
 25 Pirker, B. and Entin, K. (2019). Bosman’s Second Life, cit., 141.
 26 See on the direct effect of the free movement of workers provisions in EU law e.g. Court 
of Justice, judgment of 15 October 1969, case 15/ 69, Ugliola. In recent literature see gen-
erally e.g. Nihoul, P.  (2018). Effet direct et protection des citoyens. In:  Paschalidis and 
Wildemeersch, eds., L’Europe au présent!:  liber amicorum Melchior Wathelet. Brussels: 
Bruylant.
 27 See on the role of definitions in Russian law:  Таева, Н. (2016). Дефиниции в 
конституционном законодательстве. Lex Russica 3 (112), pp.  153– 163; Вопленко 
Н., Давыдова М. (2001). Правовые дефиниции в современном российском 
законодательстве. Вестник Нижегородского государственного университета им. 
Н.И. Лобачевского 1, pp. 64– 71.
 28 See on the need for this cross- border element in EU law e.g. Court of Justice, judgment 
of 16 December 2004, case C- 293/ 03, My, para. 40; in recent literature e.g. Wollenschläger, 
F. (2015). Binnenmarktrelevanz statt grenzüberschreitender Aktivität – die Rs. Belgacom 
als Neujustierung in der Dogmatik der Grundfreiheiten. In: Stumpf et al, eds., Privatrecht, 
Wirtschaftsrecht, Verfassungsrecht  – Privatinitiative und Gemeinwohlhorizonte in der 










The Free Movement of Persons in the Eurasian Economic Union 515
performed under an employment contract, or to perform works (services) 
under a civil law contract “in accordance with the legislation” of the relevant 
Member State.
Compared to cjeu case law such an approach appears to be much more 
formalistic. The cjeu has recognised that the main feature of an employment 
relationship is that “for a certain period of time a person performs services 
for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration”.29 Thus for the cjeu, a person may be considered a worker even 
without a work contract30 provided that they can demonstrate that their ac-
tivity is “effective and genuine”.31 The eaeu Court, by contrast, is bound by 
the definition contained in Article 96(5). Thus, when confronted with the 
question of whether professional sports are to be considered employment, the 
Court examined the relevant national laws of the Member States and ascer-
tained that in all Member States, relations between players and professional 
sport clubs are governed by working contracts.32 This, however, should not be 
misunderstood as a sign that the autonomy of notions of eaeu law was being 
abandoned which would mean that such notions could be defined by national 
law in whichever way a Member State sees fit. In EU law, the cjeu similarly 
partly defers to national definitions, partly imposes limits of EU law on such 
definitions.33 In eaeu law it is currently unclear to what extent in the future 
the eaeu Court will defer to national definitions or impose limits of eaeu law 
in certain extreme cases.34
The main advantage of the eaeu approach to legal definitions is that it sim-
plifies the work of national courts and limits the discretion of national author-
ities which do not have the possibility to oppose the validity of a person’s rights 
on the grounds that their work is not genuine or effective. On the other hand, 
 29 See Court of Justice, judgment of 3 July 198, case 66/ 85, Lawrie- Blum. Reiterated in judg-
ment of 17 July 2008, case C- 94/ 07, Raccanelli, para. 33. On the notion(s) of workers in 
EU law see e.g. Ziegler, K.  (2011). Arbeitnehmerbegriffe im Europäischen Arbeitsrecht. 
Baden- Baden: Nomos.
 30 See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 1974, case 152/ 73, Sotgiu 
v. Deutsche Bundespost.
 31 See Court of Justice, judgment of 23 March 1982, case 53/ 81, Levin v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie, paras. 17, 18.
 32 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.3.
 33 See e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 5 October 2010, case C- 400/ 10 PPU, McB, para. 52; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 24 April 2012, case C- 571/ 10, Kamberaj, para. 80. See gener-
ally Pirker B., Entin K. (2019). Legal Issues of Economic Integration, cit, p. 144– 145.
 34 In the sense of an eaeu law based margin of discretion granted to the Member States in 














one could argue that this places a heavy emphasis on the legal character of the 
relevant activities, meaning that those working without the necessary docu-
ments are not able to invoke the Treaty provisions.
Another obvious problem with the definition of a “worker” given in the Trea-
ty is that it seems to limit the scope of this term to those who are temporarily 
residing in the Member State where they are working. Does this mean that 
once a person obtains the right of permanent residence in a Member State he 
or she is automatically excluded from the scope of the Treaty? Such a narrow 
reading seems to clash with the Treaty objectives. Furthermore, the definition 
of the “state of permanent residence” in Article 96(5) defines that state as the 
one of the nationality of the relevant worker, effectively equating permanent 
residence and nationality. Thus, it does not appear that the authors of Treaty 
intended to exclude a category of people, namely permanent residents, from 
the scope of the Treaty. Rather, it can be assumed that the emphasis put on the 
temporary character of residence is meant to underline that the Treaty does 
not create a right to permanent residence and that Member States are to out-
line the conditions for obtaining this right in their national legislation. In the 
EU, by contrast, the right to remain in a Member State after having been em-
ployed in that state was introduced as early as 1970 with regard to workers and 
their family members.35 The preamble of the relevant regulation stated that 
this right represents a corollary to the right of residence acquired by workers 
in active employment.
Finally, what can be said about cross- border workers? The ecj had no difficul-
ty in extending the social advantages and the principle of non- discrimination 
to cross- border workers, including in the field of taxation.36 However, a similar 
step would require considerably more effort from the eaeu Court in order to 
overcome the inherent limitation of the Treaty definitions.
4 Rights Granted to the Worker
Once a person is considered a worker under eaeu law, what rights does this 
confer? Residence and entry rights under the eaeu Treaty are rather limit-
ed. The right to residence based on the provisions of eaeu law is bound to 
 35 See Regulation (eec) No 1251/ 70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of work-
ers to remain in the territory of a Member State. OJ L 142, 30.6.1970, p. 24– 26.
 36 See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 14 February 1995, case C- 279/ 93, 
Schumacker, where the Court interpreted the Treaty provision on the free movement of 
workers as precluding a provision of national legislation making annual adjustment of 
deductions at source available only to residents, thereby excluding natural persons who 
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the duration of the employment contract at hand.37 There is  – somewhat 
implicitly – a right of entry and the right not to register for the first 30 days 
in the territory of the state of employment, inasmuch as there is such a re-
quirement to register under national law.38 Although the objective of these 
provisions is not expressly mentioned, it seems that the period of 30 days is 
meant to allow job seekers to look for work without undertaking additional 
formalities. One could note that even before the introduction of EU citizen-
ship the right for jobseekers to arrive and stay in a Member State existed 
in EU law, although the precise duration was not laid down expressly.39 In 
eaeu law, terms of the treaty suggest that entry can only occur “for employ-
ment”, seemingly precluding them being applied to other purposes of stay. 
There are, in addition, certain alleviations for Member State nationals en-
tering other Member States for purposes “provided for by the legislation” of 
that state.40
The right to stay in a Member State of employment is prolonged by 15 days 
if 90 days have expired since the date of entry of the worker and if an employ-
ment contract is terminated early. In that case, the worker can stay only if they 
enter into a new employment contract within 15 days.41 Implicitly, these pro-
visions seem to suggest that the right of residence is otherwise limited to the 
duration of the employment contract and this impression is further reinforced 
by the definition of a worker as discussed above.
Access to employment is also facilitated. Based on Article 98(1) eaeu Treaty 
a worker has the right to engage in professional activities in accordance with 
his/ her specialisation and qualifications, including the right to have relevant 
degrees and certificates recognised in accordance with the treaty and the 
 37 Art. 97(5) eaeu Treaty.
 38 Art. 97(6) eaeu Treaty. See on such (permissible) requirements Art. 8 Directive 68/ 360/ 
EEC, OJ 1968 L 257, 13 ff., as the predecessor norm before the right of stay for three months 
was granted without any such requirement by Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, OJ 2004 L 158, 77 ff.
 39 See on the permissibility of a six- months period Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 
1991, case C- 292/ 89, Antonissen, para. 21.On the end of the status of a worker under EU 
law generally see e.g. Pirker, B.  (2014). Zum Verlust der Arbeitnehmereigenschaft im 
Freizügigkeitsabkommen. Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 23 (9), pp. 1217– 1225.
 40 In essence, when a Member State national enters another Member State, normally they 
have to use a migration card; but if their stay does not exceed 30 days and they use a suit-
able document for affixing marks of border control authorities, they do not have to use 
such a card, Art. 97(7) and (8) eaeu Treaty.












legislation of the employment state.42 Employers may hire workers from oth-
er Member States without considering restrictions for the protection of the 
national labour market; workers must not be required to obtain employment 
permits.43
Workers also have protections once employed. With regard to social secu-
rity, workers have a right to non- discrimination vis- à- vis nationals of the state 
where they are employed although pensions are excluded and are instead 
governed by the legislation of the state of permanent residence and by a sep-
arate international treaty between the Member States.44 Such a treaty, the 
Agreement on the provision of pensions for workers, has been signed during 
a meeting of the Supreme Council in St Petersburg in December 2019 but has 
not entered into force yet. The agreement grants workers the same status as 
nationals with regard to the conditions for fixing and paying pensions and the 
possibility to export some of their pension rights. This will allow workers to 
have their work experience abroad counted and grant them the possibility to 
receive their pension in another state.
Workers’ rights to emergency medical care and other types of medical 
treatment are also regulated partly in the Treaty, partly by the legislation of 
the country where they are employed and partly by applicable international 
 treaties.45
Workers are entitled to receive information on the conditions of their stay 
and employment and their rights and obligations as provided by the legislation 
of the country where they are employed, both from the state and the employer 
as the addressee.46 Upon request, workers are also entitled to a certificate from 
the employer indicating their profession and position(s), the period of employ-
ment and wages as determined by the legislation of the state of  employment.47
Which measures fall within the scope of the legal protections that work-
ers enjoy under eaeu law? The eaeu Court had the opportunity to interpret 
the law in the Professional Athletes case. Based on its earlier definition of a 
 42 See also Art. 97(3) eaeu Treaty. See in EU law Directive 2005/ 36/ EC, OJ 2005 L 255, 22 ff., 
and in the case law: Court of Justice, judgment of 7 May 1991, case C- 340/ 89, Vlassopoulou, 
para 14. In the literature, see e.g. Claessens, S. and Schneider, H. (2005). The Recognition of 
Diplomas and the Free Movement of Professionals in the European Union. In: Schneider, 
ed., Migration, Integration and Citizenship. Maastricht: Forum; Gammenthaler, N. (2010). 
Diplomanerkennung und Freizügigkeit. Zurich/ Basel/ Genf: Schulthess.
 43 Art. 97(1) eaeu Treaty.
 44 Art. 98(3) eaeu Treaty.
 45 Art. 98(4) eaeu Treaty.
 46 Art. 98(6) eaeu Treaty.
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worker, the Court held that restrictions would fall within the scope of the 
Treaty if they affected the employment activity of the people in question.48 
In the context of sports, this meant that restrictions concerning sporting 
matters exclusively seemed not to fall within the Treaty.49 A classic example 
would be rules on the composition of national teams that should not be af-
fected by eaeu law.50
When asked what kind of measures fell within this scope, the eaeu Court 
decided based on the indicative wording of the Treaty, but also based on in-
spiration from the cjeu’s case law,51 that restrictions as well as discriminatory 
measures could be scrutinised under the Treaty. For the Court, restrictions were 
defined as measures which preclude or deter the nationals of eaeu Member 
States from exercising their right to work in another Member State, including 
working conditions,52 but also e.g. access restrictions influencing employment 
prospects or residence- based restrictions.53
5 Horizontal Effect, Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust
To some extent at least, the fundamental freedom of movement of workers also 
has a horizontal effect. In the Professional Athletes case, the eaeu Court found 
that Articles 97(1) and (2) eaeu Treaty were not only applicable to State author-
ities, but also to sports organizations as the employers of professional athletes. 
Restrictions could thus be laws, acts below the level of a law or local acts of 
 48 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.3. Whereas 
the text of Article 45 tfeu points in the direction of a prohibition of discrimination, the 
cjeu has clarified through its case law that both restrictions and discriminatory measures 
are covered by the provision, see e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 17 March 2005, case 
C- 109/ 04, Kranemann, paras. 25– 26.
 49 See for such a restrictive approach also the earlier case law of the cjeu, e.g. Court of 
Justice, judgment of 12 December 1974, case 36/ 74, Walrave and Koch, para. 4. In its later 
case law, the Court narrowed down this exception and seems to perceive most restrictions 
concerning sporting matters as also falling within the scope of the Treaty, although they 
can be justified on legitimate reasons if they are proportionate, see e.g. Court of Justice, 
judgment of 11 April 2000, case C- 51/ 96, Deliège, para. 43. See also Muresan, R.  (2010). 
Ausnahmen von den EU- Grundfreiheiten im Bereich des Sports nach der “Deliège”- 
Konzeption. Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn.
 50 Pirker, B. and Entin, K. (2019). Bosman’s Second Life, cit., 138.
 51 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 1995, case C- 415/ 93, Bosman, para. 96.
 52 See in EU law Art. 7(1) and (2) Regulation 492/ 11 on “conditions of employment and work” 
and “social and tax advantages”.
 53 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case 
CE- 2- 2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.4. 















responsible organizations.54 If we compare this to the situation in EU law, at least 
for now the eaeu Court has not gone as far as the cjeu in relation to the free 
movement of workers, as the latter has established far- reaching horizontal effect 
for private employers in relation to discriminatory measures.55 The approach of 
the eaeu Court is, however, comparable to the cjeu’s in relation to other fun-
damental freedoms, where the latter court similarly focused on private actors 
with a certain collective regulatory power.56 There also does not seem to be any 
obvious reason why the eaeu Court could not follow a similar reasoning to that 
of the cjeu, namely deciding that without such an effect, private obstacles could 
be re- established where Member State measures have been struck down.57
Traces of mutual recognition and mutual trust can also be detected in the 
eaeu Court’s case law on other fundamental freedoms, for example in a case 
where customs authorities were required under eaeu law to refrain from tak-
ing unilateral decisions on documents issued by the authorities of another 
Member State.58
6 Exceptions to the Free Movement of Persons in eaeu Law
Art. 97(2) eaeu Treaty prescribes strict limits regarding the exceptions to free 
movement provisions. Member State measures must be aimed at ensuring na-
tional security including in economic sectors of strategic importance and pub-
lic order. In its relevant case law, the Court remained rather succinct.59 Note, 
nonetheless, that the list of possible restrictions in the Treaty is shorter and un-
like EU law does not mention public health.60 Nothing seems to preclude the 
eaeu Court from engaging in an exercise similar to that of the cjeu and the 
 54 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.5.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 June 2000, case C- 281/ 98, Angonese.
 56 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 December 1974, case 36/ 74, Walrave; judgment of 12 July 
2012, case C- 171/ 11, Fra.bo; judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 438/ 05, Viking; judgment 
of 18 December 2007, case C- 341/ 05, Laval. On the debate over the horizontal effect of fun-
damental freedoms and its variations in the case law in EU law see e.g. Müller- Graff, P.- C. 
(2014). Die horizontale Direktwirkung der Grundfreiheiten. Europarecht 16 (1), pp. 3– 29; 
Kainer, F. (2015). Die Gewährleistung von Privatautonomie im Spannungsfeld horizontaler 
Wirkung von Grundfreiheiten und Grundrechten in der Europäischen Union: Eine Skizze. 
In: Stumpf et al, eds., Privatrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Verfassungsrecht – Privatinitiative und 
Gemeinwohlhorizonte in der europäischen Integration. Baden- Baden: Nomos.
 57 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 March 2010, case C- 325/ 08, Olympique Lyonnais, para. 31.
 58 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, judgment of 21 February 2015, case CE- 1- 1/ 1- 16- BK, 
Russian Federation v. Republic of Belarus, para. 3(5).
 59 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory Opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para. iii.5.
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EU legislature in precisely outlining the possible grounds for (and elements 
to be taken into account in) expulsion decisions, for example.61 The inclusion 
of “economic sectors of strategic importance” in the concept of public securi-
ty, however, is rather puzzling. While the EU has settled case law stating that 
Member States are allowed to restrict the admission of foreign nationals to 
certain activities in public services,62 the term ‘economic sectors of strategic 
importance’ is extremely broad and seems to leave a wide margin of discretion 
for the eaeu Member States when determining such spheres. In this situation 
it will be up to the eecomm and the Court to prevent possible abuses by re-
quiring Member States to demonstrate a genuine link between the chosen eco-
nomic sector and national security. One possible example could be the energy 
field where a direct link between energy and security has been established in 
cjeu case law on the free movement of goods.63 Safeguarding a secure energy 
supply in case of a crisis has also been recognized as a ground of public securi-
ty by the ecj in the well- known “golden shares” cases.64
More extensive reasoning on exceptions to fundamental freedoms enshrined 
in the eaeu Treaty can be borrowed from the context of the free movement of 
goods. Faced with a case on Article 29(1) and (3) of the Treaty, the eaeu Court 
 61 See in EU law with regard to EU citizens Articles 27 to 29 Directive 2004/ 38; in the (com-
prehensive) jurisprudence see Court of Justice, judgment of 4 December 1974, case 41/ 
74, Van Duyn; judgment of 28 October 1975, case 36/ 75, Rutili; judgment of 27 October 
1977, case 30/ 77, Bouchereau; judgment of 19 January 1999, case C- 348/ 96, Calfa; judg-
ment of 29 April 2004, cases C- 482/ 01 and C- 493/ 01, Orfanopoulos; judgment of 23 
November 2010, case C- 145/ 09, Tsakouridis; judgment of 22 May 201, case C- 348/ 09, 
P.I.  v.  Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid. See also e.g. Kochenov, D.  and Pirker, 
B.  (2013). Deporting the Citizens within the Union? A Counter- Intuitive Trend in Case 
C- 348/ 09, P.I. v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid. Columbia Journal of European 
Law pp. 369– 390; Meduna, M. (2017). “Scelestus europeus sum”: what protection against 
expulsion does EU citizenship offer to European offenders? In:  Kochenov, ed., EU 
Citizenship and Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 62 See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 1974, case 152/ 73, Sotgiu.
 63 See Court of Justice, judgment of 10 July 1984, case 72/ 83, Campus Oil. For a broader reflec-
tion in this context see Leal- Arcas, R. and Filis, A. (2013). Conceptualizing EU energy secu-
rity through an EU constitutional law perspective. Fordham International Law Journal 36 
(5), pp. 1225– 1301.
 64 See Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2011, case C- 212/ 09, Commission v. Portugal; 
judgment of 4 June 2002, case C- 503/ 99, Commission v.  Belgium. In the literature, see 
Gallo, D.  (2018). On the content and scope of national and European solidarity under 
free movement rules:  The case of golden shares and sovereign investments. In:  Biondi 
et  al, eds., Solidarity in EU Law  – Legal Principle in the Making. Cheltenham:  Edward 
Elgar; Apel, M. (2017). Golden Shares: Eine rechtsdogmatische Untersuchung der primär-
rechtlichen Zulässigkeit regulatorischer sowie privater Sonderrechte an Unternehmen unter 










developed its reasoning in that context. Article 29 of the eaeu Treaty is similar 
to Article 36 of the tfeu and allows Member States to impose restrictions on 
mutual trade for the protection of fundamental interests such as human life 
and health, public morals and public order or the environment, provided that 
such restrictions do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States. The eaeu Court took 
inspiration from cjeu case law65 and held that Member States could indeed 
impose such restrictions, but that their discretion was limited. First, the mea-
sures they adopted had to pursue one of the interests laid down in Article 29(1) 
and these interests had to be narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the princi-
ple of free movement. Second, the eaeu Court repeated that restrictions could 
not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade and 
held that they had to be proportionate.66 Proportionality has also made its ap-
pearance in other situations,67 which might lead one to wonder whether we 
are witnessing the emergence of a general principle of the eaeu legal order.68
Moreover, some clues can also be taken from case law on the free movement 
of workers. The eaeu Court reaffirmed that government measures need to be 
proportionate, i.e. they should facilitate the achievement of the objectives pro-
vided in Article 97(2) eaeu and should be limited to actions which are neces-
sary for the achievement of such objectives.69 While the Court did not express-
ly address the possibility of using justifications not explicitly laid down in the 
Treaty, the jurisprudence of the cjeu which it cited70 seems to indicate that 
the eaeu Court would be willing to accept justifications based on the social 
function of sports71 – though probably not in the case of discriminatory mea-
sures.72 Such an approach would be preferable to simply excluding different 
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 January 1977, case 46/ 76, Bauhuis; Judgment of 20 May 
1976, case 104/ 75, de Peijper.
 66 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 30 October 2017, case CE- 2- 2/ 
2- 17- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Free Movement of Goods Restrictions).
 67 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Ministry of national economy of Kazakhstan (Movement of Currency across the 
EAEU Customs Border), para. iv.7.
 68 Pirker B., Entin K. (2019). Legal Issues of Economic Integration, cit, p. 147.
 69 Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, advisory opinion of 7 December 2018, case CE- 2- 
2/ 5- 18- BK, Eurasian Economic Commission (Professional Athletes case), para iii.5.
 70 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 1995, case C- 415/ 93, Bosman; judgment of 16 
March 2010, case C- 325/ 08, Olympique Lyonnais.
 71 For instance, the objective of recruiting and training young players.
 72 See for this approach in EU law e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 26 May 2016, case C- 300/ 
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rules from the scope of the Treaty since it would allow the Court to have more 
room for manoeuvre through the application of the proportionality test.
All in all, we can see that, despite obvious similarities between EU and eaeu 
law many questions remain, notably regarding the concept of “economic sec-
tors of strategic importance” and the possibility of using grounds of justifica-
tion other than those laid down in the Treaties.
7 Interim Conclusion
So far, so good? At first glance, eaeu law does not seem very different from the 
EU legal regime, at least in the case of workers. eaeu law has broad goals that 
could accommodate interpretations furthering the position of a “Civis Eurasi-
aticus” under eaeu law; it has potential direct effect and is vested with prima-
cy towards national law. Although the definition of a worker contains some 
inherent limitations, nothing prevents the eaeu Court from interpreting the 
concept broadly in order to establish an ultimately autonomous definition in 
eaeu law and fend off national attempts to undermine eaeu law’s effective-
ness with competing, narrow definitions. The bundle of rights granted to those 
who hold the status of a worker will sound familiar to an EU lawyer’s ear. Even 
though rights of entry and residence are very closely linked to employment 
contracts, a worker will be protected through non- discrimination obligations 
while only measures justified by important public interests in a proportion-
ate manner may restrict access to employment and employment conditions. 
We can thus ask whether the “Eurasiaticus” status is thus simply the reduced 
“Homo Oeconomicus” version of the status of the “Civis Europaeus”. Or, in other 
words, is this the pre- citizenship market citizen without any of the political 
ambitions surrounding the EU citizenship project?
iv The Status of Family Members of a Worker – … You May Bring Your 
Family, Get Comfortable …
Now if we accept that the status of eaeu workers somewhat resembles that of 
workers in EU law before the advent of EU citizenship, the provisions for the 
family members of workers are also somewhat logical given the story told so 
far. Namely, there are a number of protections that ensure that at least some 
relatives of a worker can come with him or her.
Regarding the definition, family members are defined as the spouse of a 
worker, their dependent children and other members of their families. To de-
fine these other family members, eaeu law refers to such persons being rec-




of employment.73 One may wonder how broad or narrow the designation of 
the circle of beneficiaries could be made by Member States following this del-
egation rule. Merely based on the wording, national legislation appears to be 
free to not define any additional family members who would then enjoy rights 
under eaeu law. Nonetheless, if we take into account the individual rights- 
friendly preamble of the Treaty, there is also good reason to favour an obliga-
tion of Member States to define family members under eaeu law based on the 
required “unconditional” respect for constitutional rights and freedoms, which 
could be read as including e.g. a right to family life.
There is also no indication as to the nationality of family members, mean-
ing that third country nationals can also enjoy the protections of eaeu law 
as family members.74 When they fall within the definition, family members 
have the same rights of entry and residence as the worker in question.75 The 
express requirement to register after 30 days if so provided by national law is 
also applicable to family members. Family members of a worker also have the 
same status as a worker with regard to the right to property and to free transfer 
of funds, social security and emergency medical care mentioned above.76 Chil-
dren of a worker residing with that worker have the right to attend pre- school 
institutions and receive education.77 The question is left open as to whether 
they can also rely on the protection of the worker from discrimination with 
regard to working conditions such as social advantages.78 Notably, there is also 
 73 Art. 96(5) eaeu Treaty.
 74 This silence leaves open, however, also certain questions that have come up in EU law. 
E.g., the cjeu had to decide (and reverse earlier case law) that a third country national 
does not have to reside legally in an EU Member State before relying on his or her rights of 
entry and residence under EU law, Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 
08, Metock, para. 54. In EU law, see also generally Berneri, C. (2017). Family reunification 
in the EU: the movement and residence rights of third country national family members 
of EU citizens. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
 75 Art. 97(6) eaeu Treaty.
 76 Art. 98(2), (3) and (4) eaeu Treaty.
 77 Art. 98(8) eaeu Treaty. If we take EU law as guidance, this includes professional educa-
tion, see Article 10 Regulation 492/ 2011. According to the cjeu, this access to education 
must not be restricted merely to those under 21 years of age or to children for whom a 
worker provides, Court of Justice, judgment of 4 May 1995, case C- 7/ 94, Gaal, para. 25. In 
EU law, see also Gori, G. (2017). Mademoiselle Gravier and equal access to education: suc-
cess and boundaries of European integration. In:  Fernanda and Davies, eds., EU Law 
Stories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 78 In EU law at least, the cjeu moved from an earlier negative stance (Court of Justice, judg-
ment of 11 April 1973, case 76/ 72, Michel S., paras. 6 and 10) towards a positive stance (Court 
of Justice, judgment of16 December 1976, case 63/ 76, Inzirillo, paras. 18 and 21), arguing 
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no specific worker status under eaeu law for persons as family members in 
the Treaty.79
In sum, eaeu law takes a broadly similar approach to EU law. It defines a 
core group of family members and provides them with somewhat parallel pro-
tections to the worker whose family they are a part of. In numerous respects, it 
does not go as far as EU law. Overall, it seems to pursue, however, an idea sim-
ilar to EU law that the right to family is part of a worker’s legal protections in 
the context of free movement. The fact that eaeu law contains these explicit 
provisions can be read as a further indication that a broad, rights- based read-
ing of the legal regime as a whole is both possible and plausible.80
v The Limitations of the eaeu Worker Status – … but Not Too 
Comfortable!
Of course, in any story as linear as the present one there must come a twist. 
So far we have noted quite a remarkable convergence between eaeu law and 
the early stages of EU law concerning the free movement of workers before 
the advent of EU citizenship, but we now need to take into account certain 
differences.
1 The Obligation to Respect the “Culture and Tradition” of the 
Member State
The first element of difference is that under eaeu law, the position of a worker 
is not only defined by its rights. Article 98 is named “rights and obligations 
of a worker”. An express provision of the Treaty requires workers and their 
family members to comply with the legislation of their country of employ-
ment, respect the “culture and tradition” of that state and be liable for offenc-
es under the latter’s legislation.81 The first and the last point seem somewhat 
Member State could thereby deny family members the social advantages it grants to its 
own citizens (Court of Justice, judgment of 20 June 1985, case 94/ 84 ONEM, para. 23).
 79 Like in EU law, this is mostly relevant for third country family members, as eaeu citizens 
can themselves rely on the Treaty protections as workers if they fulfil the necessary con-
ditions, see in EU law Article 23 Directive 2004/ 38.
 80 On the complex relationship between citizenship and (fundamental) rights in the EU 
context see in recent literature e.g. van den Brink, M. (2019). EU citizenship and (funda-
mental) rights:  Empirical, normative, and conceptual problems. European Law Journal 
25 (1), pp.  21– 36; Yong, A.  (2019). The Rise and Decline of Fundamental Rights in EU 
Citizenship. Oxford: Hart Publishing.










superfluous, as the eaeu Treaty does not exempt eaeu workers and their fam-
ily members from compliance with national law nor national criminal law ju-
risdiction, unless there is a conflict with eaeu law in which case the primacy 
of the latter applies.
With regard to the second point of Article 98, it remains questionable to 
what extent binding legal obligations can be distilled from this vague phrase 
in daily legal practice. However, such obligations do not appear unthinkable. 
In particular, one could ask whether this clause can be read as a restriction 
of rights granted by eaeu law. We have only to think of cases where workers 
are to be expelled, for example because of criminal offences that they have 
committed.82 Crimes seen as violations of particularly important values of the 
culture and tradition of a Member State could thus be treated as particularly 
virulent threats to public order and security, and facilitate a path to expelling 
eaeu workers. The vagueness of the provision is thus disconcerting in light 
of such potentially far- reaching effects. How could an individual predict what 
crimes would be covered, and thus fully appreciate the possible consequences 
of wrongdoing? Moreover, even beyond the scope of eaeu law Member States 
may feel encouraged by the “culture and tradition” clause to restrict eaeu citi-
zens’ legal position in areas where they are free to regulate as they see fit.
2 The Non- Integration Rationale of the Free Movement of Workers 
under eaeu Law
While somewhat disconcerting, the “culture and tradition” clause is not the 
most striking limitation to the rights and status of an eaeu worker. There is no 
sign of anything comparable to the right of permanent residence introduced 
in EU law by Directive 2004/ 3883 or even its precursors which granted the right 
of permanent residence in certain constellations for workers remaining in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State.84 Rather, 
Article 96(5) eaeu Treaty provides as part of the definition of an eaeu worker 
that such a worker must be lawfully residing in the state of employment, but 
must not permanently reside there.
What eaeu law does here therefore seems to be an equation between the 
citizenship of a Member State and permanent residence in that state. As shown 
above, in doing so it does not seem that the intent of those who drafted the 
eaeu Treaty was to deny workers permanently residing in a Member State the 
rights guaranteed by the Treaty, although this might be the impression given 
 82 See on this point in more detail section iii.6.
 83 Article 16 Directive 2004/ 38.








The Free Movement of Persons in the Eurasian Economic Union 527
by the Treaty at a quick glance. This view is seemingly shared by the eaeu 
Court, for in the Professional Athletes case the Court did not limit its findings 
to the players who are not permanently residing in the state of employment. 
However, the choice of words here was particularly unfortunate as it makes 
clear that, like the modalities of granting and revoking citizenship, the regula-
tion of permanent residence also remains part of the exclusive competence of 
the Member States. The latter are hence free to provide the right to permanent 
residence after a certain amount of time, often based on bilateral agreements 
between Member States, or to deny such a right altogether. Effectively this 
means that neither the eecomm through its decisions, nor Member States by 
way of an international agreement within the Union, will be able to provide 
such a right for workers since this would automatically clash with the provi-
sions of the eaeu Treaty.
This approach appears to be particularly antagonistic towards integra-
tion: the goal is to allow the free movement of workers, but without the pros-
pect of gaining permanent residence. At the same time, it appears to be the 
exact opposite approach to how EU citizenship has evolved more recently. In 
EU law, by contrast, the cjeu found that even the regulation of the acquisition 
and loss of national citizenship were within the scope of EU law85 and that 
certain EU citizenship rights gained based on the exercise of free movement 
could even be retained after an EU citizen has been naturalized in his/ her host 
Member State.86
In light of this, the purpose of the protections granted to family members 
is difficult to explain based on this non- integration rationale of eaeu law. The 
fact that it is impossible to truly become part of the society of the Member 
State through a permanently settled residence status is clearly counter to the 
rights of family members to join the eaeu worker, to receive education and so 
forth, as their presence arguably reinforces the need to provide for some per-
spective of permanent integration into the host eaeu Member State.
Moreover, the requirement that workers respect the culture and traditions 
of their host nation must also be read in conjunction with the lack of an inte-
gration rationale of the status of eaeu workers. If eaeu law offers no prospect 
 85 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2010, Case C- 135/ 08, Rottmann; Judgment of 12 
March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes. For a skeptical assessment of the latter case, see 
Kochenov, D. (2019). The Tjebbes Fail. European Papers 4 (1), pp. 319– 336.
 86 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C- 165/ 16, Lounes. For a discussion of 
the case see e.g. Réveillère, V. (2018). Family rights for naturalized EU citizens: Lounes: case 
C- 165/ 16, Toufik Lounes v.  Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2017:862, 
judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 14 November 2017. Common Market 






of permanent residence, this respect clause can hardly be understood as an 
encouragement to truly engage with or integrate into the culture and tradition 
of the state of employment. Rather, it seems to subordinate the eaeu work-
er’s own culture and tradition and to cement the idea that under eaeu law, a 
transitional worker is not here to stay. Integration of such workers and their 
engagement with the local tradition and culture seems to be perceived thus 
rather as a threat than as desirable in any true sense of the term.
vi The (Long and Winding) Alternative Road towards Citizenship: the 
Experience of the Citizenship of the “Union state” of Russia- 
Belarus as a Source of Hope?
Rather than conclude on such a sombre note, an excursion into a related field 
of law can shed some additional light on the topic of free movement rights in 
the larger eaeu context. A somewhat limited attempt to create a supranation-
al citizenship has taken place within the framework of the “Union state” of 
Russia- Belarus.87 The Treaty on the creation of a “Union state” was concluded 
in December 1999 and came into force on January 26, 2000.88 It proclaimed 
“a new stage in the process of the unification of the peoples of the two coun-
tries”. Article 6 of the treaty states that Member states, while voluntarily vest-
ing some powers into the Union State, shall retain sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity, state structure, their constitution, state flags, coats of arms, 
and other attributes of statehood.
Chapter 2 of the Treaty is devoted to Union citizenship. Article 14(1) pro-
claims that the citizens of one of the Member States are at the same time citi-
zens of the Union state. It thus establishes a direct link between national and 
Union citizenship, an impression further reinforced by the statements that it 
is impossible to become a citizen of the Union state without obtaining the 
citizenship of one of the Member States.89 The provisions referring to citi-
zens’ rights are not very detailed as from the start the parties were commit-
ted to adopting further legal acts in that regard.90 Article 14(5) proclaims the 
 87 For a detailed analysis see Смирнова, Е. (2014). “Гражданство Союзного государст
ва Беларуси и России во временном контексте: заявление о намерении или перс
пектива реальной интеграции?” – рассуждение правоведа в аспекте региональной 
компаративистики. Евразийский юридический журнал. 5 (72), pp. 34– 39.
 88 Treaty on the establishment of the Union State, Moscow 8 December 1999, 2121UNTS 13.
 89 Article 14(4) of the Treaty on the Union state.
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principle of equality with respect to citizens’ rights and obligations, which is 
highly reminiscent of Article 9 teu. The effectiveness of this principle, how-
ever, appears rather limited since it is not further reinforced by a general 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality.91 This principle 
was further developed in two separate legal acts. The first is a 1996 decision 
of the Supreme Council of the Belarus and Russia Community on workers’ 
rights which proclaims that workers enjoy equal rights with regard to remu-
neration, working time and rest, working conditions and work protection as 
well as other issues of work relations.92 In this regard the Union state basical-
ly paved the way for the regulation that was created in the framework of the 
eaeu. Contrary to what some authors assume,93 it does not seem that Russian 
workers in Belarus and workers from Belarus in Russia enjoy any privileged 
status or possess any additional rights as compared to other Member States’ 
nationals. The second is a 2006 treaty guaranteeing equal rights to the citizens 
of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus regarding free move-
ment and free choice of temporary and permanent residence on the territory 
of the Union state’s members (hereafter – St. Petersburg Treaty). The St. Pe-
tersburg Treaty provides that citizens are allowed to stay in the host state for 
up to 90 days without registration94 and gives them the possibility to directly 
apply for a permanent residence permit without needing to take on temporary 
residence status first.95 This seems quite advanced even compared to EU law.96 
The list of restrictions to the rights of free movement and free choice of a place 
for temporary or permanent residence is, however, wider than in either EU or 
eaeu law and alongside the traditional grounds of public security, public or-
der, public health and public morality it also includes the necessity to “protect 
the rights and freedoms of the citizens”.97
The treaty on the Union state also includes some political rights including 
the right to elect and be elected in the Parliament of the Union state and to 
work in the Union states bodies.98 What is even more interesting is a clause 
 91 Similar to Art. 18 tfeu.
 92 Decision No.4 of 22 June 1996 “On equal rights of the citizens with regard to access to 
work, remuneration and other social work- related guarantees”, para 2.
 93 See Абдуллаев, Э. (2016). Особенности правового регулирования трудовой 
миграции в странах ЕАЭС на современном этапе, Современная научная мысль 2, 
pp. 217– 224, 223.
 94 Art. 3 of the St. Petersburg treaty.
 95 Art. 4 of the St. Petersburg treaty.
 96 Art.16(1) of Directive 2004/ 38 grants a right of permanent residence for Union citizens 
who have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State.
 97 Art. 5 of the St. Petersburg treaty.

















on mutual diplomatic and consular protection of the Union citizens in third 
countries.99
Thus, the Union citizenship falls short of granting citizens a general right to non- 
discrimination and essentially contains similar provisions to eaeu law in relation 
to workers. However, it also contains some important rights with regard to free 
movement including the possibility to directly apply for a permanent residence 
permit based solely on one’s citizenship. It remains to be seen whether these provi-
sions could be used as a source of inspiration for the eaeu. So far, given the purely 
economic focus of the eaeu and the unwillingness of the Member States to move 
in the direction of a political union, such an evolution seems unlikely.
Another hypothesis could be that of a gradual spill- over. As some authors have 
pointed out, in many ways the Maastricht Treaty and the Citizens’ Rights Direc-
tive represented a de facto codification of pre- existing case law. In this regard it 
has been argued that “a citizenship- like status represented a natural spill- over 
accompanying the maturation of the internal market”.100 Would such a spill- over 
and an emergence of a quasi- citizenship be possible for the eaeu? The inclusion 
of certain rights for economically inactive migrants like family members and 
job seekers certainly seem like steps in this direction. On the other hand, these 
advances are mostly negated by the non- integration logic of the eaeu Treaty 
which tends to view workers merely as a factor of production and does not even 
go as far as granting them a right to permanent residence. Most importantly, 
when analysing the pre- Maastricht quasi- citizenship one cannot ignore the fun-
damental role played by the Court of Justice whose case law largely contributed 
to moving lines. Could the eaeu Court follow the same route and, relying on te-
leological interpretation, contribute to gradually moving lines? The Professional 
Athletes case certainly demonstrated its willingness to do so. However, without a 
preliminary reference procedure and without a locus standi for physical persons 
in annulment actions, it seems highly unlikely that the Court will be able to ac-
cumulate a significant amount of case law to trigger such a spill- over.
vii Conclusion
In light of all that we have seen, what does it mean if a citizen of one of the 
eaeu Member States were to exclaim “Civis Eurasiaticus sum”? Given the above, 
 99 Similar to Art. 20(2)c and 23 teu Treaty and Art. 46 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.
 100 Kochenov, D.  and Plender, R.  (2012). EU Citizenship:  From an Incipient Form to an 
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the vision underlying eaeu law’s legal framework seems to be fairly limited. 
In essence, you can work in another eaeu Member State, be protected from 
unjustified restrictions and discrimination, bring your family with you and en-
joy some protections that appear a bit unclear as to their content and scope. 
By contrast, you are not supposed to permanently settle in a foreign country 
under eaeu law, and your right to residence is very tightly linked to your em-
ployment contract. In contrast to EU law, where even before the advent of EU 
citizenship, the status of workers went beyond such narrow confines, eaeu 
law seems to adhere to a very narrow “Homo Oeconomicus” perspective with 
regard to “its” citizens. Or at least, that is the story so far. As shown through-
out this chapter, the protections of eaeu law do offer some “wiggle- room”. In 
particular, nothing excludes – and some elements promote – a broader, more 
rights- based reading of the law, including the right to family life. Much will 
thus depend on the interpretative evolution of the eaeu legal order, through 
the case law of the eaeu Court, and also of national courts. Some inspiration 
may also be found in the citizenship provisions of the Russia- Belarus Union 
state legal framework. As in the case of EU citizenship, the prevailing vague-
ness and interpretive leeway may sometimes eventually work to the benefit of 
eaeu citizens, and sometimes to their disadvantage. However, in light of the 
earlier willingness of the eaeu Court to look in the direction of EU law, it is 
hopefully not wrong to expect at least some “citizenship spirit” in the jurispru-
dence to come.

